[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

F.O.

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office.

424 FIDENTIAL.
(12344)

F.O. 424/254

CORRESPONDENCE

CLOSED UNTIL 1973

RESPECTING

TURKEY.

PART I.

[In continuation of "Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs," Part X (12068), Chapter II ("Turkey").]

JULY TO SEPTEMBER 1922.

254

F.O. 424 254 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

F.O. 424/45

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office.

CONFIDENTIAL.

(12344)

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

TURKEY.

PART I.

[In continuation of "Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs," Part X (12068), Chapter II ("Turkey").]

JULY TO SEPTEMBER 1922.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

	No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
1	To Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 663	1922 July 1	(1.) Standard Oil Company's Depots. Approves action taken regarding depots at Kouroucheshme and Selimieh. (2.) Administration of Constantinople. Submits views as to right of High Commissioners' rights to interfere	1
2	Italian Delegation ...	„ 1	Proposed agreement between His Majesty's Government and Italian Government with regard to the re-establishment of normal situation in Near East. Submits draft	2
3	Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 573	June 26	Near East settlement. Conversation with Izzet Pasha regarding need for safeguards for minorities and proposed preliminary meeting at Ismid	5
4	Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 591	„ 27	Use of Constantinople as Greek naval base. Transmits Angora Government's protest (see No. 45)	6
5	Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 593	„ 27	Atrocities in Anatolia. Views on report made by American Near East Relief officials, and on Admiral Bristol's attitude	7
6	Mr. Henderson ... No. 295. Tel.	July 2	Atrocities Enquiry Commission. Views on French proposals	8
7	To Sir L. Worthington-Evans from Lord Balfour	„ 3	Evacuation of Constantinople. Considers that present garrison must be maintained at present	9
8	Count de Salis ... No. 27 Tel.	„ 3	Palestine mandate. Cardinal Secretary of State communicated with in accordance with instructions. Draft article 14 respecting Holy Places appeared satisfactory to his wishes	9
9	To Sir M. Cheetham No. 2038	„ 5	Near East settlement. Replies to French memorandum, and puts forward points on which Allied agreement must be reached before preliminary conference (see No. 34)	10
10	General Harington to War Office Telegraphic.	„ 3	Situation on Greek front. Report of Colonel Nairne, who has visited Greek front. Withdrawal to shorter line considered possible (see Nos. 11 and 30)	11
11	Mr. Henderson to Mr. Lindley No. 299. Tel.	„ 5	Situation on Greek front. Gives appreciation of situation by military attaché (see No. 30)	11
12	To British Red Cross Society	„ 7	Atrocities Enquiry Commission. Enquires whether society would be in a position to undertake enquiry ...	12
13	To Mr. Wakely from Mr. Oliphant	„ 7	Neutrality of Constantinople and Straits. Greek bombardment of Samsoun. Transmits memorandum (see No. 50)	13
14	Lord Hardinge ... No. 1583	„ 7	Near East settlement. Refers to No. 9. Conversation with M. Poincaré, who said that Turks had informed Colonel Mougin of their readiness to accept armistice. M. Poincaré stated that condition that Greeks should be accorded rights as a belligerent would be a difficult one for French to accept	14
15	Mr. Lindley ... ... No. 241. Tel.	„ 7	Greek position. Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that no progress had been made in international situation, and desired personally that His Majesty's Government would take question in hand	15
16	Mr. Henderson ... No. 300. Tel.	„ 7	Near East settlement. Hamid Bey has expressed view that Greeks and Turks should be invited to Allied Conference (see No. 32)	15

	No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
17	Mr. Henderson ... No. 301. Tel.	1922 July 7	Near East Conference. Refers to No. 16. Hamid Bey has expressed same views (see No. 16) to French High Commissioner, who is to report it to his Government (see No. 32)	16
18	Mr. Lindley ... ... No. 244. Tel.	„ 8	Autonomous zone under Sultan. Refers to No. 16. Greek proposals for setting up of zone by Allies as only solution of situation	16
19	Mr. Lindley ... ... No. 245. Tel.	„ 8	Greek annexation of occupied territory and advance on Constantinople. Refers to No. 18. Discounts rumour of Greek intentions (see No. 40)	16
20	Mr. Lindley ... ... No. 334	June 30	Situation on Greek front. M. Sterghiades' objections to a partial retirement	17
21	Mr. Henderson ... No. 596	July 3	Storage of inflammable liquids. Transmits copies of correspondence regarding solution of question ...	18
22	Mr. Henderson ... No. 601	„ 4	Turkish financial administration. Transmits joint note to Turks regarding necessity for radical reform, together with identic reply (see No. 24)	24
23	Mr. Henderson ... No. 604	„ 4	Greek bombardment of Samsoun. Report of damage done (see No. 29)	26
24	Mr. Henderson ... No. 607	„ 4	Political situation in Turkey. Rumoured changes in the Government. Difficulties of the financial situation...	27
25	Lord Hardinge ... No. 1591	„ 9	Atrocities Enquiry Commission. Transmits note from M. Poincaré concurring in points raised by His Majesty's Government	28
26	Mr. Henderson ... No. 302. Tel.	„ 9	Near East settlement. Refers to No. 16. Italian High Commissioner is now in favour of inviting belligerents to conference without conditions	29
27	Mr. Henderson ... No. 303. Tel.	„ 11	Atrocities Enquiry Commission. Refers to No. 6. Discusses French High Commissioner's instructions regarding constitution of commission. Suggests League of Nations as selecting body (see No. 33) ...	29
28	Sir H. Lamb to Mr. Lindley No. 35. Tel.	„ 11	Greek right of search. Reports seizing of British steamship "Elpiniki" on ground of carrying contraband. Greeks maintain right of search (see No. 31)	30
29	Parliamentary Question.	„ 12	Greek bombardment of Samsoun. Enquiry by Lieutenant-Commander Kenworthy as to damage done, and reply by Mr. Harmsworth (see No. 23) ...	30
30	General Harington to War Office Telegraphic.	„ 11	Situation on Greek front. Refers to Nos. 10 and 11. Greek defensive destruction of railways and country. Probable withdrawal. Preparation should be made for evacuation	31
31	Sir H. Lamb ... ... No. 36. Tel.	„ 13	Greek right of search. Refers to No. 28. Consent to right of search against British vessels should be made conditional on general application (see No. 38) ...	31
32	To Mr. Henderson ... No. 288. Tel.	„ 13	Near East settlement. Refers to Nos. 16 and 17. If Turks are ready to meet Greeks in conference, an official communication must be made	31
33	To Mr. Henderson ... No. 289. Tel.	„ 13	Atrocities Enquiry Commission. Refers to No. 27. His Majesty's Government have approached Red Cross, and are averse from inviting League of Nations' intervention	31
34	Lord Hardinge ... No. 1629	„ 13	Near East settlement. Refers to No. 9. Transmits memorandum by French Government accepting conditionally points put forward in British memorandum, and pressing for early invitation to Greek, Constantinople and Angora Governments (see No. 75) ...	32

No.	No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
35	General Harington to War Office **Telegraphic.**	1922 July 13	Smyrna sanjak. Terms on which Greeks are prepared to hand over remainder of sanjak	34
36	To Mr. Henderson ... **No. 271. Tel.**	„ 14	General Townshend. Press reports arrival at Angora. Enquires facts of his alleged journey (see Nos. 42 and 43)	35
37	To Lord Hardinge ... **No. 2212**	„ 14	Greek right of search. Refers to Nos. 9 and 14. Inconsistent attitude taken up by French Government. Subject should be brought up in conversation with M. Poincaré	35
38	Foreign Office ... (Sir C. Hurst)	„ 14	Liquidation of Turkish position. Discusses liquidation by Allies by a unilateral act without Turkish concurrence	36
39	British Red Cross ...	„ 14	Atrocities Enquiry Commission. Transmits telegram from International Red Cross undertaking enquiry, and suggesting despatch of delegate to London ...	37
40	Mr. Lindley ... ... **No. 280. Tel.**	„ 14	Greek administration of occupied territory. Arrangements for reorganisation of zone terminating at Smyrna and Panderma. No question of annexation (see Nos. 19 and 56)	37
41	Mr. Henderson ... **No. 306. Tel.**	„ 14	Angora Government. Report of resignation (see No. 64)	37
42	Mr. Henderson ... **No. 306. Tel.**	„ 16	General Townshend. Refers to No. 36. Consul-general at Beirut has been warned	38
43	Mr. Henderson ... **No. 307. Tel.**	„ 16	General Townshend. Refers to No. 42. French High Commissioner has promised to telegraph to Beirut ...	38
44	Mr. Henderson ... **No. 308. Tel.**	„ 16	Near East settlement. Refers to Nos. 16 and 32. French High Commissioner has heard no mention of readiness of Angora to accept armistice. Turks are referring to London conference. Enquires views of His Majesty's Government as to their participation in latter	38
45	Mr. Henderson ... **No. 614**	„ 8	Use of Constantinople as Greek naval base. Transmits further Turkish protest and joint note to Greek High Commissioner	39
46	Mr. Henderson ... **No. 616**	„ 10	Near East settlement. Refers to No. 16. Transmits memorandum by Mr. Ryan on conversation with Hamid Bey, regarding participation of belligerents in conference, and relations between Angora and His Majesty's Government	40
47	Mr. Hodgson ... **No. 473**	„ 10	Treaty between Angora and Russia. Report of treaty has not been confirmed. Announces Riza Nur's arrival in Moscow	42
48	Mr. Henderson ... **No. 617**	„ 11	Turco-Greek frontier in Thrace. Transmits note to Mr. Lindley regarding withdrawal from boundary line of Greek posts	43
49	Mr. Henderson ... **No. 618**	„ 11	Djavid Bey. Activities of	45
50	Mr. Wakely to Mr. Oliphant	„ 12	Neutrality of Constantinople and Straits. Refers to No. 13. Enquires reply to Moslem argument regarding ejection of Greeks from Constantinople. Transmits telegram from India regarding alleged breaches of neutrality by His Majesty's Government (see No. 51)	46
51	To India Office ...	„ 17	Neutrality of Constantinople and Straits. Replies to arguments in No. 50	45

No.	No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
52	Mr. Henderson ... **No. 310. Tel.**	1922 July 18	Near East settlement. Refers to No. 26. Report is being circulated that belligerents will participate in conference. Minister for Foreign Affairs states that Constantinople Government desire to attend if Angora does so	47
53	Mr. Henderson ... **No. 311. Tel.**	„ 19	General Townshend. Suggests advisability of official statement through Reuter to the effect that General Townshend has no mission	47
54	General Harington to War Office **Telegraphic.**	„ 17	Situation on Greek front. Movement towards Midia ...	48
55	To British Red Cross Society	„ 19	Atrocities Enquiry Commission. Refers to No. 39. Allied and United States Governments are being informed of offer of International Red Cross. Desires inclusion of American delegates...	48
56	General Harington to War Office **No. 1993. Tel.**	„ 17	Greek administration of occupied territory. Refers to No. 40. Considers plans for reorganisation of zone to be likely. Greek withdrawal to new zone need not be dangerous	48
57	Sir M. Cheetham ... **No. 382. Tel.**	„ 19	Export of war material to Greece and Turkey. French Government recommends prohibition of export to both countries. Turkish agreement with Soviets to procure arms considered unlikely	49
58	Sir M. Cheetham ... **No. 384. Tel.**	„ 19	Atrocities Enquiry Commission. French Government accept all suggestions, and accept offer of International Red Cross	49
59	Mr. Henderson ... **No. 313. Tel.**	„ 22	Greek occupation of Constantinople. Rumoured intention of Greeks. Does not consider contingency practical (see No. 73)	49
60	Mr. Henderson ... **No. 314. Tel.**	„ 23	Near East settlement. Improbability of Mustapha Kemal agreeing to Beicos. Submits possibility of conference at Constantinople with Greek and Constantinople Governments only (see No. 74)	50
61	Mr. Henderson ... **No. 634**	„ 17	Near East situation. Reports conversations at official visits to Grand Vizier and Minister for Foreign Affairs (see No. 63)	50
62	Mr. Henderson ... **No. 639**	„ 18	Minorities in Turkey. Reports conversation with Mr. Jaquith, American Near East Relief, regarding treatment by Turks	52
63	Mr. Henderson ... **No. 641.**	„ 18	Near East situation. Refers to No. 61. Reports conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs, at latter's return visit	53
64	Mr. Henderson ... **No. 646**	„ 18	Angora Government. Refers to No. 41. Reports circumstances attending Cabinet changes	55
65	Mr. Henderson ... **No. 647**	„ 18	Near East settlement. Refers to No. 61 and 63. Minister for Foreign Affairs proposals for settlement. Suggested arrangement direct with Central Government. Importance of exclusion of Greeks for Straits and Sea of Marmora	56
66	Mr. Lindley ... ... **No. 257. Tel.**	„ 23	Near East settlement. Refers to No. 40. Greek intention to force Powers to take up question without further delay	58
67	Mr. Lindley ... ... **No. 352**	„ 14	Situation on Greek front. Transmits report by military attaché	58
68	War Office	„ 22	Military situation. Transmits General Harington's monthly report for June 1922	63

No.	No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
69	Mr. Lindley ... ... No. 258. Tel.	1922 July 24	Greek occupation of Constantinople. Refers to Nos. 59 and 66. Discusses Greek intentions (see No. 72) ...	68
70	To Sir M. Cheetham No. 248. Tel.	„ 25	Atrocities Enquiry Commission. Refers to No. 58. Importance of speedy notification to Angora	68
71	M. Rangabé	„ 27	Near East settlement. Transmits note from Minister for Foreign Affairs emphasising necessity for taking immediate measures to reach a settlement (see No. 83)	69
72	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 260. Tel.	„ 26	Greek occupation of Constantinople. Refers to No. 69. Rumours of imminent Greek advance	69
73	Mr. Henderson ... No. 316. Tel.	„ 27	Greek occupation of Constantinople. Refers to No. 59. Discusses possibility of Greek coup	70
74	To Mr. Henderson ... No. 260. Tel.	„ 27	Near East settlement. Refers to No. 60. Deprecates sounding Constantinople Government with regard to conference with Greek and Constantinople Governments only	71
75	To Sir M. Cheetham No. 2359	„ 27	Near East settlement. Refers to No. 34. Transmits further memorandum for communication to French Government (see No. 125)	71
76	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 262. Tel.	„ 27	Near East settlement. Text of note from Greek Government communicated in No. 71 (see No. 83)	72
77	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 263. Tel.	„ 27	Greek occupation of Constantinople. Refers to No. 76. Greek Government warned against attack	73
78	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 264. Tel.	„ 27	Greek occupation of Constantinople. Refers to No. 77. French Minister believes that Government is being pushed to consent to advance. He referred to report that Greece has been asked to throw in her lot with France	73
79	Mr. Henderson ... No. 317. Tel.	„ 27	Atrocities Enquiry Commission. Allied colleagues have not yet received instructions. Draft communication to Athens and Angora is being prepared (see No. 80)	73
80	Mr. Henderson ... No. 318. Tel.	„ 27	Atrocities Enquiry Commission. Refers to No. 79. Submits draft communications to Athens and Angora	74
81	Mr. Henderson No. 320. Tel.	„ 28	Greek occupation of Constantinople. Refers to No. 59. Allied High Commissioners draw attention to concentration in Thrace, and suggest warning to Greek Government	74
82	Mr. Henderson ... No. 321. Tel.	„ 28	Greek occupation of Constantinople. Refers to No. 81. Has addressed warning to new Greek Chargé d'Affaires	75
83	To Mr. Bentinck ... No. 142. Tel.	„ 28	Near East settlement (see No. 76). Enquires as to Greek plans for putting an end to the situation. Greek Government should be warned against precipitate action in view of conference (see No. 91)	75
84	To Mr. Bentinck ... No. 143. Tel.	„ 28	Greek occupation of Constantinople. Refers to No. 83. Authorises him to take steps to prevent Greek advance (see No. 90)	75
85	To M. Karakhan ... Telegraphic.	„ 28	Greek naval action in Black Sea. Replies to Soviet protest	76
86	General Harington to War Office No. 2013. Tel.	„ 27	Situation on Greek front. Greek object is to shorten line and reduce expense. Thrace is being built up defensively. No designs on Constantinople, or arming of Greeks there. Concentration is to force Powers to action	76

No.	No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
87	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 267. Tel.	1922 July 28	Greek occupation of Constantinople. Greek intention to issue ultimatum to Kemal, threatening occupation unless he accepts March decision of Powers	76
88	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 269. Tel.	„ 29	Greek occupation of Constantinople. Refers to Nos 72 and 76. Note from Minister for Foreign Affairs states that only occupation will bring about conclusion of peace, and requests Allies to give necessary orders to occupying troops (see Nos. 104 and 109)	77
89	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 270. Tel.	„ 29	Greek occupation of Constantinople. Discusses No. 88. French Minister thinks object is to force Powers to reach immediate decision	77
90	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 271. Tel.	„ 29	Greek occupation of Constantinople. Refers to Nos. 81 and 84. On receiving warning, Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that Greeks would await Allied reply before taking further action	77
91	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 273. Tel.	„ 29	Greek occupation of Constantinople. Refers to Nos. 78 and 83. Memorandum presented to Minister for Foreign Affairs conveying warning and attitude of His Majesty's Government	78
92	Sir M. Cheetham ... No. 398. Tel.	„ 29	Atrocities Enquiry Commission. Refers to No. 70. French representatives at Athens and Constantinople have received necessary instructions	78
93	To Mr. Bentinck ... No. 146. Tel.	„ 29	Greek occupation of Constantinople. Refers to No. 88. Expresses astonishment at Greek request for permission to occupy	78
94	To Mr. Henderson ... No. 263. Tel.	„ 29	Atrocities Enquiry Commission. Refers to No. 80. Approves draft notification to Angora and Athens with amendment in last paragraph	78
95	Mr. Henderson ... No. 323. Tel. Very Urgent	„ 29	Greek occupation of Constantinople. Refers to Nos. 59 and 81. Seriousness of present situation, and massing of Greek troops. General Harington urges immediate warning to Athens. Suggests Greek ships should be ordered to leave Constantinople	79
96	Mr. Henderson ... No. 653	„ 25	Russo-Turkish Agreement. Discusses text of alleged agreement	79
97	Mr. Henderson ... No. 656	„ 25	Mustapha Kemal. Refers to No. 64. New law prolonging functions as Commander-in-Chief	80
98	Count de Saint Aulaire	„ 30	Turkish Petroleum Company. Claims under San Remo Agreement. Attitude of French Government... ...	82
99	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 276. Tel.	„ 30	Greek occupation of Constantinople. Situation not so grave, but immediate decision regarding Eastern question is essential	83
100	Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 324. Tel.	„ 30	Military situation. Refers to Nos. 90 and 95 Discusses situation and precautionary measures which should be taken (see No. 105)	84
101	To Mr. Henderson ... No. 268. Tel.	„ 31	Atrocities Enquiry Commission. Refers to No. 80. Amendment to draft note to Angora in view of attitude of Red Cross (see No. 111)	84
102	Mr. Palmer ... ... No. 216	„ 18	Conditions in Anatolia. Signor Tuozzi's impressions. Latter will be Italian delegate to commission of enquiry into atrocities	85
103	Mr. Satow ... ... No. 109	„ 18	General Townshend. Refers to No. 36. Reports arrival and action taken	85

No.	No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
104	M. Rangabé	1922 July 30	Greek occupation of Constantinople. Communicates further note from Greek Government, in which latter request Allied consent to occupation (see No. 109) ...	86
105	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 278. Tel.	„ 31	Military situation. Agrees with views expressed in No. 100. Minister for Foreign Affairs will be advised to withdraw troops from frontier. Deprecates measures of an unfriendly nature towards Greeks	87
106	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 280. Tel.	„ 31	Greek occupation of Constantinople. Refers to No. 84. Identic note handed to Minister for Foreign Affairs refusing to take measures requested by Greek Government	88
107	Sir H. Rumbold No. 326. Tel.	Aug. 1	Sultan. General officer commanding enquires views of His Majesty's Government as to personal protection to be afforded to Sultan in event of Greek occupation (see No. 121)	88
108	Sir M. Cheetham ... No. 400. Tel.	July 31	Blockade of Greek ports. "Temps" urges blockade as most effective measure to compel Greeks to abandon their policy in Thrace and Asia Minor	89
109	To Mr. Bentinck ... No. 147. Tel.	Aug. 1	Greek occupation of Constantinople. Refers to No. 88. His Majesty's Government's reply to Greek Government's request for Allied consent to occupation ...	89
110	To Sir H. Rumbold. No. 290. Tel.	„ 1	Military situation. Refers to Nos. 100 and 109. Deprecates exaction of severe guarantees from Greeks, but has no objection to Greeks being requested to withdraw from frontier	90
111	To Sir H. Rumbold.. No. 291. Tel.	„ 1	Atrocities Enquiry Commission. Requests Minister to defer action suggested in No. 101	90
112	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 282. Tel.	„ 2	Greek occupation of Constantinople. Refers to No. 89. Minister of War states that Greeks have no intention of advancing on Constantinople. It is hoped that early decisions will be taken by Powers to secure peace ...	90
113	To Mr. Bentinck ... No. 152. Tel.	„ 2	Military situation. Refers to No. 110. Greeks should be urged to withdraw troops from frontier of neutral zone	90
114	To Paris ... ... No. 256. Tel. Rome No. 215. Tel. Washington No. 244. Tel.	„ 2	Atrocities Enquiry Commission. Communicates International Red Cross's suggestions. Allied and American Governments should be pressed for a reply (see No. 120)	91
115	To International Red Cross	„ 2	Atrocities Enquiry Commission. Organisation of commission. Assurances required by His Majesty's Government (see No. 133)	91
116	M. Rangabé	„ 3	Greek occupation of Constantinople. Communicates note from Greek Government setting forth Greek intentions	92
117	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 287. Tel.	„ 3	Greek proclamation of autonomy in Asia Minor. Greece is reported to have been called upon to lay foundation of definite administration of Western Asia Minor. Proclamation of autonomy (see No. 126)	92
118	Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 329. Tel.	„ 2	Use of Bosphorus by Greek navy. Refers to Nos. 100 and 110. Allied admirals have suggested that Greek men-of-war should be forbidden use of Bosphorus. Admiral Brock has been informed that His Majesty's Government would deprecate proposal	93

No.	No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
119	Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 332. Tel.	1922 Aug. 3	Military situation. Crossing of frontier line by Greek patrol, which was fired on by Turkish gendarmerie. Measures taken to prevent similar incidents	93
120	Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 333. Tel.	„ 3	Greek proclamation of autonomy in Asia Minor. Turkish protest	93
121	To Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 296. Tel.	„ 3	Sultan. Refers to No. 107. Sultan should be afforded any protection he may need	94
122	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 289. Tel.	„ 3	Greek occupation of Constantinople. Greeks have stated that if present *démarche* did not induce Powers to take serious measures, they would advance on Constantinople at all costs	94
123	Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 331. Tel.	„ 3	Military situation. Proposed note, communicated by Allied admirals, to be sent to Greek admiral in event of Greek troops crossing frontier (see No. 127)	94
124	To Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 297. Tel.	„ 4	Military situation. Refers to No. 110. Use of Turkish troops in defence of Constantinople considered undesirable	95
125	Sir M. Cheetham ... No. 1821	„ 4	Near East settlement. Communicates memorandum from M. Poincaré in reply to His Majesty's Government's memorandum in No. 75 (see No. 145) ...	95
126	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 297. Tel.	„ 4	Greek proclamation of autonomy in Asia Minor. Refers to No. 117. Contents of proclamation	96
127	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 298. Tel.	„ 4	Military situation. Refers to No. 123. Deprecates taking of measures which would imply mistrust of Greek assurances	97
128	Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 335. Tel.	„ 5	Near East situation. Summary of position	97
129	Sir M. Cheetham ... No. 412. Tel.	„ 7	Atrocities Enquiry Commission. Refers to No. 114. M Poincaré raises no objections to proposals of International Red Cross	98
130	Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 680	„ 1	Committee of Union and Progress. Reports on activity of former leaders	98
131	Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 683	„ 1	Military situation. Reports meeting of Allied High Commissioners, generals and admirals, and communicates letter from General Harington embodying his proposals	100
132	To Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 307. Tel.	„ 9	Near East settlement. Refers to No. 125. French Government suggests Rhodes, or a Swiss or North Italian town as venue of conference	102
133	International Red Cross	„ 8	Atrocities Enquiry Commission. Refers to No. 115. Replies to His Majesty's Government's note regarding organisation and assurances required	102
134	Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 340. Tel.	„ 10	Thefts of Allied war material. Is opposed to request for removal of Turkish officials	103
135	To Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 308 Tel.	„ 10	Near East settlement. Refers to No. 132. Communicates remainder of French note in No. 125	104
136	Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 344. Tel.	„ 12	Near East settlement. Refers to No. 75. Considers that High Commissioners should receive instructions to urge Nationalists to conclude an armistice	104
137	To Mr. Bentinck ... No. 165. Tel.	„ 12	Greek proclamation of autonomy in Asia Minor. Refers to No. 117. Instructs him to join his colleagues in registering a formal reservation in respect of proceedings of Greek Government (see No. 161) ...	104

No.	No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
138	To Washington **No. 249. Tel.** Rome **No. 220. Tel.**	1922 Aug. 12	Atrocities Enquiry Commission. Red Cross have formally agreed to despatch commissions, and are approaching Athens and Angora	105
139	Sir H. Rumbold **No. 343. Tel.**	„ 12	Near East settlement. Refers to No. 132. Recommends that preliminary conference should take place at Venice. There should be no misapprehension as to its character and scope	105
140	Sir H. Rumbold **No. 699**	„ 8	Near East situation. Reports conversation at audience of the Sultan	105
141	Sir H. Rumbold **No. 348. Tel.**	„ 14	Near East settlement. Refers to No. 139. French High Commissioner has seen no report to effect that Nationalists are ready to conclude armistice. It is improbable that they will do so before an explanation of Paris proposals	108
142	To International Red Cross	„ 15	Atrocities Enquiry Commission. Refers to No. 133. Expresses thanks for action taken and assurances offered	109
143	Italian Ambassador	„ 14	Near East settlement. Refers to Nos. 75 and 125. Memorandum communicating Italian Government's views on British and French proposals (see No. 147)	109
144	Mr. Bentinck **No. 400**	„ 3	Greek occupation of Constantinople. Refers to Nos. 91 and 106. Transmits correspondence with Greek Government regarding Greek intentions and attitude of Allies	111
145	To Lord Hardinge **No. 2606**	„ 18	Near East settlement. Refers to No. 125. Transmits memorandum in reply to French proposals, together with draft instructions to Constantinople and draft invitation to preliminary conference to Governments of Athens, Constantinople and Angora (see No. 159)	112
146	Sir H. Rumbold **No. 360. Tel.**	„ 18	Atrocities Enquiry Commission. Refers to No. 114. Arrival of M. Schlemmer, International Red Cross delegate. Consent of Athens and Angora asked, but no reply yet received	114
147	To Italian Ambassador	„ 19	Near East settlement. Refers to No. 143. Transmits copy of No. 145, and trusts that Italian Government will concur in draft instructions to Angora and in draft invitation	115
148	Sir H. Rumbold **No. 713**	„ 12	Situation in Greece. Transmits memorandum by M. de Bilinski, manager of National Bank of Turkey ...	116
149	Sir H. Rumbold **No. 714**	„ 12	Near East settlement. Records conversation with Djavid Bey regarding freedom of Straits, protection of minorities and Capitulations	119
150	Sir H. Rumbold **No. 725**	„ 15	Situation in Smyrna. Refers to No. 148. Transmits memorandum by M. de Bilinski	120
151	Sir H. Rumbold **No. 726**	„ 15	Mr. Lloyd George's speech on Near East situation. Reports conversation with Izzet Pasha, who expressed alarm at results of speech	122
152	Sir H. Rumbold **No. 733**	„ 15	Mr. Lloyd George's speech on Near East situation. Comments on speech and its effects	122
153	Sir H. Lamb to Sir H. Rumbold **No. 45. Tel.**	„ 20	Military action near Burhanie. Turkish force has cut Aidin railway, blowing up bridge and damaging section of line. Greek reinforcements have been sent (see No. 163)	124
154	Mr. Bentinck **No. 401**	„ 5	Situation in Greece. Refers to Nos. 15 and 18. Transmits memorandum by Minister for Foreign Affairs on military and economic outlook. Negotiations for a loan	124

No.	No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
155	Mr. Bentinck **No. 421**	1922 Aug. 11	Greek occupation of Constantinople. Reviews circumstances of question, and draws attention to present aspect of military situation	125
156	Sir H. Rumbold **No. 352. Tel.**	„ 21	War material for Turks. Italian aeroplanes delivered at Angora. French war material going to Kemalists through Mersina. Reported preparations for Turkish offensive on Eskishehir front	128
157	Sir H. Rumbold **No. 354. Tel.**	„ 23	Atrocities Enquiry Commission. Red Cross delegate hopes to constitute commissions at Geneva by September 5. United States Government have agreed to provide £1,000 towards expenses	128
158	Mr. Bentinck **No. 328. Tel.**	„ 25	Near East settlement. Article in "Athenaiki" states Greek High Commissioner has come to Athens in connection with Kemalist peace proposals. Article adds that Greeks will not negotiate with Constantinople or Angora to avoid misunderstanding with Great Britain	120
159	Lord Hardinge **No. 1969**	„ 25	Near East settlement. Refers to No. 145. Transmits memorandum by M. Poincaré, French Government accept Venice as venue of preliminary conference, and concur in draft invitation with one alteration (see No. 192)	120
160	Mr. Bentinck **No. 331. Tel.**	„ 26	Greek Loan. Refers to No. 154. Greek Government requests assistance of His Majesty's Government in negotiation of loan	131
161	Mr. Bentinck **No. 428**	„ 15	Greek proclamation of autonomy in Asia Minor. Refers to No. 137. Transmits note handed to Greek Government, and subsequent conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs	131
162	Mr. Bentinck **No. 333. Tel.**	„ 28	Greek military measures. Telegram from Smyrna reports that all Greeks residing in occupied area, born in 1903, have been ordered to report themselves for enlistment	132
163	Sir H. Lamb to Sir H. Rumbold **No. 49. Tel.**	„ 28	Military action near Burhanie. Refers to No. 153. Greeks have retaken Burhanie station and are transporting men from there to Ushak	132
164	To Belgrade ... **No. 58. Tel.** Bucharest **No. 72. Tel.**	„ 28	Near East settlement. Enquires local feeling regarding Thracian frontier which will be discussed at contemplated conference (see Nos. 201 and 214)	133
165	To Sir H. Rumbold. **No. 331. Tel.**	„ 28	Near East settlement. French Government accept draft instructions to High Commissioners, and draft invitation subject to one alteration. Italian Government accept generally (see No. 143)	133
166	To Sir H. Rumbold ... **No. 335. Tel.**	„ 28	Near East settlement. Discusses British and French proposals regarding instructions and invitation, and requests views (see No. 175)	133
167	Sir H. Lamb to Sir H. Rumbold **No. 52. Tel.**	„ 28	Military action east of Ushak. Refers to No. 163. Turks have cut Cassaba railway in two places, isolating Afium Kara-hissar	134
168	Sir H. Lamb to Sir H. Rumbold **No. 52a. Tel.**	„ 29	Capture of Afium Kara-hissar. Refers to No. 167. Capture not officially confirmed but heavy fighting has been in progress	134
169	Mr. Bentinck **No. 336. Tel.**	„ 29	Greek occupation of Constantinople. Press calls on Government to act, and there are again hints of a sudden advance	134

	No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page
170	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 338. Tel.	1922 Aug. 29	French military mission. Greeks are getting rid of ...	135
171	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 339. Tel.	„ 29	Action at Afium Kara-hissar. Turkish attack, and evacuation of town	135
172	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 340. Tel.	„ 29	Action at Afium Kara-hissar. Report from Chief of General Staff. Refers to No. 171	135
173	Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 365. Tel.	„ 29	Action at Afium Kara-hissar. Railway and Kutaya reported to be in Nationalist hands. Offensive started on considerable scale	138
174	Sir H. Rumbold to Sir H. Lamb No. 386. Tel.	„ 29	Nationalist ports closed. Vessels of all nationalities refused admittance. Matter will be taken up	136
175	Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 367. Tel.	„ 29	Near East settlement. Refers to No. 166. Shares His Majesty's Government's inclination to accept French suggestion as it stands	136
176	Lord Hardinge ... No. 449. Tel.	„ 30	War material for Turks. M. Poincaré states that reports of supply of munitions by France are unfounded ...	137
177	Lord Hardinge ... No. 450. Tel.	„ 30	Near East settlement. M. Poincaré states that Venice conference should be hastened up in view of military events	137
178	Sir H. Lamb to Sir H. Rumbold No. 53. Tel.	„ 29	Action at Afium Kara-hissar. Refers to No. 168. Greek evacuation	137
179	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 341. Tel.	„ 30	Military situation. Greeks complain that Turkish attack has only been made possible by large supplies of French and Italian war material sent unhindered ...	138
180	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 342. Tel.	„ 30	Minister of War's departure for Smyrna. Reports departure with M. Stratos	138
181	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 343. Tel.	„ 31	Military situation. Refers to No. 169. Press foresees *démarche* requesting financial and general support from His Majesty's Government. Necessity for abandonment of Asia Minor is suggested	138
182	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 344. Tel.	„ 31	Military situation. Refers to No. 181. Situation is calm, but desperate measures may be contemplated...	138
183	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 345. Tel.	„ 31	French officers for Turks. Refers to No. 179. Press states that French officers had flown Turkish aeroplanes and commanded divisions. Minister for Foreign Affairs has published official denial (see No. 188)	139
184	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 346. Tel.	„ 31	Near East settlement. Refers to No. 164. Submits that return to Turkey of whole of Eastern Thrace would produce mutiny and possibly revolution	139
185	Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 368. Tel.	„ 31	Near East settlement. Effect of Nationalist offensive on conference proposals	139
186	Sir H. Lamb ... No. 54. Tel.	„ 31	Military situation. Has become critical. Suggests presence of Allied warships in harbour	139
187	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 347. Tel.	„ 31	Military situation. Refers to No. 182. M. Stratos advocates retirement to original mandated frontier. M. Gounaris wants entire evacuation. Abandonment of Asia Minor may be carried out suddenly	140
188	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 349. Tel.	„ 31	French officers for Turks. Refers to No. 183. "Athenaiki" publishes nominal roll of sixteen French officers serving in Kemalist army	140

	No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page
189	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 350. Tel.	1922 Sept. 1	Military situation. Refers to No. 181. Greek Government is preparing note to His Majesty's Government explaining situation and recent events...	140
190	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 351. Tel.	„ 1	Military situation. Refers to No. 187. Attitude of general public	140
191	Sir H. Lamb to Sir H. Rumbold No. 55. Tel.	„ 1	Military situation. Refers to No. 178. Situation not improving. Evacuation of Ushak reported	141
192	To Lord Hardinge ... No. 270. Tel.	„ 1	Near East settlement. Refers to No. 159. His Majesty's Government accept changes proposed in draft instructions and invitation. Italian Government are being asked to fix early date for conference	141
193	To Mr. Kennard ... No. 234. Tel.	„ 1	Near East settlement. Refers to No. 192. Invites Italian Government to fix date for conference ...	141
194	To Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 340. Tel.	„ 1	Near East settlement. Refers to Nos. 175 and 192. Omission in his proposal regarding date of evacuation in draft invitation	142
195	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 353. Tel.	„ 1	Military situation. Report by Italian Minister, from reliable information. Situation serious but not desperate	142
196	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 356. Tel.	„ 1	Military situation. Refers to No. 195. News from front very grave. Talk of abandoning Smyrna. Commander-in-chief has received suggestion to ask for armistice	142
197	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 357. Tel.	„ 2	Military situation. Refers to No. 196. Suggests His Majesty Government should assist in removing Christians from Asia Minor in view of evacuation, and that warships should proceed to Smyrna ...	143
198	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 358. Tel.	„ 2	Military situation. Submits views on effect of possible Greek request for armistice	143
199	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 359. Tel.	„ 2	Military situation. Two telegrams are being sent to London for communication to His Majesty's Government: (1) refers to protection of Allied nationals in Smyrna and (2) to Greek willingness to accept armistice	143
200	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 360. Tel.	„ 2	Military situation. Refers to No. 196. Greek Government will request His Majesty's Government to arrange armistice. Evacuation of Asia Minor will be begun immediately	144
201	Sir A. Young ... No. 117. Tel.	„ 2	Near East settlement. Refers to No 164. Attitude of Serb-Croat-Slovene Government to Thracian frontier question	144
202	Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 370. Tel.	„ 1	Near East settlement. Refers to No. 175. Turks have enquired whether His Majesty's Government wish to cancel promise to hasten date of evacuation. Question is due to indiscretion on part of French	145
203	Sir H. Lamb ... No. 56. Tel.	„ 2	Military situation. Ushak evacuated and burnt. Greek army in full flight. Early arrival of warships is sole means to preserve order...	145
204	Sir H. Lamb ... No. 57. Tel.	„ 2	Military situation. Slight improvement owing to re-establishment of contact between 1st and 2nd Army Corps. Troops sent to Thrace expected back ...	145
205	Sir H. Lamb ... No. 59. Tel.	„ 2	Military situation. Refers to No. 204. Suggests Turks should be induced to agree to armistice pending decision as to evacuation of Smyrna by Greeks (see No. 208)	145

	No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
206	To Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 344. Tel.	1922 Sept. 2	Military situation. In view of military events Greeks will accept armistice on understanding that immediate evacuation of Asia Minor will be carried out	146
207	To Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 345. Tel.	„ 2	Smyrna: British subjects in. Refers to No. 203. Instructions for protection and possible evacuation owing to inability of Greek army to defend town ...	146
208	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 362. Tel.	„ 3	Military situation. Refers to Nos. 200 and 205. Agrees that Turks should be induced to accept armistice pending decision as to evacuation of Smyrna ...	146
209	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 363. Tel.	„ 3	Military situation. Effect on political situation. *Moral* of troops bad	146
210	Sir H. Lamb ... No. 60. Tel.	„ 3	Military situation. Refers to No. 204. Greek army can offer no further resistance. Arrival of refugees. Evacuation of ammunition and aviation camp ...	147
211	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 365. Tel.	„ 3	Armistice negotiations. Greeks enquire whether request for mediation for establishment of peace should be addressed to His Majesty's Government or to all three Allies	147
212	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 367. Tel.	„ 3	Military situation. Greek troops have passed through Ushak unmolested. Capture of portion of 2nd Army Corps feared. Greek warships go to Smyrna to evacuate troops and material	147
213	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 368 Tel.	„ 3	Armistice negotiations. Refers to No. 200. French Minister considers Greek request should not have been addressed to His Majesty's Government alone. His Majesty's Government stated to wish armistice to precede evacuation, while French hold opposite view	148
214	Mr. Millington-Drake No. 106. Tel.	„ 2	Near East settlement. Refers to No. 164. Views of Roumanian Government on Thracian frontier (see No. 306)	148
215	Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 371. Tel.	„ 2	Near East settlement. Hamid Bey points out result of delay. He refers to Prime Minister's speech implying that Paris proposals might be altered to disadvantage of Turkey. He enquired whether invitation to Venice might soon be expected	149
216	To Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 347. Tel.	„ 3	Armistice negotiations. Greek desire for armistice on understanding of evacuation of Asia Minor. Enquires views as to communication of offer to Turks (see No. 233)	149
217	Mr. Bentinck No. 441	Aug. 17	M. Triandaphyllakos's resignation. Reports circumstances	149
218	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 442	„ 17	M. Simopoulos. Refers to No. 217. Report on ...	150
219	Mr. Benti... ... No. 369. Tel.	Sept. 4	Armistice negotiations. Refers to Nos. 216 and 213. Enquires whether Greeks may be informed that there is no objection to their telling French and Italians of request made to His Majesty's Government for armistice	150
220	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 372. Tel.	„ 4	Military situation. Refers to No. 212. Greek 1st and 2nd Army Corps reported to have gained touch with one another and have occupied positions near Ushak	151
221	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 373. Tel.	„ 4	General Tricoupis. Refers to No. 212. Appointment in place of General Hadjianestis	151

	No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
222	Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 373. Tel.	1922 Sept. 3	Armistice negotiations. Refers to Nos. 198 and 206. If armistice is proposed to Nationalists in order to save Greece, they may demand National Pact as condition. If Allies intervene, they may demand evacuation of Constantinople	151
223	Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 374. Tel.	„ 3	Nationalist offensive. Stated to be result of Greek proclamation of autonomy in Asia Minor, and Mr. Lloyd George's speech	151
224	Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 375. Tel.	„ 3	Near East settlement. Refers to No. 192. Italian High Commissioner awaits instructions. French High Commissioner considers proposals for conference premature owing to military events	152
225	Lord Hardinge ... No. 458. Tel.	„ 4	Near East settlement. Refers to No. 192. Necessary instructions sent to Athens and Constantinople in regard to invitation	152
226	To Mr. Bentinck No. 191. Tel.	„ 4	Military situation. Greek Chargé d'Affaires warned that Greek Government should not imagine situation worse than it is, and should throw away no cards that may be valuable later	152
227	To Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 350. Tel.	„ 4	Smyrna: provisioning of. Refers to No. 204. Requests that American Relief Association may be invited to do what they can (see No. 269)	152
228	To Paris ... ... No. 275. Tel. Rome No. 236. Tel.	„ 4	Armistice negotiations. Refers to No. 206. Proposal to invite Angora to send representatives to frontier to conclude armistice (see Nos. 244 and 252)	152
229	To Paris ... ... No. 277. Tel. Rome No. 240. Tel.	„ 4	Smyrna: protection of foreign colonies. "Iron Duke" and "King George V" have proceeded to Smyrna. French and Italians should be asked to concert measures for temporary protection of foreign colonies and refugees (see No. 245)	153
230	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 376. Tel.	„ 4	Military situation: attitude of Royal Family. Refers to No. 209. Criticisms at inaction of King and Royal Family	153
231	Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 378. Tel.	„ 4	Armistice negotiations. Refers to Nos. 208 and 222. Considers Allies should keep their hands free, even at expense of advising Greeks to seek armistice in usual military fashion	153
232	Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 379. Tel.	„ 4	Military situation. Views expressed in No. 231 are on assumption that Greek collapse is complete, which will endanger position of His Majesty's Government in regard to Near East settlement. Independent action may be only alternative, such as occupation of Gallipoli Peninsula	154
233	Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 380. Tel.	„ 4	Armistice negotiations. Refers to Nos. 216, 222, 231 and 232. Discusses question of Allied intervention ...	154
234	Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 381. Tel.	„ 5	(1) Smyrna. (2) Armistice. (3) Near East settlement. Refers to No. 233. Reports discussion of questions with Allied High Commissioners	155
235	Sir H. Lamb ... No. 61. Tel.	„ 4	Smyrna: protection of foreign colonies. Protection of British colony found impracticable. Decision taken to ship British subjects desirous of leaving to Malta or Cyprus	156
236	Sir H. Lamb ... No. 62. Tel.	„ 4	Smyrna: refugees. Refers to No. 204. Enquires whether Red Cross would undertake relief	156
237	Sir H. Lamb ... No. 63. Tel.	„ 5	Military situation. Reports present position	156

No.	No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
238	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 377. Tel.	1922 Sept. 5	Military situation. Refers to No. 221. Reports military appointments which indicate determination of Greeks to face situation and retrieve it if possible	157
239	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 379. Tel.	„ 5	Military situation. Refers to Nos. 226 and 228. Improvement in the situation. Minister for Foreign Affairs informed that Greeks would get better armistice terms if they showed they had still some fight left in them	157
240	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 380. Tel.	„ 5	Armistice negotiations. Refers to Nos. 232 and 233. Considers His Majesty's Government could obtain better terms for Greeks than they could themselves ...	157
241	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 381. Tel.	„ 5	Military situation. Refers to Nos. 226 and 239. Impossible at present to say how far panic of Government is justified. Influx of refugees at Smyrna is having its effect	158
242	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 384. Tel.	„ 6	Armistice negotiations. Refers to No. 243. Submits considerations, and considers that strong independent action would strengthen hands of His Majesty's Government. Sets forth Greek needs, in event of His Majesty's Government giving material assistance ...	158
243	Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 383. Tel.	„ 5	Armistice negotiations. Refers to No. 228. Considers it indispensable that Allied generals should be told definitely how far they may go in negotiations with Kemalists	159
244	Lord Hardinge ... No. 456. Tel.	„ 5	Armistice negotiations. Refers to No. 228. French Government consider that offer of mediation would risk rejection, but are ready to send instructions to Constantinople to convey to Turks and Greeks the urgency of concluding an armistice	160
245	Lord Hardinge ... No. 457. Tel.	„ 5	Smyrna: protection of foreign colonies. Refers to No. 220. Arrival at Smyrna of armoured cruisers. French admiral has received instructions for protection of French colony	160
246	To Mr. Bentinck ... No. 192. Tel.	„ 6	Atrocities by Greek troops. Attention of Greek Government should be called to reports (see No. 263) ...	160
247	Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 388. Tel.	„ 6	Armistice negotiations. Allied colleagues recommend conclusion of armistice before issuing invitations to conference. Submits views of High Commissioners on Allied intervention	161
248	Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 389. Tel.	„ 6	Military situation. Refers to Nos. 237 and 238. Exact situation is difficult to estimate in view of conflicting reports, but Greek commander-in-chief has not yet expressed desire for armistice	161
249	Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 390. Tel.	„ 6	Armistice negotiations. Refers to No. 228. Allied High Commissioners are putting forward proposals for an armistice (see No. 256)	161
250	Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 391. Tel.	„ 6	Atrocities by Greek troops. Nationalist protest. Desirability of refraining from excesses should be urged on Greek Government	162
251	Mr. Kennard ... No. 265. Tel.	„ 7	Military situation. Attitude of Italian press. Any British proposals for compensation for Greece must be resisted	162
252	Mr. Kennard ... No. 266. Tel.	„ 7	Armistice negotiations. Refers to No. 228. Italian Government have sent instructions to High Commissioner at Constantinople to agree to any unanimous decision. Minister for Foreign Affairs is inclined to French view that intervention may lead to rejection	162

No.	No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
253	To Mr. Bentinck ... No. 201. Tel.	1922 Sept. 7	Smyrna: refugees. Enquires intentions of Greek Government with regard to removal of refugees ...	163
254	To Mr. Bentinck ... No. 202. Tel.	„ 7	Smyrna: refugees. Refers to No. 253. His Majesty's Government may be prepared to send ships to assist in evacuation	163
255	To Mr. Bentinck ... No. 203. Tel.	„ 7	Armistice negotiations. Refers to No. 249. Greek Government may be informed of action of Allied High Commissioners	163
256	To Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 360. Tel.	„ 7	Armistice negotiations. Refers to No. 249. Approves action taken. It should be made clear that Allied intervention will be confined to securing evacuation of Anatolia (see No. 287)	163
257	To Paris ... ... No. 279. Tel. Rome No. 244. Tel.	„ 7	Minorities in Thrace and Asia Minor. Proposes that League of Nations should be invited to take measures for protection of minorities (see Nos. 258 and 307) ...	164
258	To Paris ... ... No. 280. Tel. Rome No. 245. Tel.	„ 7	Minorities in Thrace and Asia Minor. Submits draft invitation to League of Nations for concurrence ...	164
259	To Paris ... ... No. 283. Tel. Rome No. 250. Tel.	„ 7	Armistice negotiations. Refers to Nos. 244 249 and 256. French Government should be informed that Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople have put forward armistice proposals	165
260	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 387. Tel.	„ 7	General Tricoupis. Reported capture with General Digenis and staff	165
261	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 388. Tel.	„ 7	Greek army. Reports on Generals Polimanakos and Frango, and on condition of 1st and 2nd Army Corps	165
262	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 389. Tel.	„ 7	Military situation. Idea is prevalent that Greek Government have exaggerated gravity of situation to obtain British intervention	165
263	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 391. Tel.	„ 7	Atrocities by Greek troops. Refers to No. 246. Attention of Greek Government has been drawn to reports. Minister for Foreign Affairs has promised to telegraph to Minister of War at Smyrna	166
264	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 392. Tel.	„ 8	Greek Government. Resignation. M. Calogeropoulos asked to form Cabinet	166
265	Mr. Bentinck ... No. 395. Tel.	„ 8	Smyrna: refugees. Refers to Nos. 253 and 263. Greek Government appeals for assistance	166
266	Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty No. 279. Tel.	„ 8	Smyrna: Greek evacuation. Evacuation nearly complete. Headquarters moving to Chesme. M. Sterghiades will go on board "Iron Duke" ...	167
267	Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 393. Tel.	„ 7	Armistice negotiations. Refers to No. 249. Communication of proposals to Hamid Bey. Latter is telegraphing to Angora	167
268	Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 394. Tel.	„ 7	Armistice negotiations. Refers to No. 267. Care taken to minimise danger of refusal on part of Angora. Greek High Commissioner informed of *démarche* ...	168
269	Sir H. Rumbold ... No. 395. Tel.	„ 7	Smyrna: provisioning of. Refers to No. 227. United States High Commissioner promises all possible help from American relief association	168
270	Sir H. Lamb ... No. 67. Tel.	„ 8	Smyrna: Greek Evacuation. Evacuation nearly complete, when town will be without Government. Allied patrols will preserve order. Turks should be invited to nominate administration officials immediately	168

No. and Name.	Date.	Subject	Page
271 To Mr. Bentinck No. 204. Tel.	1922 Sept. 8	Armistice negotiations. Refers to No. 268: reco[mmends] Government should use military representative [illegible]	168
272 To Mr. Bentinck No. 207. Tel.	" 8	Smyrna refugees. Refers to No. 255. Requests [illegible] to be informed what kind of relief desired at Smyrna. Expresses intentions of Greek Government. See No. 28.	169
273 To Sir H. Rumbold No. 388. Tel.	" 8	Smyrna. Withdrawal of non-Ottoman Authority to arrange with Allied colleagues to send such instructions as are considered necessary to Admirals at Smyrna.	169
274 To Paris No. 287. Tel. Rome No. 268. Tel.	" 8	Smyrna. Cessation of hostilities. French and Italian Governments to be informed of instructions given in No. 273.	169
275 Mr. Bentinck No. 396. Tel.	" 8	Greek affairs. Refers to No. 261. Information concerning withdrawal of Greek Division from 3rd Corps area. Greek Government's attitude.	169
276 Mr. Bentinck No. 399. Tel.	" 8	Smyrna refugees. Refers to No. 265. Supplies report of Commander-in-Chief on question of assistance.	170
277 Mr. Bentinck No. 400. Tel.	" 8	Greek affairs. Refers to Nos. 240 and 243. Request for information regarding present state of Greek forces.	170
278 Mr. Bentinck No. 401. Tel.	" 8	Mr. Venizelos' movements. Refers to Nos. 255 and 268. Has informed Greek Government of proposals put forward by His Majesty's Government and suggested that they should be communicated to Allied representatives at Athens.	170
279 Mr. Bentinck No. 402. Tel.	" 8	Smyrna. Reports that if there is trouble Kemal's position not strong enough to hold out long. Kemal does not appear to be anxious to have Mustafa Kemal's telegram to Greek Ministers. It is reported that Venizelos is being asked to return to Athens.	171
279a Mr. Bentinck No. 403. Tel.	" 8	Military situation. Summary of Greek operations and Turkish retreat. Statement by Greek Government and reply on behalf of His Majesty's Government. Greek support.	171
280 Mr. Bentinck No. 404. Tel.	"	Greek military situation. Refers to No. 271. Venizelos' statement of Greek position. Impossible to withdraw troops. Suggestion that invitation to Mr. Lloyd George should be issued for Mudania meeting.	171
281 Mr. Bentinck No. 405. Tel.	" 9	Smyrna refugees. Refers to No. 272. Gives details regarding number of refugees and relief needed.	172
282 Mr. Bentinck No. 406. Tel.	" 9	Brussa operations. Refers to No. 260. Greek Government's views on Turkish request for armistice. Instructions sent to Greek Headquarters.	172
283 Mr. Bentinck No. 407. Tel.	" 9	Armistice negotiations. Refers to Nos. 268 and 271. Instructions sent to Master of War to send officer from Smyrna to attend meeting.	172
284 Sir H. Rumbold No. 386. Tel.	" 8	Armistice negotiations. Refers to Nos. 244 and 249. Views on instructions sent to French High Commissioner.	172
285 Sir H. Rumbold No. 387. Tel.	" 8	Smyrna. Local suppression of hostilities. Gives rates telegrams sent to Greek and Turkish Consuls at Smyrna authorising them to facilitate surrender of town to Turks.	173

No. and Name.	Date.	Subject	Page
286 Sir H. Rumbold No. 398. Tel.	1922 Sept. 8	Greek affairs. Greek troops at Ismid. It is reported that Greeks intend to burn town. Considers that strong representations should be made to Greek Government. See No. 28.	173
287 Sir H. Rumbold No. 399. Tel.	" 8	Armistice negotiations. Refers to Nos. 256 and 269. His Excellency points out that armistice negotiations should be regarded as [illegible] Greeks. Turkish terms. Refers to Mr. Venizelos' suggestion. See No. 16.	173
288 Sir H. Rumbold No. 401. Tel.	"	Armistice negotiations. Refers to No. 268. Instructions to encourage Admiral's impression of possibility of obtaining Mudania Armistice which he appointed for negotiations for exchange Armenians from Brussa. Consummation. See No. 16.	174
289 Sir H. Rumbold No. 402. Tel.	"	Military situation. Greek evacuation of Ismid. Strong Turkish forces on slopes of mountains fifty miles east of Ismid. Signs of advancing Brussa.	174
290 Sir L. Oliphant No. 403. Tel.	"	Armistice negotiations. Refers to No. 26. His Excellency has received three proposals and some of answers. It is [illegible] on which the subject was.	174
291 Communiqué issued by Mediterranean Headquarters to Press. No. 285. Tel.	" 9	Smyrna. Greek evacuation. Telegram from Sir H. Rumbold reporting arrangement for evacuation. Situation improved.	175
292 Sir H. Erskine No. 270. Tel.	7	Memorandum. Turkish Note Minor 2. Note communicated refers to No. 257. Minister for Foreign Affairs is not opposed to proposal to transfer to Lake of Nemi proposal that conference should take place at end of month and that meanwhile experts should prepare.	176
293 T. Mr. Bentinck No. 209. Tel.	" 9	Brussa operations. Refers to Nos. 246 and 284. Strong representations have been made to Greek Government and reply received. Withdrawal of Brussa. See No. [illegible].	176
294 To Mr. Bentinck No. 210. Tel.	" 9	Smyrna refugees. Refers to Nos. [illegible] and 272. Views should be urged [illegible] Greek Government. Relief.	176
295 Sir H. Rumbold No. 370. Tel.	" 9	Smyrna refugees. Refers to Nos. [illegible]. Transport question. Suggestion for Disposals Board to [illegible]. Arrangements about [illegible] Smyrna.	176
296 Mr. Lamb No. 408. Tel.	"	Greek evacuation. Refers to No. 275. Withdrawal might be [illegible] Smyrna. Special Service from Turkish [illegible] Greek troops [illegible] Smyrna. [illegible] 35,000 men. By Smyrna group.	177
297 Mr. Bentinck No. 412. Tel.	" 9	Greek evacuation. Refers to Nos. 280 and [illegible] Mudania. See No. 240.	177
298 Mr. Bentinck No. 413. Tel.	" 9	Smyrna refugees. Greek Government [illegible] Greek settlers [illegible] Persia for resettlement.	177
299 Mr. Bentinck No. 414. Tel.	" 9	Greek evacuation. [illegible] Turkish assurances [illegible] will [illegible] Greek forces [illegible] Mudania. [illegible] considered will [illegible] Greek withdrawal.	177

	No and Name	Date.	Subject	Page
300	Mr Bentinck No. 416. Tel	1922 Sept. 9	Greece internal situation Refers to No 297 M Calogeropoulos has dissuaded and M Trandafilacos is endeavouring to form Ministry (see No 310)	178
301	Sir L Rutherford No. 409 Tel.	" 10	Neutral zones Nationalist occupation According to reports Nationalist are considering occupation of Asiatic shore of Bosphorus and of Chanak Allies are agreed to despatch small contingents and to warn Nationalists	178
302	Commander-in-chief Mediterranean, to Admiralty No. 288. Tel	" 10	Situation Some looting and firing has taken place Turkish commander is patrolling town and wears trouble with Allies ships Naval guards are remaining on shore	178
303	Mr Lennox No. 24 Tel	" "	Atrocities by Greek troops Transmits message from Lord Balfour regarding Reinhart protest and reply sent	178
304	Mr London No. 25. Tel	" 10 11	Near East situation Reports conversation with League of Nations Transmits message from Lord Balfour proposing that League of Nations should mediate peace between Greeks and Turks and suggesting that if Greeks and Turks would submit question to League	179
305	To Sir H Rumbold No. 371. Tel.	" 10	Smyrna Withdrawal of Greek troops Refers to No 287 Wishes to be informed of views of Allied governments	179
306	Mr M Langton Drake No. 570	" 2	Near East settlement Refers to No 214 Views of Roumania Movement of Turkish frontier Transmits extract from Press of Constantinople	179
307	Sir R Rumbold No. 780	" 2	Near East settlement Reports conversation with Hon Mr Child on effect of Nationalist offensive on proposed conference	180
308	Sir H Rumbold No 787	" "	Atrocities by Greek troops Transmits Nationalist protest	181
309	Mr de Martino	" 9	Near East settlement Importance of early invitation to Italy Proposes invitation to first conference at Mudania Constantinople and Angora (see No 310)	182
310	To Mr de Martino	" 11	Near East settlement Refers to No 309 His Majesty's Government consider that any invitation to Italy should form part of joint invitation and in regard to time of conference	183
311	Mr Bentinck No. 417. Tel.	" 10	Greece internal situation Appreciation of effects on Greek Government and return of deserted troops It is feared that communistic element at Volo is growing in numbers	181
312	Mr Bentinck No. 415. Tel	" 10	Armistice negotiations Refers to Nos 282 and 293 Representations made to Greek Government	184
313	Mr Bentinck No. 419. Tel.	" 10	Military situation Military stores embarked at Smyrna Headquarters moved to Chesme Troops in good condition Minister for Foreign Affairs considers armistice unnecessary now to ensure embarkation of army of Asia Minor	184
314	Mr Bentinck No. 420. Tel.	" 10	Smyrna refugees Refers to Nos 265 281 and 291 Greek Government seem to regret Italian and Allied ships for transport Explains Minister for Foreign Affairs visit and reasons for evacuation	185
315	Mr Bentinck No. 421 Tel.	" 10	Greece internal situation Refers to No 300 M Tsaldaris has formed Ministry with M Calogeropoulos as Minister for Foreign Affairs	185

	No and Name	Date.	Subject	Page
316	Mr Bentinck No. 422 Tel	1922 Sept. 10	Refugee situation Refers to No. 286. Suggests consideration with regard to transport of refugees from Asia Minor	185
317	Mr Bentinck No. 423 Tel	" 11	Greece internal situation Refers to No 297 Greek Cabinet	186
318	Sir A Young No 113. Tel	" 11	Near East settlement Serbian Slovene Government cannot view with indifference return of Turks to Europe Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs lays stress on danger of collision frontier between Turkey and Bulgaria	186
319	Mr London No. 26. Tel.	" 11	Near East settlement Refers to No 304 Transmits message from Lord Balfour accepting League of Nations intervention French delegation is informing its Government of incident in regard to Turkish and reason to delay	186
320	Commander-in-chief Mediterranean to Admiralty No. 297 Tel.	" 11	Turco-Polish relations Interview has been arranged with Noureddin Pasha whose attitude is not satisfactory and who is not aware of negotiations between Angora and Poland (see No 2)	187
321	Commander-in-chief Mediterranean to Admiralty No. 299. Tel	" 11	Turco-Bolshevik relations Interview with Nouredin Pasha	87
322	Commander-in-chief Mediterranean to Admiralty No. 300 Tel	" "	Smyrna Protection of foreign nationals Necessity of assuring safety of Britons at Aidin and Magnesia Communication to be made to Greek Government Protection of nationals Nationalist Turkish troops are now entering	187
323	Commander-in-chief Mediterranean to Admiralty No. 301 Tel.	" 11	Smyrna Departure of British troops Nationalist Turkish information that rumour that British troops were firing on Greek troops in Smyrna is without foundation Arrival of Monarch at Piraeus	88
324	Commander-in-chief Mediterranean to Admiralty No. 302 Tel.	" 11	Mudania Konia Interview at Smyrna Text of telegram No 60 from Smyrna reporting arrival stating that he and will have to consult Government before signing Turkish National Assembly will decide according to what extent His Majesty's Government can be recognised later	188
325	Sir R Graham No. 271 Tel	" 10	Near East settlement Interview with Nizami Pasha Turkish Minister His Majesty's Government's decision to recognise Turkish Republic Terms on which agreed to are stated only on condition of evacuation of Smyrna and satisfactory hope was to adopt upon for conference	188
326	Sir R Graham No 272 Tel	" 10	Straits Refers to No 225 Osman Nizami Pasha stated that only solution was to entrust protection of Straits to Turkey as mandatory of Allies on behalf of League of Nations	89
327	To Sir H Rumbold No. 374. Tel.	" 11	Military position of His Majesty's Government in regard to Straits and Constantinople Recent unilateral decisions taken by Constantinople Regret that Turkish Europeans not prepared to be bound at all events if necessary accept Treaty As to time when Turkish Army and Interior positions of Allies relative to evacuation of Smyrna	89
328	To Sir R Graham No. 267. Tel	" 11	Near East settlement Refers to Nos 292 299 and 300 His Majesty's Government agree at conference as originally conceived to view that of new Italian Government should be urged to agree to proposed reference to League of Nations regarding armistice	190

No. and Name	Date.	Subject	Page.
329 To Paris No. 294. Tel Rome No. 268. Tel	1922 Sept 14	Albanian policy in regard to Straits and Constantinople An opinion of His Majesty's Government there is no reason for altering attitude as regards Straits Constantinople French and Italians should co-operate with His Majesty's Government for preservation of Straits Peace with Turkey and the Turkish capitulations see Nos 325 and 326	130
330 [illegible] International Red Cross	[illegible]	Allocation among various countries French Government has agreed to contribute 2½ per cent of total amount required for the organization of relief	140
331 To Constantinople Admiralty Telegraphic.	14	Naval and military position of His Majesty's Government Plans for removal of Ottoman people from Smyrna in case of Turkish retaking Smyrna	11
332 [illegible] Denmark No. 424. Tel.	14	[illegible] Greek refugees undertaken by Madame [illegible] refugees	101
333 [illegible] Athens No. 406. Tel.	14	[illegible] Greek refugees [illegible] Refugees from Black Sea [illegible] Southern shore of Marmora [illegible] Asia Minor [illegible] Smyrna [illegible]	141
334 To Mr London Tel 31 Tel.	12	Near East conference [illegible] No 321 Draft [illegible] for [illegible] Greek Foreign Office [illegible] Allies [illegible] Asia Minor [illegible] Turkish [illegible]	192
335 Lord Derby No. 2139	2	[illegible] Greek [illegible] No 320 Mr [illegible] Straits [illegible] Straits [illegible] Allies Negotiations [illegible]	92
336 Mr Rumbold No 427. Tel.	12	Greece [illegible] Report No 311 Statements [illegible] Turkish [illegible] Mr [illegible]	133
337 Mr Rumbold No. 428. Tel.	12	[illegible] Greek [illegible] Mr [illegible] and Papers [illegible] Mr [illegible]	133
338 Mr Rumbold No. 429. Tel	12	[illegible] Nos 325 [illegible] Mr [illegible] Turkish [illegible] Mr [illegible]	135
339 Mr Rumbold No 431 Tel.	13	Greek [illegible] Papers Nos 308 and 312 Reports [illegible] Mr [illegible]	141
340 [illegible] Admiralty Mediterranean to Admiralty No. 305. Tel.	13	[illegible] Turkish [illegible] Mr [illegible]	139
341 Commander-in-chief Mediterranean to Admiralty No. 311 Tel.	1	Turkish [illegible] Reports from Sir H Lamb that Mustapha Kemal does not regard self-government as [illegible] Greece would not [illegible]	64

No and Name	Date.	Subject.	Page.
342 Commander-in-chief Mediterranean, to Sir H Rumbold No. 312. Tel.	1922 Sept 13	Turco-Greek negotiations Mr Scarpa Kemal is being asked to confirm statements contained in No 341	165
343 Commander-in-chief Mediterranean to Admiralty No. 313 Tel	13	Smyrna situation Armenian quarter rounded up will be considered [illegible] Greek have embarked about 400 women and children	165
344 Sir H Rumbold No 408 Tel	[illegible]	Refugees at Rodosto Chargé d'affaires urgently appeal for rescue see No 332	65
345 Sir H Rumbold No. 409. Tel.	13	Turco-British relations Refers to No 344 Repeats instructions sent to Sir H Lamb in view of Mustapha Kemal's statements as to existence of state of war	138
346 Sir H Rumbold No 273 Tel	[illegible]	Near East conference Press attitude Demand that Hellenic Government should be associated with [illegible]	198
347 Sir H Rumbold No. 274 Tel	[illegible]	Near East conference Points on the proposals [illegible] Nos 328 329 Straits and Constantinople Attitude of foreign Affairs Committee Question of [illegible]	8
348 M Kamkoff Telegraphic.	12	Naval settlement Precautions against any attack [illegible]	197
349 To Mr Rumbold No. 318 Tel.	3	Greek forces His Majesty's Government [illegible]	190
350 To Mr London No. 32. Tel	[illegible]	[illegible] Letter of No 321 Negotiations [illegible]	140
351 To Mr London No. 32. Tel.	12	Near East [illegible]	30
352 To Sir H Rumbold No. 384. Tel.	13	Turkish [illegible]	200
353 To Sir H Rumbold No. 385. Tel.	13	Warlike [illegible]	200
354 To Sir H Erskine No. 271 Tel.	[illegible]	Erzerum Refers to No 32 Replies to second Note Passages alleged [illegible]	200
355 To Sir H Lamb No. 29. Tel	13	Smyrna Refugees Colonies [illegible] Nos 311 and 315 Instructions to enlist [illegible]	20
356 To Paris No. 301 Tel. Rome No. 270. Tel	13	Turco-British relations see No 341 Information of Mustapha Kemal's state [illegible]	94
357 Mr Bentinck No. 433. Tel	13	Greek [illegible]	201

No.	Name.	Date.	Subject	Page.
		1922		
358	Mr. Bentinck. No. 433. Tel.	Sept. 13	Greek press (General Constantinopoulos's views regarding publications)	202
359	Mr. Bertrand. No. 434. Tel.	" 13	Graeco-Bulgarian relations. Refers to No. 340. French stated to be encouraging Bulgaria to make trouble for Roumania. Bulgarian Chargé d'Affaires speaks bitterly of those in Greek circles who talk of Macedonia entitled to shake off Greek yoke	202
360	Mr. Bentinck. No. 436. Tel.	" 14	Armistice negotiations. Minister of Foreign Affairs states that armistice is objectless and that Asia Minor question	202
360a	Mr. Bentinck. No. 437. Tel.	" 14	Reported intervention of French Ministers protest against alleged threats by Minister for Foreign Affairs. No knowledge of latter. General attitude of French Ministers causing irritation	203
361	Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean to Secret Admiralty. No. 315. Tel.	" 12	Turkish negotiations. Text of Nationalist letter to be sent to Allied Powers proposing to open negotiations at Ismid. Statement that National Assembly was in state of war with Great Britain	203
362	Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean to Secret Admiralty. No. 318. Tel.	" 13	Turkish negotiations. Text of note to Allied Powers. Enclosure No. 2	203
363	Foreign Office to Mediterranean to Admiralty. No. 319. Tel.	" 13	Naval situation. Allied warships should not be withdrawn until satisfactory steps have been taken that could be construed as hostile to war	204
363A	Foreign Office. No. 463. Tel.	" 14	Allied military police to guard Constantinople and Straits. Proposal for Italy to contribute to allied police and to withdraw Italian troops in Anatolia to Smyrna	204A
364	Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean to Secret Admiralty. No. 320. Tel.	" 14	Turco-Bulgarian frontier. Instructions to Allied Commissioners regarding state of war. Government's decision of	204
365	Secret Admiralty. No. 410. Tel.	" 13	Minutes of meeting held to discuss Constantinople. Refers to No. 82. His Majesty's Government are of opinion that no case for neutral zone has been established. Allied Powers should withdraw from Asiatic shores. Withdrawal from Asiatic shores would have diplomatic effect. Less serious aspect of British occupation. Straits and Marmora free to ships of all nations	204
366	Lord Hardinge. No. 465. Tel.	" 14	Turco-Bulgarian relations. Refers to No. 356. French consul at Sofia has advised Government of Bulgaria to make trouble on Greek frontier. Bulgarian Government's views regarding	205
367	Sir R. Graham. No. 278. Tel.	" 13	Minorities in Turkey in Asia Minor. Refers to Nos. 272 and 324. Italian memorandum to be communicated to League of Nations. Measures for protection	205
368	Sir R. Graham. No. 277. Tel.	" 13	Near East Conference. Refers to No. 346. Tone of press more cordial. Several papers express hope that His Majesty's Government will refuse to participate	205
368A	Mr. Bentinck. No. 438. Tel.	" 14	Reported proposal of Greek Government to abandon Eastern Thrace to regain Bulgarian alliance. Arrangements for passage of Greek troops. See No. 140	205A
369	Sir R. Graham. No. 279. Tel.	" 13	Allied military police in regard to Straits. Refers to No. 339. Italian Government's views	206

No.	Name.	Date.	Subject	Page.
		1922		
370	Sir R. Graham. No. 279. Tel.	Sept. 14	Paris Conference. Refers to No. 344. Desirability of informing public of true facts of case	206
371	To Mr. Erskine. No. 38. Tel.	" 14	Turco-Bulgarian frontier. Greek Government request that representations may be made at Sofia	206
372	To Bucharest. No. 76. Tel. Belgrade. No. 61. Tel. Sofia. No. 37. Tel.	" 14	Turkish crisis. Urgent report on development in event of overthrow of Government. See No. 377	207
373	Sir A. Young. No. 391.	" 10	Near East situation. Press comments	207
374	Mr. Bentinck. No. 440. Tel.	" 15	Constantinople. Mustapha Kemal's attempt to win over American correspondents. Kemal states that Kemal hopes His Majesty's Government will not be over-hasty in Constantinople. Will not be well taken	208
375	Mr. Bentinck. No. 441. Tel.	" 15	Greek refugees. Ministry of Public Assistance are re-arranging organisation for relief. Archbishop of Canterbury has been invited to appeal through channels. Enquiries whether His Majesty's Government could help in sending refugees from Asia Minor to Greece	209
376	Mr. Bentinck. No. 443. Tel.	" 15	Minorities in Asia Minor. Refers to No. 374. American engineer has been hired by Kemal to attempt to organise Assyrians with view of having Thrace given to Mar Shimun in exchange for Mosul	209
377	Sir A. Young. No. 119. Tel.	" 15	Turkish crisis. Refers to No. 372. Constantinople. Serb report. Situation unchanged. Calm at present	209
378	Mr. M. Ingram Drake. No. 113. Tel.	" 14	Near East settlement. Refers to No. 2. Attempt to force issues at Angora under Treaty of Sèvres. Roumania declines her assistance by sending troops. Straits of Marmora in time of freedom of Straits	209
379	Sir R. Rumbold. No. 418. Tel.	" 14	Near East situation. Refers to No. 328. Agrees that conference in regard to Asia Minor is not at present advisable. Important that some decision should be arrived at as soon as possible	210
380	Senior Naval Officer, Aegean Light Cruiser Squadron to Admiralty. No. 496. Tel.	" 15	Governor-General of Transvaal (telegram No. 71 from Secretary of State, Cape Town) requests for Mr. Seaman's return. Suggests that British consuls in charge of Greek property should remain	210
381	Mr. Lonsdale. No. 29. Tel.	" 14	Greek refugees. Refers to No. 350. Long's mission has no funds for international loan. Greece is not accepting American Near East Relief supplies to Smyrna. Foreign representatives in Smyrna have sent telegrams to urge Greek Government to reconsider	211
382	To Mr. M. Ingram Drake. No. 78. Tel.	" 15	Allied military occupation of Straits and Constantinople. Refers to No. 378. Enquiry whether Roumania would be prepared to provide force at expense of Allied Powers. Chief of Imperial General Staff's opinion will be given	212

No. and Name	Date.	Subject	Page.
383 To Sir H Rumbold No 393. Tel.	1922 Sept 15	Allied military policy in regard to Constantinople and Straits Refers to No 363a Instructions to join with Allied colleagues in warning to Angora regarding neutrality of zones see No 420	212
384 To Lord Hardinge No. 304. Tel	" 15	Minorities in Turkey Refers to Nos 2 and 357 inquiries whether French Government agree to investigation by League of Nations see No 424	212
385 To Sir H Rumbold Telegraphic.	" 15	Syrian withdrawal Refers to No 380 Authorises withdrawal	212
386 Lord Hardinge No. 2156	" 15	Allied military policy in regard to Straits and Constantinople Transmits memorandum by M Poincaré	212
387 Mr Bentinck No. 444. Tel	" 16	Turco-Persian relations Is assured that Kemal has given definite undertaking to new Persian Government that it is not his intention to support Bolshevism	213
388 Mr Bentinck No. 445. Tel.	" 15	Greek occupation of Constantinople Newspapers report withdrawal which is unknown Press favourable Does not consider observations will lead to any change in views of His Majesty's Government	213
389 Sir H Rumbold No. 417 Tel.	" 15	Near East settlement Central Government are anxious that Conference should be called immediately	213
390 Sir H Rumbold No. 418 Tel.	" 15	Allied military policy in regard to Straits and Constantinople Refers to No 378 Allies propose to invite Turkish Government to send representatives to Conference to meet Allies as soon as possible	214
391 Sir H Lamb No. 419 Tel	" 15	Smyrna Sir H Lamb considers withdrawal undesirable and has no knowledge that Mustapha Kemal contemplates advance	214
392 To Commander in Chief Mediterranean from Admiralty No. 913 Tel	" 15	Supplying coal for Russian forces Requests opinion of Admiral as to keeping vessels during winter	215
393 To Senior Naval Officer Mediterranean Light Cruiser Squadron from Admiralty No. 429. Tel	" 15	Supplying fire-fighting appliances instead of fire-float lost see No 388	215
394 Commander in Chief Mediterranean to Admiralty No. 338. Tel.	" 16	Smyrna refugees Gives details with regard to numbers and ports	215
395 Sir A Young No 121 Tel.	" 17	Near East settlement Greek Chargé d'Affaires has informed Swedish Government that Greece is not opposed to conference	215
396 Sir H Rumbold No. 420. Tel	" 15	Near East settlement Refers to Nos 39 and 391 Has spoken in favour of immediate conference and writes his ideas of basis	216
397 Sir H Rumbold No. 422. Tel.	" 16	Smyrna withdrawal Repeats message to Sir H Lamb Thanking colleagues on King George V	216
398 Senior Naval Officer Mediterranean Light Cruiser Squadron to Admiralty No. 499. Tel.	" 16	Smyrna fire Refers to No 393 Details as to extent of fire. British losses &c	216
399 Lord Hardinge No. 463. Tel	1922 Sept 14	Anglo-Italian policy in regard to Straits and Constantinople Substance of M Poincaré's memorandum submitted in No 386	217
400 Mr Erskine No. 46. Tel.	" 17	Turco-Persian boundary on Turkish frontier Serbian Chargé d'Affaires considers reports exaggerated	217
401 Mr Erskine No 47 Tel	" 16	Bulgarian bands Representations made to Minister for Foreign Affairs who has undertaken necessary measures and guarantees that no organised movement on Bulgarian side of frontier	217
402 To Sir H Rumbold No. 396. Tel	" 16	Anglo-Italian Notes Refers to No 384 approves reply to Quai d'Orsay Intermediate zones	217
403 To Mr London No 38. Tel	" 16	Greek retreat Refers to No 381 Russian would have preferred to see Angora Government represented at Conference Has spoken in this sense to Belgian delegate on right of transit	218
404 To Paris No. 307 Tel Rome No. 274. Tel.	" 16	Turco-Italian relations M Graziani has stated that although state of war does not exist formal peace treaty has not been concluded	218
405 Mr Bentinck No. 447 Tel	" 16	Smyrna Refers to Nos 3 and 4 Reports Russian Representative at Angora agrees to recognition of Mustapha Kemal Government provided Allies withdraw from Smyrna see No 4	218
406 Mr Bentinck No. 448. Tel.	" 16	Turco-Persian relations Reports further conversation see No. 420	219
407 Commander in Chief Mediterranean to Admiralty No. 339 Tel	" 17	Supplying Russian Volunteer Fleet with coal Refers to No 39 Gives position of ships	219
408 Commander in Chief Mediterranean to Admiralty No 340 Tel	" 7	Mudros Refers to telegram No 302 Gives position of ships	219
409 Commander in Chief Mediterranean to Admiralty No. 342 Tel	" 17	Smyrna withdrawal Has received telegram from Admiralty and has issued orders	220
" Senior Naval Officer Dardanelles to Admiralty No. 501 Tel.	"	Smyrna withdrawal Telegram No 2 for Sir H Lamb Arrangements at Skumbrah on Belgian consulate have been made Allied naval officers were present Mustapha Kemal Pasha will meet Sir H Lamb with Marshal Fevzi for Constantinople Allied proposals to be subject to go	220
411 Sir H Rumbold No 424 Tel.	" 17	Greek retreat Refers to No 388 reports Greek intention that each troops should march	220
412 To Mr Erskine No 41 Tel.	" 7	Syrian refugees Refers to No 39 Requests all particulars	221
413 Sir H Rumbold No. 801	" 17	Near East settlement Refers to No 8 Suggests conference	220
414 Sir H Rumbold No 805	" 12	Turkish military successes Effect on Mudros Capitulation Views on revolt in Anatolia Greek forces Turkish advance Effect on Mudros Capitulation	221
415 Lord Hardinge No. 2174	" 16	Near East settlement Reports conversation with M Poincaré on question of Angora Government Attitude of France Text of Franco-Turkish proposals and Mr Lindsay's observations thereupon for Thrace settlement	223

No. and Name.	Date.	Subject	Page.
418 Mr. Lindley No. 450. Tel.	1922 Sept. 15	Concentrations of Greek troops. Information regarding 3rd and 4th Army Corps (see No. 505)	225
419 Mr. Lindley No. 451. Tel.	" 17	Armistice zones in neutral zone. Reports of organisation of forces. It is policy of His Majesty's Government as to keep Bulgaria out of Europe. Neutral zone should not fix. Powers will become interested (see No. 183)	226
420 Mr. Allen Upton Clarke No. 115. Tel.	" 18	Allied policy in regard to Straits and Constantinople. Refers to No. 382. Recommendation that Powers should be ready to attack Bulgaria at once and should recognise Serbia to allow some policy. They will say for His Majesty's Government in regard to Straits question at conference.	227
421 Sir H. Rumbold No. 425. Tel.	" 17	French High Commissioner at Constantinople and British High Commissioner are recalled for instructions to go to armistice to-morrow. (Repeated to Athens) (see No. 380)	227
422 Sir H. Rumbold No. 427. Tel.	" 18	Allied policy in regard to Straits and Constantinople. Refers to No. 382. Note from French Government regarding Bulgaria and Turkey. Reply sent 8th September	228
423 Foreign Office to Sir H. Rumbold No. 416. Tel.	" 16	Suggestion that Allied Powers should be asked to take steps to prevent Bulgaria from attacking Turkey. Refers to No. 382. Whether Serbia should take necessary steps	228
424 Admiralty to Sir H. Rumbold No. 604. Tel.	" 18	Supply of stores for Serbia. Letter from Admiralty regarding No. 411 and stating that Mr. Lindley will be instructed to inform Serbian Government accordingly	228
425 Lord Hardinge No. 468. Tel.	" 15	Note sent to Bulgaria. Refers to No. 382. Serbian Minister for Foreign Affairs writing to Lord Hardinge regarding Serbia. Allied policy to be determined by Conference of Ambassadors	228
426 Lord Hardinge No. 460. Tel.	" 16	Mandates. Phrase used in Mr. Balfour's speech to be inserted in Treaty. Suggestion that Mandates should be dealt with by Council of League of Nations	229
427 Lord Hardinge No. 467. Tel.	" 16	Near East settlement. Refers to No. 382. Reply to memorandum of the Allied Powers was handed to Serbian Minister	229
428 Sir R. Graham No. 280. Tel.	" 18	Earthquakes. Instructions to visit Hastings for information as to whether it is worth while to go there after all	230
429 Sir R. Graham No. 281. Tel.	" 18	Allied policy. Reports that Serbia is not to be allowed to take part in military operations. Treaty of peace will not be signed before operations	230
430 Sir R. Graham No. 282. Tel.	" 18	Allied policy. Refers to Serbia. Italian proposal to amend Bulgarian armistice. Reply to Belgrade message regarding satisfactory attitude of Bulgaria. Italians say they are prepared to agree. Refers to No. 427	230
431 Mr. Erskine No. 51. Tel.	" 17	Troop Concentrations on Turkish frontier. Refers to No. 406. No. Information of power passing into hands of military. Reports of size of bands embodied in Mudania district	231

No. and Name.	Date.	Subject	Page.
430 To Mr. Lindley No. 228. Tel.	1922 Sept. 18	Reoccupation of coast. Refers to No. 368A. Payment for other requisitions subject to consideration of British consent	231
431 To Mr. Lindley No. 230. Tel.	" 18	Smyrna situation. Refers to Nos. 405 and 406. Action taken by His Majesty's Government to preserve status quo	231
432 To Sir H. Rumbold No. 398. Tel.	" 8	Allied military policy in regard to Straits and Constantinople. Refers to No. 380. Impression that Greeks and Turks not intending to agree and whether it was possible to find some High Commissioners (see No. 380)	231
433 To Lord Hardinge No. 308. Tel.	" 8	Allied military policy in regard to Straits and Constantinople. Refers to No. 381. His Majesty's Government would welcome French Government's proposals	231
434 Mr. Herbert No. 506.	" 9	War material supplied to Kemalists. Refers to Nos. 78 and 91. Treasury report by military mission regarding alleged supplies	232
13 Mr. Brenan No. 507.	" 9	Near East situation. Impressions of Smyrna refugees	234
435 Mr. Herbert No. 516.	" 11	Military situation. Treasury report by military mission regarding military events and measures with collapse of Greek army in Asia Minor	237
437 Mr. Erskine No. 249.	" 12	Turkish garrisons at Ineboli. Question of repatriation of Turks	240
438 Mr. Erskine No. 252.	" 13	Military situation. Press comments on Greek disaster. Turkish press strong article by Enver on Smyrna	240
439 Mr. Erskine No. 253.	" 13	Near East situation. Treaty situation. Extract from report by military mission in Asia Minor. Refugees. Greek garrison at Ineboli and Turkish intention to send to Smyrna	242
440 Mr. Morgan Brown No. 486.	" 14	Near East situation. Refers to No. 308. Views of French Government in regard to revision of Treaty of Sèvres. Press opinion	243
441 Sir H. Young No. 397.	" 4	Near East settlement. Refers to Nos. 318 and 371. Swedish Government decides to grant all Turks to Europe and repatriation of Greeks. Russian Trade Delegation	244
442 Sir H. Rumbold No. 843.	" 14	Near East situation. Press opinion	247
443 Mr. Findlay No. 454. Tel.	" 8	Future of Smyrna. Refers to No. 411. Prime Minister and Marquess of Curzon's view that question is not yet ripe for decision	247
444 Mr. Lindley No. 453. Tel.	" 18	Hon. Mr. Stevenson's conversation on Near East policy. Greek army's confidence in Allies. Reasons for success of Greek plans. Considers Greek plans open. Refers to No. 2 to Consul-General Athens. Reasons of National Defence. Refers to No. 2 to Consul-General Athens. Proposal to return of Turks to Europe. Refers to No. 2 to Consul-General Athens. Reports	249
11 Mr. Findlay No. 456. Tel.	" 18	Incident between Greek and French troops near Mudania. Greek request fire on French troops. Reasons alleged for incident. Greek withdrawal over to Kemalists	249
446 Mr. Lindley No. 457. Tel.	" 18	Greek advance. Refers to No. 451. Thousands went to Smyrna. Refers to No. 451. Thousands went to Smyrna. More ships needed for transport of Greek troops. Importance of British	250

	No. and Name	Date	Subject	Page.
447	Sir A. Young **No. 124. Tel.**	1922 Sept. 8	Near East situation. Alleged pro-Turkish statement of M. Nace to Manchester Guardian correspondent. Reports of mobilisation are without foundation. No action taken yet in regard to hands threatening Thrace	250
448	Sir H. Dering **No. 116. Tel.**	„ 18	Near East settlement. M. Diamandy enquired whether conference is likely to take place	251
449	Sir R. Rumbold **No. 428. Tel.**	„ 18	Syrian recent events. Reports Mr. Howe	51
450	To Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean Admiralty **No. 924. Tel.**	„ 18	Evacuation of Asia of Kemalist forces into Thrace. British ships to leave Constantinople. Gallipoli area declared neutral zone. Measures to be taken if necessary etc.	252
451	To Senior Naval Officer 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron Admiralty **No. 431. Tel.**	„ 18	Syrian refugees. Requests report on question of Nos. 338 and 358 and enquiries as to extent of evacuation. See Nos. 358 and 449	272
452	Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean Admiralty **No. 350. Tel.**	„ 18	Evacuation of Asia Minor by Greek troops. Measures to be taken by Allies to safeguard Christian population. Allied troops to be withdrawn from neutral zone. See No. 449	252
453	Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean Admiralty **No. 352. Tel.**	„ 18	Turkish proposal to Greek Government that Greek people in Asia Minor should be withdrawn. See No. 449	—
454	To Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean Admiralty **No. 928. Tel.**	„ 19	Prevention of nationals entering Asia Minor. Reference to No. 452. Instructions to be issued that Greeks are to be allowed to land at present	253
455	To Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean Admiralty **No. 929. Tel.**	„ 19	Relative strength of Greek and Turkish armies. Turkish threat to Thrace. Measures to be taken by Allies. See Nos. 449 and 452. Greek refugees. See No. 451	253
456	Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean Admiralty **No. 354. Tel.**	„ 18	British view of case for Greek evacuation. Reference to Greek proposal to withdraw troops. See No. 449	253
457	Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean Admiralty **No. 355. Tel.**	18	Syrian refugees. Proposal to send to Angora for permission for Greek evacuation. Arrangements of 18 and 30 to be invoked. Syrian refugees must leave Greece. Syrian refugees not to be landed	254
458	Senior Naval Officer 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron to Admiralty **No. 605. Tel.**	„ 19	Smyrna massacres. Reference No. 451. Further details available	254
459	Senior Naval Officer 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron to Admiralty **No. 506. Tel.**	„ 19	Massacres. Reports Smyrna. Telegram No. 74 from Sir H. Lamb. Details to be communicated by letter now off. Request consul report in case of massacres to avoid cavalry	254
460	Senior Naval Officer 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron to Admiralty **No. 507. Tel.**	„ 19	Smyrna massacres. Reference to No. 451. Repeats telegram No. 498	254

	No. and Name	Date.	Subject	Page
461	Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean to Admiralty **No. 362. Tel.**	1922 Sept. 19	Prevention of Nationalists receiving assistance and arms leaving Constantinople. Orders issued that no clearances from Constantinople and Chanak are to be given to ships proceeding to Nationalist ports in Mediterranean, Black Sea and Marmora (see No. 462)	255
462	Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean to Admiralty **No. 365. Tel.**	„ 19	Clearance orders. Refers to Nos. 450, 454 and 461. Orders are being held in abeyance pending further instructions (see No. 480)	255
463	Mr. London **No. 37. Tel.**	„ 19	Greek refugees. Refers to No. 402. Dr. Nansen's suggestions for relief (see No. 491)	255
464	Mr. London **No. 39. Tel.**	„ 19	Armistice negotiations. Refers to Nos. 434 and 453. Discussion at League of Nations Committee of Dr. Nansen's suggestion that League should offer good offices to belligerents with a view to cessation of hostilities	256
465	Lord Hardinge **No. 468. Tel.**	„ 18	Policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to Smyrna and Eastern Question in Greek press	256
466	Lord Hardinge **Telegraphic.**	„ 22	Withdrawal of Greek troops from neutral zones. It is reported that Greek Government intend to withdraw all Greek troops	267
467	To Sir R. Rumbold **No. 399. Tel.**	„ „	Colonel Surrey. Enquiries as to allegation of report that Colonel Surrey is at this time governor-general of Smyrna area (see No. 69)	257
468	To Lord Hardinge **Telegraphic.**	„ 19	(1) Withdrawal of Greek troops from neutral zones. (2) Kemalists undertaking not to enter occupied zones. Proposed letter from Lord Hardinge to Greek Government reported	257
469	To Lord Hardinge **No. 309. Tel.**	„	Near East settlement. Transmits message from Prime Minister to Lord Curzon reporting interview with Rear-Admiral Hope and agreement arrived at that Greeks should not be allowed to land at Smyrna. Hope instructed accordingly. Operations of Greek Army	257
470	To Lord Hardinge **Telegraphic.**	„ 20	Near East position. His Majesty's Government's views. Transmits message from Prime Minister to Lord Curzon expressing gratification with firm language held to M. Poincaré	258
471	Mr. Lindley **No. 499. Tel.**	„ 19	Smyrna massacres. Report by Rear-Admiral Hope. Whole town is destroyed except Turkish quarter	258
472	Mr. Lindley **No. 461. Tel.**	„ „	Greek alternative solution. Reviews position	258
473	Mr. Lindley **No. 461A. Tel.**	„ 20	Greek refugees. Refers to Nos. 265 and 434. Greek Government is willing to receive refugees and is not only doing so	259
474	Sir H. Rumbold **Telegraphic.**	„ 19	Withdrawal of Nationalist forces into Thrace. Suggests that proposed notification to Nationalists should not be made in view of non-support of French and Italians (see No. 542)	259A
475	Sir H. Dering **No. 117. Tel.**	„ 19	Near East settlement. Roumanian Government willing to co-operate in defence of constantinople, but not to participate in conference as opposed to neutral Turco-Bulgarian frontier	259
476	Sir H. Dering **No. 118. Tel.**	„ 19	Near East settlement. Refers to No. 454. Considers that Roumanian Government will make early request to participate in conference	260

	No. and Name	Date	Subject	Page
476	Sir H. Dering No. 119. Tel.	1922 Sept. 20	Near East settlement. Substance of note addressed to French Minister states that Roumania cannot participate in conversations in regard to Constantinople unless supplied with instructions for defence of eastern frontier. Note comments on line of Roumanian policy on three essential points	260
477	Sir H. Rumbold No. 429. Tel.	"	Smyrna. Foreign Office refers to No. 2. Mr. Lloyd George's proposals about access for relief	260
478	Sir L. Mallet No. 430. Tel.	"	Greek refugees in Thrace. Have been protests against removal of Asia Minor refugees to Thrace to form Greek majority in that province and alleging intended atrocities on Greek population. See No. 464	261
479	Sir L. Mallet No. 431. Tel.	"	Refugees. Sir H. Rumbold reports Turkish Government's wish to have their views made known to French and British High Commissioners	261
480	Sir L. Mallet No. 432. Tel.	"	Allied Commanders-in-Chief's Staffs and constantinople. Refers to No. 426 and 432. Not found to be of great importance. Will be discussed in the Inter-Allied Conference. See No. 484 for text	261
481	Sir H. Rumbold No. 433. Tel.	"	Allied armies in the neighbourhood of Straits and constantinople. Note from Angora to Paris	261
482	Sir L. Mallet about No. 434. Tel.	"	Withdrawal from Thrace of Allied troops at Chanak. French people's anxiety to be informed by Allied Governments of their intentions. Proposal for withdrawal	262
483	Sir L. Mallet about to Mr. Balfour No. 435. Tel.	20	Turkish offer of armistice. Refers to No. 422. Allied Commanders-in-Chief's proposal to stop all hostilities	262
484	Sir L. Mallet about to Lord Hardinge No. 437. Tel.	20	French Government's wish to Secretary of State and Foreign Secretary for a conference with High Commissioners and Generals at the end of September. Effect to be given to the proposal. Mr. Lloyd George's views	262
485	Sir L. Mallet about to Lord Hardinge No. 438. Tel.	20	Withdrawal of troops from Chanak. Message from Lord Hardinge received. Telegram to Secretary of State for War	262
486	Sir L. Mallet about to Lord Hardinge No. 439. Tel.	20	Withdrawal from Chanak. Message of 19th from Reference No. 485. Speedy withdrawal of troops to be carried out. Unfavourable report of Turkish attitude and its result of some importance. See No. 491	263
487	Sir L. Mallet about to Lord Hardinge No. 440. Tel.	21	Withdrawal from Chanak. Message from Chanak. Mr. Lloyd George's views. Refers to No. 485. Proposal that Commanders-in-Chief should make recommendations to Governments	263
488	Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean to Admiralty No. 370. Tel.	"	Chanak. Turkish attitude. Views of New Home Government. Proposal to send a strong force of Nationalists across straits. Recommendation against. His Majesty's ships. See No. 486	263
489	To Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean from Admiralty No. 933. Tel.	19	Withdrawal of British forces. Refers to No. 166. Instructions to be issued to Commanders-in-Chief	264
490	To Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean from Admiralty Telegraphic	20	Constantinople. Refer to No. 252 and 262. Mr. Balfour's views. Hand control of shipping	264

	No. and Name	Date.	Subject	Page
491	Mr. London No. 41. Tel.	1922 Sept. 20	Greek refugees. Refers to No. 463. Amount of loan has been fixed to put £300,000 gold francs at disposal of High Commissioners for administrative purposes	264
492	Mr. London No. 42. Tel.	" 21	Greek refugee question. Refers to No. 258. Personal views invited. Council of League of Nations or decision to be taken. League's difficulties. No responsibility for refugees. League's consideration of proposed emergency credit. See No. 517	264
493	Mr. Hodgson No. 201. Tel.	" 20	Russian and Near East situation. Russian attitude in Russian note. Russian proposals to be communicated but terms as Russia might act on them	264
494	Lord Hardinge No. 469. Tel. Part I.	19	Withdrawal of French troops from Asiatic Turkey. Refers to No. 443. Protest made in connection with President Grevy's Letter of 1887	265
495	Lord Hardinge No. 469. Tel. Part 2.	" 19	Near East situation. Precedent of Grevy's letter. Comments on the situation. Turkish attitude. Proposal that Allied Commanders-in-Chief should meet at Constantinople. Terms of armistice. Turkish proposals. Question of probable breach	265
496	Lord Hardinge Telegraphic	20	Near East situation. Proposed Straits Convention. Reports of restoration of Mosques. Mr. Lloyd George's message to Turkish people	266
497	Lord Curzon to Prime Minister and Cabinet By telephone	" 20	Near East situation. Proposed Straits Convention. Report of proposal to open negotiations with Nationalists. Instructions by Prime Minister	267
498	Lord Hardinge Telegraphic.	" 20	Near East situation. Proposed Straits Convention. Lord Curzon's opinion of Cabinet's decision to agree to armistice and to summon conference as soon as possible	268
499	Lord Hardinge to Mr. London Telegraphic.	" 20	Near East situation. Message for Lloyd George from Prime Minister. Suggestion that Allied forces have been ordered to withdraw. Mr. Lloyd George's views. Proposal to meet Allied Commanders-in-Chief	269
500	Secret Clerk No. 104. Tel.	20	Near East settlement. Attitude of Government with regard to what will probably be rejection of Turkish proposals	269
501	Mr. Stanley of	" 21	Threatening settlement. Turkish attitude. Proposal not to accept suggestions of Hungarian Government	269
502	Admiralty	21	Measures to be taken in event of Near East negotiations. Telegram suggests to Lord High Commissioner of Mediterranean. See No. 408 and discusses question	270
503	Mr. Lindley No. 462. Tel.	20	Attack on one of Greek troops. Refers to No. 116. Denies	27
504	Mr. Lindley No. 463. Tel.	20	Greek refugees. Refers to No. 478. About 2,000 in Thrace and Greek possessions. Many thousands in Roumania. Must have assistance as future	272
505	Lord Stanley No. 322. Tel.	" 21	Measures proposed to meet. Proposal to make statement to House as to policy in regard to Turkish question. Will communicate with British citizens	272
506	To Commander-in- chief Mediterranean from Admiralty No. 949. Tel.	20	Goeben and Turkish vessels in Golden Horn. Refers to No. 488. Course undesirable to sink vessels. Further question of Goeben's armament and machinery. See No. 508	272

	No and Name.	Date.	Subject	Page
507	To Rear-Admiral Lord H Beresford Sq No 436 Tel	1922 Sept 21	Sovereign rescues Requests confirmation of fact that Kemal is persuading evacuation up to the 30th September see No 436	272
508	Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean to Admiralty No 373 Tel.	" 2	Goeben and Turkish vessels at Golden Horn refers to No 496 Question of stoppage of coaling or taking officers or men from these vessels in spite of convention	273
509	Senior Naval Officer Straits to Admiralty No 509 Tel	" 2	Reinforcements ordered to Chanak Telegram No 74 for Sir H Lamb Turks will resume their positions early next month Troops are marching north	274
510	Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean to Admiralty No 378 Tel	" 21	Three Turkish officers' prisoners only way to avoid unfortunate end will be to	274
511	Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean to Admiralty No 376, Tel.	"	Smyrna refugees Refugees must be evacuated to Greece by 30th September Note is to be sent that no more ships will be provided after that date	274
512	To Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean No 936 Tel.	" 21	Instructions to sight at Nicomedia Steamer Troops not to be landed	274
513	Lord Hardinge By telephone	" 21	Near East Conference Allied reply received Stop on account to be made of point during Fixed for 22nd September Proposed Greek Turkish Armistice to consist of Greek Army of Thrace	274
514	Sir H Rumbold No. 283. Tel	" 21	Proposed publication of Greek answer to the Press	275
515	To Mr London No. 45. Tel.	" 21	Near East Conference Refers to No 483 Both of Italian and Japan would be represented by	276
516	To Mr London No. 47 Tel	" 21	Greek Government Refuse to Allow Greek Army of Thrace to advance Memorandum for presentation to Greek Government supported by His Majesty's Government	276
517	To Mr London No 48. Tel	" 21	Armistice negotiations Refers to No 482 Armistice must protect	276
518	To Lord Hardinge No. 312 Tel	" 21	Military power of His Majesty's Government Regrets to agree to withdrawal Hopes not	276
519	To Lord Hardinge No 313 Tel.	" 21	Greek and Turkish situation Your Home Message from Sir M Hankey to Lord Curzon Naval officers at Constantinople not to be made	277
520	To Lord Hardinge No. 314. Tel.	" 21	Straits of Dardanelles and Constantinople For Lord Curzon from Foreign Office Suggests that in order to deal with questions of direct observation request sent Straits	277
521	To Lord Hardinge No. 315. Tel.	" 21	Freedom of Straits for Lord Curzon Prime Ministers statement at Parliamentary Committee of Trades Union Congress	278

	No and Name	Date.	Subject	Page.
522	To Sir H Rumbold No. 410. Tel. Mr Hodgson No. 214. Tel.	1922 Sept. 21	Conference Projected conference at Lausanne to discuss political and military allied requests report	278
523	Procès-verbal	" 20	Near East conference Minutes of meeting between Lord Curzon and Monsieur Henri Paris 20th September	278
523A	Sir H Rumbold No. 436. Tel.	" 20	Armistice negotiations Greek reasons for particulars of armistice Terms will be dispatched	284A
524	Mr Lamb No. 485. Tel	"	Situation at Chanak Refers to Mr Ismay's reports of general situation Hope new situation will enable agreement to be made	285
525	Mr Lamb No. 467 Tel.	" 21	Situation at Chanak Refers to No 455 Reinforcements Advantage of not requiring withdrawal of troops	285
526	Sir H Derby No. 120. Tel.	" 21	Reinforcements Near East Decision of Council that Situation of Britain has improved to withdraw troops from Chanak Hope Greeks will	285
527	Sir H Rumbold No. 441 Tel	" 21	Situation Near East Critical Importance of avoiding Situation Statement of Turkish demands Minister will be glad to hear	285
528	Sir H Rumbold No. 442 Tel	" 21	Near East Conference Correspondence with Senior Naval Officer Straits Refers to No 483 Section 2 Suggestion that Japan should be represented by Allied Powers	285
529	Sir H Rumbold No. 443. Tel.	" 21	Military power of Turkey Refers to No 483 Section 4 His Majesty's Government are anxious that	286
530	Sir H Rumbold No. 444 Tel	" 21	Transport of Nationalist troops to Europe Refers to No 483 Section 5 Senior Naval Officer Straits has been instructed that	287
531	Secretary to Admiralty to Foreign Office No 438 Tel	" 2	Prevention of Turks crossing Bosphorus Message for Lord Curzon Text of	287
532	Sir H Rumbold No. 448. Tel	" 22	Armistice negotiations Greek Government's opinion that Kemal would be willing to agree to withdrawal of Greek Army of Thrace Memorandum Situation	288
533	Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean to Admiralty No. 381. Tel	" 21	Prevention of Turks crossing Bosphorus Report concerning Turkish movements Greek Government	288
534	To Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean from Admiralty No. 953. Tel	" 22	Prevention of Turks crossing Bosphorus Reference No 533 Cannot discuss	288

No and Name.	Date.	Subject	Page.
535 To Commander in Chief Admiral Mediterranean Fleet for Admiralty No. 984 Tel	Aug 29 Sept 2	Prevention of Turks crossing to Europe Instructions to High Commissioner not to take provocative action does not affect responsibility of navy	28
536 Senior Naval Officer Salonika to Admiralty No. 510. Tel	" 22	Smyrna refugees Refers to No 497 reports that Kemal is permitting evacuation up to end September	281
537 Lord Hardinge No. 471. Tel.	" 21	Near East settlement Lord Curzon to conduct informal conversations with King of Jugoslavia M Pasitch and M Nintchitch	289
538 Sir H Rumbold No 105. Tel	" 22	Czechoslovakia Near East policy Prague Minister's conference at Marienbad Question of keeping Turks out of Europe	290
539 Sir H Rumbold No 368 Tel.	" 2	Greek Press and Near East situation Attitude towards British and French policy Present time unfavourable to press that Chanak Crisis will not be renewed Question whether see No 509	291
540 To Mr Findley No. 244. Tel	" 22	Greek reparations Refers to No 473 His Majesty's Government have come to the conclusion that a reasonable settlement of Greek reparations claims would be £10 000 000 but Dr Nansen's proposal has been accepted to the extent of £4 000 000 on condition that other Powers agree to it	291
541 To Sir H Rumbold No. 417 Tel	" 22	Greek refugees Refers to No 479 question not to be discussed with Allied High Commissioners who are best source of information of efforts Angora are taking and British vessels will be available for Smyrna	291
542 To Sir H Rumbold No. 418 Tel.	" 22	Entry of Nationalist troops at Europa Refers to No 479 Proposal for letters to Angora Reply at end of No 541 and to No 534 will be communicated to Cabinet	292
543 To Mr Lamb No. 52. Tel	" 22	Smyrna refugees Refers to No 495 Mr Lamb Report of discussion with regard to refugees at Constantinople should have no real effect	292
544 To Paris No 318. Tel. Rome No. 280. Tel Washington No. 284. Tel	" 22	Smyrna refugees Mustafa Kemal's decision Protest should be made and Kemal's attention pressed for evacuation on humanitarian	292
545 Proces verbal	" 21	Near East settlement Minutes of meeting held by Lord Curzon M Poincaré and Count Sforza on the 20th September at the Quai d'Orsay	293
546 Mr Findley No 488. Tel.	" 22	Christian population of Thrace Anxiety of Constantinople Greek refugees from Kemalist coasts are expected	300
547 Mr Findley No. 470. Tel	" 23	Smyrna Central refugees Refers to No 495 154 refugees evacuated at Piraeus on board steamship City of Versailles	301
548 Mr Lindsay No. 471. Tel	" 23	Steamship Charnwood Message received requesting that Charnwood may be ready to sail capable of carrying 3 000 refugees or troops	301
549 Sir H Rumbold No. 121. Tel	Sept 22	Constantinople Near East settlement Communique to Government organs re phases Nationalist interests in freedom of Straits and Balkan equilibrium	301
550 Sir G Hering No. 122. Tel	" 2	Defence Consultant note Refers to No 478 Measures taken for representation and participation in contingent at Constantinople	301
551 Sir H Rumbold No. 123. Tel	" 22	Bolshevik attempt to subornate Greek troops in Thrace Reports discovery of plot to spread communist propaganda Documents under seal from Russian Legation No 654	302
552 Sir H Rumbold No. 447 Tel	" 22	Smyrna refugees Telegram from Mytilene requests assistance on behalf of £20 000 lent under the guarantee of Greek bankers between 15th and 25th of September in respect of refugees who were forcibly taken away and forged passports are shown	302
553 Sir H Rumbold No. 448. Tel.	" 22	Arrest of British subjects at Constantinople Refers to No 529 Further report	102
554 Sir H Rumbold No. 449. Tel.	" 2	Military power of His Majesty's Government Proposal Irrington has orders to proceed to Constantinople Question of defence of neutral zone	303
555 Sir H Rumbold No 450 Tel	" 3	Turkish vessels in Bosphorus Admiral Brock's orders to remove all vessels Points out difficulties which would be experienced in carrying out instructions	303
556 Sir H Rumbold No. 451 Tel	" 23	Turkish vessels in Bosphorus Communication to Nos 555 Points out impossibility of vessels being able not to receive support of Allies	304
557 Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean to Admiralty No. 392. Tel.	" 22	Smyrna refugees Evacuation Turkish attack on Ismid Report from Rear Admiral Troubridge Flight of Greek Supreme Council Report from Rear Admiral Pepe states Turks will attack on the 23rd September	304
558 Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean to Admiralty No. 393. Tel	" 23	Turkish situation Report from Rear Admiral Pepe Supplementary to Nos 557 Situation unchanged See No 576	304
559 Lord Hardinge Sir H Rumbold Sir A Nicolson No. 475. Tel.	" 3	Near East settlement Text of letter from Angora Communication should be obtained from French Ministry for communication to Master General Foreign Affairs	304A
560 To Senior Naval Officer 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron for Admiralty Telegraphic	" 2	Smyrna refugees Employment of Greek troops for evacuation See No 559	305
561 Senior Naval Officer 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron for Admiralty No. 434. Tel.	" 23	Smyrna refugees Refers to No 554 Understands Greek ships may only enter if operating under control of Allied or American authorities	305
562 Senior Naval Officer 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron for Admiralty No. 511 Tel.	" 23	Smyrna British refugees Telegram No 55 from Sir L Lamb All known Hellenes and Armenians have been evacuated except a few who have refused to go	305
563 Mr Graves Watson No. 91 Tel	" 29	Port Gallino Near East situation Offers of co-operation from Railway Battalion	305

	No. and Name.	Date.	Subject	Page.
565	Lord Hardinge No. 472 Tel.	1922 Sept. 22	Near East settlement. Message from Lord Curzon. Meeting with Venizelos to discuss terms of possible agreement as basis of conference. M. Poincaré's opinion on same. Hardinge.	305
566	Lord Hardinge No. 476. Tel.	" 22	Near East settlement. Irish text of note sent to Angora Government with regard to [illegible] of conference. Hardinge. See No. 572.	307
567	Sir G. Clerk No. 106. Tel.	" 23	Exchange rate at Nancy has gone [illegible] to No. 563 from Minister at Berne. Has [illegible] of opinion [illegible] taken on Rhine and Danube.	308
568	Sir A. Geddes No. 372. Tel.	" 23	United States press. Near East situation. Refers to No. 559. Sir A. Geddes's opinion [illegible] given.	308
569	The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.	23	Greek retreat. Refers to [illegible]	308
570	The Earl of Granard No. 246. Tel.	23	Near East. Refers to telegram from Lord Curzon. Should [illegible] Angora. See No. 573.	309
571	The Earl of Granard No. 320. Tel.	23	Near East. Refers to telegram from Lord Curzon. Should [illegible] Angora. See No. 573.	309
572	The Earl of Granard No. 321 Tel.	" 23	Near East. Refers to telegram from Lord Curzon. Should [illegible] Angora. See No. 573.	310
573	The Earl of Granard No. 322 Tel.	" 23	Near East. Refers to telegram from Lord Curzon. Should [illegible] Angora. See No. 573.	310
574	Lord Curzon.	23	Near East. Should [illegible] Angora.	311
575	Mr. Lindley No. 473 Tel.	23	Near East. Refers to telegram from Sir G. Clerk. Should [illegible] Angora. See No. 573.	311
576	Mr. Lindley No. 474. Tel.	" 23	Greek offer to [illegible] Refers to No. 564. Has [illegible] Angora. See No. 573.	311
577	The Secretary to the Treasury No. 421. Tel.	" 23	Remittance to Greece for [illegible] Refers to No. 564. Has [illegible] Angora. See No. 573.	311a
578	Mr. Hodgson No. 208. Tel.	" 24	Evacuation of Mosul. Turkish [illegible] Reports [illegible]	311
579	Sir H. Rumbold No. 452 Tel.	" 21	Turkish [illegible] Refers to No. 564. Has [illegible] Angora. See No. 573.	311a
580	Sir H. Rumbold No. 453 Tel.	" 21	Return to Russian zone of Greek refugees. Georgian Agreement. Text of [illegible] sent to Angora. See No. 573.	311
581	Sir H. Rumbold No. 454 Tel.	" 24	Turkish intentions in regard to Near East settlement. Decisions taken at Swansea meeting are [illegible] passing Angora will assist [illegible] evacuation of Constantinople and [illegible] Greeks from Thrace.	312

	No. and Name.	Date.	Subject	Page.
578	Sir H. Rumbold No. 455. Tel.	1922 Sept. 24	Armistice negotiations. Census. Refers to No. 565. Report on treaty [illegible]	312
579	Sir H. Rumbold No. 456 Tel.	"	Turkish advance. Greek Kemalist forces. Refers to No. 576. Kemalist forces asked to withdraw from neutral zone.	312
580	Sir H. Rumbold No. 457 Tel.	" 24	Near East conference. Invitation to conference sent to Angora Government. Refers to No. 573.	312
581	Sir H. Rumbold No. 459 Tel.	" 24	Constantinople. Press censorship. Arrangements made to [illegible] at short notice.	312
582	Commander Kemeys Tynte, R.N. Admiralty No. 402 Tel.	" 24	Turkish attack on Greeks. Naval [illegible] Turkish troops [illegible] Smyrna.	313
583	Lord Hardinge Telegraphic.	" 23	Near East settlement. Lord Curzon reports [illegible] Greek result [illegible]	
584	Lord Hardinge to Sir H. Rumbold No. 477 Tel.	" 23	Defence of Constantinople. From Lord Curzon. Sir H. Rumbold [illegible] Angora. Has been [illegible] to assist in [illegible] order. See No. 583.	
585	Lord Hardinge No. 478. Tel.	" 24	Defence of Constantinople. From Secretary of State [illegible] General Harington [illegible]	
586	Sir H. Rumbold No. 285. Tel.	" 23	Italian attitude in Near East settlement. Minister for Foreign Affairs told Lord Curzon [illegible]	
587	Sir H. Rumbold No. 286 Tel.	24	Near East. Secretary of State [illegible] Minister for Foreign Affairs [illegible]	
588	Sir R. Graham No. 287 Tel.	23	Italian attitude. Mussolini's [illegible]	315
589	Sir R. Graham No. 288. Tel.	24	Greek [illegible]	316
590	Sir A. Geddes No. 373. Tel.	23	Smyrna refugees. Refers to No. 543. Admiral Sinclair High Commissioner [illegible]	316
591	To Mr. Lindley No. 250. Tel.	24	Greek refugees. Refers to No. 567. His Majesty's Government anxious to [illegible] See also No. 576.	316
592	To Lord Hardinge No. 323 Tel.	24	Turkish advance on Eski Kemalist [illegible] Refers to No. 558.	317
593	Sir H. Rumbold No. 322		Near East settlement. Refers to No. 565. Reports conversation with Ismet Pasha [illegible] Angora [illegible] Swansea. Ismet's views [illegible]	316
594	Sir H. Derby No. 493	18	Armed [illegible] policy in regard to Constantinople. Withdrawal of Hellenic troops [illegible]	317

No. and Name.	Date.	Subject	Page.
595 Sir H. Rumbold No. 823	Sept. 18	Bolshevism in Smyrna. Transmits memorandum by Mr. Hope	319
596 Sir H. Rumbold No. 826	" 19	Treaty settlement. Situation. His Majesty's Government suggests that Eastern Thrace should be ceded to Greece. Turkish Sultan's government	320
597 Sir H. Erskine No. 494		Roumanian Near East policy. Refers to No. 481. Views on situation arising from Angora Government's rejection of proposals. Intends to proceed to Bucharest. Views of Roumanian Government. Tel.	321
598 Sir H. Erskine No. 496	"	Roumanian Near East policy. Reports further conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs	323
599 Sir H. Rumbold No. 496	" 19	Is of opinion that policy of Great Britain should be to support Greece. Urges from Imperial point of view necessity of immediate agreement with Greece. Is not in favour of Greek occupation of Constantinople. Views of French Government	323
600 Sir A. Geddes No. 856	" 21	Mr. Lindley's proposals. Interview with Ismet Pasha. Refuses to consider proposals. Terms of Allied ultimatum against Turkey	325
601 Mr. Lindley No. 2221		Withdrawal of proposals. Angora Government. Transmits text of Ismet Pasha's reply	327
602 Mr. Lindley No. 2222	" 20	Interview with Ismet Pasha. Transmits text of Mudania agreement. Views of Angora Government on proposals. Refuses to sign	327
603 Lord Hardinge No. 3227	" 21	Interview with Ismet Pasha. Transmits text of proposals. Refuses to sign. Views of French Government	329
604 Mr. Lindley No. 2228	" 24	Mr. Lindley's interview with Ismet Pasha. Refuses to sign. Views of Mr. Lindley. Views of French Government	329
605 Sir H. Rumbold No. 476. Tel.	" 25	Roumanian Government's policy. Interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs. Views of Roumanian Government. Refers to No. 512	330
606 Mr. Lindley No. 477. Tel.	" 25	Greek refugees. Refers to No. 591. Views on situation. Impossibility of Greek Government's proposal. Turkish Government's attitude. Is not in favour of evacuation	330
607 Mr. Lindley No. 478. Tel.	25	Near East situation. Interview with Ismet Pasha. Refuses to sign. Views of Mr. Lindley. Is not in favour of evacuation	331
608 Sir A. Young No. 125. Tel.	" 25	Near East situation. Text of note. Views of Roumanian Government. Serious situation. Views of Mr. Young. Is not in favour of evacuation	331
609 Sir H. Rumbold No. 490. Tel.	" 26	Situation. Refers to No. 540. Is unable to report progress. Views of Roumanian Government	331
610 Sir H. Rumbold No. 491. Tel.	" 25	Turkish ultimatum. Interview with Ismet Pasha. Views of Roumanian Government	332
611 Sir H. Rumbold No. 492. Tel.	25	Roumanian proposals for revision of Treaty of Bucharest. Refers to No. 510. Agrees that Roumania should be represented at conference. Refers to Nos. 541 and 580	332
612 Sir H. Rumbold No. 493. Tel.	" 25	Roumanian Government's attitude. Refers to Averoff. Refers to No. 510. Greek Minister has asked Roumanian Government to intervene on behalf of Averoff. Should be advised to leave	332

No. and Name.	Date.	Subject	Page.
613 To Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean. From Admiralty. No. 983. Tel.	1922 Sept. 24	Control of shipping in Bosphorus. Refers to No. 555. Note on should be taken with receipt of further instructions. See No. 613	333
614 To Commander-in-Chief Near East. From Admiralty. No. 989. Tel.	" 25	Control of shipping in Bosphorus. Refers to Nos. 555 and 613. Orders. Decision. Full latitude given to Admiral	333
615 Lord Hardinge No. 479. Tel.	" 24	Near East situation. Instructions to ignore Attitude of press	333
616 Lord Hardinge Telegraphic	" 25	Agreement pending between Angora Nationalists and Constantinople. Views of Mr. Franklin-Bouillon. Refers to suggestions of His Majesty's Government. Views of Mr. Ambassador. Refers to No. [illegible]	334
617 Sir A. Geddes No. 375. Tel.	25	Near East situation. Refers to No. 606. Attitude of Angora Nationalists. Views of press	334
618 Sir W. Max Muller No. 110. Tel.	" 24	Near East crisis. Minister for Foreign Affairs's views. Refers to note to Allied Governments. Hopes to come to agreement with Angora Government. Suggestions. Situation might be improved by Russian action	334
619 To Mr. Lindley No. 251. Tel.	2	Greek withdrawal. Refers to No. 576. Refugees. Should avoid. Is unable to advise	335
620 Lord Hardinge No. 328. Tel.	" 24	Fate of troops in Constantinople. Refers to No. 6. Press comments. Information	335
621 Procès verbal	24	Near East situation. Minutes of meeting between Lord Curzon, M. Poincaré and Count Sforza at Quai d'Orsay on 24th September. Views of Angora Government	335
622 Foreign Office. Mr. Nicolson	" 25	Interview with Straits Commission	337
623 Mr. Lindley No. 480. Tel.	" 25	Near East situation. Interview with Ismet Pasha. Refuses to sign. Views of Mr. Lindley. Is not in favour of evacuation	337
624 Mr. Lindley No. 482. Tel.	" 24	Near East situation. Refers to No. 616. Peace terms. Views of Mr. Lindley. Is not in favour of Greek evacuation. Views of Greek Government. Refers to report that Turkish army is advancing on Mudania	339
625 Sir H. Rumbold No. 495. Tel.	" 26	Despatch of Greek troops to Thrace through Roumanian territory. Refers to No. 611. Greek Minister has asked for transit of troops. Refers to No. 611. Views of Roumanian Government. Refers to Nos. 611 and 612	339
626 Mr. London to Lord Allenby No. 55. Tel.	" 25	Flight of Sultan. Refers to No. [illegible]. Views of Sultan. Intends to leave Constantinople. Views of Mr. London. Refers to No. [illegible]	341
627 M. Kurakhin Telegraphic	" 24	Near East situation. Refusal of Angora Government to sign. Views of Western Powers. Appeal by Allied Governments to Angora Government. Proposals for conference of Powers. Views of Soviet Government. Proposals for peace. Views of Soviet Government. Proposals for peace. Views of Soviet Government. Proposals for peace

	No and Name	Date.	Subject	Page.
629	Lord Hardinge No. 481 Tel.	1922 Sept.	... instructions to obtain ...	353
630	Lord Curzon No. 482 Tel.	"	... troops ... Chanak ...	353
631	Lord Hardinge No. 483. Tel	" 26	... Action taken ... French ...	353
632	Sir C. Hardinge No. 290. Tel.	" 26	... Near East ...	354
633	Sir H. Rumbold No. 291. Tel.	" 27	...	354
634	Mr. Peake No. 56. Tel	" 26	...	354
635	Sir A. Geddes No. 376. Tel.	" 26	...	355
636	Sir A. Geddes No. 378 Tel	" 27	...	355
637	Procès-verbal	" 28	...	355
638	To Sir L. Lindley No. 252 Tel	" 26	...	361
639	To Mr. Bland No. 253 Tel.	" 27	...	361
640	To Mr. Bradley No. 264. Tel.	" 29	...	362
641	To Sir H. Rumbold No. 85. Tel	" 26	...	362
642	To Mr. Lamb No. 89. Tel	" 26	...	362
643	To Sir C. Hardinge No. 326. Tel	" 26	...	362
644	To Sir C. Geddes No. 290 Tel.	" 28	...	363

	No and Name	Date	Subject	Page
645	Lord Hardinge No. 743	1922 Sept. 15	Egyptian Near East crisis Effect of Turkish victory	363
646	Mr. Lindley No. 486 Tel.	" 26	...	364
647	Mr. Lindley No. 487. Tel	" 26	...	364
648	Mr. Lindley No. 493. Tel.	" 26	...	364
649	Mr. Lindley No. 496. Tel.	" 27	...	364
650	Mr. Lindley No. 500. Tel	" 27	...	365
651	Sir H. Rumbold No. 466 Tel	" 27	...	365
652	Sir H. Rumbold No. 467 Tel.	" 27	...	365
653	Sir H. Rumbold No. 468. Tel	" 27	...	366
654	Sir H. Rumbold No. 469 Tel	" 27	...	366
655	Sir H. Rumbold No. 470. Tel	" 27	...	366
656	Sir L. Lindley No. 471. Tel.	" 27	...	367
657	Sir H. Rumbold No. 472 Tel	" 27	...	368
658	To Commander-in-chief Mediterranean Admiralty No. 997 Tel	" 25	...	368
659	Commander-in-chief Mediterranean to Admiralty No. 416. Tel	" 26	...	368

No and Name.	Date	Subject	Page
650 Cox [illegible] No 419 Tel.	1922 Sept 25	[illegible] Mr Venizelos to Mr Lindley	369
651 Foreign Office to Admiralty No. 15. Tel	" 26	[illegible]	369
652 Lord Hardinge Telegraphic	" 26	Mr Venizelos's [illegible] Lindley to No 649 Naval [illegible] 25 September Latter not be able to visit Foreign Office [illegible]	369
653 Sir R Rodd No. 384 Tel	" 26	[illegible] Naval Staff [illegible] Mr Venizelos [illegible]	369
654 Sir R Rodd No. 385. Tel	" 26	Mr Venizelos [illegible] Naval [illegible]	370
655 Mr Lindley No. 266 Tel	" 27	Despatch of [illegible] troops to Turkey [illegible] No 652 Proposed [illegible]	370
656 To Mr Lindley No 267. Tel	" "	Appeal [illegible]	370
657 To Mr Lindley No. 268 Tel	" 27	Cavalry [illegible]	370
658 To Sir H Rumbold No. 434 Tel Mr Lindley No 268 Tel.	" 27	Date [illegible]	371
659 [illegible]	" 27	[illegible]	371
660 Mr Lindley No 266	" 27	Proposed [illegible] to Mr [illegible] No 652	371
661 Mr Lindley No 506. Tel	" 28	[illegible]	372
662 Foreign Office No 333 Tel	" 28	[illegible]	372
663 Sir H Rumbold No. 473 Tel	" 28	Mr Venizelos [illegible]	373
664 Sir H Rumbold No. 474. Tel	" 28	Mr Venizelos [illegible] Mr Lindley's [illegible]	373
665 Sir H Rumbold No 475. Tel.	" 28	British troops [illegible] to No 651 [illegible]	373
666 Sir H Rumbold No. 476 Tel	" 28	[illegible] Naval Staff [illegible] No 650 [illegible]	374
667 Sir H Rumbold No. 477. Tel.	" 28	Military policy of His Majesty's Government. Refers to No 629 French High Commissioner's suggestion for withdrawal of British troops from Asiatic shore of Straits. Consider such withdrawal impossible	374
668 Sir H Rumbold No. 478. Tel.	" 28	Arrest of British subjects at Chanaksu. Messrs. Soloy Dodge and Lawrence have arrived by steamship Adria	374
669 Sir H Rumbold No. 479. Tel.	" 28	Neutral zones. Comments of General Harington's arguments with regard to neutral zones, passage of Russian troops to Europe etc	374
670 Sir H Rumbold No. 480 Tel.	" 28	Position at Chanak. Situation report.	374
671 To Mr Lindley No. 263. Tel.	" 28	Turkish air forces. Transports arrange for Naval Mission from Admiralty. Foreign Office to be kept informed of position	375
672 To Mr Lindley No. 264 Tel	28	Despatch of [illegible] troops to Thrace. Refers to No 665. Requested to submit [illegible] to proceed [illegible]	376
672a To Sir H Rumbold No. 442 Tel	28	Transit [illegible] Instructions [illegible] troops do not [illegible] entry of [illegible] Dardanelles [illegible] No 708	376a
673 To Mr Lindley No. 76. Tel	28	Greek refugees. Request [illegible] before carrying [illegible] Mr Lindley's suggestion	376
674 Mr Lindley No. 509 Tel	" 28	Passage of Greek troops through Dardanelles. Refers to No 665. Acting Chief of General Staff [illegible]	376
675 Mr Lindley No. 515 Tel	" 28	Despatch of Greek troops to Asia Minor [illegible]	376
676 Mr Lindley No. 518. Tel	" 29	Turkish [illegible] Mr Venizelos's [illegible] Foreign Affairs	377
677 Sir A Young No. 129 Tel	" 28	Naval [illegible] Decision will be taken in [illegible] Mr Poincaré [illegible]	377
678 Sir A Young No. 130. Tel.	" 28	Receipt of Secretary of State's No 687. Mr Venizelos [illegible]	378
679 Sir H Rumbold No. 124. Tel	" 28	Naval and [illegible] troops for Thrace. Result of observations. Refers to No 665. Inquiry [illegible]	378
680 Sir H Rumbold No. 482 Tel.	29	Colonel Sutton. Refers to No 667. Above [illegible] Three French officers [illegible]	378
681 Sir H Rumbold No. 484 Tel	29	Meeting of Greek Ministers. Mr Venizelos's Naval Reports. Meeting Mr Ironside. Mr Venizelos [illegible]	379

No. and Name	Date.	Subject	Page.
667 Sir H Rumbold No. 477. Tel.	1922 Sept 28	Military policy of His Majesty's Government. Refers to No 629. French High Commissioner's suggestion for withdrawal of British troops from Asiatic shore of Straits. Consider such withdrawal impossible	374
668 Sir H Rumbold No. 478. Tel.	" 28	Arrest of British subjects at Chanaksu. Messrs. Soloy Dodge and Lawrence have arrived by steamship Adria	374
669 Sir H Rumbold No. 479. Tel.	" 28	Neutral zones. Comments of General Harington's arguments with regard to neutral zones, passage of Russian troops to Europe etc	374
670 Sir H Rumbold No. 480 Tel.	28	Position at Chanak. Situation report.	374
671 To Mr Lindley No. 263. Tel.	" 28	Turkish air forces. Transports arrange for Naval Mission from Admiralty. Foreign Office to be kept informed of position	375
672 To Mr Lindley No. 264 Tel	28	Despatch of [illegible] troops to Thrace. Refers to No 665. Requested to submit [illegible] to proceed [illegible]	376
672a To Sir H Rumbold No. 442 Tel	28	Transit [illegible] Instructions [illegible] troops do not [illegible] entry of [illegible] Dardanelles [illegible] No 708	376a
673 To Mr Lindley No. 76. Tel	28	Greek refugees. Request [illegible] before carrying [illegible] Mr Lindley's suggestion	376
674 Mr Lindley No. 509 Tel	" 28	Passage of Greek troops through Dardanelles. Refers to No 665. Acting Chief of General Staff [illegible]	376
675 Mr Lindley No. 515 Tel	" 28	Despatch of Greek troops to Asia Minor [illegible]	376
676 Mr Lindley No. 518. Tel	" 29	Turkish [illegible] Mr Venizelos's [illegible] Foreign Affairs	377
677 Sir A Young No. 129 Tel	" 28	Naval [illegible] Decision will be taken in [illegible] Mr Poincaré [illegible]	377
678 Sir A Young No. 130. Tel.	" 28	Receipt of Secretary of State's No 687. Mr Venizelos [illegible]	378
679 Sir H Rumbold No. 124. Tel	" 28	Naval and [illegible] troops for Thrace. Result of observations. Refers to No 665. Inquiry [illegible]	378
680 Sir H Rumbold No. 482 Tel.	29	Colonel Sutton. Refers to No 667. Above [illegible] Three French officers [illegible]	378
681 Sir H Rumbold No. 484 Tel	29	Meeting of Greek Ministers. Mr Venizelos's Naval Reports. Meeting Mr Ironside. Mr Venizelos [illegible]	379

	No and Name	Date	Subject	Page
682	Lord Hardinge No. 485. Tel.	1923 Sept. 28	Admiralty suggest that press estimates that Lord Beatty has only 2 battleships and 2 battle cruisers with Fleet are misleading. Suggest that statement showing part taken by Great Britain should be entered through another	384
683	Lord Hardinge No. 488. Tel.	" 28	Greek political situation. Venizelos's resignation as result of further meeting of Revolutionary Committee which will probably lead to dictatorship. Views of British Representative on the situation	385
684	Lord Hardinge No. 487. Tel.	" 28	Near East conference. Proposals for demilitarisation of Straits. Views of Russia and Bulgaria	386
685	Sir H. Rumbold No. 293. Tel.	" 28	Near East conference. Question of Turkish Press and censorship	389
686	Sir H. Rumbold No. 295. Tel.	" 29	Withdrawal of British troops from Constantinople. Reference to No. 668. Views of Foreign Office and Admiralty. Request for report of naval movements	98
687	[illegible]			
688	Sir H. Rumbold No. 289. Tel.		Withdrawal of British troops from Constantinople. Reference to No. 668	98
689	To Sir H. Rumbold No. 292. Tel.	"	Near East conference. Turkish Press censorship. Reference to No. 685. Views of His Majesty's Government. Proposals should be communicated to Turkish Government	98
690	To Sir H. Rumbold No. 959	" 29	Withdrawal of British troops from Constantinople. Reference to No. 688. Views of His Majesty's Government	81
691	Mr. Rumbold No. 519. Tel.	" 29	Reports that Venizelos has left Athens. Progress of Revolutionary movement. Views of Revolutionary Committee. Proposed ultimatum to Greek Government	385
692	Mr. Lamb No. 521. Tel.	" 29	Withdrawal of British troops from Constantinople. Reference to No. 688. Views of Greek Government. Proposal to withdraw British troops from Constantinople. Views of Foreign Office and Admiralty. Reference to No. 686. Views of Admiralty	381
693	Mr. Lamb No. 522. Tel.	" 29	Withdrawal of British troops from Constantinople. Reference to No. 688. Views of Greek Government. Proposal to withdraw British troops from Constantinople. Views of Foreign Office and Admiralty. Reference to No. 686. Views of Admiralty	382
694	Sir H. Rumbold No. 483. Tel.	" 29	Withdrawal of British troops from Constantinople. Reference to No. 688. Views of Greek Government. Proposal to withdraw British troops from Constantinople. Views of Foreign Office and Admiralty. Reference to No. 686. Views of Admiralty	384
695	Sir H. Rumbold No. 485. Tel.	" 29	Withdrawal of British troops from Constantinople. Reference to No. 688. Views of Greek Government. Proposal to withdraw British troops from Constantinople. Views of Foreign Office and Admiralty. Reference to No. 686. Views of Admiralty	98
696	Sir H. Rumbold No. 486. Tel.	" 29	Withdrawal of British troops from Constantinople. Reference to No. 688. Views of Greek Government. Proposal to withdraw British troops from Constantinople. Views of Foreign Office and Admiralty. Reference to No. 686. Views of Admiralty	382
697	Sir H. Rumbold No. 487. Tel.	" 30	Near East settlement. Views of political parties. His Majesty's Government regarding Mudania Convention. Demilitarisation of Straits. Withdrawal of troops as to Mudania	387
698	Sir H. Rumbold No. 489. Tel.	" 30	Mudania meeting. Reference to Nos. 682 and 691. Conversation with Italian envoy. Reasons of withdrawal of British troops in Thrace in connection with meeting	383

	No and Name	Date.	Subject	Page.
709	Sir H. Rumbold No. 490. Tel.	1923 Sept. 30	Mudania meeting. General Harington reports improvement. Action might be delayed for a day or two to see whether Mudania meeting determines does not consider that Kemalists mean business at Ghanak	386
710	Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean to Admiralty No. 431 Tel.	" 30	Turkish warships in Dardanelles. Passage into Sea of Marmora is being prevented	387
711	Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean to Admiralty No. 433 Tel.	" 30	British evacuation of Constantinople. Requests Admiralty views on points arising out of evacuation	387
712	Lord Hardinge No. 492 Tel.	" 30	Mr. Frank Rattigan's interview with Kemal. Reports General Harington's return to Turkish Headquarters. Interview with Mr. Rendel who reported hopeful message from Mr. Franklin-Bouillon and Kemal's confidence of ultimate agreement without Anglo-Italian solution	387
713	Sir A. Chamberlain No. 393. Tel.	29	Arrangements for Near East Conference. Refers to No. 66 and other telegrams	389
714	To Lord Hardinge No. 330. Tel. Sir R. Graham No. 263 Tel.	30	Greek request for withdrawal of Turkish Embassy has been under consideration whether refusal would take place prior to Kemal's acceptance of invitation to conference. In the view of His Majesty's Government the answer is in the negative	388
715	To Sir H. Rumbold No. 452. Tel.	30	Greek peculiarly precarious position. Representations at Athens would be useless and would rather make bad worse	388

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Correspondence respecting Turkey.

Part I.

[In continuation of "Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs." Part X (12068), Chapter II, "Turkey."]

E 6169/48/44] **No. 1.**

The Earl of Balfour to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 663.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 1, 1922.*

I HAVE received your despatches Nos. 521 and 536 of the 10th and 12th ultimo containing a report on the Standard Oil Company's depots at Kouroucheshme and Selimieh and recording your conversation with the United States High Commissioner. I entirely approve the attitude which you have adopted with regard to Admiral Bristol and the action which you took in conjunction with your French and Italian colleagues in this matter.

2. In accordance with your suggestion, the question of the Allied High Commissioners' right to interfere in the administration of the city has been examined by the legal advisers of this Department, and the considered opinion which they have furnished is to the following effect:—

3. There is, as you observe, no exact precedent for the situation which exists at Constantinople to-day, but there is no doubt that the three Allies are entitled to at least all the rights of an occupying belligerent, and it may be prudent to deal with this particular question on the footing that they are not entitled to anything more. It does not appear that the fact that the Allied forces are represented at Constantinople by High Commissioners makes any difference, since it must be open to the Powers to exercise their rights by means of civilian officials instead of a military commander if they see fit to do so, and the extent of those rights could not be diminished thereby.

4. In the second paragraph of your despatch No. 521 you expressed the view that the High Commissioners "as the civilian authorities of a town under Allied military occupation . . . are ultimately responsible for the proper administration of this city, and that they can, if it be considered expedient modify local administrative regulations in the interests of the forces of occupation or the population in general." This view is considered to be correct, except that the last five words go rather too far. The conventional provision on the question is article 43 of The Hague Land War Regulations, which provides as follows:—

> "the authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore and ensure as far as possible public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country."

5. No reason is seen why this rule should not be applied to Constantinople, although the Sultan and his Government are still there, the Turkish Administration is only being carried on by the permission of the occupying forces, and the situation does

[illegible] the Straits Convention where the local administration is entrusted to the Turkish authorities, subject to the general control of the Military Commission. This being so, the High Commissioners are, they feel sure, confident that they are ultimately responsible for the proper administration of the Straits, but it is considered that the discretion left to the Turkish authorities by the Convention is sufficient to enable them to take all necessary steps for the security of the Straits against the forces of the Nationalist party.

[illegible] the High Commissioners consider that the existing Turkish regulations for preventing the passage of vessels through the Straits are perfectly adequate for the purpose, and that the Nationalist Government would not be justified in making any changes in them which would tend to hamper the passage of merchant vessels. The High Commissioners would point out that the Turkish authorities have always shown a most friendly disposition towards the Allied Powers, and that the Turkish Government would be well advised to continue to act in accordance with the Convention of Lausanne. The High Commissioners are of opinion that the Turkish authorities are now fully aware that the control of the Straits is entrusted to the High Commissioners. He would appreciate a reply as to the High Commissioners' intentions in the event of vessels of war coming through the Straits without permission or with false papers.

I have, &c.
BALFOUR

E 6662 6453 65 No. 2

Draft [illegible] Proposed to be initialled by the Italian Ambassador [illegible]

[illegible] Italian Government having ascertained their entire desire to establish cordial relations between Italy and Turkey, and to co-operate with the other Powers in new and stable political conditions in the Near East, have agreed as regards the questions raised by the Nationalist advance in Asia Minor and the threat to the neutral zone of Constantinople, that they will discharge their obligations in such questions when [illegible] the Straits Convention.

They will support before the Allied Powers the attainment of the necessary amendments for a Mediterranean settlement, both from a political and economic point of view. If events have such progressed meanwhile as to give them previously obtained, they will endeavour themselves shall to give them the most satisfactory solution of the question of facilitating the Anglo-Italian collaboration in the other Mediterranean questions.

The two Governments have given [illegible]

In the question relating to the Straits of Constantinople the two Governments have ascertained that, although they dispose of [illegible] have recourse to military pressure on the various parties, it is convenient to continue to exercise their influence over them in

view of reaching a permanent settlement of the peace. The two Governments agree in the opinion that, according to the principles which have always been upheld, the fundamental directors of their common actions must be directed towards the ensuring of the freedom of the Straits and the effective protection of the minorities in the Near East.

2. The Italian Government, in order to facilitate the return to normal conditions of the Arab countries detached from the Turkish Empire and entrusted to the British mandate, are willing to consent that the draft mandates of Palestine and Iraq should be discussed by the League of Nations before the coming into force of the peace treaty with Turkey and are also disposed to give their approval to the said drafts, subject to some explanations which are separately dealt with.

The British Government, on their part, recognise and the difficulty of the practical realisation of the rights and privileges given to Italy in Asia Minor under the Tripartite Agreement, and consent that article 15 of the Palestine mandate should be applied to Italy notwithstanding the provisions of article 6 of the said Tripartite Agreement.

The British Government further reconsider [illegible] to the Italian Government with regard to Palestine and accept the assurances contained in [illegible] Annex No. 1.

3. The British Government, in order to enable the Italian Government to realise as far as possible the benefits recognised to Italy in Asia Minor by the Tripartite Agreement, are disposed to support before the Turkish Government a close examination of economical concessions in the Italian priority zone which the Italian financial group, should present to them and to recommend.

4. The British Government, in accordance with the spirit of the letter addressed at Genoa by Mr. Lloyd George to Signor Schanzer on the oil question, are disposed to favour the collaboration of Italian enterprisers with British enterprisers in view to obtaining an exploration of concessions of the west-southern vilayets of Turkey.

Memorandum. In accordance with the provisions of the new draft of article 14 of the Palestine mandate (Annex No. 2), the Italian Government are disposed to consent that the Commission of the Holy Places should not examine in the report that will be presented to the decision of the League of Nations Council with regard to the existing rights in the Holy places. Before the question of the Christian [illegible]. However the British Government are free from this engagement prepared not to raise any objections to recognition by the Kingdom of Cossack and [illegible] rights of His Majesty the King of Italy on the said Islands. When the question should be laid before the Commission of the Holy Places and the League of Nations Council the British Government will also agree to assume a favourable attitude in this matter.

6. The British Government recognise the interests of Italy in the Italian Government and Mediterranean Powers to participate in the settlement of the Tangier question and will notify to the French and Spanish Governments their point of view on the best basis for the British Government so far as they are concerned, consider convenient the participation of Italy in any negotiation about the same question.

7. The British and Italian Governments agree to negotiate at once the convention for the cession of the Islands to Dodecanese.

8. The British Government guarantee to the Italian Government all their support with the Egyptian Government in order to come to a speedy conclusion of the convention for the rectification of the Cyrenaica Egyptian frontier on the basis already agreed between the British and Italian Governments.

9. The British and Italian Governments recognise the opportunity of examining and discussing the questions arising between them from the London Agreement of 1906 on Abyssinia for the purpose of ameliorating any reason of contrast between the two countries, and are anxious to secure, together with the French Government, the integrity and independence of Abyssinia and the development of her economic resources.

10. The British and Italian Governments, in accordance with their agreement of July 1915, agree on the common interest of following a perfectly identical line in the questions relating to the Sanussi and its chiefs.

11. The Italian Government always in view to resolve the Mediterranean question in a way to facilitate the final re-establishment of a normal situation in that sea inform the British Government of the settlement of the Dodecanese question which they are intended to reach with Greece in substitution of the former Italo-Greek Agreement of August 1920, which does not answer any more to the Mediterranean situation contemplated by the Treaty of Sèvres at the time of the aforesaid agreement. The

Italian Government intends to adhere to Greece the undertakings specified in the agreement of August 9th subject to the following qualifications:

(a) Undertakings to remain under the future security of Italy with the exclusion of the conditions of the Dodecanese contemplated by article 15 of the Italo-Venizelos Agreement.

(b) Undertakings to withdraw the reservations to Article 12 of the Italo-Venizelos Agreement in the declaration of the Greek Government.

(c) Subject to the arrangements under which Greece ceded Italy.

The British Government approve the line of view of the Italian Government and are willing, if necessary, to support it with the Greek Government.

Annex 1

N.B. The following proposals have not yet been submitted to the formal consideration of the Italian Government, but represent the views of the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office.

Cyprus.

Assurances should be given that Government shall not do anything which would be detrimental to the interests of the Greek population of the island, and in particular that no steps will be taken which might prejudice the rights of existing religious communities in Cyprus.

The British Government should undertake to negotiate with the Italian Government with regard to the draft treaty to be signed at the most favourable opportunity for the cession of public works, services and utilities, including the Cyprus section of the railway, so far as these are necessary for the efficient working of the railway, and to agree that the cost of such cession shall be determined by arbitration, the arbitrator to be appointed by the President of the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague.

The British Government should undertake to negotiate with the Italian Government with regard to the draft treaty to be signed at the most favourable opportunity for the cession of public works, services and utilities, including the Cyprus section of the railway, so far as these are necessary for the efficient working of the railway, and to agree that the cost of such cession shall be determined by arbitration, the arbitrator to be appointed by the President of the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague.

The British Government should undertake to negotiate with the Italian Government with regard to the draft treaty to be signed at the most favourable opportunity for the cession of public works, services and utilities, including the Cyprus section of the railway, so far as these are necessary for the efficient working of the railway, and to agree that the cost of such cession shall be determined by arbitration, the arbitrator to be appointed by the President of the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague.

The British Government should undertake to negotiate with the Italian Government with regard to the draft treaty to be signed at the most favourable opportunity for the cession of public works, services and utilities, including the Cyprus section of the railway, so far as these are necessary for the efficient working of the railway, and to agree that the cost of such cession shall be determined by arbitration, the arbitrator to be appointed by the President of the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague.

The British Government should undertake to negotiate with the Italian Government with regard to the draft treaty to be signed at the most favourable opportunity for the cession of public works, services and utilities, including the Cyprus section of the railway, so far as these are necessary for the efficient working of the railway, and to agree that the cost of such cession shall be determined by arbitration, the arbitrator to be appointed by the President of the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague.

The British Government should undertake to negotiate with the Italian Government with regard to the draft treaty to be signed at the most favourable opportunity for the cession of public works, services and utilities, including the Cyprus section of the railway, so far as these are necessary for the efficient working of the railway, and to agree that the cost of such cession shall be determined by arbitration, the arbitrator to be appointed by the President of the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague.

The British Government should undertake to negotiate with the Italian Government with regard to the draft treaty to be signed at the most favourable opportunity for the cession of public works, services and utilities, including the Cyprus section of the railway, so far as these are necessary for the efficient working of the railway, and to agree that the cost of such cession shall be determined by arbitration, the arbitrator to be appointed by the President of the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague.

The British Government should undertake to negotiate with the Italian Government with regard to the draft treaty to be signed at the most favourable opportunity for the cession of public works, services and utilities, including the Cyprus section of the railway, so far as these are necessary for the efficient working of the railway, and to agree that the cost of such cession shall be determined by arbitration, the arbitrator to be appointed by the President of the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague.

The British Government should undertake to negotiate with the Italian Government with regard to the draft treaty to be signed at the most favourable opportunity for the cession of public works, services and utilities, including the Cyprus section of the railway, so far as these are necessary for the efficient working of the railway, and to agree that the cost of such cession shall be determined by arbitration, the arbitrator to be appointed by the President of the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague.

The British Government should undertake to negotiate with the Italian Government with regard to the draft treaty to be signed at the most favourable opportunity for the cession of public works, services and utilities, including the Cyprus section of the railway, so far as these are necessary for the efficient working of the railway, and to agree that the cost of such cession shall be determined by arbitration, the arbitrator to be appointed by the President of the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague.

The British Government should undertake to negotiate with the Italian Government with regard to the draft treaty to be signed at the most favourable opportunity for the cession of public works, services and utilities, including the Cyprus section of the railway, so far as these are necessary for the efficient working of the railway, and to agree that the cost of such cession shall be determined by arbitration, the arbitrator to be appointed by the President of the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague.

Iraq.

In view of the fact that the Iraq mandate is at present under discussion and that the political conditions in Iraq and Palestine are not exactly similar, the British Government give to the Italian Government the general assurance that, so far as the different conditions of Iraq will permit, His Majesty's Government will ensure that Italian interests in Iraq will be safeguarded on similar lines to those now suggested for Palestine.

Annex 2

Article 14

1. In order to determine the existing rights of the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in Palestine to which the Mandatory is pledged under the preceding article to maintain a commission consisting of not less than seven members shall be appointed by the Council of the League of Nations. The duty of the commission shall be to frame a report defining these rights, including rights of worship, user, or access. The report shall be laid before the Council of the League of Nations for official and final confirmation and shall be binding on the Mandatory.

2. In the preparation of the report the commission will consider any claims to any of the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites and will endeavour, in consultation with representatives of the communities concerned, to arrive at agreed definition of existing rights. If agreement cannot be reached at within a period to be fixed in each case by the commission, the commission, after hearing all parties, shall decide what rights shall be maintained. Decisions shall be by majority vote, but shall not take effect until they have been confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations. On confirmation they shall be binding on the Mandatory.

3. In the preparation of the report the commission will consider any claims to any of the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites and will endeavour, in consultation with representatives of the communities concerned, to arrive at agreed definition of existing rights. If agreement cannot be reached at within a period to be fixed in each case by the commission, the commission, after hearing all parties, shall decide what rights shall be maintained. Decisions shall be by majority vote, but shall not take effect until they have been confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations. On confirmation they shall be binding on the Mandatory.

4. In the preparation of the report the commission will consider any claims to any of the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites and will endeavour, in consultation with representatives of the communities concerned, to arrive at agreed definition of existing rights. If agreement cannot be reached at within a period to be fixed in each case by the commission, the commission, after hearing all parties, shall decide what rights shall be maintained. Decisions shall be by majority vote, but shall not take effect until they have been confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations. On confirmation they shall be binding on the Mandatory.

5. In the preparation of the report the commission will consider any claims to any of the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites and will endeavour, in consultation with representatives of the communities concerned, to arrive at agreed definition of existing rights. If agreement cannot be reached at within a period to be fixed in each case by the commission, the commission, after hearing all parties, shall decide what rights shall be maintained. Decisions shall be by majority vote, but shall not take effect until they have been confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations. On confirmation they shall be binding on the Mandatory.

6. In the preparation of the report the commission will consider any claims to any of the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites and will endeavour, in consultation with representatives of the communities concerned, to arrive at agreed definition of existing rights. If agreement cannot be reached at within a period to be fixed in each case by the commission, the commission, after hearing all parties, shall decide what rights shall be maintained. Decisions shall be by majority vote, but shall not take effect until they have been confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations. On confirmation they shall be binding on the Mandatory.

7. In the preparation of the report the commission will consider any claims to any of the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites and will endeavour, in consultation with representatives of the communities concerned, to arrive at agreed definition of existing rights. If agreement cannot be reached at within a period to be fixed in each case by the commission, the commission, after hearing all parties, shall decide what rights shall be maintained. Decisions shall be by majority vote, but shall not take effect until they have been confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations. On confirmation they shall be binding on the Mandatory.

8. In the preparation of the report the commission will consider any claims to any of the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites and will endeavour, in consultation with representatives of the communities concerned, to arrive at agreed definition of existing rights. If agreement cannot be reached at within a period to be fixed in each case by the commission, the commission, after hearing all parties, shall decide what rights shall be maintained. Decisions shall be by majority vote, but shall not take effect until they have been confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations. On confirmation they shall be binding on the Mandatory.

E 6567 5 44 **No. 3**

Sir H. Lamb to the Earl of Balfour (*Received July 5*)

No. 1550

My Lord, *Constantinople, June 26, 1922*

I PAID a visit to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 20th instant.

Izzet Pasha opened with the position as regards the Near East settlement. He said that nothing seemed to have happened to mark any progress. I replied that the Nationalists were principally to blame for the delay of which Ismid complained, and I added that the last notes from the Constantinople and Angora Governments were still under discussion between the three Allied Powers. A fresh element in the situation since the conference at Paris was the revelation of wholesale deportations, &c. being carried on even at the present moment by the Kemalist

authorities. These proceedings make it all the more imperative that the most effective guarantees possible should be obtained for the protection of the Christian minorities in Asia Minor.

5. Izzet Pasha agreed that there must be effective safeguards for these minorities, and suggested that the two commissions should be constituted for a definite period after the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace which would satisfy themselves on the spot that the minorities were being properly treated. Finally Izzet Pasha said that he wished to see the Sultan on the 2nd instant, and would be glad to know what he should tell His Majesty about the proposal made by Angora for preliminary meeting at Ismid. Before stating that I had reason to suspect His Majesty's Government was opposed to such a meeting, which might be exploited to useful results, I said that I could not anticipate what Italy told His Highness at the beginning of our interview. It was clear to me that the Constantinople Government is very much concerned at the prospect of fighting between representatives of the Allied Governments and the Nationalists, from whom the Central Government has been excluded.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

E 6573 27 44 No. 4

Sir H. Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour. Received June 4.

(No. 585.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, June 27, 1922.*

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 581 and 582 of the 24th instant, I have the honour to enclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, the Turkish text of the protest against the treaty of Sèvres which the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Angora Government has sent to the Nationalist agents in neutral countries, and which reads as follows:—

2. The text of this protest was telegraphed to Angora at 4 p.m. on the 23rd instant by the President of the Allied Ottoman Telegraph Control at Stamboul.

3. I have, however, not yet received from Hamid Bey the official text, though it has appeared in the Turkish press with certain omissions mainly as regards passages especially to the British Empire. I understand that the actual British cruisers off Samsun last night were in communication with the Nationalist people there, and that the latter have been informed by the Allied Powers that they are not prepared to allow any further massacres of Christians. The Nationalist Government have, however, declined to withdraw their troops from Samsun, and the Allied Commissaries at Constantinople have been instructed to inform the Porte that they will hold the Turkish Government responsible for the safety of the Christian population of Samsun.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 4

Note communiquée au Grand Vizir par Youssouf Kemal

PAR sa note du 8 courant, le soussigné Ministre des Affaires étrangères du Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie a fait protester contre le bombardement de la ville de Samsoun effectué la veille par une escadre britannique. Notre dite note a également signalé aux Puissances alliées les faits graves qui se sont déroulés à Samsoun et qui constituent une nouvelle atteinte portée par elles aux principes du droit des gens et aux conventions internationales. Le but du débarquement effectué à Samsoun par les troupes grecques était manifestement d'encourager les sentiments hostiles des Grecs du littoral contre le Gouvernement turc.

Le bombardement a forcé la flotte grecque de retraite à Constantinople pour se réapprovisionner et elle a depuis été renforcée par plusieurs autres bâtiments, qui, après avoir opéré dans la mer Noire, où ils se sont livrés à des actes de piraterie, ont plusieurs fois été aperçus retournant à Constantinople.

D'après les dernières informations, le croiseur auxiliaire américain "Naxos" et deux torpilleurs, partis à l'entrée de la mer Noire, sont actuellement en train de visiter les bateaux qui y entrent ou en sortent. Tous les voiliers et barques turques qu'atteignent la ligne d'observation établie près du pont de Galata sont détruits, les équipages emmenés prisonniers à Malte où ils sont soumis à un traitement très dur.

Ces événements démontrent que les Hellènes sont à même d'utiliser librement comme base navale un port qui se trouve sous l'occupation interalliée et où un général britannique commande en chef et cela malgré que le 13 mai 1921 la neutralité de la ville de Constantinople et de toute sa zone ait été solennellement proclamée par les Puissances occupantes. Ce fait est d'autant plus grave à remarquer que, quelques mois auparavant, les Ministres des Affaires étrangères des mêmes Puissances, réunis à Paris, avaient déclaré par leur note du 26 mars qu'ils auraient par-dessus tout, en proposant une solution, à éviter toute suspicion de l'une ou l'autre de ces deux parties, maintenir comme une main ferme la balance égale entre les deux. C'est, d'autre part, sur cette prétendue contrariété de conduite à l'égard des deux belligérants que le rejet total des propositions a été basé et c'est sur cette même base que les deux belligérants ont rejeté l'ensemble des conventions proposées.

A cette occasion le Ministre soussigné ne peut s'empêcher de rappeler les protestations qu'avait déjà fait valoir son note du 4 septembre 1921 au sujet de la perquisition effectuée le 27 août précédent par les Anglais à bord des voiliers turcs se trouvant dans le port de Samsoun afin d'y rechercher des armes et des munitions, alors que le commandant de l'escadre alliée du Caucase supérieur avait annoncé depuis longtemps les grandes Puissances de persévérer dans la politique de stricte neutralité qu'elles avaient assurée aux gérants du pouvoir, notamment M. Lloyd George, dans son discours à la Chambre des Communes, et que l'Angleterre maintient encore aujourd'hui avec tant d'éclat vis-à-vis des deux belligérants.

Par votre dépêche du 4 juin courant précédente la flotte hellénique s'était servie de Constantinople comme base de ses agressions dans la mer Noire, la note de retrait de cette ville vous avait été précédemment notifiée.

Comme on sait, les exactions et les cruautés dont les Grecs se sont rendus coupables à l'égard des populations musulmanes de l'Asie Mineure ont été portées à la connaissance du monde entier par les rapports des Commissaires spéciaux envoyés sur les lieux par les Gouvernements alliés eux-mêmes, qui, en outre, ont fait établir complètement par leurs propres officiers et consuls les faits qui sont de nature à révolter les consciences humaines les plus endurcies et par conséquent extrêmement nuisibles à toute idée de paix et d'ordre dans le monde entier.

Sur ce point, tous les rapports, dont ceux du général Asseo, délégué italien à la Commission de Smyrne, ne sont que la répétition des précédents, ainsi que les plaintes et les réclamations incessantes de la population musulmane, tendent à démontrer que les Grecs ont choisi comme système d'extermination de la race musulmane le massacre en masse, l'incendie des villages, le pillage et la destruction des biens, la déportation des habitants, hommes, femmes et enfants, et la profanation des mosquées et des tombeaux.

Le soussigné Ministre des Affaires étrangères du Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie est obligé de faire la présente note de protestation contre ces violations systématiques et inouïes de tous les principes de l'humanité et de la civilisation, et il espère que les Puissances alliées, qui ont pris l'engagement de garantir le traité d'Ascq-Marie, ne manqueront pas d'user de leur influence pour mettre un terme à ces actes de barbarie.

YOUSSOUF KEMAL.

Angora, le 22 juin 1922.

[E 6574 19 44] No. 5.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour. (Received July 4.)

(No. 586. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, June 27, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith, in original, a telegram, dated the 16th instant, from the Chief of the American Near East Relief Mission regarding the atrocities in Anatolia, and Admiral Bristol's attitude thereto, as well as to certain statements.

2. The first two paragraphs of this telegram report conditions, according to facts, as I have no reason to believe that the report handed to me by Dr. Ward and which was transmitted to your Lordship in my despatch No. 498 of the 31st May last, was different from the report which that gentleman handed to the American High Commissioner at Athens, Bristol, who made no objection whatever to my seeing Dr. Ward. I must, however, add that I am assured that the latter would give me a full report on the atrocities in question.

3. There is no doubt that the revelations of these atrocities was very disagreeable to Admiral Bristol, as it is calculated to inflame a large and powerful section of American public opinion, and seriously to interfere with the persistent efforts made by

the American High Commissioner to push American trade in Anatolia. Admiral Bristol was in fact pushed into a difficult position though one in which greater experience would never have left room for such a position. On the other hand there is little doubt that the Standard Oil Company and other American commercial interests have been struggling right through most of the last four years for their own ends. On the other hand a large section of the American community have long desired that commercial enterprise should take precedence of financial and political considerations whatever action he took, Admiral Bristol must run the risk of being criticised in one report or the other. The American community here will, I do not doubt, be interested to see the American public opinion with which their High Commissioner at Constantinople is in touch, as these reports

I have already reported to you that Mr. Giles, the confidential secretary to the American High Commissioner, and Mr. Rice, correspondent of the Chicago Daily Tribune in Athens, have both personally inspected the scenes of the recent massacres and atrocities in Pontus and Armenia, which have been carried out with the active support of the Nationalist Turks. He has also collected a mass of evidence corroborating these stories. The assumption is that the latter report that Mr. Rice will write the Kemalists will be hailed in Washington as a vindication by the Young Turks of the charges which the Americans have made against the Standard Oil Company of having financed the Young Turk revolution. It is possible that the Americans may be in possession of the facts before it is known that the American Government would take any action on the Commissioner's report. I do not doubt that the reports of Mr. Giles and Mr. Rice will be of considerable interest and importance.

I have &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

No. 6

Mr. Hardinge to the Earl of Balfour. (*Received July 3.*)

(No. 258.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, July 2, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 261 appears to have crossed Admiral Bristol's telegram No. 292 to you which was in reply to my telegram No. 255 to the Government.

Mr. Hardinge is instructed to explain to Admiral Bristol proposal and add that it originated with his colleagues at Washington and that they have approached also the Italian and French Governments.

After hearing these considerations Admiral Bristol may possibly be induced to withdraw his objections. Result of enquiry to be really decisive would be very desirable, at least so far as Constantinople is concerned, if Allied and American commissioners

Moreover Angora would have greater difficulty in refusing neutral enquiry without appearing to the eyes of the world

If no decision about proposal could be arrived at I do not see why we should not agree to the suggestion that delegates should meet to discuss matters of mutual interest. Bekir Sami is said to be one of the delegates proposed by Angora Government. Nothing from any of the Balkan States, perhaps except Rumania, could be expected. United States there would be no interest in the matter. Bulgarian Press is pro-Turkish.

Whatever may be the decision of the Conference I presume mutual proposals to American and Athens will be left to Powers ready to do so.

Delaying new proposal to these extent I do not think need be improbable of Angora accepting enquiry into the armistice proposed thereby involving further delay in the long run. I would however, suggest that no decision be taken until I have had opportunity of consulting Sir H. Rumbold who should reach London on 4th July.

I take it that telegram under reference supersedes at any rate for the time being your telegrams Nos. 259 and 260 though all three read me simultaneously.

I observe that no decision will be possible here to give effect to original proposal unless and until new French suggestions disposed of in one sense or the other.

Repeated to Athens No. 69.

E 6293 5 44] No. 7

The Earl of Balfour to Sir L. Worthington-Evans.

Dear Worthington-Evans, *Foreign Office, July 3, 1922.*

YOUR letter of the 22nd June about the possibility of evacuating Constantinople raises political considerations of some difficulty. Withdrawal at the present moment must in practice mean that the Allies, as a whole, are washing their hands of the Turco-Greek situation. The retention of an Allied contingent of one or two battalions might be enough to prevent the Greeks from entering Constantinople, but it would involve a great increase in the prestige of Angora, and probably a good deal of agitation of Kemalist elements in Constantinople with French connivance until the position of our battalions became impossible. It might mean attacks on Constantinople as long as Mustapha Kemal is faced by Greeks troops in Asia Minor, and if he can obtain indirect control over Turkey. So long, therefore, as any attempt is to be made to pursue the Paris plan and to co-operate with the French, I feel that we should keep our present garrison at Constantinople.

If that plan is definitely abandoned, it will probably be in favour either of active support of Greece by Great Britain as well as the question of a plebiscite, or of some form of Allied neutrality in Thrace, being allowed to settle the issue between the two. In either case, we should want to keep our troops in Constantinople for the time being as a base, which is the utmost to which we can reduce the reserve of a strong garrison at Chatalja.

In the latter case we might further reduce our garrison at Constantinople and possibly be able to return to Gallipoli. If so we may have again to consider whether it would not be our best course to withdraw Greece into a very much smaller area than at present, and to concentrate our resources and the assistance of our Allies to secure the defence of Thrace.

As matters stand I take it that we should not move more troops to Constantinople, but should maintain our forces as at present. Every opportunity should however be taken of pressing on Sir Charles Harington the difficult position in which he is placed, and I hope he may be able to make a move in the direction of Ismid.

Yours sincerely,

BALFOUR.

No. 8

Count de Salis to the Earl of Balfour. (*Received July 4.*)

(No. 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *The Vatican, July 3, 1922.*

YOUR despatch No. 148.

At once saw His Eminence Cardinal Secretary of State and expressed His Majesty's thanks for communication made to him in accordance with your instructions in regard to draft article 14 respecting Holy Places, and requested the Secretary of State to express His wishes.

He entirely agreed to retention of the French protectorate over the Holy Places to which His Majesty's Government have agreed, given their consent.

His Eminence will arrive to-morrow and will stay a few days. He will go to Vatican.

E 6136 5 44 No

The Earl of Balfour to Sir M Leeman (Paris)

(No. 203)
Sir *Foreign Office July 1, 1922*

I HAVE received Lord Hardinge's despatch No of the 7th June, enclosing a copy of a note from the French Government regarding the Near Eastern settlement, which was handed to Mr Phillimore by M Poincaré, and I transmit herewith a further copy of the note for communication to

I am, &c
BALFOUR

Enclosure No

Memorandum

His Majesty's Government have carefully considered the observations contained in M Poincaré's note of the 7th June on the proposals of the Allied Governments for the settlement of the Near East, and they have noted with satisfaction the general agreement which exists between the two Governments on the principles which should govern the settlement.

They are prepared to accept the suggestion that the Allied Governments should agree to postpone the consideration of the Straits question, and they also accept the proposal that the Allied Governments should refuse to discuss the proposals of the Ankara Government for the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres, and should inform the Ankara Government that they are not prepared to consider any proposals which do not provide for the withdrawal of the Greek forces from Asia Minor. His Majesty's Government are also in agreement with the French Government that the Allied Governments should not be committed to any definite scheme for the settlement of Asia Minor, but should confine themselves to laying down the general principles which should govern the settlement, leaving the details to be worked out by the Powers principally concerned.

line [illegible] long [illegible] numbers [illegible] with the troops disposed in depth their [illegible] seems [illegible] are [illegible] sufficient. Health excellent [illegible] Greek [illegible] present situation [illegible] does not include [illegible] large offensive [illegible]

Greeks [illegible] after [illegible] it would [illegible] offensive [illegible] would become [illegible] recognise that Greek [illegible] present conditions [illegible] I would await [illegible] except [illegible] 1920 [illegible] 1921 [illegible] Greeks [illegible]

E 6606 19 44 — No. 12.

[illegible]

Sir, — *[illegible] July [illegible] 1922.*

[illegible] His Majesty's Government [illegible] French, [illegible] Governments [illegible] expectations [illegible] Asia Minor [illegible]

[illegible] Allied and Associated Governments [illegible] Red Cross Society [illegible] position to [illegible] Turkey on the other [illegible] arrangement.

As your [illegible] Asia Minor, and I [illegible] addressed to the International Red Cross [illegible]

I am, &c.
LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

[E 6759/76/44] — No. 13.

Mr. Oliphant to Mr. Wakely (India Office).

My dear Wakely, — *Foreign Office, July 7, 1922.*

LORD PEEL came over recently and explained to Lord Balfour that he would be glad to receive information regarding the recent bombardment of Samsoun by the Greeks, in order that he might place the Government of India in possession of the facts with a view, I gather, to combating the Moslem agitation. I now enclose herein a memorandum prepared in the Department and submitted to Crowe, who hopes that it will meet Lord Peel's requirements.

Yours sincerely,
LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

Enclosure in No. 13.

Foreign Office Memorandum respecting the Neutrality of Constantinople and the Straits and Greek Bombardment of Samsoun.

Neutrality of Constantinople and the Straits.

THE Greco-Kemalist conflict has developed practically without break out of the war between Turkey and the Allies, which was begun by the Turkish bombardment of Odessa and Sevastopol on the 29th October, 1914.

After the armistice of the 30th October, 1918, Greece, as one of the Allied Powers, [illegible] in the occupation of Constantinople and subsequently, in the same capacity, undertook certain military operations against the Kemalists, who refused to accept the Treaty of Sèvres.

The situation was modified by the change of régime in Greece in December 1920, and after the London Conference of March 1921 the Allies made it known that, if hostilities were resumed by either party, it would be on their own responsibility. Soon after [illegible] to dissociate themselves from the [illegible] Greco-Kemalist hostilities they adopted a general neutral attitude in the matter of assistance in any form to either belligerent. This attitude was [illegible] on the 10th August 1921, by formal declaration, which specified that such assistance [illegible] private Allied firms and [illegible]

It is evident [illegible] that [illegible] the present circumstances [illegible] neutral [illegible] all the established rules of international practice. [illegible] the Allied Governments were not agreed among themselves [illegible] the [illegible] of neutral [illegible] warfare [illegible] the case of the right of visit and search of Allied vessels to which [illegible] belligerents were [illegible] was apparent [illegible] that the Greeks could [illegible] from Constantinople which was [illegible] in the occupation when they still participated [illegible] part of the Allies [illegible] about a complete change in the Greek position [illegible] almost certainly have [illegible] of force against a Power which was [illegible] would have been tantamount to intervention [illegible] the Kemalists, and would therefore [illegible] assume the character of an [illegible] act.

In so far as concerns the passage of Greek ships of war through the Straits, the pre-war arrangements in regard to the neutrality of the latter were terminated by the passage of the "Goeben" and the "Breslau" through the Dardanelles in 1914 and by the entry of Turkey into the war, and [illegible] arrangements under the new treaty [illegible] Straits are open to warships of all nations except in so far as this may be incompatible with the armistice with Turkey of the 30th October 1918.

2. Bombardment of Samsoun.

In regard to the bombardment of Samsoun on the 7th June, it is known that the Kemalists have for some time been obtaining large supplies of arms and munitions from Soviet Russia. According to recent reports from reliable eye-witnesses, a considerable part of these are brought to Samsoun in [illegible] vessels. Moreover, there is reason to believe that munitions, when, in view of the declaration of neutrality of the

20th August 1921, may now be supplied to the Kemalists by private firms in Allied countries, have been reaching northern Anatolian ports in certain Allied vessels which, owing to the difference of view among the Allies on the question of the application of the ordinary rules of neutrality in maritime warfare referred to above, the Greeks are prevented from subjecting to visit and search.

Samsun is the port for one of the most important routes from the coast to the interior of Anatolia and as a natural landing place for shipments from Russia to Asia Minor, it becomes therefore very reasonable that it should be used as a distributing base, as the Greeks allege.

No further part of the bombardment from a neutral source has yet been received, but the Greek Minister states that the Greek Government first demanded the destruction of the guns and munitions of the Greek supervisor, and only bombarded the town after this demand had been refused and some hours' notice had been given. It is also the Greek contention that the bombardment by the Turks was carried out in accordance with the Hague Convention, which provides for the bombardment by naval forces only after due notice has been given.

It is further stated that Kemalist battery positions in the Greek zone were so placed that the town would not appear to be bombarded.

Other authorities in Constantinople have not been asked to furnish a report as possible of the actual facts.

I have, &c.
(For the Chargé d'Affaires, ad interim)
HARRY G. CHAPMAN

E 6767 5 44

No. 14

Lord Hardinge of Penshurst to Mr. Lloyd George (received July 8)

(No. 1357)

My Lord, *Paris, July 7, 1922*

I CALLED yesterday by the President of the Council the memorandum enclosed in your Lordship's despatch No. 1345 of the 4th instant containing a report of the Prime Minister's interview with the representatives of the Near East Relief Committee who had visited Smyrna, and the representatives of Greece and of the Constantinople Allied Governments.

In the course of our interview I took occasion to ask M. Poincaré whether he had any further reply to communicate in answer to the Memorandum which I had addressed to the Quai d'Orsay during the last week in June, stating the views of His Majesty's Government in regard to the situation in the Near East, and in the event of a breach of the peace between the Greek and Angora

that Greeks would not have involved themselves in any commitments as regards Allied response.

[illegible] report of this paper should such a course be contrasted with French [illegible] telegraphs instilling some view to Asiatic Government without [illegible] sitting [illegible] situation.

[illegible] conversation mentioned in first paragraph will be sent by next King's Messenger.

No. 17

Sir H. Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour. Received July 8.

(No. [illegible])
My Lord, *Constantinople, June 7, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to report that [illegible] Hamilton Rice spoke to the [illegible] French High Commissioner [illegible] Greek Government [illegible] Allied Governments [illegible] certain [illegible] will report [illegible] Greeks.

E 6802 5 44 No. 18

Lord Hardinge to Mr. Bonar Law. Received July 9.

No. 241 Confidential.
Telegraphic. *Paris, July 4, 22.*
My dear Law, No. 211.

M. Sterghiades [illegible] told [illegible] Greek Government [illegible] Asia Minor.

[illegible] Venizelist Government [illegible] expecting [illegible] Smyrna [illegible] Greek Government [illegible] Allies [illegible] Greek Government [illegible] Allies [illegible] Greek Government [illegible] Allies

Having [illegible] with his objections to a partial retirement, which seemed to me of a [illegible] of not [illegible] incontrovertible, character, M. Sterghiades turned to the possibility of a settlement. He [illegible], as he has done on former occasions, say that, if he were responsible for the government of Greece, he would give the order for evacuation to-morrow. He took the line rather that the problem was insoluble without the [illegible] of the Powers. Greece could neither evacuate nor continue the war alone. The Powers must come to a decision of some kind [illegible]. Greece was ready to accept any decision [illegible] herself and was willing [illegible] with the [illegible] of the Powers, to enforce the [illegible] decision [illegible]. I did not ask M. Sterghiades whether the Greeks would [illegible] continue the war, even with [illegible] the Paris [illegible] would have been [illegible].

My conversation yesterday with M. Baltazzi was [illegible] interesting [illegible] with the High Commissioner. His Excellency [illegible] complained [illegible] the French attitude regarding the [illegible] of [illegible], [illegible] that the French Government [illegible] Greece. I [illegible] know [illegible] their attitude was [illegible] personal spite [illegible] towards [illegible] first part [illegible] Moscow [illegible] was [illegible] most important [illegible] latter [illegible] the [illegible] not go [illegible] Greece was [illegible] Excellency [illegible] the slightest [illegible] government [illegible] England [illegible] France [illegible] Greece [illegible] from [illegible] other difficulties [illegible].

The impression [illegible] from this conversation was, as reported in my telegram No. 235 of yesterday's date, that the Greek Government [illegible] to take any decision [illegible]. The world has [illegible] less, [illegible] given [illegible] attention from Asia Minor to Macedonia. [illegible] appeared in the Government press during the last few days calling attention to the reported activities of Bulgarian and Albanian bands in Macedonia and Epirus, and emphasising the supreme importance of those districts and of Thrace to the future of Greece. The object of this campaign seems evident. It is the beginning of an effort to persuade the Greek public that Asia Minor is of secondary importance from the national point of view and that the future of Greece lies in Europe. It would have been well had this fact been realised earlier, and it is characteristic of the present situation that its realisation now promises fresh difficulties when the question of Thrace comes to be seriously tackled.

I have, &c.
F. O. LINDLEY.

E 6823/48/44 No. 21

Sir Horace Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received [illegible])

(No. 593.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, July* [illegible], 1922.

I HAVE the honour [illegible] reference [illegible] Sir Horace Rumbold's despatch No. 420 of the 5th May last, to transmit to your Lordship herewith [illegible] of a further joint note, dated the 22nd May, from the United States High Commissioner [illegible] regard to the [illegible] question of the storage of inflammable liquids. Admiral Bristol therein recapitulated his former arguments respecting the injustice [illegible] to American interests by the existing Allied regulations on the subject and expressed the hope that no time would be lost in modifying them.

2. The three Allied High Commissioners referred this note to the Advisory Trade Committee which, after long and careful study, had practically finished its task of drawing up the text of a new and comprehensive draft law regulating the conditions under which [illegible] inflammable liquids shall be [illegible] and stored in Constantinople.

3. The American representative on this committee was in full concurrence with the provisions of this law, with the exception of the period laid down, namely, six months, after which no further storage afloat was to be permitted. Admiral Bristol's note of the 22nd May was addressed to the High Commissioners with a view to inducing the latter to agree to a reduction of this period.

4. Admiral Bristol also made personal representations in this sense to the three High Commissioners, who finally agreed to limit the period of delay to three months.

5. On this basis it has, I trust, been possible to settle at last this long-outstanding question with the United States High Commissioner. It is not an entirely satisfactory solution. It is out of the question that oil tanks for the storage of petrol [illegible] constructed within three months, but it would equally have been so had six months been the period laid down. Until such tanks have been erected, the Standard Oil Company, which alone possesses depots already constructed, will enjoy a temporary monopoly of storage in Constantinople. The duration of this monopoly will depend on various contingencies: the goodwill of the Turkish Government in affording facilities for other local or foreign firms to build depots, or its own energy in constructing them for itself; the success which may attend the efforts which the Standard Oil Company is likely to display to render the task of competitors [illegible].

6. In this connection I would mention that I recently assured the representative of the Asiatic Petroleum Company here that, once the new law was promulgated, he could count on the good offices of this High Commission in securing authorisation to construct tanks within the area permitted under the law.

7. I beg leave to enclose the text of the draft law* and regulations* in question, together with copies of the [illegible] to be addressed to the Turkish Government recommending the Sublime Porte to accept and promulgate the law as soon as possible.

8. Copies of [illegible] note to Admiral Bristol informing him [illegible] decisions of the High Commissioners and of the Admiral's subsequent reply are also enclosed, together with an [illegible] drawn up by the Advisory Trade Committee giving a brief account of its labours.

I have, &c.
NEVILE M. HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 21.

Rear-Admiral Bristol to Allied High Commissioners.

Excellency, *May 22*, 1922.

I HAVE [illegible] failed to give [illegible] careful attention to the Allied High Commissioners' note [illegible] of the [illegible] March concerning the manipulation and storage of inflammables on barges. [illegible] very sincere regret, but I [illegible] seemed to detect [illegible] the note of the 17th March [illegible] a willingness on the part of the Allied High Commissioners [illegible] what appears [illegible] the very [illegible] position taken by my Government [illegible] this question. [illegible] the more [illegible] this opinion [illegible] [illegible] Allied High Commissioners [illegible] of the 24th February that an early settlement of the question was [illegible] foreseen [illegible] of the [illegible] observed by the last two communications which I have received from my Allied colleagues [illegible] also [illegible] of [illegible] approach any [illegible] with [illegible] consideration of the [illegible] storage of inflammables. [illegible] is pertinent [illegible] once more to the attention of the Allied High Commissioners the American point of view with respect to the [illegible] storage of inflammables on barges.

Without [illegible] way [illegible] of [illegible] the authority properly exercised by the Allied captains of the port, I [illegible] to emphasise the fact that in permitting [illegible] storage of inflammables on barges and [illegible] modifying to that extent existing Turkish law and regulations [illegible] authority of the Allied captains of the port was exercised [illegible] of a character [illegible] seriously prejudice the interests of an important American business interest.

I desire, furthermore, to invite the attention of the Allied High Commissioners to the reasons which, I understand, were given by the Allied captains of the port for modifying the law and regulations governing the [illegible] and control of inflammables in the port of Constantinople. These reasons are as follows:—

1. That Beicos Bay was a safe place for the [illegible] of [illegible] cargoes.
2. That even though the Turkish authorities had forbidden this method of handling inflammables, this had no effect now, as the port was under inter-Allied control and subject to regulations made by the [illegible] Allies [illegible] others.
3. That if storage on barges were stopped it would give the Standard Oil Company a monopoly of the handling of [illegible] in the port, and it was [illegible] that small dealers were protected and not excluded from business by large corporations.

* Not printed.

 C

The efforts which have been constantly made by me during the past year to correct the [illegible] which began with the action of the Allied captains of the port have been without avail and the original act of injustice therefore [illegible] remained in effect and with increasing prejudice to American interests. The [illegible] to the American concern directly involved (the Standard Oil Company) may to some degree be measured by the fact that that company has been compelled for some time past to sell its products in the Constantinople market at a price [illegible] cents less than the cost per gallon [illegible] in order to meet competition [illegible] by the Allied captains of the port from the obligation of [illegible] with the Turkish law and regulations. This injury, however, is greater than can be expressed in mathematical terms.

I cannot believe that the Allied High Commissioners, with a full knowledge of the circumstances in this case, would desire to place themselves on record as favouring an act of injustice which would [illegible] so obviously detrimental to the interest of the nationals of an Associated Power, and I venture, therefore, to hope that a careful consideration of the point of view set forth in my present note [illegible] will not fail to lead to the [illegible] where [illegible] without delay [illegible] matters.

I take, &c.

MARK L. BRISTOL,
Rear-Admiral, U.S. Navy,
United States High Commissioner.

Enclosure 2 in No. 21.

Joint Note to Turkish Government.

LES Hauts Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie soussignés ont [illegible] signalé à plusieurs reprises à la Sublime Porte l'urgence que présentait à [illegible] point de vue de la sécurité [illegible] la législation régissant actuellement l'emmagasinage des [illegible] inflammables, législation qui [illegible] répond plus aux nécessités modernes et dont certaines dispositions [illegible] inappliquées, sont d'ailleurs tombées en désuétude, laissant le champ libre à l'arbitraire.

Un projet ayant été préparé pour [illegible] à cette situation par la préfecture de la ville [illegible] à la connaissance des soussignés, ils ont chargé le Comité consultatif du Commerce de l'étudier.

Cette étude [illegible] avec la collaboration [illegible] service de [illegible] et du service des [illegible] Dette publique ottomane, les ingénieurs des principales [illegible] et les représentants des compagnies [illegible].

[illegible] comporterait un projet de décret[*] et un projet de règlement annexe à celui-ci,[*] [illegible] conditions de [illegible] satisfaire [illegible].

Les Hauts Commissaires [illegible] Sublime Porte, [illegible] manière la plus pressante, [illegible] règlement [illegible] en vigueur [illegible] risques [illegible] avec le régime actuel.

Les Hauts Commissaires soussignés [illegible] d'autre part, faire remarquer que la [illegible] système [illegible] des [illegible] inflammables [illegible] rendra [illegible] nécessaire [illegible] l'ajustement du [illegible] la Banque [illegible] de la Turquie [illegible] et aux termes duquel les [illegible] affectés [illegible] service [illegible] entrepôts publics [illegible] secondaires doivent être affectés, en tant que de besoin, au service [illegible]. Il appartiendra à la préfecture de s'entendre [illegible] avec la Banque [illegible] à ce sujet.

PELLÉ.
NEVILE HENDERSON.
GARRONI.

Constantinople, le 23 juin 1922.

* Not printed.

Enclosure 3 in No. 21.

Joint Note to Admiral Bristol.

LES Hauts Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont l'honneur d'accuser réception de la lettre que son Excellence le Haut Commissaire des États-Unis a bien voulu leur adresser le 22 mai dernier au sujet de la manipulation et de l'emmagasinage des liquides inflammables à bord des dépôts flottants.

Ainsi qu'ils [illegible] dans leur note collective du 24 février, les modifications portées par les capitaines du port ne devaient avoir qu'un caractère provisoire. Le projet de loi [illegible] par cette note, et qui est destiné à régler définitivement la question, sous réserve toutefois les droits éventuels de la Commission des Détroits [illegible] intérêts spéciaux des [illegible] a été, depuis lors, [illegible] et [illegible] approuvé par le Comité consultatif du Commerce. Seuls les délais d'application de la loi [illegible] tels qu'ils sont déterminés dans l'article 32, n'ont pas été [illegible] approuvés par le [illegible] américain, la période de six mois prévue par le paragraphe 2 [illegible] leur paraissant retarder à l'excès la mise en vigueur [illegible] longtemps attendue.

Pour se rapprocher [illegible] exprimé par son Excellence l'Amiral Bristol, les Hauts Commissaires soussignés ont décidé de [illegible] à trois mois ce délai en question. Dans l'espoir que cette modification donnera satisfaction aux intérêts américains [illegible] et [illegible] sincère [illegible] de la Sublime Porte la promulgation aussi prompte que possible [illegible], ils ne [illegible] le Haut Commissaire des États-Unis [illegible] ses efforts aux leurs [illegible] résultat.

D'autre part, tenant compte [illegible] que [illegible] Hauts Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie [illegible] qu'ils ont [illegible] 15 [illegible] à cette date.

[illegible] propositions qui avaient été faites [illegible] du 8 mars [illegible] membres alliés du Comité consultatif du Commerce [illegible] la Standard Oil Company [illegible] sans désavantage [illegible]. Les dépôts flottants [illegible] et [illegible] être [illegible] son Excellence le Haut Commissaire des États-Unis [illegible].

PELLÉ.
NEVILE HENDERSON.
GARRONI.

Constantinople, le [illegible] juin 1922.

Enclosure 4 in No. 21.

Admiral Bristol to Sir H. Rumbold.

Excellency, *June 28, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the collective note of the Allied High Commissioners of the 23rd June, 1922, concerning the manipulation and storage of inflammable liquids on floating barges.

In response to the invitation conveyed in my identic note of the 22nd May, 1922, the Allied High Commissioners are good enough to propose a settlement of this question which may be summarised as follows:—

1. The reduction of the delay granted in article 32 of the proposed law on the storage and handling of inflammable liquids from six months to three months.
2. Urgent representations to the Sublime Porte with a view to securing the earliest possible promulgation of the proposed law.
3. Should the proposed law be promulgated before the 15th July the delay of three months would begin to run upon the date of promulgation, in any event and even if the law is not promulgated upon that date, the three months' delay will begin to run from the 15th July.

"The renewal of the proposition first made by the Allied representatives at the Admiralty Treaty Committee on the 30th March, 1922, to enable the Standard Oil Company to export during the period of the three months following the publication of the rebates allowed upon petroleum products stored upon floating tanks.

In replying I have the honour to inform the Allied High Commissioners that I accept the proposal contained in their note. I shall at once communicate with the Sublime Porte to urge the withdrawal of the Royal Swedish Legation, to urge the ratification of the protocol now awaiting the approval of the Allied Governments, and to press for the immediate payment of the sum of 800,000 Turkish pounds proposed by the Allied High Commissioners in their note of the 8th March by the representatives of the Admiralty Treaty Committee in respect of the tithe most unfairly exacted by the Constantinople Municipality from the Standard Oil Company, and I desire therefore to suggest that during the period of 15 days, such supplementary tax in the oil rebates as may be found to be due from the Standard Oil Company should be paid into the Ottoman Imperial Bank to the account of the Allied Governments concerned."

I have, &c.

MARK L. BRISTOL,
Rear-Admiral, U.S. Navy,
United States High Commissioner.

No. 5.

Sir H. Rumbold to Mr. Ismay.

(Received March 17.)

DEAR ISMAY, *Constantinople, March 16, 1922.*

A necessity has arisen for bringing into force the provisional decree of the Ottoman Government dated the 28th February, 1909, regulating the collection of the octroi duties at the Port of Constantinople. This decree, which was drawn up in consultation with the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, has been in force since the date mentioned, but it has been found necessary to make certain modifications in it, and to submit the amended text to the Ottoman Parliament for approval.

In the meantime, however, the Ottoman Government have found themselves in urgent need of funds, and have requested the High Commissioners to authorise the collection of octroi duties at Constantinople, pending the approval of the amended decree by the Ottoman Parliament. The High Commissioners have agreed to this request, on the understanding that the proceeds of the octroi duties will be paid into a blocked account at the Ottoman Imperial Bank, and will not be released without the consent of the High Commissioners.

The Ottoman Government have also requested the High Commissioners to authorise the collection of octroi duties at the Port of Smyrna, pending the approval of the amended decree by the Ottoman Parliament. The High Commissioners have agreed to this request, on the understanding that the proceeds of the octroi duties will be paid into a blocked account at the Ottoman Imperial Bank, and will not be released without the consent of the High Commissioners.

The Ottoman Government have also requested the High Commissioners to authorise the collection of octroi duties at the Port of Mersina, pending the approval of the amended decree by the Ottoman Parliament. The High Commissioners have agreed to this request, on the understanding that the proceeds of the octroi duties will be paid into a blocked account at the Ottoman Imperial Bank, and will not be released without the consent of the High Commissioners.

The Ottoman Government have also requested the High Commissioners to authorise the collection of octroi duties at the Port of Alexandretta, pending the approval of the amended decree by the Ottoman Parliament. The High Commissioners have agreed to this request, on the understanding that the proceeds of the octroi duties will be paid into a blocked account at the Ottoman Imperial Bank, and will not be released without the consent of the High Commissioners.

The Ottoman Government have also requested the High Commissioners to authorise the collection of octroi duties at the Port of Beirut, pending the approval of the amended decree by the Ottoman Parliament. The High Commissioners have agreed to this request, on the understanding that the proceeds of the octroi duties will be paid into a blocked account at the Ottoman Imperial Bank, and will not be released without the consent of the High Commissioners.

The Ottoman Government have also requested the High Commissioners to authorise the collection of octroi duties at the Port of Haifa, pending the approval of the amended decree by the Ottoman Parliament. The High Commissioners have agreed to this request, on the understanding that the proceeds of the octroi duties will be paid into a blocked account at the Ottoman Imperial Bank, and will not be released without the consent of the High Commissioners.

The Ottoman Government have also requested the High Commissioners to authorise the collection of octroi duties at the Port of Jaffa, pending the approval of the amended decree by the Ottoman Parliament. The High Commissioners have agreed to this request, on the understanding that the proceeds of the octroi duties will be paid into a blocked account at the Ottoman Imperial Bank, and will not be released without the consent of the High Commissioners.

The Ottoman Government have also requested the High Commissioners to authorise the collection of octroi duties at the Port of Gaza, pending the approval of the amended decree by the Ottoman Parliament. The High Commissioners have agreed to this request, on the understanding that the proceeds of the octroi duties will be paid into a blocked account at the Ottoman Imperial Bank, and will not be released without the consent of the High Commissioners.

The Ottoman Government have also requested the High Commissioners to authorise the collection of octroi duties at the Port of Port Said, pending the approval of the amended decree by the Ottoman Parliament. The High Commissioners have agreed to this request, on the understanding that the proceeds of the octroi duties will be paid into a blocked account at the Ottoman Imperial Bank, and will not be released without the consent of the High Commissioners.

The Ottoman Government have also requested the High Commissioners to authorise the collection of octroi duties at the Port of Suez, pending the approval of the amended decree by the Ottoman Parliament. The High Commissioners have agreed to this request, on the understanding that the proceeds of the octroi duties will be paid into a blocked account at the Ottoman Imperial Bank, and will not be released without the consent of the High Commissioners.

The Ottoman Government have also requested the High Commissioners to authorise the collection of octroi duties at the Port of Aqaba, pending the approval of the amended decree by the Ottoman Parliament. The High Commissioners have agreed to this request, on the understanding that the proceeds of the octroi duties will be paid into a blocked account at the Ottoman Imperial Bank, and will not be released without the consent of the High Commissioners.

The Ottoman Government have also requested the High Commissioners to authorise the collection of octroi duties at the Port of Akaba, pending the approval of the amended decree by the Ottoman Parliament. The High Commissioners have agreed to this request, on the understanding that the proceeds of the octroi duties will be paid into a blocked account at the Ottoman Imperial Bank, and will not be released without the consent of the High Commissioners.

The Ottoman Government have also requested the High Commissioners to authorise the collection of octroi duties at the Port of Tor, pending the approval of the amended decree by the Ottoman Parliament. The High Commissioners have agreed to this request, on the understanding that the proceeds of the octroi duties will be paid into a blocked account at the Ottoman Imperial Bank, and will not be released without the consent of the High Commissioners.

The Ottoman Government have also requested the High Commissioners to authorise the collection of octroi duties at the Port of Kosseir, pending the approval of the amended decree by the Ottoman Parliament. The High Commissioners have agreed to this request, on the understanding that the proceeds of the octroi duties will be paid into a blocked account at the Ottoman Imperial Bank, and will not be released without the consent of the High Commissioners.

The Ottoman Government have also requested the High Commissioners to authorise the collection of octroi duties at the Port of Suakin, pending the approval of the amended decree by the Ottoman Parliament. The High Commissioners have agreed to this request, on the understanding that the proceeds of the octroi duties will be paid into a blocked account at the Ottoman Imperial Bank, and will not be released without the consent of the High Commissioners.

The Ottoman Government have also requested the High Commissioners to authorise the collection of octroi duties at the Port of Massawa, pending the approval of the amended decree by the Ottoman Parliament. The High Commissioners have agreed to this request, on the understanding that the proceeds of the octroi duties will be paid into a blocked account at the Ottoman Imperial Bank, and will not be released without the consent of the High Commissioners.

The Ottoman Government have also requested the High Commissioners to authorise the collection of octroi duties at the Port of Hodeida, pending the approval of the amended decree by the Ottoman Parliament. The High Commissioners have agreed to this request, on the understanding that the proceeds of the octroi duties will be paid into a blocked account at the Ottoman Imperial Bank, and will not be released without the consent of the High Commissioners.

The Ottoman Government have also requested the High Commissioners to authorise the collection of octroi duties at the Port of Mocha, pending the approval of the amended decree by the Ottoman Parliament. The High Commissioners have agreed to this request, on the understanding that the proceeds of the octroi duties will be paid into a blocked account at the Ottoman Imperial Bank, and will not be released without the consent of the High Commissioners.

The Ottoman Government have also requested the High Commissioners to authorise the collection of octroi duties at the Port of Aden, pending the approval of the amended decree by the Ottoman Parliament. The High Commissioners have agreed to this request, on the understanding that the proceeds of the octroi duties will be paid into a blocked account at the Ottoman Imperial Bank, and will not be released without the consent of the High Commissioners.

The Ottoman Government have also requested the High Commissioners to authorise the collection of octroi duties at the Port of Perim, pending the approval of the amended decree by the Ottoman Parliament. The High Commissioners have agreed to this request, on the understanding that the proceeds of the octroi duties will be paid into a blocked account at the Ottoman Imperial Bank, and will not be released without the consent of the High Commissioners.

The Ottoman Government have also requested the High Commissioners to authorise the collection of octroi duties at the Port of Hanish, pending the approval of the amended decree by the Ottoman Parliament. The High Commissioners have agreed to this request, on the understanding that the proceeds of the octroi duties will be paid into a blocked account at the Ottoman Imperial Bank, and will not be released without the consent of the High Commissioners.

The Ottoman Government have also requested the High Commissioners to authorise the collection of octroi duties at the Port of Kamaran, pending the approval of the amended decree by the Ottoman Parliament. The High Commissioners have agreed to this request, on the understanding that the proceeds of the octroi duties will be paid into a blocked account at the Ottoman Imperial Bank, and will not be released without the consent of the High Commissioners.

The Ottoman Government have also requested the High Commissioners to authorise the collection of octroi duties at the Port of Loheia

En égard à l'article 12 du contrat de l'Emprunt municipal de la Ville de Constantinople du 12 décembre 1909 qui précise que

"Les recettes provenant des dépôts de pétrole de Pacha Bagtche et toute autre taxe municipale qui remplacerait les revenus de ces dépôts seront versées intégralement et *sans déduction* à la Banque Nationale de Turquie à la fin de chaque semaine."

Les articles 6 et 8 du projet de loi en examen nous paraissent régler les intérêts des obligataires de cet emprunt.

Il conviendrait que ce qui se rapporte à la surveillance et au contrôle de l'exploitation des dépôts de pétrole soit réglé par la Préfecture de police de la Ville afin que cette dernière puisse sans retard faire rentrer les gages affectés à l'emprunt municipal pour cent 1909, qui sont échus depuis mai dernier, et que le cas échéant, d'autres gages lui soient affectés en remplacement des pertes que la Ville pourrait subir de ce chef.

En tout cas nous établissons nos réserves expresses sur tout ce qui concerne le relèvement et les règlements enregistrant notamment les dépôts de matières inflammables important toute modification à ces obligations ou sur tout emprunt, l'exigence de la Préfecture de la Ville de Constantinople et le Gouvernement impérial dans quelques autres réserves équivalant à la limite à toute perte provenant des modifications du régime des droits et à toutes exigences supplémentaires de taxes.

Veuillez &c.

BANQUE NATIONALE DE TURQUIE.

E 6829 557 44 — No. 22.

Mr. Henderson to the Earl of Balfour (Received July 13.)

(No. 161.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, July 4, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, with reference to Sir Horace Rumbold's despatch No. 503 of the 12th instant, copy of a joint note which, after consultation with the Provisional Financial Commission, the Allied High Commissioners addressed to the Turkish Government on the 23rd instant, drawing attention to the urgent necessity for a radical reform of the Turkish financial administration.

2. Your Lordship will observe that the High Commissioners there stated that unless the Central Government were prepared to take the advice of those associated with them on the Commission, they could not see that any useful purpose would be served by their remaining in Constantinople, and that they would be obliged to withdraw from the Ottoman Treasury the control established over its principal revenues.

3. The Allied High Commissioners considered that no useful purpose would be served by representations under the category of measures which affected the sovereignty of the Turkish Government, but they were calculated to arrest the progressive bankruptcy of the country, and it was hoped that the Turkish Government would be willing to treat exceptional circumstances by exceptional measures.

4. The terms of the joint note provoked considerable consternation in Government circles and, pending the receipt of further despatches on this subject from Constantinople, I myself addressed a letter to the Grand Vizier, pointing out that the Allied Commissioners had not intended to present an ultimatum, but had merely drawn the attention of the Turkish Government to the fact that unless the Provisional Financial Commission were given the power to put into force the reforms which they considered necessary, they would be obliged to withdraw from the Ottoman Treasury the control established over its principal revenues.

5. In the meantime, I have the honour to enclose copy of the Grand Vizier's reply which, the Turkish Government has now informed the Allied Commissioners, is to be considered as their official note. The terms of this reply reflect the state of mind of the Turkish Cabinet at the moment at which it was drawn up. With the reservations and conditions implied in the reply from the Sublime Porte of a purely provisional nature, it contains a practical acceptance of the Allied demands, but its equivocal character gives plenty of scope for delay and possibly retraction.

6. As soon as the definite outcome of the reserves contained in this communication has been ascertained, and if it be favourable, I shall suggest to my French and Italian colleagues that, taking this reply as an acceptance in principle, the Turkish Government be requested to invite the Provisional Financial Commission to discuss the details of the proposed reforms with a Turkish Commission under the presidency of the Minister of Finance.

I have &c.

NEVILE M. HENDERSON,

Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 22.

Joint Note to Turkish Government.

Constantinople, le 23 juin 1922.

LES Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie soussignés, après avoir pris connaissance de la lettre de la Sublime Porte en date du 8 juin dernier, ont réexaminé la situation de plus en plus critique du Trésor impérial, en vue de déterminer la forme sous laquelle ils pourraient prêter un concours efficace au Gouvernement ottoman.

Ils ne se dissimulent pas la gravité que revêt aujourd'hui le problème de l'équilibre du budget de l'Etat en raison du refus que la Sublime Porte a systématiquement opposé aux nombreuses suggestions visant l'application des mesures d'économie imposées par les circonstances.

Ils sont, cependant, disposés à prêter encore une fois leurs conseils et leur aide à la Sublime Porte, sous certaines conditions.

Ils estiment que ces mesures d'économie doivent être recherchées en premier lieu dans la réduction du personnel dont le nombre dépasse considérablement celui exigé par le service administratif actuel, et, ensuite, dans la suppression d'organismes dispendieux ou inutiles, tels que certains établissements militaires et navals, sociétés et monopoles.

Dans la poursuite de leurs travaux, les Hauts-Commissaires, à Sa Hautesse la Sublime Porte s'inspirant des mesures que tous les Gouvernements occidentaux ont décrétées, bien que leur situation financière ne comporte aucune comparaison avec celle de la Turquie, ont, en procédant à la compression des cadres du personnel :

1. Mettre d'office à la retraite tous les fonctionnaires civils et militaires de la limite d'âge ou qui auront accompli le nombre d'années nécessaires pour jouir de leur pension ;
2. Mettre en disponibilité les agents qui ne tombent pas dans la susdite catégorie, restant ainsi à pourvoir dans les services de l'Administration ;
3. Licencier éventuellement, moyennant une indemnité convenable, tous ceux dont le rendement serait insuffisant.

Si ces dispositions ne permettaient pas l'exécution de ces mesures ou si de leur application il devait résulter toutes les économies nécessaires, la Sublime Porte devra promptement des lors aviser aux moyens d'arriver à ces fins.

Tout en recommandant les économies à réaliser ci-dessus, la Sublime Porte devra aussi arrêter un programme tendant à pourvoir aux ressources et pour cela organiser ses services de perception spécialement en ce qui concerne les douanes.

Le montant de chaque budget devra toujours rester dans les possibilités de ces ressources et ne devra pas les dépasser.

Lorsque les Hauts-Commissaires, ultérieurement, reconnaîtront la nécessité de la convoquer, ainsi requis à convoquer la Commission de contrôle, ils ne manqueront pas d'examiner avec bienveillance toute proposition qui leur sera faite en vue de procurer à l'Etat des ressources extraordinaires, destinées à assurer à l'avenir la régularité du fonctionnement des services de l'Etat.

Mais tant que ne sera pas inaugurée la politique financière préconisée, les Hauts-Commissaires soussignés auront le regret de ne pas pouvoir intervenir ou s'associer à l'emploi d'expédients et de palliatifs qui, tout en laissant le problème sans solution, ne feraient que mettre le plus grand crédit et la sécurité de l'Etat.

PELLÉ
NEVILL HENDERSON
GARRONI

Enclosure 2 in No. 22.

Vizzi to British High Commissioner.

Monsieur le Haut-Commissaire, *Sublime Porte, le 26 juin 1922.*

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la note collective que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser le 23 juin, conjointement avec ses collègues de France et d'Italie concernant la situation du Trésor impérial.

Le Gouvernement impérial avait déjà pris précédemment certaines mesures en vue d'assainir l'équilibre du budget. C'est principalement grâce à ces mesures que durant la période allant de mars 1917 à mai 1918 les traitements ont été réduits de 1 800 000 et quelques livres turques à 4 000 livres turques et les autres dépenses de 638 000 livres turques à 2 000 livres turques. Ne vous paraît-il pas incontestable que le nombre qui persiste dépasse encore de beaucoup les besoins réels de l'administration?

Aussi, la Chambre a-t-elle, spécialement, institué le 21 mai dernier une commission dépendant du Conseil d'État et composée de représentants des différents départements et chargée de procéder à une révision générale de tous les traitements et émoluments de l'État, en tenant compte à la fois des services rendus et des ressources dont dispose le Trésor. Cette commission a déjà commencé ses travaux et il est à espérer que ceux-ci pourront être menés à bonne fin dans un délai assez court.

Les économies réalisées par ce moyen, ainsi que celles qui résulteront de la suppression de certains services devenus inutiles, permettront de faire face à une partie importante des dépenses nouvelles que nécessitera la mise en vigueur du traité de paix.

Le Gouvernement impérial a également l'intention de procéder à une révision générale de tous les impôts existants, afin de les mettre en harmonie avec les nécessités actuelles et de créer de nouvelles ressources. Il a, à cet effet, chargé une commission spéciale de préparer un projet de loi qui sera soumis à la Chambre dans le courant de la présente session.

Enfin, le Gouvernement impérial a l'intention de faire appel à des capitaux étrangers pour la mise en valeur des richesses naturelles du pays et pour la création de nouvelles voies de communication. Il a, à cet effet, déjà conclu avec des groupes financiers européens et américains des contrats qui sont actuellement soumis à l'approbation de la Chambre.

Veuillez, &c.
VIZZET

E 6830 27 44 No. 23

Mr. Henderson to the Earl of Balfour (Received July 10.)

(No. 61)
My Lord, *Constantinople, July 1, 1922*

I HAVE the honour to refer to your Lordship's telegram No. 257 of the 28th ultimo and to state that the damage actually done at Smyrna on the 7th July was considerably less than at first reported.

2. The Prodromos states that about sixty shops were burnt, but that as two Levantine warehouses were destroyed the number of victims was small. The Police press announced that twenty-eight houses belonging to Mussulmans, fifteen to Greek subjects and thirteen belonging to Armenian organisations were destroyed, and that the casualties numbered seven, four killed and three wounded.

3. This latter information has been corroborated from other sources, and the United States High Commissioner has been good enough to furnish me with the following report of the destruction of property made to him by the captain of an American destroyer who was present at the time of the bombardment of Samsoun. According to this report the Ottoman warehouse filled with goods belonging to local merchants, was partially destroyed, as was an oil depot containing considerable quantities of benzine and kerosene (probably American); the damage at this latter case is assessed at 23 000 dollars. Moreover, a Government building, the Konak, had seven rooms damaged, a magazine filled with clothing for Greek army recruits (£7 30 00), were destroyed, a garage rented by the Near East Relief Organisation was hit three times, and will cost between 200 and 1 000 dollars (according to varying estimates) to refit. The magazine of the Asiatic Tobacco Company and its contents was damaged to the extent of 2 000 dollars.

4. I trust I may be given authority to protest against this outrage should it be found necessary.

5. I understand from very secret sources that the Turkish coastal defence guns returned the Greek fire, but this fact, as being carefully concealed, although the Angora papers were rash enough to state that "Turkish batteries compelled the Greek fleet to withdraw." The rumour that the "Averof" was so badly damaged that on her return to Constantinople she was obliged to go into dry docks as groundless, as a matter of fact, she proceeded direct to Athens and went thence to Chios with King Constantine on board.

I have, &c.
NEVILLE MACHENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

E 6831 312 44 No. 24

Mr. Henderson to the Earl of Balfour (Received July 11.)

(No. 67)
My Lord, *Constantinople, July 1, 1922*

FOR some time past I have been in receipt of disquieting reports as to political situation, especially during last week or so. For reasons of security the future of Ghazi cannot be settled in a few days, and that they have not yet succeeded in reaching a decision is proved by the fact that the Nationalist Parliament has postponed its sittings from Nos. 4 and 5 of the present month to 1st January.

2. The resignation of my colleague does not, therefore, call for any comment, but when it was announced that Mr. Fethi Bey, Minister of the Interior and Acting Minister of Public Works, had left to take a holiday in Europe for reasons of health it would be replaced temporarily at the Ministry of the Interior by Marshal Salih Pasha, Minister of Marine, another of the former Young Turk Cabinet. As Rauf Pasha had left on the 24th June, and Salih Pasha had only taken over the Ministry of the Interior on the 28th June it was strongly rumoured that he had sent in his resignation. This was not confirmed until two days later, on the 30th June, by private secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Lowther that Salih Pasha was expected to remain but that two other Ministers, Khalid Bey, Minister of Justice, and Hassan Fehmy Bey, Minister of Public Instruction, were expected to resign that day. They did not, however, do so. The position at the time I am writing is that no Cabinet changes have been announced but there is a general feeling that there has been trouble behind the scenes which has not yet been made public.

The Constantinople Government continues to do all that is possible to convey the impression that it is carrying on the administration of the country in every matter of importance. It is, nevertheless, impossible from a general point of view that any considerable change should take place, as such a change might be the prelude to important developments in the situation as between Constantinople and Angora. The present Government is admittedly not very satisfactory from an Allied point of view. It is, however, in its manner of dealing with current questions, and at least one notable fact, namely, the Ministry of War, is certainly committed to the Kemalists. What renders a considerable change undesirable is not any positive advantage in the retention of the present Government but the possible danger of something worse.

[illegible] disappearance of Said Pasha might easily precipitate a general crisis, though a crisis of regret for one of character or intelligence he was held in great respect by moderate Turks, and carries weight as a[n] ex-Grand Vizier and a soldier of high rank. The resignation of men like Kiazim Bey and Said Bey, on the other hand would probably have little notable significance for a reconstruction of the present Government leaving its principal members unaffected.

5. The immediate effect of the recent measures will appear to be the official formation and recognition by the Nationalists of their own Government. The High Commissioners at their meeting on the 23rd June have decided to ask their colleagues among the Allied Governments to address a Note to the Nationalists [illegible] Note will be of a very serious character, and Ministers are giving the gravest consideration to the question of personal and [illegible] Ministers will [illegible] report to their Governments with the least possible delay.

6. We have received also from Constantinople the following telegraphic report which I would like to see a change of Government in the anti-Kemalists have for long made use of the [illegible] gangs of Turks have sought [illegible] to [illegible] the High Commissioners, and have [illegible] without success. [illegible] the Greeks as well. Last spring [illegible] will have seen by Mr. Lindley's telegram No. [illegible] and by my telegram No. 281 of the 20th June that we were [illegible] David Ferid Pasha [illegible] as an instrument by which the Nationalists could [illegible] respect of success [illegible] would be [illegible] Ahmed Tewfik [illegible] Pasha [illegible] Sultan [illegible] support [illegible] Government [illegible] Nationalists [illegible] Kemalists [illegible] Rescript [illegible] Kemalists [illegible] Assembly [illegible] Nationalists [illegible] Government [illegible] Nationalists [illegible] Government [illegible] Nationalists [illegible] Government

[illegible] of [illegible] and [illegible] Red Cross. Latter is [illegible] composed of Russians [illegible] would not consent to [illegible] being to [illegible] without definite instructions from [illegible] Government [illegible] persons [illegible] delegates being [illegible] for various [illegible].

M. Poincaré [illegible] refers to [illegible] at Constantinople [illegible].

[illegible] Angora [illegible] pending unanimous decision of [illegible] essential to [illegible] necessary [illegible] were [illegible] XXX.

[illegible] I suggest [illegible] telegram No. 298 [illegible] Allied [illegible].

No. 28.

Sir H. Lamb (No. 35) to the Earl of Balfour.—(Repeated to Foreign Office. Received July 12.)

(No. 35.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Smyrna, July 11, 1922.*

BRITISH [illegible] from [illegible] to Adalia [illegible] was stopped [illegible] 10 [illegible] port [illegible] 100 sacks of sugar [illegible].

[illegible] British [illegible] sugar [illegible] imported [illegible].

[illegible] list of [illegible].

Greek [illegible] 21st April, 1922.)

E 6957/27/44] No. 29.

Extract from [illegible] House of Commons, July [illegible], 1922.

Lieutenant-Commander Kenworthy asked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether [illegible] of the damage caused to the persons and property of [illegible] the bombardment of Samsun by Greek warships; whether any [illegible] persons were killed or injured or their property damaged; and what [illegible].

[illegible]

Mr. Harmsworth: According to [illegible] has [illegible] received from the Acting British [illegible] it appears that as a result of the [illegible] of Samsun [illegible] persons were killed and three wounded. No information [illegible]. The material damage [illegible] depot containing considerable quantities of [illegible] of the Konak or Government House and a portion of the [illegible]. According to the Turkish press 20 Moslem [illegible] and [illegible] houses were destroyed.

Mr. [illegible]: [illegible] Constantinople to be used as a base?

Mr. Harmsworth: [illegible] does not arise.

[E 6941/27/44] No. 30.

Lieut.-General Sir C. Harington to War Office.—(Communicated by War Office, July 13.)

(Secret.)
Telegraphic. I. *Constantinople, July 1[illegible], 1922.*

YOUR No. 9657 of [illegible] July, 1922.*

My No. [illegible] of 3rd July, 1922, and No. 19[illegible] of 7th July, 1922, were sent after conversation with Colonel Nurse. His appreciation to Lindley, which was not sent on to High Commissioners [illegible] contained gist of my telegram No. [illegible], and added that in his opinion Greek defensive destruction of railways and country would form basis of fresh Mahommedan anti-British campaign, besides damaging Greece in eyes of the world. Nurse [illegible] officers who accompanied him, and I all see the same picture. Greeks will have to show signs of weakening if they are not prepared to [illegible] another winter, and I am watching for these signs. I regret to learn that Foreign Office do not consider it opportune to proceed with preparations of plans for shipping, forces [illegible] rather refugees. I can therefore do no more except point out that if decision to evacuate is ever reached unless above points have been carefully prepared for, the evacuation will result in complete chaos.

No. 31.

Sir H. Lamb to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received July 13.)

(No. 36.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Smyrna, July 13, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram and Athens telegram of 12th July.

Exercise of right of search against British vessels only will almost necessarily compel British companies to suspend service, involving serious loss and compromising future trade relations.

I venture to submit that our consent should be made conditional on general application, and that Greeks should be compelled to publish list of contraband at once.

Please make facts known to Messrs. J. Langdon Rees Company, of 22 Leadenhall Street, with whom [illegible] prevented by censor from communicating by telegraph.

(Addressed to Athens, No. 46.)

No. 32.

The Earl of Balfour to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 268.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July 13, 1922.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 300 and 301 of 7th July.

M. Poincaré states that Angora Government have expressed officially to Colonel Mougin their readiness to meet the Greeks in conference and to accept an armistice.

Our view is that if the Angora Government wish to proceed with this idea they should come into the open and convey the intimation in a more official manner.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 191; copy to Paris.)

No. 33.

The Earl of Balfour to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 269.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Foreign Office, July 13, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 303 of 11th July: Atrocities Commission.

His Majesty's Government have accepted French proposal for neutral instead of Allied commissioners, and have approached International Red Cross at Geneva. Their reply is awaited.

I am averse from inviting League of Nations' intervention as likely to involve difficulties with United States Government, who would regard themselves as having been entrapped, and might possibly refuse to participate in commission.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 230, by bag.)

* Reads as follows: "Reference High Commissioner's telegram of 6th July, No. 298. Was Nurse's report contained therein seen by you before despatch, and have you any comments?"

E 6964/5/44 No. 34

Lord Hardinge to the Earl of Balfour (Received July 14)

(No. 1629)
My Lord *Paris, July 13, 1922*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of the French Government's reply to the memorandum on the Near Eastern settlement which, in accordance with the instructions contained in your Lordship's telegram No. 220 of the 5th July, I transmitted to M. Poincaré on the 6th July.

The Secret Government, while accepting conditionally the points put forward by His Majesty's Ministry, as preliminaries for the meeting of the conference, press for the early adherence of the French proposals for procedure, press for the early adherence of the Greek Government to the proposed date of the meeting.

I have, &c.
HARDINGE OF PENSHURST

Enclosure in No. 34

Note from Millerand

M. Millerand *Paris, le 3 juillet 1922*

J'AI reçu la lettre en date du 29 du mois dernier par laquelle votre Excellence a bien voulu me transmettre de la part de Son Altesse Royale le Sultan et de Sa Majesté le Roi Georges de Grèce un mémorandum relatif à l'établissement de la paix en Orient.

Je me suis empressé d'en donner lecture à mes collègues du Conseil des Ministres et j'ai l'honneur de faire connaître à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement français a été d'avis qu'il serait désirable, si cela était possible, que les Gouvernements alliés associés entre eux les Gouvernements d'Angora, d'Athènes et de Constantinople arrêtent d'un commun accord les propositions qu'ils présenteront pour la convocation de la conférence envisagée.

Veuillez agréer, &c.
R. POINCARÉ

Enclosure 2 in No. 34

Memorandum by the French Government on the Near Eastern Settlement

[Avant-propos.] Le Gouvernement français a pris connaissance avec le plus grand intérêt des propositions qui lui ont été communiquées par le Gouvernement britannique, et qui, après avoir été soumises à Sa Majesté le Roi Georges de Grèce, ont été également agréées par le Gouvernement hellénique. Il a été convenu entre les deux Gouvernements qu'il serait procédé à un échange de vues avec les représentants des Alliés auprès des Gouvernements d'Angora, d'Athènes et de Constantinople.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique a tout d'abord fait connaître que, si les propositions qu'il avait présentées lui paraissaient dans leur ensemble de nature à servir de base à un accord, il ne pouvait cependant se prononcer définitivement sur les différents points qu'après avoir pris connaissance des vues du Gouvernement français. Celui-ci, de son côté, a fait savoir qu'il était prêt à accepter, en principe, les propositions britanniques, sous réserve de certaines modifications qu'il désirait y apporter.

Le Gouvernement britannique a accueilli favorablement les propositions du Gouvernement français, et il a fait connaître qu'il était prêt à accepter la plupart des modifications qu'il désirait y apporter. Il a également fait savoir qu'il était d'accord avec le Gouvernement français pour penser que la conférence préliminaire à laquelle devaient être soumises les propositions générales de paix devrait être réunie à Paris.

Le Gouvernement de la République est heureux de constater que le Gouvernement britannique, en présentant comme préliminaires indispensables à la réunion de la conférence certains points sur lesquels il était d'accord avec le Gouvernement français, a précisément visé ceux des conversations qui, à son avis, devaient avoir pour objet d'aplanir les difficultés susceptibles de surgir au cours de la conférence elle-même.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, cependant, a fait connaître qu'il désirait que certains points soient éclaircis avant la réunion de la conférence.

En ce qui concerne les questions générales de paix, il est bien entendu que ce sont celles que les Ministres des Affaires étrangères de Grande-Bretagne, de France et d'Italie ont décidé de soumettre, dans le courant de la présente semaine, aux délégués turcs et grecs. En ce qui concerne les éclaircissements que le Gouvernement britannique désire obtenir, il semble que le succès de toutes les démarches faites par les Gouvernements alliés auprès des Gouvernements grec et turc, pour amener les Grecs et les Turcs à accepter ses conditions de paix, dépendra, en grande partie, de la netteté avec laquelle les représentants des Alliés auprès de ces deux Gouvernements auront été chargés de faire connaître à ceux-ci les propositions qu'ils auront à leur soumettre. Il est donc d'une importance capitale que les instructions qui seront données à ces représentants soient rédigées de manière à ne laisser subsister aucune équivoque sur la portée exacte des propositions. Il est également indispensable que les représentants des Alliés auprès des Gouvernements d'Angora, d'Athènes et de Constantinople soient autorisés à déclarer que, si les propositions qu'ils auront à faire connaître à ces Gouvernements sont acceptées par eux, elles le seront également par les Alliés, et que, si elles sont rejetées par eux, elles le seront également par les Alliés.

Le Gouvernement britannique a également fait savoir qu'il était d'accord avec le Gouvernement français pour penser que, si les Gouvernements d'Angora, d'Athènes et de Constantinople ne donnaient pas leur acceptation aux propositions des Alliés, ceux-ci devraient se réunir à nouveau en conférence pour examiner quelles mesures il y aurait lieu de prendre pour contraindre ces Gouvernements à accepter les conditions de paix qui leur auraient été proposées.

Le Gouvernement britannique a, enfin, fait savoir qu'il était d'accord avec le Gouvernement français pour penser que, si les Gouvernements d'Angora, d'Athènes et de Constantinople refusaient d'accepter les propositions des Alliés, ceux-ci devraient se réunir à nouveau en conférence pour examiner quelles mesures il y aurait lieu de prendre pour contraindre ces Gouvernements à accepter les conditions de paix qui leur auraient été proposées.

Le Gouvernement britannique a, enfin, fait savoir qu'il était d'accord avec le Gouvernement français pour penser que, si les Gouvernements d'Angora, d'Athènes et de Constantinople refusaient d'accepter les propositions des Alliés, ceux-ci devraient se réunir à nouveau en conférence pour examiner quelles mesures il y aurait lieu de prendre pour contraindre ces Gouvernements à accepter les conditions de paix qui leur auraient été proposées.

Le Gouvernement de la République est heureux de constater que le Gouvernement britannique, en présentant comme préliminaires indispensables à la réunion de la conférence certains points sur lesquels il était d'accord avec le Gouvernement français, a précisément visé ceux des conversations qui, à son avis, devaient avoir pour objet d'aplanir les difficultés susceptibles de surgir au cours de la conférence elle-même.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, cependant, a fait connaître qu'il désirait que certains points soient éclaircis avant la réunion de la conférence.

En ce qui concerne les questions générales de paix, il est bien entendu que ce sont celles que les Ministres des Affaires étrangères de Grande-Bretagne, de France et d'Italie ont décidé de soumettre, dans le courant de la présente semaine, aux délégués turcs et grecs. En ce qui concerne les éclaircissements que le Gouvernement britannique désire obtenir, il semble que le succès de toutes les démarches faites par les Gouvernements alliés auprès des Gouvernements grec et turc, pour amener les Grecs et les Turcs à accepter ses conditions de paix, dépendra, en grande partie, de la netteté avec laquelle les représentants des Alliés auprès de ces deux Gouvernements auront été chargés de faire connaître à ceux-ci les propositions qu'ils auront à leur soumettre. Il est donc d'une importance capitale que les instructions qui seront données à ces représentants soient rédigées de manière à ne laisser subsister aucune équivoque sur la portée exacte des propositions. Il est également indispensable que les représentants des Alliés auprès des Gouvernements d'Angora, d'Athènes et de Constantinople soient autorisés à déclarer que, si les propositions qu'ils auront à faire connaître à ces Gouvernements sont acceptées par eux, elles le seront également par les Alliés, et que, si elles sont rejetées par eux, elles le seront également par les Alliés.

Le Gouvernement britannique a également fait savoir qu'il était d'accord avec le Gouvernement français pour penser que, si les Gouvernements d'Angora, d'Athènes et de Constantinople refusaient d'accepter les propositions des Alliés, ceux-ci devraient se réunir à nouveau en conférence pour examiner quelles mesures il y aurait lieu de prendre pour contraindre ces Gouvernements à accepter les conditions de paix qui leur auraient été proposées.

Le Gouvernement britannique a, enfin, fait savoir qu'il était d'accord avec le Gouvernement français pour penser que, si les Gouvernements d'Angora, d'Athènes et de Constantinople refusaient d'accepter les propositions des Alliés, ceux-ci devraient se réunir à nouveau en conférence pour examiner quelles mesures il y aurait lieu de prendre pour contraindre ces Gouvernements à accepter les conditions de paix qui leur auraient été proposées.

Le Gouvernement de la République est heureux de constater que le Gouvernement britannique, en présentant comme préliminaires indispensables à la réunion de la conférence certains points sur lesquels il était d'accord avec le Gouvernement français, a précisément visé ceux des conversations qui, à son avis, devaient avoir pour objet d'aplanir les difficultés susceptibles de surgir au cours de la conférence elle-même.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, cependant, a fait connaître qu'il désirait que certains points soient éclaircis avant la réunion de la conférence.

En ce qui concerne les questions générales de paix, il est bien entendu que ce sont celles que les Ministres des Affaires étrangères de Grande-Bretagne, de France et d'Italie ont décidé de soumettre, dans le courant de la présente semaine, aux délégués turcs et grecs. En ce qui concerne les éclaircissements que le Gouvernement britannique désire obtenir, il semble que le succès de toutes les démarches faites par les Gouvernements alliés auprès des Gouvernements grec et turc, pour amener les Grecs et les Turcs à accepter ses conditions de paix, dépendra, en grande partie, de la netteté avec laquelle les représentants des Alliés auprès de ces deux Gouvernements auront été chargés de faire connaître à ceux-ci les propositions qu'ils auront à leur soumettre. Il est donc d'une importance capitale que les instructions qui seront données à ces représentants soient rédigées de manière à ne laisser subsister aucune équivoque sur la portée exacte des propositions. Il est également indispensable que les représentants des Alliés auprès des Gouvernements d'Angora, d'Athènes et de Constantinople soient autorisés à déclarer que, si les propositions qu'ils auront à faire connaître à ces Gouvernements sont acceptées par eux, elles le seront également par les Alliés, et que, si elles sont rejetées par eux, elles le seront également par les Alliés.

Le Gouvernement britannique a également fait savoir qu'il était d'accord avec le Gouvernement français pour penser que, si les Gouvernements d'Angora, d'Athènes et de Constantinople refusaient d'accepter les propositions des Alliés, ceux-ci devraient se réunir à nouveau en conférence pour examiner quelles mesures il y aurait lieu de prendre pour contraindre ces Gouvernements à accepter les conditions de paix qui leur auraient été proposées.

Le Gouvernement britannique a, enfin, fait savoir qu'il était d'accord avec le Gouvernement français pour penser que, si les Gouvernements d'Angora, d'Athènes et de Constantinople refusaient d'accepter les propositions des Alliés, ceux-ci devraient se réunir à nouveau en conférence pour examiner quelles mesures il y aurait lieu de prendre pour contraindre ces Gouvernements à accepter les conditions de paix qui leur auraient été proposées.

Le Gouvernement de la République est heureux de constater que le Gouvernement britannique, en présentant comme préliminaires indispensables à la réunion de la conférence certains points sur lesquels il était d'accord avec le Gouvernement français, a précisément visé ceux des conversations qui, à son avis, devaient avoir pour objet d'aplanir les difficultés susceptibles de surgir au cours de la conférence elle-même.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, cependant, a fait connaître qu'il désirait que certains points soient éclaircis avant la réunion de la conférence.

En ce qui concerne les questions générales de paix, il est bien entendu que ce sont celles que les Ministres des Affaires étrangères de Grande-Bretagne, de France et d'Italie ont décidé de soumettre, dans le courant de la présente semaine, aux délégués turcs et grecs. En ce qui concerne les éclaircissements que le Gouvernement britannique désire obtenir, il semble que le succès de toutes les démarches faites par les Gouvernements alliés auprès des Gouvernements grec et turc, pour amener les Grecs et les Turcs à accepter ses conditions de paix, dépendra, en grande partie, de la netteté avec laquelle les représentants des Alliés auprès de ces deux Gouvernements auront été chargés de faire connaître à ceux-ci les propositions qu'ils auront à leur soumettre. Il est donc d'une importance capitale que les instructions qui seront données à ces représentants soient rédigées de manière à ne laisser subsister aucune équivoque sur la portée exacte des propositions. Il est également indispensable que les représentants des Alliés auprès des Gouvernements d'Angora, d'Athènes et de Constantinople soient autorisés à déclarer que, si les propositions qu'ils auront à faire connaître à ces Gouvernements sont acceptées par eux, elles le seront également par les Alliés, et que, si elles sont rejetées par eux, elles le seront également par les Alliés.

Le Gouvernement britannique a également fait savoir qu'il était d'accord avec le Gouvernement français pour penser que, si les Gouvernements d'Angora, d'Athènes et de Constantinople refusaient d'accepter les propositions des Alliés, ceux-ci devraient se réunir à nouveau en conférence pour examiner quelles mesures il y aurait lieu de prendre pour contraindre ces Gouvernements à accepter les conditions de paix qui leur auraient été proposées.

Le Gouvernement britannique a, enfin, fait savoir qu'il était d'accord avec le Gouvernement français pour penser que, si les Gouvernements d'Angora, d'Athènes et de Constantinople refusaient d'accepter les propositions des Alliés, ceux-ci devraient se réunir à nouveau en conférence pour examiner quelles mesures il y aurait lieu de prendre pour contraindre ces Gouvernements à accepter les conditions de paix qui leur auraient été proposées.

bien entendu que l'acceptation ... [illegible] ... dans ces conditions par le Gouvernement français ... [illegible] ... subordonnée à l'assentiment de tous les autres Gouvernements sans exception.

D'autre part, le retrait du Gouvernement français ... [illegible] ... droits sur ... [illegible] ... le conflit entre Grecs et Turcs. Comme indiqué dans la dépêche du 4 octobre 1921, à l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté, l'application à ces territoires ... [illegible] ... retrait aient pour effet ... [illegible] ... Gouvernement français a prescrit ... [illegible] ... régies ... [illegible] ... du régime ... [illegible] ... les régies ordinaires ... [illegible] ... Constantinople ... [illegible] ... sur ... [illegible] ... les régies ordinaires ... [illegible] ... et ... [illegible] ... Conseil ... [illegible] ... Dettes ... [illegible] ... l'intérêt ... [illegible] ... Alliés.

Enfin, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté ... [illegible] ... rappelle ... [illegible] ... à la Conférence de Paris pour ... [illegible] ... traité ... [illegible] ... du sort des populations de l'Asie Mineure ... [illegible] ... Il ne saurait ... [illegible] ... séparément ... [illegible] ... effet, comme il l'a fait ... [illegible] ... Gouvernement ... [illegible] ... Conférence ... [illegible] ... nous ... [illegible] ... reconnaître ... [illegible] ... Conférence ... [illegible] ... Paris.

En ce qui concerne ... [illegible] ... enfin ... [illegible] ... britannique ... [illegible] ... Alliés sur ces points particuliers, ... [illegible] ... Angora, l'Ambassadeur ... [illegible] ... efficace pour ... [illegible] ... Paris.

Paraphé : Hardinge et Peel.

E 7134 525 44 No. 35

... Office to ... Secretary, ... Paris ... Foreign Office, July 14

(Telegraph)

My telegram ... [illegible] ...

... has been received ... [illegible] ... Venizelos, ... [illegible] ... that Greek ... [illegible] ... remedies ... [illegible] ... prepared to ... [illegible] ... Smyrna on following terms:

1. British troops ... [illegible] ... Forest ... [illegible] ... employed ... [illegible] ... Christmas ... [illegible] ... years.
2. Greek troops will not ... [illegible] ... were attacked ... [illegible] ... base from British zone to ... [illegible] ... British zone ... [illegible] ... present if necessary, Greeks to return at once ... [illegible] ... positions.
3. Greeks should stay for ... [illegible] ... two weeks and a few ... [illegible] ... hours for mothers ... [illegible] ... six weeks from ... [illegible] ... Greek ... [illegible] ... accepted.
4. ... [illegible] ... Parthenon ... [illegible] ... fortifications ... [illegible] ... shall be slightly ... [illegible] ... removed.

Major de Amistoy ... [illegible] ... refers ... [illegible] ... Greeks will probably not insist on their troops staying if ... [illegible] ... terms agreed to.

I propose, subject to your approval, to accept these conditions with proviso that, without permission of British area commander, Greeks may not cross boundary.

Early reply ... [illegible] ...

No. 36

The Earl of Balfour to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople)

(No. 271)

Telegraph ... R ... *Foreign Office, July 14, 1922*

PRESS telegrams from Constantinople report that General Townshend has arrived at Angora. Can you ascertain what are the facts of his alleged journey? He was in May last given a passport marked "Not valid for Turkey" and on that occasion gave a definite assurance that he would make no attempt to enter Turkey until peace was signed and that his proposed journey extended only to Paris, Madrid and Carlsbad.

E 6767 5 44] No. 37

The Earl of Balfour to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 2212.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 14, 1922*

It appears from your conversation with M. Poincaré, reported in your Excellency's despatch No. 1583 of the 7th July, that the French Government contemplate protesting against (3) prospecting for the wreck right of search) in the memorandum enclosed in my despatch No. 2055 of the 7th July.

2. Your reply ... [illegible] ... has been incorporated in an official reply now being drafted for them to recede from its attitude, and I am therefore to request that you will take an early opportunity of reverting to the subject in conversation with M. Poincaré. His Excellency's argument that it would be [illegible] ... of Paris secrets ... [illegible] ... based on an incorrect ... [illegible] ... The accepted principle of international law is that belligerents may at their own risk search neutral vessels for contraband ... [illegible] ... consenting ... [illegible] ... when found. This is illustrated by the experience of the war, when Great Britain, ... [illegible] ... strong objection ... [illegible] ... the contrary, the United States, which still ... [illegible] ... refused to permit private individuals ... [illegible] ... material ... [illegible] ... Allies as well as with Germany, but never denied the right of the belligerents to intercept such traffic when carried on by ... [illegible] ... the high seas. Nor, as they will admit, is the ... [illegible] ... duty of the ... [illegible] ... urged by Germany that since ... [illegible] ... was powerless to prevent the ... [illegible] ... of supplies ... [illegible] ... coasts and ports of Great Britain ... [illegible] ... it was the duty of neutral powers ... [illegible] ... and control ... [illegible] ... hostilities between the belligerents by ... [illegible] ... all cargoes ... [illegible] ... which ... [illegible] ... interfere with ... [illegible] ... neutral ships carrying supplies ... [illegible] ... Germany or destined ... [illegible] ... for Germany.

3. His attitude therefore, which is now taken up by the French Government is one ... [illegible] ... with one of the most important principles governing naval warfare, through ... [illegible] ... exactly conformable to the contentions which Germany unsuccessfully put forward during the late war, for the avowed purpose of impugning the exercise of well established belligerent rights by the Allied navies. The same ... [illegible] ... may be observed with certainty ... [illegible] ... to ... [illegible] ... at the time by the French Government.

4. The principles ... [illegible] ... are in the eyes of His Majesty's Government of vital importance, and they cannot believe that the French Government can ... [illegible] ... realised the full effect of the line of action they seek to pursue. Such ... [illegible] ... against whom the British Government can, in any circumstances, fail to make the most emphatic protest, and I must earnestly appeal to the French Government to reconsider it. His Majesty's Government ... [illegible] ... approve ... [illegible] ... to concur with the Allied declaration that in the present conflict between Greece who fought with us in the war and Turkey who fought against us they would preserve a strictly neutral attitude, but also with the paramount duty of maintaining the authority of the recognised sheet-anchor of maritime law, to which this country has always attached the greatest importance.

I am, &c.

BALFOUR

E 7113 5 44] No 38.

Memorandum by Sir C. Hurst

THE termination of the state of belligerency between the Allies and Turkey can be achieved without a treaty, was a question of fact

A great part of the Turkish possessions in Europe was occupied by the Allies by a unilateral act without Turkish concurrence

2 The territory which it is proposed to detach from Turkey under the Treaty of Sevres is now in the occupation of the Allies and has been for some time entirely free from Turkish control There is no bar to any transfer apart from a new treaty of sovereignty from Turkey by such a unilateral act There are many instances where a foreign Power has annexed territory by force or conquest from a previous sovereign, and the decree of annexation declaring the conquered territory to be henceforth a part of the dominions of the conqueror has been followed by the prompt payment of a yearly tribute in lieu of taxation of various descriptions of certain specified powers All that was necessary was to embody in the sections of the Treaty of Sevres relating to territories detached from Turkey all the clauses in the proposed decrees of annexation, making such slight change of language as would not be applicable to the parties to the Treaty of Sevres

This system would not be applicable to the portions of the Treaty of Sevres relating to territory which at present are the subject of the exercise of Turkish sovereignty such as the establishment of an autonomous region in Turkish rights restricted to suzerainty

Having regard to the Allied interests in proposing a settlement in these areas it would be preferable that Turkey should be induced to enter into a treaty with the Allies rather than that the latter should unilaterally declare that they will withdraw from Constantinople and the Straits until Turkey agrees to certain terms Even when the conditions of the measures which should be adopted to safeguard Allied interests under the Treaty of Sevres relating to Turkey proper such as the military and naval clauses and all those regarding the Straits, cannot be insisted upon by the Porte, &

Some of the provisions of the Treaty of Sevres could be carried out by measures to be taken in Allied territory such as the publication of various papers and the advantage of including some of the treaty provisions that have been planned and have been accepted by Turkey in the Armistice agreement, however is not essential and it would be possible to include in the Allied Declaration by appropriate language all the Sevres provisions which would be useful for the protection of minorities and other matters which it is desirable should be carried out

The best and only way for the Allies to secure the execution by Turkey of all that is important in the Sevres Treaty would be by a treaty of peace between the Allies and Turkey

The question of the Greek forces in Asia Minor is one which requires careful consideration Quite apart from the political aspect of the matter the withdrawal of the Greek forces and the evacuation of Smyrna would be a most difficult operation and would have to be carefully arranged in order to prevent disorder and massacre

7 Should the arrangement with Greece be made by Turkey, it would be necessary to arrange with Turkey what is to be done with the Capitulations and other matters connected with the position of foreigners in Turkey, such, for instance, as the question of recognising the new authority of the Turkish courts to which foreigners are to be subject, and the question of the withdrawal of the various foreign missions from Constantinople

8 Generally speaking a very large part of the work of the Lausanne Conference would be practically settled by the Allies themselves before the Conference met and the Conference would only have to register certain arrangements, and to obtain agreement to them as would be necessary To abandon the Straits would be a step to be regretted as it would involve the abandonment of the contemplated neutralisation of the Straits and the surrender of a large part of the control which we have hitherto exercised over the Straits It would be possible to reserve a right to make changes in the zone of the Straits by agreement with the Powers, but the occupation in some form would have to be maintained until Turkey accepted the arrangement

9 Finally it could be said that the experiment is novel I know of no precedent for it which can be quoted It would be difficult to base the ground, but also upon the ground that it is merely the imposition by force of an arrangement which largely represents a peace settlement which was so unjust that the inhabitants have rebelled against it

July 14, 1922

[E 7011 19 44] No 39

British Red Cross Society to Foreign Office — Received July 15,

Sir, 19, *Berkeley Street, London, July* 14, 1922

IN continuation of my letter of the 10th July stating that our proposal had been transmitted to the International Red Cross, I have the honour to enclose a copy of a telegram received yesterday from the Comite international de la Croix Rouge, Geneva, in reply to my letter of the 11th July asking them if they would undertake the proposed enquiry into the atrocities alleged to have taken place in the territories in Asia Minor

As will be seen from the telegram, the Comité International are prepared to send a delegate to London to discuss the matter with you should you so desire and, for your information, I may add that the president of the Comite International is M Gustav Ador, 1 Promenade du Pin Geneve Suisse

I am &c.,
H B CHAMPAIN *Secretary.*

Enclosure in No. 39.

Comité international de la Croix-Rouge to British Red Cross Society,

(Telegraphic) *Geneva July* 13, 1922

COMITÉ international de Croix Rouge accepterait faire selon principes Croix-Rouge enquêtes demandées Serait disposé si désirez envoyer délégué conférer Londres.
COMITE INTERNATIONAL CROIX-ROUGE

No. 40

Mr Lindley to the Earl of Balfour (Received July 15,

(No 240 Most Confidential)
(Telegraphic) *Athens, July* 14, 1922

MINISTER of Foreign Affairs informed me to-day that recent Cabinet meetings had resulted in two decisions

1 No Greek forces to be withdrawn from their present positions in Asia Minor for the time being

2 Administration of a zone terminating at Smyrna on Panderma and including railway line joining the two towns to be reorganised

M Stergiades left for Smyrna to-day and will begin reorganisation at once Intention is to give greater authority to local elements, both Christian and Mussulman with the idea of setting up an administration which will secure evacuation of Greek forces on I will form basis for some form of provincial autonomous Government Minister for Foreign Affairs said that M Stergiades would probably make some announcement to population on that we I a country would not be used There had not been any question of immediate annexation (see my telegram No 245)

Minister for Foreign Affairs wished above to be considered as very confidential
(Repeated to Constantinople)

No. 41

Mr Henderson to the Earl of Balfour (Received July 15,

(No 305)
(Telegraphic) R *Constantinople July* 14, 1922

TELEGRAMS from Angora correspondents of [? group omitted] have announced resignation of Angora Government.

No official statement has been made

Resignation followed on adoption of new law on procedure for election of Ministers by Grand National Assembly and is stated to have been presented for sake of form in order to give Assembly opportunity of confirming or withdrawing confidence given to Ministers under old procedure

Information regarding exact nature of new procedure is somewhat contradictory, but it certainly curtails power hitherto exercised by Mustapha Kemal Nevertheless latest press telegrams indicate that principal members of retiring Cabinet including Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of National Defence are being re-elected

---

No. 42

Mr Henderson to the Earl of Balfour — *Received July 16*

(No. 306)
(Telegraphic) R — *Constantinople July 16, 1922*

BEIROUT telegram No. 18

I have reported your telegram No. 271 to Commissioner-General at Beirout and have instructed him to take all steps in his power to induce General Townshend to abandon his assistance given to His Majesty's Government

---

No. 43

Mr Henderson to the Earl of Balfour — *Received July 16*

(No. 307)
(Telegraphic) R — *Constantinople July 16, 1922*

MY immediate preceding telegram

I have French High Commissioner another bad case telegraphed to Beirout to warn French authorities that stolen Cotton Law's passport was specially marked not valid for Turkey but it would be necessary to adopt procedure in passport matters so offensive to many Countries to Constantinople Turkish territory The proposal fails

---

No. 44

Mr Henderson to the Earl of Balfour — *(Received July 16)*

No. 308
(Telegraphic) D — *Constantinople July 16, 1922*

YOUR telegram No. 268

Since Colonel Morgan's telegram passing given to Angora Government regret French High Commissioner not able to introduce direct note of *démarche* of Angora Government

French High Commissioner stated that so far as he was aware there had been no further interview of Colonel Morgan's telegrams respecting readiness of Angora Government to accept armistice

French High Commissioner stated that Nationalist agent had given him account of interview with Mr Ryan reported in my telegram No. 300 and that he thought therefore that I was aware of wishes of Angora Government in this respect What had been said to Colonel Morgan was by Nationalist Minister for Foreign Affairs and Mustapha Kemal Pasha's Government meant to very much more

I urged strongly that second paragraph of your telegram under reference might be communicated but His Majesty's Government would be prepared to consider intervention in a friendly manner officially I would however observe that there are two conferences in the air at present at Berlin and Boulogne and that Angora Government's suggestion, as more both to Colonel Morgan and through Hamid Bey refers solely to participation of belligerents in forthcoming conference in Western Europe

Hamid Bey made this still clearer in subsequent interview with Mr Ryan on 13th May

I have no indication nor French High Commissioner either, that Angora would agree to Boulogne, which I see from confidential print that His Majesty's Government

contemplate as meeting-place for preliminary conference without commitment I should be glad therefore to learn whether His Majesty's Government would be prepared to consider intimation if it conveyed desire of Angora to participate in forthcoming conference in London

I shall not mention views of His Majesty's Government to Nationalist agent here until I hear at this If this were at once arranged French High Commissioner suggests that Nationalist delegate might possibly be Fethi Bey, Commissioner of the Interior who is actually at Beirout on his way to Paris and who was principal negotiator in Franklin-Bouillon Agreement

---

[E 7066/76/44] — No. 45.

Mr Henderson to the Earl of Balfour — *(Received July 17)*

(No. 614)
My Lord — *Constantinople July 8, 1922*

WITH reference to Sir Horace Rumbold's despatch No. 581 of the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of further note from the Nationalist agent here reiterating the protest recently made by his Government against the use of Constantinople as a naval base by the Greek fleet

2. The ground for this renewed protest is the action of Greek vessels operating from Constantinople in destroying Turkish vessels carrying wood from Kefken to Constantinople

3. The attention of the High Commissioners and Italy has been drawn to this matter by representations of the Advisory Trade Committee. The latter were specially concerned at the effect of this section of the world's supply of Constantinople from the export point of view. They pointed out that the Greek authorities had already used as many obstacles as possible in the transport of wood from Gerelis, Yalova, &c., but this new step implies were now openly proposing to the Ottoman that no available supplies of wood would be allowed to go down to Constantinople for six weeks at the earliest. Greek naval authorities persisted in their present activities and this would result in a serious shortage in Constantinople and a rise in its price.

4. My French and Italian colleagues and I have accordingly decided to address an urgent communication, copy of which I beg leave to enclose, to the Greek High Commissioner here with a view to concentrate instructions being given to the Greek naval authorities to desist from interference with this traffic.

5. I have the honour to enclose herewith translation of correspondence on the subject of His Majesty's Ministers' Athens with the request that I should support by making the strongest representations to the Greek Government.

6. I would add that a similar protest to that now received from Kefken has been sent to the High Commissioners by the Turkish Government here.

7. My Italian and French colleagues are getting more and more restless at the constant incidents arising out of the presence of the Greek naval and military authorities at Constantinople such as the bombardment of Samsoun, the seizure of the Trebizond ammunitions which have not been of sufficient importance to bring to your Lordship's notice.

8. I think it would be well if the Greek Government were warned lest worse befall them, to instruct their authorities in the future to adopt more conciliatory attitude towards the demands of the representatives of the occupying Powers. The Allied High Commissioners have, for instance received a reply that they demanded that the Trebizond should be restored to the Sam Samsun Company please see my despatch No. 554 of the 20th June 1922 and in spite of their repeated assistance at the request of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Allied Forces of Occupation, has any satisfaction been given to their request for a withdrawal of the Greek military frontier line in Eastern Thrace please see my despatch No. 517 dated the 11th July, 1922.

9. I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to Mr Lindley.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

Enclosure No. 45

M. Hamdi to Sir H. Rumbold.

[N. and des Nos. 22 and 24 are missing. A letter from Monsieur de Fontenay to Their Excellencies MM. les Ambassadeurs des États-Unis d'Amérique, de Grande-Bretagne, de France, d'Italie et du Japon, dated ... 1922, informs Their Excellencies Youssouf Kemal Bey, Minister des Affaires étrangères, that the Grande Assemblée Nationale d'Angora has decided to send delegates to a Conference to be held at Lausanne, and that Ismet Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs, has been appointed President of the Turkish delegation. The letter requests that Their Excellencies will be pleased to inform the Allied Governments of the above decision.]

Constantinople, October 1922.

Enclosure 2 in No. 45

Lord Curzon to Sir H. Rumbold.

[Nos. 1 and 2 are missing. In these despatches Lord Curzon points out that the Allied Governments are not prepared to accept the invitation to the proposed Conference, and that the Conference should be held at Lausanne, and not at Angora. He instructs Sir H. Rumbold to inform the Turkish Government of the decision of the Allied Governments.]

Constantinople, October 1922.

[E 7067/5/44] No. 46

Mr. Hohler to the Earl of Balfour. (Received ... 17.)

No. 614. Angora, ... *extract*] ... 1922.

I HAVE had a private interview with Ismet Pasha, No. 3000 of ... 7th instant, to transmit to him the communication therewith recorded. Mr. Peterson's conversation with Ismet Pasha showed that he was not prepared to accept the proposed Conference of Allies, for the end of this month, to settle matters between Britain and the Angora Government.

2. Apart from the points specifically dealt with in your reference, Ismet Pasha expressed to Mr. Peterson that he was anxious to know whether Angora could be assured of the complete independence of Turkey, and referred to the part of Mr. Lloyd George's conversation with Mr. Ryan, reported in your despatch No. ... of ... 1922, in which Mr. Lloyd George is reported to have said that Turkey must be free to control the Straits, and that Constantinople must be the capital of Turkey.

3. Ismet Pasha's attitude in respect of the real authority with which, as mentioned in the paragraph marked "secret" of Mr. Peterson's memorandum, the delegates of the Nationalist Government to any future conference should be invested, is also noteworthy. I gather from secret sources that Ismet Pasha has gone so far as to be ready to suggest to his Government that they should state, in addressing what that authority should be,

I have, &c.

NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 46.

Memorandum by Mr. Ryan.

I HAD a long conversation with Ismet Pasha on the 3rd July. We first discussed certain matters of current business. I then, in accordance with an agreement previously arrived at between Mr. Peterson (acting on instructions from the proposed Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs to be held at the end of July, with the express object of ascertaining Ismet Pasha's attitude), asked him what he thought of the general situation. He said that it was for him to ask me that question. I said we had had one telegram from London sent before the visit of Mr. Peterson and before that of Mr. Schurzer, foreshadowing a conference towards the end of the month. We had heard nothing since. Mr. Schurzer's return to Washington would doubtless have been taken as the first step in the arrangements for this conference. Accordingly Ismet Pasha at once said that he would like to have information with the Angora Government's reply, and that it would be well if Turks and Greeks were also invited to the proposed conference of Allied Ministers before proceeding to Lausanne. He said that, in the interests of peace, he would not like to suggest anything that would be calculated to prevent the Allied Ministers from proceeding to Lausanne. A reply would be sent, and the Allied Ministers would by that time have separated. An exchange of views between the Angora Deputies would, he considered, be useful, as Turks and Greeks would remain free to fight on the battle front. Such a procedure had nowhere. Angora sincerely desired peace, and it was necessary to *brusquer les temps et l'espace* to arrive at quickly. The conference should therefore be one at which all the parties

I asked what was Ismet's personal view or preview of the Angora Government. Ismet Pasha said that was his Government. I said that I would report what he said. Mr. Peterson's visit had been the proposal to attend the very first of the recent Paris Conference, the object of bringing about a direct conference between Allied generals, military and naval. Ismet Pasha would doubtless recollect that what was proposed as a result of the Paris Conference was a conference of Allies and belligerents on a private basis, whereas what he was now suggesting was a conference of Allies and belligerents "sur un pied officiel". Ismet Pasha said: "Vous engagez-vous, si nous venons?" I did not press Ismet as to what he meant by this. I expressed doubt as to whether a conference of Allies and belligerents without a preliminary assurance of results would be more successful than the other conferences which Ismet Pasha had in mind. I then turned to the subject of the general attitude of the Angora Government towards His Majesty's Government.

Ismet Pasha said that the mistake was a bad one for Britain, as before of being too suspicious of the intentions of His Majesty's Government. I then proceeded to make Angora take up the policy of the British Government. What I objected to was the fear that we should not again meet with the "Peoples" Angora might again, I suggested, be persuaded to forget enough to satisfy them. I then went on to say that no dealings which had taken place were in good faith as far as it went. I gave as a instance the negotiations renewed at a recent date that we had secured Turkish ships in the Black Sea at a year. That accusation made me think that I was disposed of.

Ismet Pasha said that the Angora Government really desired the friendship of Great Britain and that in arranging forward measures such as I had mentioned they were actuated by a desire to force Great Britain into friendship with them. I said, pressing my point, that I was glad to hear that we had supported the Greeks after declaring neutrality. Ismet Pasha, with more than usual outspokenness, contended that we had the use of Constantinople as a naval base, and

the presence of a Greek Military Mission and Greek troops in Constantinople. I reminded him that the proclamation of neutrality had applied to a land area only, and said that the Greek Military Mission was not affecting military operations. He insisted that a declaration of neutrality in regard to the land extended necessarily to territorial waters, and that neither the continued presence of Greek ships here nor the presence of a Military Mission could be reconciled with recognised principles of neutrality. I am unable to say that in this part of the conversation I felt that he had the best of the argument especially as I did not feel free to use the opposing argument that the Turks here were in fact constantly violating the neutrality of the neutral zone by sending arms &c. to Anatolia.

2. The conversation then turned on matters of no particular interest except for one point. He said that Great Britain, even in her sternest mood, had not wished to destroy Turkey, and that, even if Turks were right in considering the Treaty of Sevres as a dictated one it had not been drawn up with the intention of passing such a sentence. I understood the drafters of the Treaty to have had in mind such a way as to secure the establishment of the future Turkey claimed by the Nationalist forces on the lines of Turkey in Asia, but to have contemplated a reasonable measure of control over the latter's finances and military forces. We should both be content if this were all that Lord Curzon's Treaty had in mind.

(Secret.) 3. We know from secret sources that the report that Riza-Nur Bey proposed to have had the effect of knowing what extent Kemalist aims were prejudicial to the interests of the Allies, and to ascertain the measure of support which Angora could look for from Soviet Russia. Riza-Nur was instructed to tell Bekir that he was willing to go to Moscow for the purpose of discussing with Chicherin the question of the Straits, and that Bekir was anxious that he should do so. Bekir, however, was not willing to commit himself to any definite proposals, but suggested that Riza-Nur should go to Angora and discuss matters with the Kemalist leaders. Riza-Nur left Constantinople on the 15th June, and is expected to return to Constantinople about the 15th July. Bekir is said to have told Riza-Nur that he was not to commit himself to any definite proposals, but that he should discuss matters with the Kemalist leaders. Riza-Nur left Constantinople on the 15th June, and is expected to return to Constantinople about the 15th July.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Paris, Rome and Athens.

I have, &c.
A. R.

Italy, No. 29.

E 7076/3873/44 No. 47

Mr. Halgarth to the Earl of Balfour (Received July 1.)

No. 47. (No. 617.) Confidential.

My Lord, *Moscow, July 10, 1922.*

WITH reference to Foreign Office despatches Nos. 48 and 603 of the 1st and 28th June, I have the honour to report that I have made such enquiries here as have been possible, in default of confirmation of the report as to a new secret treaty between Angora and Soviet Russia.

The *Izvestia* of the 7th July mentions the arrival in Moscow of Riza-Nur Bey, Minister of Education in Turkey from Kharkov, where he has been acting as representative of his Government on the occasion of the ratification of the Turco-Ukraine Treaty. The note adds that "Riza-Nur arrived charged with a number of diplomatic missions and with a personal letter from Mustafa Kemal to Lenin. The conversation between Karakhan and Riza-Nur lasted over two hours, and was of a most friendly nature."

I will endeavour to ascertain the object of Riza-Nur's visit to Moscow.

I have, &c.
R. M. HODGSON.

E 7068/769/44 No. 48

Mr. Henderson to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received July 17.)

No. 617.)

HIS Majesty's Acting High Commissioner at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a note sent to His Majesty's diplomatic representative at Athens on the 11th July respecting the Turco-Greek frontier in Thrace.

Constantinople, July 11, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 48.

Mr. Head sends to Mr. Lindley (Athens).

(No. 616.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 11, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the question of withdrawing the Greek and Turkish forces to an equal distance on either side of the Turco-Greek frontier in Thrace has for a considerable time been the subject of correspondence between the General Officer Commanding-in-chief Allied Forces of Occupation, the Allied High Commissioners and the Greek High Commissioner. The Turkish forces under the superintendence of the French Military Command were withdrawn at an average distance of seven kilometres from the line, but it was so far seen found impossible to induce the Greek authorities to take similar step.

2. On the 12th December, 1922, a note was addressed at the request of the General Officer Commanding-in-chief by the Allied High Commissioners to the Greek High Commissioner suggesting that the Turkish posts should be withdrawn. The Allied military authorities considered this proposal a good one, it being preferable to keep the frontier guards out of each other's sight in order to prevent the exchange of rifle fire. On the receipt of the General Officer Commanding-in-chief's letter of the 6th January (a copy of which is enclosed) a further joint note was addressed to the Greek High Commissioner, but none was received until the 19th April that M. Theotokis was prepared to forward the requisite reply.

3. As you will observe from the Greek High Commissioner's note, he claims that because there have been no incidents, the Greeks are not to be withdrawn, but he forgets that the presence of detachments is largely due to the withdrawal of the frontier posts and that therefore, it is only reasonable that the Greek forces should withdraw to a similar distance.

4. The French military authorities are responsible for the maintenance of order in the zone of occupation. The General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Allied Forces of Occupation, fully concurs in General Charpy's view that such a separation of the opposing frontier posts is necessary, and I have the honour to suggest that you may see good enough to take this matter up with the Greek Government in conjunction with your French and Italian colleagues and to let me know their decision.

I have, &c.
N. M. HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure 2 in No. 48

Note No. 1 the Greek High Commissioner

EN se référant à la note [illegible] 20 octobre dernier du Haut-Commissaire de Grece, les Hauts-Commissaires de France de la Grande Bretagne et d'Italie soussignés ont l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de son Excellence M. Venizelos que les generaux alliés estiment [illegible] pour l'avenir les événements qui [illegible] les [illegible] détachements [illegible] frontières grecques et turques, les troupes grecques et turques devraient être retirées [illegible] et [illegible] [illegible] de la frontière orientale [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[E 7074 76 44] No 50

Viceroy (India Office) to the Marquess of Crewe (Received July 13)

My dear Colonel Hart, *India office, July 12, 1922*

I shall be glad to have Hankey's further memorandum on the neutrality of Constantinople, which I was unable to get to in time for Lord Peel last week. I have only seen two or three extracts from the same subject in the Secretary of State's recent telegrams, but I gather that it seeks to ascertain what steps the Foreign Office ought to take in the event of Mustapha Kemal's army advancing on the Straits.

The Foreign Office say that the Greeks should not be summarily ejected from Constantinople, which was, in fact, their principal capital and on the occupation of which they still put great store. If Greeks withdrew from Constantinople under the ægis of the Allies, they would remain at Constantinople and under the ægis of the Allies. They would remain at Constantinople and use it as the power base from which the other Allies are not participating could be justified? If the Allies as a whole withdrew from Constantinople to-morrow, the Greeks and thereafter Kemal would be in possession and the fact

I should be glad to hear that the Government have further evidence. I also enclose a copy of a further telegram from Mr. Vereker. The questions raised will perhaps be covered in general by your present memorandum, as further information is necessary in order to ascertain the facts just where we are on the matter. I will only say that it would be a great advantage if we could have facts and not opinions, and I am sure that Hankey is the man to furnish the Viceroy with the information which he requires.

With apologies for having to trouble you on this subject

Yours sincerely

H. WAKELY

Sir Maurice Hankey has explained that he has not had time to read the papers and will deal with this matter as soon as he can.

L. S. A.

Enclosure No. 1

Viceroy (India Office) to Lord Peel

(Private and Personal) *July 12, 1922*

I enclose News Agency telegram as to reported British warning.

"Reuter's Delhi Correspondent says Press in Calcutta and other centres, [illegible] Lord Curzon's speech in House of Lords regarding East. Moslem opinion is aroused by what is regarded as partisan attitude of British Government's representatives at Greek headquarters. Cross Straits report purpose of speeding Constantinople and Black Sea ports. Constantinople first step and Greek retirement would be signal for Moslems to take [illegible] of humility as frost overtook Allied Britain's recent [illegible] Turkish and Arabic policy. Crisis therefore very grave. Moslems are never again to be subject to Christian rule."

I have no information to regard to contents of Mr. Vereker's telegram. Can you supply us with any further information which would enable us to take action in the matter?

E 7074 76 44 No 51

Foreign Office Intelligence

THE explanation of the various references to Constantinople in hostile Turkish quarters in which the other Allies are not participating is to be found in the necessarily non-committal character of the reply sent to the Allied note of July 11th. This reply is based on the fact that we are at war with Turkey, and we are at peace, or on friendly terms, with all the other Powers (including Russia) now calling the conference, or present, with whom we cannot be legally at war. Constantinople could indeed hardly be declared non-belligerent or neutral territory, but it would be quite

unprecedented to prevent a belligerent from using his enemy's territory by the intervention of neutrals, especially by "neutrals" with whom the said belligerent is technically still in alliance.

2. It is rather misleading to say that the Greeks "went to Constantinople under the ægis of the Allies." They were one of the Allies who went to Constantinople together. If the Allies withdrew from Constantinople to-morrow there is no reason why the Greeks should not continue to enjoy the fruits of the Allied victory, in which they participated, by remaining there. It may indeed be said that the Allies of Greece were alone preventing her from being in sole occupation of Constantinople, for, apart from her title to remain there as an Ally, if she wished it, there can be no doubt that her military position in Thrace and her command of the sea would enable her to occupy it effectively in sorrow if the Allies were to withdraw.

3. Greece cannot be deprived of the practical advantages which she obtained as a partner in the joint Allied victory in the recent war, just as Angora cannot escape the disadvantage of being part of the Turkey defeated in it. It is therefore relevant that ships of war are reserved if the use of Constantinople is to be practically confined to absolute neutrals, but equally the respective advantages and disadvantages of belligerents and neutrals in the case of belligerents themselves placed by the force of circumstances in the position of neutrals.

4. With regard to the Viceroy's telegram of the 12th July, our memorandum of the 5th July covers the point about the passage of the Straits, and the further explanation given above is the answer to the point about the use of Constantinople by the Greeks as a naval base. There is of course no question of a British permission set forth Greeks to pass the Straits. If any permission were required it would come from the Allies. Similarly the use of Constantinople by the Greeks as a naval base is a matter for the Allies as a whole, and they cannot be deprived of this except would have to be taken with the Allies. It is not clear what facts other than those given in our memorandum are required by the Viceroy. The [illegible] strongly impressed by anti-British arguments advanced by Moslems. The copy of the telegram from the Indian news agency refers to no particular incidents to show that they are thinking of the withdrawal of the Greeks from Constantinople by the Greeks. Should any further information regarding the question which can be added to our memorandum of the 5th July, was given in a recent answer in the House of Commons, a copy of which is enclosed.

Foreign Office, July 17, 1922

No. 52

Mr Henderson to the Earl of Balfour (Received July 18)

(No 310)

(Telegraphic) *Constantinople, July 18, 1922*

MY telegram No 302

Report originating from French sources, is being circulated here that belligerents will participate in the forthcoming conference in Western Europe.

Minister for Foreign Affairs requested me yesterday to acquaint your Lordship of desire of Constantinople Government to attend that conference if Government of Angora do so.

I inferred from that he would rest assured on that point, but that so far I had received no indication of any intention on the part of His Majesty's Government to agree to participation of belligerents the Central Government at any conference elsewhere than in the neighbourhood of Constantinople.

No. 53

Mr Henderson to the Earl of Balfour (Received July 19)

(No 311)

(Telegraphic) R *Constantinople, July 19, 1922*

BEIROUT telegram No 29

In view of importance attached to General Townshend in Turkish circles I would suggest advisability of telegraphing official statement, through Reuter making it clear that he not only has no sort of mission but that he has proceeded to Angora in defiance of the properly expressed wish of His Majesty's Government.

[E 7137 27 44] No. 54

Lieut.-General Sir C. Harington (War Office)—Communicated by War Office, July 19)

(Telegraphic) Constantinople, July 17, 1922
(Part I.)

GENERAL CLARKE left for Constantinople to-day. The French have given Greeks assurance of Cretan troops not being withdrawn yesterday en route for Anatolia, and are exerting pressure by persistent rumour of Greek preparations for capture of Constantinople and advance from Thrace. Charge d'Affaires was also duly cognisant of Greek plans as now narrated and informed. I gave him gist of Paris telegram No. 1058 of 27th June and No. 1085 of 12th July. I do not anticipate movement of troops.

Italian agent is probably to some extent Turkish agent. I took him to task and told him I suppose movement of Greeks or anyone else to cross neutral zone must be by sporting permission of Great Britain. He usually became very busy and went off. Nationalist forces from Anatolia cannot export of a small high-class character.

(Part II.)

I also agreed that Greek claims to some of the necessities of Thrace and other districts [illegible] were not unreasonable, but demonstration of French guns.

I said personally I did not anticipate serious fighting between Greeks and Turks, but [illegible] Venizelos troops, Greeks [illegible] remained [illegible] there.

I think we should [illegible] at present [illegible] very important to us.

Because [illegible]

E 7011 19 44 No. 55

From the Paris Peace Conference [illegible]

Sir, [illegible]

As you will see from Lord Balcarres's telegram No. 1058 of the 27th June, the Supreme Council thought it desirable to [illegible] to point out that [illegible] to express to the Greek Government His Majesty's views with regard to [illegible] the Anglo-Franklin Agreement.

2. The Governments of the United States, France and Italy are being informed of this step, and it is hoped that a reply will be received very shortly. In the meantime, and pending the reply, it would seem desirable that the Nationalist Government should be warned that the Supreme Council will [illegible] to include in their Armistice delegates to be selected by the United States Government.

I am, &c.
LANCELOT OLIPHANT

E 7136 27 44] No. 56

From the Secret Service [illegible] (War Office)—Communicated by Foreign Office, July 19)

No. 1994. (Secret.)
(Telegraphic) Constantinople, July 17, 1922

MR. HINDLEY'S telegram No. 25 to Foreign Office.

I think this is quite likely. Sterghiades has left this evening for financial reasons. Greeks now they cannot maintain present extended front. They want to organise [illegible] portion of territory without ravaged hence and which has been

love to withdraw behind it, making it clear that those who want protection must come inside. That Sterghiades is starting this at once shows true reasons value of time, since on account of weather they must begin withdrawal from front in a few weeks. It must be realised that withdrawal to new zone will place southern shore of Marmora [illegible] Mudania, Brusa, even Nationalist hands on our flank.

There is no reason why this should be dangerous, except that if Greeks concentrate Nationalists knowing French would not support us, would no doubt take to embarrass us here. The fact of Greeks withdrawing voluntarily and for financial reasons would free Nationalists of anxiety of subsequent Greek advance. It is to be wished. Angora could not transfer troops to Ismid Peninsula. This appreciation is to be understood to be claimant but the doubtful loyalty of local gendarmerie to the Greek Nationalists get to Constantinople first always be a grave difficulty here. Question requires careful study. Alleged consideration to reference Foreign Office telegram No. 268 idea of Nationalist readiness for armistice is probably prompted by fear of instructions favourable to Greeks.

No. 57

Sir M. Cheetham to the Earl of Balfour (Received July 20)

[By Bag.]

No. 382.
(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 19, 1922

MY telegram No. 375 of 17th July.

In conversation to-day M. le Peretti averted to the suggestion of the prohibition of the export of war material to Greeks and Turks alike made by M. Poincaré in his recent memorandum. He recommended such a measure on its own merits as a means of putting an end to hostilities. He said he thought the American Government would [illegible] to forbid the export of arms from the United States, and that none of the smaller Powers who might be in a position to sell munitions would take the responsibility of assisting the continuance of the war. In any case the Greeks would be able to prevent consignments to the Kemalists. If war material were not forthcoming, our belligerents would be more disposed to make peace.

When I asked M. de Peretti about the danger to which he had previously alluded of the Turks coming to an agreement with the Soviets if they could get arms in no other way, he answered that according to his information, the Soviet armies were themselves very badly supplied.

No. 58

Sir M. Cheetham to the Earl of Balfour (Received July 20)

[By Bag.]

No. 384.
(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 19, 1922

FRENCH Government accept all suggestions made in our telegram No. 238 of 18th July regarding atrocities enquiry.

They agree to accept offer of International Red Cross and to selection of members of the two commissions by that body. They likewise agree to request facilities of Governments of Athens and Angora, and they will send necessary instructions to Constantinople as desired.

No. 59

Mr. Henderson to the Earl of Balfour (Received July 23)

(No. 313.)
(Telegraphic.) Constantinople, July 22, 1922.

FRENCH and Italian High Commissioners questioned me yesterday as to reasoned intention of Greeks to attempt occupation of Constantinople and former mentioned that French general here was seriously perturbed on the subject (please see General Officer Commanding's telegram No. 1994 D) of 17th July to War Office).

I told them that General Officer Commanding was carefully watching situation. was fully cognisant of measures to be taken to reinforce Greek troops in Thrace, but did not consider a legal detention to be serious.

I said that whatever their numbers or powers in other quarters, I could not consider contingency to be practical politics so long as Constantinople remained in Allied international occupation.

Nor did it seem likely that Greeks for double purpose of stimulating Greek army and people and of embarrassing Kemalists, wish to give the impression that this Secret object could be served by General Officer Commanding taking precautionary measures in connection with French calculated to oppose attempt if it were made. Such co-operation would afford convincing proof that His Majesty's Government are not contemplating *coup* of this nature.

At the same time I equally see no objection to impression continuing to exist if it really has effect of giving Angora thought that it may possibly not be expedient to give warning of the subject to Greek Government which it is conceivable latter even desires in order to be able to explain to Allies that they are only precluded from taking this step through position of Powers.

(Repeated to Athens.)

No. 60

Mr Henderson to the Earl of Balfour (*Received July 23*)

(No. 314.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, July 23, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 273.

Information from all sources tends to confirm extreme improbability of Mustapha Kemal agreeing to Peace as the result of the Conference. The root of the whole matter is the Turkish feature is but little appreciated possibility of Kemal finally deciding reference back with Constantinople Government only. It has come to light since my despatch No. 647.

Idea that Powers might have such success might possibly induce Angora Government to agree to Peace did in fact originate after result were at further request that Conference might continue till agreement be reached with other two parts concerned. If Angora's reckoning proved unfortunate.

Owing this expected breakdown has it not some such course as affording loophole for settlement. Except declaration of Mustapha Kemal remaining stubborn would be well that Constantinople Government might in last resort, prove possession of Angora to accept settlement from which latter were excluded and that French Government in view of its agreements with Angora would be loath to agree to such an arrangement.

If Conference Constantinople Government might be entirely sounded on the point especially as I see no objection to mine going abroad that such a contingency were possible.

Only pressing point suggest seems from Government's to have stress on over-growing influence Soviet Government Angora with which I am aware French High Commissioner is seriously perturbed.

[E 7281/5/44]

No. 61

Mr Henderson to the Earl of Balfour (*Received July 27*)

(No. 31)

My Lord, *Constantinople, July 17, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I have to-day had a conversation with Izzet Pasha, of which I beg to offer the following account to Your Lordship, I consider it desirable to pay official visits to the Grand Vizier and the Minister for Foreign Affairs in my capacity as Allied High Commissioner.

2. I succeeded in seeing both of them on the 13th instant. My conversation with Tewfik Pasha referred principally to the financial situation of the Constantinople Government, and I took the opportunity to impress upon His Highness the absolute necessity not only of decreasing reforms and reductions in the Administration, but of effectually carrying them out. Tewfik Pasha was however, mainly reminiscent, and

was as I learnt later, somewhat perturbed at discovering that he had forgotten when receiving me to put his fez on, in accordance to etiquette he should have done.

3. He asked me whether I had any official confirmation respecting the proposed Allied conference at the end of July. I told him that I had not as, except that it had been agreed upon in principle, no date, so far as I knew, had yet been fixed for it. I added that it was not easy for statesmen, each of whom had important internal matters to deal with, to select a late summer festival of them. He agreed, and as if he himself contemplated the possibility of an invitation to attend the conference said that he would not himself find it easy to find the time to go to Western Europe, and that in any case the journey would be a long and tiring one for him. Tewfik Pasha appeared so set on the fact that I would have liked to recommend him not to attempt it but to leave the task of defending the interests of Turkey and of the Central Government in more vigorous hands.

4. Tewfik Pasha deplored the continuation of the present state of the peace negotiations, and expressed regret that the Allies had not answered the reply of the Sublime Porte to the Paris proposals. He was presumably referring to their note of the 29th April enclosed in Sir H. Rumbold's despatch No. 799 of the 30th April last). He said that very little was required to satisfy the Government of the Sultan. All that was necessary was for the Greeks to be excluded from the Straits and the Sea of Marmora, and for guarantees to be afforded for the security of Constantinople.

5. It is interesting to note that this summing up of a basis for a settlement so far as the Constantinople Government is concerned was repeated to me later almost textually by the Minister for Foreign Affairs whom I visited immediately on leaving the Grand Vizier.

6. Izzet Pasha asked me whether I anticipated any result from the next conference. I told him that in my personal opinion I feared it difficult to attain any result so long as Turkey herself was not invited. It was the lack of confidence in that respect which was one of the factors that was delaying a solution. Izzet Pasha agreed, and asked whether it would not be feasible for the Powers to resort to a settlement with the Central Government and then leave the latter the task of imposing it upon the Government of Angora. The gestures of the Constantinople Government were not excessive. They were perfectly ready to recognise the complete neutrality of both sides of the Straits provided the Greeks were not left in Gallipoli Peninsula and the Sea of Marmora. If the Allies, he said, were prepared to admit the exclusion of the Greeks from the Straits, it would be easy for them to arrive at an arrangement with the Constantinople Government, which latter could endeavour to induce Angora to accept it. He could not guarantee that they would succeed in this, but such a procedure would entitle the Powers to leave all the responsibility for the final settlement with the Turks themselves. There were many *bien pensant* officers in the Grand National Assembly who were getting more and more restive under Mustapha Kemal's rule, while the majority of the officers of the army of Anatolia had become thoroughly disgusted with politics.

7. I asked Izzet Pasha whether he could give me any information as to what if the Allies agreed that Greek troops should not be moved east of the Gallipoli Peninsula the Central Government would be ready to accept in other respects the *ensemble* of the Paris proposals. He replied that there was also the question of the security of Constantinople. The line drawn in the Paris proposals was not a really strategic one. It might prevent the Greeks from reaching Constantinople in the twenty-four hours, but it would not prevent them from getting as far as the Chataldja lines. Having once got as far as Chataldja it would be difficult to evict them again. He remembered the Bulgarian coup at Eastern Roumelia in 1885, and how afterwards diplomatic action was powerless to turn the Bulgars out again.

8. I remarked that the line in Eastern Thrace had been carefully selected by the Allied generals, among whom was Marshal Foch the greatest soldier of the present day. Izzet Pasha replied that he was himself a soldier, and knew Thrace a great deal more intimately than Marshal Foch. He had explained his objections to the Paris line to General Charpy, who was scarcely less distinguished soldier than the Marshal and who had agreed with them. If Constantinople was to enjoy any sense of security, it must have an effective barrier in Thrace against a possible irruption. The Maritza line would be the most satisfactory one, but, if not the Maritza, then a line from Enos through Lake Bourgas.

9. I then remarked that, apart from any other considerations, I did not see how Greece could possibly be asked to make any further withdrawals. We had already agreed to ask her to evacuate the whole of Asia Minor. Great Britain was generally

[illegible] Turkey [illegible] for the Greeks. This was not the case; we had no [illegible], but, on the contrary, we were [illegible] inspired by a sense of justice, and by what we [illegible] the true interests of the Near East. Greece had occupied Smyrna at the request of the Allies. [illegible] of the Allies [illegible] excessively [illegible] suffered comparatively little in the great war [illegible] with M. Venizelos [illegible]. We were [illegible] to cut these [illegible] Asia Minor. It would [illegible] to impose further sacrifices upon her.

[illegible] Izzet Pasha thanked me for my frankness, but replied that [illegible] withdrawal [illegible] was made at Greece's own interests [illegible] to understand [illegible] Izzet Pasha, was like [illegible] that it was too long for [illegible] rest [illegible] the army of Greece was too far [illegible]. [illegible] was [illegible] the past two years [illegible] the Turks [illegible] again [illegible] as there was in the case of the Turks and [illegible] Greece [illegible] own interests [illegible].

11. I [illegible] Greece [illegible] which failed to appreciate what was [illegible] own interests. [illegible] that speaking entirely [illegible] Turkish sovereignty [illegible] Turkish sovereignty [illegible] the Smyrna area [illegible] were [illegible] guarantee [illegible] danger of [illegible] Izzet Pasha [illegible] sovereignty and [illegible] special regime [illegible] to allow [illegible].

[illegible] were [illegible] by [illegible] Straits [illegible].

13. The Minister for Foreign Affairs [illegible] some other [illegible] Angora [illegible] working [illegible] Nationalist Government at Angora [illegible] so far [illegible] said the [illegible] year or two [illegible] would be [illegible] independent power.

I have, &c.

NEVILE HENDERSON,

Acting High Commissioner

[E 7286/19/44]

No. 62

Mr. Henderson to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received July 24.)

(No. 639. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, July 18, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, with reference to Sir Horace Rumbold's despatch No. [illegible] of the 24th ultimo, that Mr. Jaquith, the Managing Director of the American Near East Relief in Constantinople, came to see me on the 12th instant.

2. [illegible] told the United States High Commissioner that I was anxious to hear from Mr. Jaquith himself an account of his recent visit to Angora, but that before asking [illegible] upon me [illegible] whether Admiral Bristol had any objection to my doing so. Admiral Bristol [illegible] volunteered to arrange an interview for me.

3. Mr. Jaquith [illegible] strictly confidential for the use of the Foreign Office, and not for publication [illegible] whatever. He explained that he proposed to visit Anatolia again later [illegible] year, and [illegible] if the Nationalists [illegible] that he had reported adversely upon them [illegible] their treatment of minorities, it would render his position a difficult one and react [illegible] on his own

work there [illegible] on that of the various Near East Relief Missions, with a personnel of some forty Americans scattered throughout the country.

4. I gave him an undertaking that his remarks would be treated as strictly confidential [illegible] be published [illegible] in Parliament.

5. As a matter of fact, the information which he gave me [illegible] new facts in regard to the deportations and extermination of the Christian minorities. It [illegible] out, however, all that has previously been reported. Mr. Jaquith was very categorical in this respect. He said, in fact, that Major Yowell's report and those of Dr. Ward, Mr. Gibbons and other American relief workers gave only a portion of the truth; they described only facts [illegible] assertained [illegible] witnesses of what [illegible] of the way [illegible]. He himself had been accompanied on his journeys by [illegible], and had naturally been unable to pry too openly into the matter of atrocities [illegible] question survivors. He could not himself prosecute enquiries, especially as he had to consider first the interests of his missions. But in the course of his travels in Eastern Anatolia, which lasted seven weeks, [illegible] covered about 3,000 [illegible] and had visited all the more important towns, Samsoun, Kharput, Sivas, Marsovan, &c., he had noticed along the sides of the roads thousands of [illegible] and [illegible] skulls and bones uncovered by the wandering pariah dogs. [illegible] the Turks had not had the patience or the time to conceal. [illegible] respects [illegible] taken to remove anything in the way of evidence. He [illegible] deportees were concentrated [illegible] propose to visit, orders were given for them to be [illegible] before his arrival. For this reason Mr. Jaquith gave it as his opinion that the work of a Commission of Enquiry would [illegible] very precarious results. The [illegible] the reason [illegible] the [illegible] now [illegible]. He told only [illegible] facts which could not be [illegible] that [illegible] the point [illegible] Admiral Bristol [illegible] informed [illegible] Commission [illegible].

6. Mr. Jaquith [illegible] the letter to Fethi Bey [illegible] Sir H. Rumbold's despatch [illegible] reference. There [illegible] Fethi Bey [illegible] and had drafted another for Mr. Jaquith [illegible] vigorous denial of the truth of Major Yowell's allegations. Mr. Jaquith [illegible] Fethi Bey [illegible] the letter [illegible] Mr. Jaquith [illegible] Fethi Bey.

7. Speaking generally, Mr. Jaquith said that the nation of England at the present moment was [illegible] Power [illegible] was respected in Anatolia. France was despised [illegible] to be treated with consideration so long as she rendered services [illegible]. The Italians were regarded with contempt. Only about a third of the [illegible] was under cultivation, but the crops promised to be very good [illegible] scarcity or shortage of food. He [illegible] looked [illegible] to the [illegible].

8. Mr. Jaquith was particularly emphatic [illegible] Soviet Russia [illegible] the country. All [illegible] military officers were paid, he said, [illegible] Russian gold [illegible] the fixed rate of [illegible] to the [illegible] piece. He had not met Aralov, but he had gained the impression that the influence of that able and intelligent representative of the Soviet Government was supreme in Angora. All the Nationalists' money [illegible] from Russia. In fact, the one point which intrigued him was what Russia got in return for all she gave.

I have, &c.

NEVILE HENDERSON,

Acting High Commissioner.

E 7288/5/44]

No. 63

Mr. Henderson to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received July 24.)

(No. 641.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, July 18, 1922.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs returned yesterday [illegible] recorded in my despatch No. [illegible] of the 17th instant.

2. Izzet Pasha, in referring to the reports which are being circulated here as to the possible participation of the belligerents in the forthcoming conference in London or Western Europe, said that his Government had made no request to be invited

inasmuch as it was under the impression that that conference was to be purely Allied. If, however, the belligerents were to participate he requested me to inform your Lordship, on the part of the Central Government, that he attended likewise. I assured his Highness that His Majesty's Government would not consent to the exclusion of the Central Government from any conference at which the Angora and Greek Governments were invited, but that so far as I was yet aware His Majesty's Government had not contemplated the participation of belligerents except at conference with the High Commissioners in the neighbourhood of Constantinople. I promised, however, to verify your Lordship's view in the manner he desired (please see my telegram No. 310 of to-day's date).

3. I next asked Izzet Pasha whether he would confirm the impression he had given at our last meeting that the Constantinople Government would be ready to subscribe to the terms of the Paris proposals provided the Greeks were excluded from Gallipoli shores of the Straits and from the Sea of Marmora, and that Constantinople were demilitarised, therefore, as regards Eastern Thrace against possible Greek aggression. I would be glad to know this definitely and without prejudice to the deliberations of my Government prior to the meeting of the Allied Foreign Ministers. Was I to understand that, in all respects as regards the territorial, military, financial reforms and economic arrangements, the Central Government would unreservedly adhere to the principles of their own Paris proposals?

4. Izzet Pasha was not entirely categorical on this point. He said, however, that, provided Turkey was treated with justice, she would accept whatever was finally decided. The Paris proposals had left scope for discussion on these matters. Lord Curzon had promised Ismet generous concessions in respect of the Capitulations. Ismet Pasha was interested to put his house in order. He had a formula ready for judicial reform. He saw no objection, for instance, to some such temporary arrangement as the present Mixed Tribunal for a period of ten years or rather less (Izzet corrected himself). During those five years experts, including the best that Europe could provide, might elaborate a more perfect system which would give satisfaction to all concerned. He was convinced that all these matters could easily be arranged so long as we repeated Turkey were fairly and justly treated. In this connection he referred with some bitterness to what I gathered to be Article 128 of the Treaty of Sevres and to the impossible position in which the Government would be placed, if every Jew and Ottoman Greek in Constantinople were allowed freely to acquire foreign nationality.

5. I asked the Marshal whether it was his considered opinion that a direct arrangement with the Central Government offered the best chance of terminating existing differences, which we were all anxious to end as soon as possible. I foresaw myself, I said, great difficulties. The Powers were likely to urge on the concessions they had finally agreed to make to Turkey at the last Meeting. For instance, the Government of Angora would not, I thought, be prepared to admit Greeks to remain in Asia Minor. It would be necessary for the Greeks to remove and to arrange, in fact, if any definite result was to be obtained from the present situation of their remaining in the occupied territory. Besides I said, I had only a brief report of the position in 1920. The Central Government had also signed a treaty with the Allies, at Sevres, which had been ratified by the Sultan.

6. Izzet Pasha thought it probable that there would be a great difference between the Treaty of Sevres and any solution reached to-day. It had been signed by those who were either personally unknown to the Turkish people, such as the late Grand Vizier Pasha, who had carried an ill-advised mission of this kind to Paris, or were a body, or a group of persons who were actually detested by them. His diplomatic colleague was probably referring to Ismet Bey. In the present war Ismet had been one of the principal leaders of the people and had won for himself the confidence and love of the Turkish people. He (Izzet) was still a comparative stranger to them, but the people knew and trusted Ismet. Ismet had been the chief organiser of the resistance against the Greeks and the Government of Angora was founded by him. The peasants of Anatolia had come from all parts of Anatolia to Kutaya to swear allegiance to Ismet. We know Izzet Pasha has been at variance with Ismet. The open rupture between them ceased, but the government of Angora was still in the hands of Ismet's friends and supporters. He had survived the worst period of Turkish history. He had therefore every reason to be possessed with a totally different point of view for the moment to that of Mustapha Kemal. It was not possible to make peace except on his own terms, that was Izzet Pasha's opinion.

there was a really favourable prospect of peace being attained by the procedure he now proposed. He urged, however, that time should not be lost, as his prestige, which was still high in Anatolia, would, I do not doubt, in course of time be undermined by the calumnies which the Government there was unscrupulously spreading against him. He quoted as an instance the Maltepe Racecourse, an enterprise recently started by a Belgian company. He was being accused by his enemies of a wanton sacrifice of Ottoman interests by selling priceless land for this purpose to the foreigner for a song, when they should, he said, rather be praising the unfortunate company which was exploiting this comparatively worthless land at a heavy loss.

7. I told Izzet Pasha that I feared that I was considerably less optimistic than he was, and the conversation then turned to other matters.

I have, &c.

NEVILE HENDERSON

Acting High Commissioner

(E 7291/5/44) No. 64.

Mr Henderson to the Earl of Balfour (*Received July 24*)

No. 640.

My Lord, *Constantinople, July 18, 1922.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 305 of the 14th instant, it is now possible to present a somewhat clearer view of the circumstances attending the recent Cabinet changes at Angora and the new workings of the latter are still obscure.

2. It will be remembered that, as a result of the debate in the Grand National Assembly at the end of last November on the draft law of the Ministers or Commissioners (see Sir H. Rumbold's despatch No. 54 of the 16th January), it was decided to refer the draft law back to the Constitutional Committee, and to refer at the same time to a joint committee the question of the Presidency of the Council and the mode of electing candidates for vacancies in the Cabinet.

3. Since that time it has more than once been reported that the matter was again coming before the Assembly, but it is only recently that these reports have taken definite shape. The committee or committees concerned would appear to have prepared two draft laws, one on the mode of electing the Commissioners and the President of the Council and the other on the duties and responsibilities of the Commissioners. The former of these was said before the Grand National Assembly on or about the 6th July and was passed without material modifications after a two days' debate.

4. It is not yet certain what form the law was finally passed. According to one account, it was decided that a committee consisting of the President of Vekil Pres (or of two Deputy Presidents) of the Assembly, the chairman of standing committees for the various sections and the President of the Council of Commissioners should prepare a list of candidates for any vacant commissionerships; that the Assembly should make its choice from among the candidates so nominated. According to another account the Assembly would itself nominate candidates altogether, and decide that the Assembly should make its choice from among the whole body of its members by secret, duly accredited ballot. I believe the second of these versions to be correct and the first version to represent not the final decision but the proposals of the Bureau laid before the Assembly.

5. The law also provides for the election of a President of the Council of Commissioners. I understand that no exact data to be chosen by the Commissioners themselves. The exact arrangement now adopted is again uncertain, but it seems clear that the final choice in this case also rests with the Assembly.

6. In either case it now bestows upon the President, i.e., Mustafa Kemal, of the right which he has hitherto exercised of himself nominating candidates for vacant commissionerships. As the existing Commissioners had been elected under the old system, and others, that are to be, also were to resign their respective offices in order that a new election might take place under the new law, the election was duly held on the 3rd July. It would appear to have proceeded smoothly in a full house. It resulted in the selection of a Cabinet differing little from the old. The following is the composition of the new Government:

President of the Council: Reis Bey (new).

Chief of General Staff: Fevzi Pasha (hitherto combined this office with the Presidency of the Council; re-elected only to the post of Chief of General Staff).

National Defence Kiazim Pasha (re-elected)
Religious Affairs Ali Ihsan Azmi Effendi (re-elected)
Foreign Affairs Yussuf Kemal Bey (re-elected)
Finance Hassan Fehmi Bey (re-elected)
Justice Ibrahim Arif Bey (new, hitherto Kemalist representative in Rome)
Economic Affairs Mahmoud Essad Bey (new).
Interior Ata Bey (acting for Feizi Bey absent on leave (Ata Bey is now he appears to have been elected in advance of the others owing to the necessity for filling the temporary vacancy due to Fethi's departure).
Communications for Public Works Rechad Bey, acting for Feizi Bey absent on leave)
Health Emad Bey acting for Riza Nour Bey (assertion on admission that Russia (re-elected) to acting post).
Public Instruction Vehbi Bey (re-elected).

7. Only three members of the previous Cabinet disappear before-named namely Hassan Bey (Foreign Affairs), Refik Shevket (Justice), and Ali Fuad (Acting Public Works). So little is known of the first two that it is not possible to estimate the significance of their future absence from the Government. The third, Ali Fuad Bey, is well known as an extremist of some importance, his disappearance from the Government is greatly due to the fact that he was elected Deputy for two places and chose Van instead of Angora. He was succeeded by Rouf Bey.

8. It is too soon to say what the reconstruction of the Cabinet as a whole makes for the stronger position of Angora from the point of view of the Allies. Rouf Bey has been somewhat of a dark horse since we last year, when he resigned his then post of Chief of the General Staff over a quarrel with Mustafa Kemal. Now that the first row has been stemmed to latter's detriment, it is possible that Rouf may emerge as the real possibly with leanings towards Italy to the Sultan's cause. He is for the loss of Nazim Bey, who is very likely to stand for any showing in the grape. Hassan is only one of such other members of the Government as not well known, whether Ali Fuad, formerly agent-general in Egypt, Ali Kemal, last seen at the Lausanne Conference as a strong Nationalist. So is Mahmoud Essad Bey, one of the new appointments. His knowledge of Ata Bey, the Deputy for Erzerum or Feizi Bey for Smyrna are still the subject of a good deal of speculation.

9. In short it is not necessary to suspend judgment on the trend of events at Angora. Its attitude may possibly become clearer in the course of the discussion of the latter after it went to the Lausanne Conference, which is almost bound to have recently begun. All that can be said for the present is that Mustafa Kemal's authority has suffered an important setback but that it remains a matter of uncertainty whether this setback is sufficient to necessitate which is the Assembly, which Mustafa Kemal may have taken or may find to have been to secure his ascendancy over it. Whether he has suffered a real defeat

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

(E 7292/5/44)

No. 65

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to Mr. Ramsay MacDonald (Received July 7)

(No. 647)

Constantinople, July 18, 1923

My Lord,

I HAVE reported in other despatches on two conversations which I have had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

2. Your Lordship will observe from those records that Izzet Pasha is certainly of opinion that peace might be attained if the Powers were to make a further concession to the Angora Government. Greece would already be a party to such an arrangement. If Angora persists in refusing to make peace except on its own terms, Izzet Pasha considers that the Government of the Sultan would have a fair prospect of being able to impose that arrangement on Angora provided some further concessions were made by the Powers to Turkey.

3. I was careful to avoid giving Izzet Pasha any reason to think that the Powers would be ready to depart in any respect from the body of the Paris proposals. I pointed out to him several serious objections to the point which we had in mind. But I said to him that His Majesty's Government would be glad to know the point of view of the Central Government before the next meeting of the Allied Foreign Ministers.

4. As I said to the Marshal himself I do not share his optimism as to the feasibility of his suggestions. Izzet Pasha is a soldier endowed with loyalty, with common sense, but with a simple mind. I am inclined to think that he considerably overrates his own prestige at home, moreover, has worked during the past year and a half in a small circle, and is influenced by personal sentiments. His reference to Djemal Pasha as provoked by the personal animosity which exists between them, and under the impression that his star in the ascendant, being a favourable one as to recent events at Angora, the Cabinet crisis which resulted therefrom and the subsequent election of Rouf Bey as President of the Council. This latter is or was an intimate friend of his. But Izzet Pasha is probably as little able as anyone else in Constantinople to appreciate the true significance of what has occurred at Angora, or the trend of present events there. I would refer your Lordship in this connection to my despatch No. 646 of the 17th instant. Rouf Bey may be most unwilling to play the role which Izzet Pasha may possibly imagine he will have assigned to him. Personally, it is felt that Izzet Pasha, in his present attitude, is playing a game which would be raised even here to a very high degree, to foreign control in the matter of the financial system and the economic administration and to the reduction in any form of the Capitulations.

5. I record, however, his Highness's suggestions for what they are worth. They may at least merit the attention of your Lordship's Government. The crux of the matter is, in my opinion, the exodus of the Greeks from the shores of the Straits and the Sea of Marmora, and this despatch which I venture to recommend for careful consideration is possibly the best argument which Izzet Pasha could adduce in support of his plea. But no one who knows the National Pact otherwise will dispute Greece's sovereignty over the Straits or the Sea of Marmora. There is no reason why the Greeks should not be asked to support the Turkish view in that respect. He himself of course has no specific objection to the Greeks, but he dislikes Lord Curzon, Mr. Baldwin, Sir Austen Chamberlain, the British, Italians, French and Americans all because they are in favour of the Greeks. Nor does he like the Russians. Yet Russia is perhaps more dignified than either Turks or Greeks should any sovereignty. Nor do I see that the Greeks could complain if it were treated in this same manner.

6. A conversation which Mr. Ryan had last night with the American High Commissioner is an interesting commentary on Izzet Pasha's proposals. Mr. Ryan asked the Marquis to read another article in the Ikdam which he had seen in typescript. This was to the effect that the delegates to the conference which was to be held at the end of July. His Excellency said that he saw no objection to the next conference with the belligerents in the conference at which was to be held at the end of July. His Excellency said that he saw no objection to the next conference with the belligerents in the conference between their representatives and the Foreign Ministers in Western Europe. He spoke as if he would almost prefer this course to that of a meeting of those representatives with the Allied High Commissioners at once. He expressed the view that when the all-general should be asked to submit the case beforehand to the Press decisions those less suggestive to the basis of the negotiations for the Allies themselves. Marquis Garroni went on to say that if, as the result of such a conference, the Kemalists were still found to be attractable, there would, he thought, remain but one solution, and that was that Smyrna, which must in any case be evacuated, should be handed over to the Sultan's troops. He thought that if the objection that His Majesty has practically no troops with which to take over the district over. He thought that the Sultan could soon gather together a sufficient force to take the place delivery and that the Kemalists would not venture to attack them, since the fact that the occupied area was being restored to Turkish sovereignty would deprive them of any justification for such attack.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner

No 66

Mr Lindley to the Earl of Balfour (Received July 24)

(No 257)
Telegraphic) *Athens July* 23 1922

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs informed me last night that all information received by Greek Government indicated improbability either of Eastern question being discussed in London or of conference actually taking place at Boulogne or elsewhere In these circumstances Greek Government felt obliged to bring matters to a head and were interested chiefly to know the Powers that Greece must reassure the Allies of fact on which she had relied when she placed her case in their hands last autumn This communication would indicate that Greek Government intended to disregard wishes of His Majesty's Government in so far as it was intended to afford Powers time to take up question with a further delay Minister for Foreign Affairs begged that above investigations considered strictly confidential

It seems quite possible that communication may be accompanied by some action going further than that contemplated in peroration of paragraph of my telegram No 250, and I should be glad to receive whose Near Eastern question in a form so acute that it cannot further be disregarded

(Repeated to Constantinople)

E 7351/27/44 No 67

Mr Lindley to the Earl of Balfour (Received July 25)

(No 372 Confidential)
My Lord *Athens July* 14, 1922

HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a most interesting report made by Colonel Hon Nairne Publicity attaché to this Legation on his recent tour round the Greek front in Asia Minor This report should be published and circulated for all to the world and the Press have come to the end of propagating that the Greek army was heightened its fighting power and more ready to take part in a revolution than an engagement with the enemy The fact seems to be that the army was never in a more healthy condition and I have little doubt that the large offensive spirit which Colonel Nairne notes is now lacking would return with the consciousness that the support of Great Power would ensure the fruits of a successful operation being enjoyed

The second point to which I would draw your Lordship's attention is the contradictory character in which the military attaché expresses regarding the new Smyrna Administration The views expressed in my despatch No 300 of the 13th June were based on reports from excellent sources but they seem to be at complete variance with Hadjianestis who appears though eccentric to possess some scholarly qualities and a good character The correspondent Colonel Nairne reports him to have to declare himself a Venizelist at heart and who prizes it more than to meet the Leaders Events are to be seen whether he is capable of dealing with the very difficult situation which will arise a few months when the army is freed and the territory of Smyrna whether another writer in the trenches or execution

But this question which has been the principal theme of discussion at the Cabinets of Powers which is reported to your Lordship have been succeeding each other here for the last three weeks At first they are at an end, and the Greek High Commissioners at Constantinople and Smyrna have returned to their respective posts As I advanced to the Government have taken the important decision to do anything whatever as regards the military side of the question As regards the diplomatic side it is otherwise your Lordship will have noticed in the decision, reported in my telegram No 250 of to-day's date, to follow closely the lines of the views developed to me by M Stergiadis and reported in my telegram No 244 of [illegible] last

In conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day I did not learn more than that the Administration was to be reorganised in a zone of which the two eventual terminals were to be Smyrna and Panderma and of which the interior would follow out in detail throughout the railway line uniting the two towns M Baltazzi said that the reorganisation will take the form of calling on the local population to take a larger part in the administration than it had heretofore and he did not conceal the fact that the Greek Government hoped that the Administration thus established would be made permanent in the final settlement

and would in fact constitute a form of autonomous government At the same time he explained that no announcement of the change would be made at Athens but that M Stergiadis would probably issue a proclamation to the population he would not, however speak of autonomy

I made no observations to M Baltazzis as to the merits of the decision of his Government but to your Lordship I venture to submit the following considerations It is abundantly clear that whatever the exact truth as to the number of Armenians and Greeks already suppressed by the Kemalists the Christian population of the occupied area will either fight or leave the district *en masse* if a Turkish Administration is reinstalled Either of these two eventualities, or the more probable combination of both would complete the ruin of the Levant and would be such a reflection on the policy pursued by His Majesty's Government since the armistice that it is impossible to regard it with out the utmost dismay It would mean the end of our prestige in the East If this proposition be accepted we shall be forced whatever the French may wish to insist on some kind of autonomy for what may be called the Smyrna zone The word autonomy must never be used any amount of camouflage may be employed but it will be impossible to readmit a Turkish Administration and Turkish forces into the zone It is therefore all to our advantage to get the pistol accustomed to this fact by the creation of a permanent autonomous Administration by the Greeks It can be represented to Turkish opinion as a concession when this Administration has been taken out of Greek hands and transferred to those of the Allies, and it will be a distinct advantage to the latter to have a framework constructed by a man of the experience and ability of M Stergiadis upon which to build How the institution of an autonomous zone is to be brought within the four corners of the Paris proposals is another matter but I observe that your Lordship has, in your latest note, pointed out to the French Government the necessity of strengthening the minority clauses of those proposals and it is presumably on these lines that the question is to be attacked

I have &c
F O LINDLEY

Enclosure in No 67

Colonel Hon Nairne to Mr Lindley

Sir *Athens July* 13, 1922

ON returning from a month's tour in Asia Minor I have the honour to submit a report on the Greek army and civil affairs as matters connected with its occupation of that country I attach a diary of my tour (Appendix A*),

2 When I first visited the Greek army of Asia Minor, just a year ago, I was able to report a detailed statement of the strength of the army and of the amount and nature of arms, munition, equipment, transport and supplies which were available As the War Office and the General Officer Commanding-in-chief at Constantinople are kept informed by the British military representatives in Asia Minor regarding these details and from time to time communicate them to me, and as my visits were such as to show the *moral* and the tendencies of the army I use my time in trying to visit a large proportion of the formations disposed and I see as much as possible of the troops

I was particularly fortunate in having the company of Major A B Johnston British military representative Smyrna, from Smyrna to Eskishehr and of Major M C Strover British military representative, Brussa from Eskishehr to Constantinople These two officers speak in every possible way their intimate knowledge of the Greek communications troops and positions were invaluable

Everywhere and always I received the greatest kindness, help and hospitality from the Greek authorities, commanders and soldiers I was given permission to go wherever I liked and to see anything that I wished

3 The general condition of the troops was better than I had expected to find it The clothing of the men was serviceable the boots in particular were much better than they were in 1919 or even in 1920 the greatcoats are the worst articles of clothing I saw being of inferior quality and much worn and frayed The ration was sufficient and included meat two or four times a week oftener than the men would have it when doing farm work in addition to the fresh vegetables I heard of the rations were on the ground of monotony for the Greek Government seems to have obtained

* Not printed

large stores of macaroni and to give it to the troops every day. All the men were [illegible] which [illegible] was [illegible] as good as our own were in the forward areas in France and Belgium. [illegible] were well cared for [illegible] and spirits were excellent. The relations between officers and men appeared to be good [illegible] officers even in the crowded narrow streets showed that discipline was being maintained. Three things which particularly struck me were

First. That more training was being carried out by troops in local reserve for the front line than I have ever before seen. [illegible] French officers were attached to formations to supervise training [illegible] more talk than action. It would be [illegible] the fact that troops are [illegible] working [illegible].

Second. A great improvement [illegible] in the organisation of the works. Again [illegible] at the present [illegible] represents [illegible] well [illegible] work.

Third. For the first [illegible] support and reserve troops in the line [illegible] which has taken a firm hold of the Greeks. There [illegible] there are theatres [illegible] plays with actors [illegible].

4. The [illegible] opposing lines of entrenchment are generally so far apart that [illegible] by the use of the other patrols [illegible] reconnaissance prevent actual [illegible] the Greeks [illegible] success in most of these encounters [illegible]. The [illegible] was the Turkish [illegible] attack at [illegible] last April [illegible] the Greeks [illegible] on the Turks [illegible] the Greeks [illegible] with General [illegible] the natural [illegible] effect a surprise [illegible].

5. Better organised [illegible] the [illegible] with all possible [illegible] sent [illegible] among the troops who [illegible] wanted [illegible] officers [illegible] is yet [illegible] with certain units I think the Greek [illegible] at the front is as good as ever. The troops appeared to be well [illegible] superior to the Turks. They would [illegible] the Turks and would meet it with a very [illegible] and would [illegible] had been [illegible] attack [illegible] would [illegible] I think [illegible] the Greek [illegible]. The [illegible] desire to seek the [illegible] and that because it no longer [illegible] troops [illegible] in front [illegible] Turks [illegible] positions and [illegible] experience that went [illegible] that even [illegible] took [illegible] decision which [illegible] The Greek leaders [illegible] particularly the [illegible] officers [illegible] that so far from being able to hold a more extended line Greece will not be able to pay much longer for the maintenance of [illegible] its present strength and that withdrawal either from Asia Minor [illegible] restricted line with shorter communications will soon be [illegible].

6. Several senior Greek officers spoke anxiously of the internal and financial situation in Greece and of the [illegible] settlement of the Asia Minor situation. They [illegible] their present line [illegible] Kemal's present forces [illegible] that it has [illegible] that [illegible] has kept [illegible] supplied [illegible] and has even succeeded [illegible] the troops [illegible]. They know that the end of [illegible] and that without financial assistance from at any rate one of the Allied Powers Greece will shortly be unable to [illegible] her army. They [illegible] withdrawn to [illegible] nearer their base if not [illegible] of Asia Minor must soon be necessary but they are convinced that a withdrawal without a real settlement would mean death or ruin to the Christian inhabitants and probably to [illegible].

Turks who have befriended the Greeks. By abandoning the Afion Karahissar–Eskishehr railway the Greeks would be giving up their strongest pawn which they fought last year to gain and without that pawn they would have small hope of negotiating any settlement which they would believe to be adequate or honourable.

The question that remains is what [illegible] really [illegible] for safety if a withdrawal is to take place before next year. Two thirds of the Greek army is in the southern area with Afion Karahissar as its centre. Ushak and Afion Karahissar are supplied by railway and so the necessity of making or maintaining roads has not been so urgent as in the northern area. But the railway from [illegible] to Afion Karahissar is a single line running up steep gradients, in the case of anything like a forced evacuation of the area it would be necessary to use the roads as well as the railway, but when the autumn rains break in September most of the roads will become impassible for heavy transport. So, if an evacuation of the southern area is to take place this year, in any conditions other than an orderly withdrawal effected by a settled agreement the movement of stores and heavy transport should not be delayed beyond the middle of August at the latest.

In the northern area, the conditions did not appear to me to be so urgent. The troops are scattered and would have to depend on country roads for their concentration but near Eskishehr there is a good double line of railway to Karakeui whence a good metalled road leads to Brusa and Mudania. The lateral road Karakeui–Bilejik–Keupri Hissar is in fairly good order so is the road from Gemlik to Brusa. The Keupri Hissar–Brusa road is now being very thoroughly [illegible] and [illegible] should be in first class order.

7. In spite of the [illegible] anxiety of the most intelligent of the Greek senior officers, I saw [illegible] intimate [illegible] the region of [illegible] and other [illegible] of the roads where the line is not served by a railway, is as [illegible] with a resolve to maintain the present [illegible] with [illegible] will await [illegible] and progressive work still being [illegible] on the [illegible] and other defensive organisations of the present front and the [illegible] may be intended only to deceive the Turks but when known facts [illegible] the simple explanation is more [illegible] right [illegible] I [illegible] was that the Greeks intend to [illegible] their present general line until circumstances absolutely force them to draw back and that in the meantime they are going to continue to work on the improvement of their positions [illegible] as if it were to be permanent. Whether the Government and the [illegible] will [illegible] be [illegible] in August I cannot say [illegible] that month without a settlement or some financial relief the retention of the Greek army in its present position will become [illegible].

8. From the preceding paragraphs of this report it will be seen that the [illegible] of the Greek [illegible] in Asia Minor are likely to be faced with a situation which may require great firmness and tact as well as capacity for organisation. Whether the troops are [illegible] to remain in Asia Minor and to suffer [illegible] anxiety for the maintenance of their families at home or to withdraw and to feel that they are abandoning their brothers in the [illegible] region in Asia Minor they will need very careful handling. So the recent changes in the chief command and the headquarters staff as well as in subordinate commands and staffs, are of special importance.

I have known General Hadjanestis for eighteen months as an [illegible] officer who never [illegible] to me and who was obviously [illegible] devoted to King Constantine. He was said to be Anglophobe but I always found him well bred, cultured and courteous and [illegible] fifteen years or more ago when he was attached to [illegible] battery of artillery at Woolwich. He had eccentricities [illegible] and was almost universally said to be [illegible]. In his appearance he is very like a [illegible] well dressed Don Quixote. As far as his military qualities were concerned I had to form my judgment from what I was told from time to time by a number of officers of every age and grade and of varied [illegible] served with him. It was [illegible] that I gave [illegible] his [illegible] recognised [illegible] exaggerated [illegible] were of those [illegible] exaggerated [illegible] days. He is [illegible] to [illegible] after [illegible] years ago [illegible] and I think there is no doubt that he has recovered [illegible] be [illegible] with [illegible] Metaxas [illegible] was one of the first [illegible] selected when the Greeks began to form a General Staff before the Balkan wars of this century.

He was general staff officer of a division commander of division in the Balkan wars and afterwards was a successful though eccentric head of the Evelpides (Cadet) College in Athens. So, though he has no experience of recent war he has seen as much active service as General Papoulas had when he took over the command in Asia Minor.

General Hadjanestis's arrival in Asia Minor was the signal for the departure of the chief of staff, General Pallis, and of the sub-chief Colonel Sarvanis. Since then Colonel Spridon, the very capable head of the Transport and Supply Bureau at general headquarters, has gone on leave and will possibly not return. The loss of these officers is serious, but General Pallis and Colonel Sarvanis were both in need of a rest and probably foresaw the difficulty which Colonel Spridon actually encountered of referring to any basic arrangements as evident without arousing General Hadjanestis's resentful suspicion that he was being run by his staff. General Vamvakas the new chief of staff is very capable being as new to his post as is the army commander he is less likely than the old staff officers to arouse his jealously, possibly, his command of a division through the thick of last year's fighting will inspire respect in General Hadjanestis mind.

During my tour of the front I was only a few days behind General Hadjanestis so the impressions he had left were fresh. The general feeling seemed to be relief at finding him much more reasonable than had been expected. A legend such as has grown up round him is not easily killed and there was still some fear of what his future attitude might prove to be but several officers told me that they believed time had improved his balance and would now give freer play to his undoubted talents. Every officer in Asia Minor whom I asked about him and who had known him in the past said that apart from his eccentricities he was a very good soldier. The energy with which he carried out his long tour travelling long distances and seeing every part of the front proved his physical toughness and he seems to have shown a quick insight into the situation and condition of the troops.

However much his character may have relaxed his control over discipline is shown by his address to the army on taking up the command, translation attached as Appendix B*.

9. The most probable of the many reasons which were originally given for General Papoulas's supersession was that he had been taking in politics and this was confirmed to me two days ago by the Minister of War. In this case politics almost certainly meant the friendliness of the Metaxas League. I learned in Constantinople that General Ioannou has now given up his intention of going to Smyrna as Governor-General. Hadjanestis has not encouraged the league. Apart from that he has shown a broad-minded tolerance in the first appointments he has made in the army. With commendable decision he has replaced or maintained commanders by fresher and abler men I know them better each one several of the newly appointed officers served under Mr. Venizelos in sympathised with his politics. The new appointments are shown in the Order of Battle of the Greek army of the 1st July, compiled by G.H.Q. Constantinople.

10. An important recent decision of the Greek Government has cancelled the organisation of the troops in Thrace as a separate army and reconstituting them as the IVth Army Corps, has placed them under General Hadjanestis's command. Thus Asia Minor and Thrace now form one united command.

It is possible to read into this new adjustment a Greek intention to try to seize Constantinople by force from the Allies. I have heard that inference drawn and do not believe it justified. It is true that the idea of a Greek Constantinople is kept alive in the minds of Greek soldiers. As I myself heard in a funeral oration at a military memorial service at Afion Karahissar. It is possible too that if the Allies left Constantinople the Greeks might try to seize it. But I neither saw nor heard anything in Asia Minor which suggested that the Greeks would try to take it from the Allies. On the contrary I often heard Greek officers and soldiers say in allusion to munitions reaching Kemal from overseas. "We can fight the Turks, but not the French and Italians as well." It is unlikely, therefore, that Greece or her troops would be willing to incur the active opposition of the Allies by trying to force their troops of occupation.

I have &c.

E. S. HOARE NAIRNE.

Military Attaché, Athens.

---

* Not printed.

E 7364/27/44] No. 68

War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 31.)

(Secret.) *War Office, July 29, 1922.*

THE Director of Military Operations and Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and begs to forward for his information a copy of Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Harington's monthly report for June 1922 which he thinks may be of interest.

Major-General Sir William Thwaites would particularly draw the attention of Sir Eyre Crowe to paragraph 4 of the report which describes the recent operations with brigands in the Chanak area, and to paragraph 10, which reports other recent military events in Anatolia. Major-General Sir William Thwaites thinks that this report may be useful in amplifying such information as is already in the possession of Sir Eyre Crowe.

Enclosure in No. 68.

THE ALLIED FORCES OF OCCUPATION (TURKEY).

Summary of Events for June 1922.

(Secret.) *General Headquarters, Constantinople, July 20, 1922.*

1. *The Situation in Turkey in Europe.*

THE general situation has been quiet. Several bands of brigands have, however, made their appearance during the month. During the night of the 5th-6th June thirty armed men broke out west of Hafsikeui, they were pursued by gendarmerie and six of them were captured. On the 9th June thirty armed men landed west of Kara Burun on the Black Sea coast but were remarked when a force of gendarmerie and troops proceeded against them. On the 24th June a band crossed the frontier from the Greek sector and penetrated into Ottoman territory. The gendarmerie pursued and succeeded in capturing its chief.

In the British area no case of brigandage has been reported during the month at Petrakkoi-sear Argos. No further cases of Europeans damage to railway lines have occurred. A sum of £T 100 has been collected from the village of Kirech Burun.

2. *The Situation in the Ismid Peninsula.*

Only one case of brigandage has been reported during the month, when a band of ten armed men broke into a house at Kizil and stole money and valuables. One case of piracy has also been reported at the mouth of the Bosphorus. The situation generally has been quiet.

3. *The Situation in Gallipoli Peninsula.*

The situation has been quiet. The local Greek authorities have been working actively to repair the roads.

4. *The Situation in the Chanak Area.*

During the months of May reports were received of the concentration of brigand bands, in particular those of Aziz and Samik, in the vicinity of Ezine. About the 23rd May the Ottoman gendarmerie reported that the brigands were too numerous for them to deal with unaided, and requested the co-operation of British troops. Two mounted infantry patrols of the Loyo Regiment were therefore despatched one from Karaagha and one from Chanak, the former was to work down the neutral boundary south-westwards, the latter was to move towards Greykli and thence along the neutral line north-westwards, the patrols were then to combine and return to Chanak.

The patrols left on the 24th May. On the 29th May the patrol from Chanak was fired on at Kodak, no one was wounded, the fire was returned, and one brigand was seen to fall. On the 30th May in the neighbourhood of Bunar Bashi, the same patrol was engaged by a force of brigands estimated at about 150 strong and occupying entrenched positions. After an engagement lasting some time the patrol,

which was at once overwhelmed, was compelled to retire with the loss of three machine guns and was driven back in disorder on Ezine. Some of the prisoners taken by the brigands were subsequently released, but others were killed.

The patrols of the Chanak area have been strengthened by the addition of a squadron of armoured cars, and it is thought that the motive for the attack on the patrol was largely one of revenge for its activity.

On the 30th May the French commander at Ezine, during the course of the engagement with the patrol, sent a detachment to the British zone. These detachments appear to have penetrated as far as Bozkeui and then retired. It is not known after this that they engaged the brigands.

It is fairly certain that the original object of the concentration of brigands in the Ezine area was to prevent the movement of British troops, and the brigands were provoked by the above-mentioned burning of their houses.

The situation has been dealt with as follows. The Ottoman civil and military authorities and gendarmerie are strongly held responsible for the restoration of order. They were instructed that the brigand Sadik must be killed or captured by the 20th June, failing which vigorous disciplinary action would be taken against them. The gendarmerie have been reinforced by the despatch of three officers and eighty gendarmes from Constantinople who, it is said, work with British supervising officers, who have also been sent. Mobile support has been afforded them by the despatch of British detachments from the Asiatic to the European shore. The brigand Sadik was not killed or captured by the 20th June, but a large number of the Chanak gendarmerie have been replaced by fresh men. The army of Asia Minor has also been strengthened. Hadji Adil Bey, who is the chief of police at Ismid, has been appointed to command the gendarmerie in the Chanak area, and he is said to be a capable officer. He has left Ismid for Chanak, where he proceeded to arrest a number of the gendarmes. His Chief of Staff, Ferid Bey, is a man favourably known to the Nationalist Government, and it is hoped that the appointment of these two officers will result in the return of the situation to normal. The Greek Government have agreed to be guided by the decision of the latter before, therefore, the whole of the sanjak will soon be a British Land.

8 *The Situation in Constantinople*

Nothing has occurred since Sir H. Rumbold left Constantinople on the 3rd June to M. Clive Farrere the eccentric French novelist, whose visit for the extravagant Oriental receptions arranged in Constantinople in honour of the municipality has stayed was marked by ecstatic raptures on the part of the Turks, whose enthusiasm for all presents the value of which they are unappreciative. He made a point in his speeches that proof of the Turkish was distinctly anti-British. After visiting Mustapha Kemal at Ismid he proceeded to Angora and was received in audience on the 23rd June.

7 *The Smuggling of Arms and Munitions from Ottoman Government Depots*

On the 27th June the steamer 'Saint Likie' was arrested by a Greek destroyer in the Gulf of Ismid. She had on board 10,000 grenades and eighty boxes of ammunition. Members of her crew, on interrogation by the Greeks, stated that the guns were made at Zeitun Burnu and that two French officers were present at the loading. I have communicated the case to the Allied commanders, who are at present considering what further steps to take.

The new Turkish vali-designate, Ihsan Bey, who is also to be Chief Secretary to the High Commissioner, and the British authorities have had several conversations with regard to the future of the Chanak area.

8 *The Local Refugee Situation*

With reference to paragraph 8 of my despatch of the 1st May, it appears that the French ceased to ration all refugees on the 1st May, but merely continued to accommodate them. In consequence of this the numbers in the camp at Gallipoli, the only one now maintained, have grown slightly smaller, a few men having enlisted in the French Foreign Legion and a few others also having left. The number of refugees accommodated by the French on the 28th June was 1,439.

During the past month the number of departures from Constantinople of refugees at large in the city was little more than 200. The reason for so small a number is the recent arrest of certain highly placed Russian officers in Bulgaria by the Bulgarian authorities and the receipt of discontented letters from friends in Bulgaria by refugees here.

Colonel Procter's fund for the feeding of refugees in Constantinople will be exhausted by the end of June. The future fate of these refugees is as yet uncertain. The High Commissioners in London have agreed to take over the feeding of the refugees provided the League of Nations first sets aside 30,000*l.* for purposes of evacuation. Of this sum the British Government have promised 1,000*l.* and the Japanese Government 500*l.* but the remainder is not yet forthcoming.

In my telegram No. 1944 of the 16th June I stated the urgency of the situation, and I requested that the League of Nations be urged to take the matter up immediately. After all the efforts that have been made here to help the refugees, it would be a great pity if success should pass away just when it appears within sight.

Since the above was written I have received telegram No. 90815, dated the 20th June, affording me the support of His Majesty's Government in this crisis.

9 *Repair of Roads in Constantinople*

Tenders have now been received for all the roads in Constantinople whose repair is to be undertaken. By the terms of the contracts work should be started on all these before the 7th July, but experience of Turkish officials prevents optimism.

10 *The Military Situation in Anatolia*

The military situation in Anatolia has remained unchanged throughout the month. Desertion in the Nationalist army has increased considerably during the last two months. At the end of April serious trouble arose in the Koja Ili group. Some 500 deserters assembled and refused to be arrested. The greater part of the troops sent against them joined them, and in great confusion Colonel Salahuddin Shevket was arrested. This revolt was by no means organised, by Semadi A., Deputy for Mersina in the Grand National Assembly, and personally inspired by Enver, and possibly Envers supporters. By the middle of June all had been suppressed. Nusret Pasha visited the Koja Ili area at the same time, probably to repair Ismet's prestige. After visiting Geyve and Akbazar he arrived at Ismid on the 18th June, where he interviewed Hadji Bey and Chief Farrere, who went to Ismid on a brief visit.

On the Greek side General Papoulas has relinquished the command of the army of Asia Minor, which has been succeeded by General Hadjianestis. This change, which has been accompanied by certain changes in the headquarters staff, has almost certainly been engineered from Athens, and has created great irritation in the Greek army. It is probably to this cause, taken by the new Cabinet of Gounaris to gain control of the army which they appear to have considered as too greatly influenced by the Venizelist League.

On the 7th June Greek warships bombarded Samsoun and caused a few casualties and slight material damage. The object of the bombardment was to destroy war material in the town and fire was opened only after a demand for the destruction of it had been sent to the Nationalist Headquarters had been refused by them. The usual Turkish press has made out of this a second bombardment of an undefended town, omitting to mention however that the ships were fired on by the coast batteries, as the Nationalist communiqué published by the Angora papers testifies.

On the 9th June a Greek landing party, assisted by destroyers and aeroplanes, landed at Koveli Bay, about 25 miles south of Sea of Marmora. This force advanced to Ieronda and after a short engagement with new troops a few prisoners, having attained their objective, namely, the evacuation of some 1,500 Greek refugees from the area south of the Meander, who had been concentrated at Ieronda.

11 *The Political Situation in the Near East*

The proposal for a Allied enquiry into the alleged massacres and deportations in both Nationalist and Greek territory in Anatolia has been submitted to both Angora

and Athens. The latter has accepted, but no official reply has been received from Angora. Judging from the tone of Mustapha Kemal's speech mentioned above, it would seem probable that the reply will take the form of a refusal. The British, Italian and United States High Commissioners have received the necessary instructions from their Governments. The French High Commissioner still awaits his Government's orders to co-operate.

Following upon certain disturbances organised by anti-Bolshevik groups in Georgia towards the end of May severe repressive measures were taken by the Communist authorities. Wholesale arrests of anti-Bolshevik leaders, including, it is said, many officers of the ex-regular Independent Caucasian Brigade, took place. Many of those arrested were subsequently shot. As a precaution against security the authorities have now succeeded in mobilising in Georgia, between the ages of 18 and 48, and to have drafts of them off to units in Central Russia. This report, however, lacks confirmation. The present situation is comparatively quiet, as troops have been drafted into the affected areas and the Mensheviks and their adherents are contenting themselves with spreading propaganda wherever possible. This is said to meet with a certain amount of success, except with the Armenians, whose natural Turkophobe instincts predispose them to look towards Russia for support.

12. *The Meetings of the Directing Committee of Generals and Conferences of Allied Commanders.*

The forty-first, forty-second, forty-third and forty-fourth meetings of the Directing Committee of Generals and Conferences of Allied Commanders were held during the month.

13. *The Peace Proposals of the Allied Foreign Ministers.*

Progress continues to be made in preparing the military plans which will be required in accordance with the proposals of the Allied Foreign Ministers. Provisional instructions regarding the evacuation of Anatolia by the Greek forces and its reoccupation by the Turkish forces have now been approved, and instructions regarding the embarkation of the Greek forces have also been drawn up. A scheme for the reorganisation of the gendarmerie and police forces in the areas to be evacuated has also been elaborated. The problem of the demilitarisation of Western Thrace is now receiving careful and progress is being made with the consideration of the refugee question.

With regard to the re-establishment of Ottoman civil administration in the areas to be evacuated, a special meeting of the Allied High Commissioners and Allied generals was held on the 8th June. After a somewhat lengthy discussion it was agreed that the Allied Governments should be asked to decide whether Allied authorities should intervene in any way in the appointment of the Ottoman officials selected to replace the Turkish and Greek Administration, or should control the Turkish Administration when set up. In the latter case the Committee for the Study of the Civil Administration of the Gendarmerie will continue to study the handing over of the Greek administration to the Turkish authorities and the restoration of the Turkish gendarmerie and police forces. Certain military members will, however, in order that the study of these points may proceed, change their terms of reference for the committee and their report will, after approval by the Committee of Generals, be submitted to the Allied High Commissioners.

While this arrangement is not an entirely satisfactory solution of the difficulties that have arisen, it will at least prevent the work of this committee falling disproportionately behind that of the other committees. The study to be carried out by the military members should provide a basis which can easily be adapted to the decisions of the Allied Governments, which I hope to receive at an early date.

14. *The Pay, Clothing and Equipment of the Ottoman Gendarmerie.*

During the month the whole of the arrears of pay for February has been paid to all units of both the police and gendarmerie except the Charak gendarmerie battalion. This, all units in the area subject to the control of the Provisional Financial Commission of Control have been paid up to the end of May. The Charak battalion which is paid for entirely out of the receipts of the sanjak has not yet been completely paid for April. The reason for this is being investigated and it may be necessary to reduce the strength of this battalion slightly. Should it, however, the Greeks agree to hand over the whole sanjak to British administration, it will probably be possible to find the necessary money from the sanjak revenues.

A quantity of summer clothing has been issued on repayment to the men of the Scutari and Charak battalions. Certain further sums having been placed to the credit of the gendarmerie by the Ottoman Treasury, orders have been placed for the supply of some of the more essential articles of equipment and clothing.

15. *The Ottoman Gendarmerie under British Control.*

The strength of the Scutari battalion is 7 officers and 240 other ranks and that of the Charak battalion 4 officers and 120 other ranks.

16. *His Majesty the King's Birthday.*

On the 3rd June, on the occasion of His Majesty the King's birthday, the 1st battalion the Irish Guards and the 1st battalion the Buffs (East Kent Regiment) trooped the colours on the Maxim parade ground, where other units held private parades.

17. *Memorial Service for the late Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Bart., G.C.B., D.S.O.*

On the 24th June a memorial service for the late Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Bt., G.C.B., D.S.O., was held at Headquarters, Army Corps of Occupation. It was attended by the representatives of the British and Foreign naval, military and diplomatic services, from whom many independent expressions of condolence have also been received. Sir Henry Wilson's death has been very deeply felt throughout the Forces here. Representatives of the Russian Wrangel Detachment of the 34th Brigade attended the ceremony, and the buglers of the Irish Guards sounded the "Last Post."

18. *French Pilgrimage to the Dardanelles War Graves.*

On the 11th June the second French pilgrimage to the Dardanelles cemeteries took place. The French High Commissioner-General Pellé was accompanied by the Japanese High Commissioner and representatives of the French naval and military services. I was represented by my Chief-of-the-Staff (Brigadier-General H. Shuttleworth, C.B., D.S.O.).

After the celebration of Mass at the foot of the monument to the French dead, wreaths from the French High Commissioner, army and navy were placed on British graves, and General Pellé gave a very friendly address.

19. *Anatolian Railway.*

A summary of the working of the Anatolian Railway under British control is embodied in the Appendix.

H. H. ARMYTAGE *Lieutenant-General,*
Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces of Occupation, Turkey.

APPENDIX.

The Anatolian Railway.

It will be remembered that railway communication was restored with Ismid and Arabazar on the 21st October last year. This service has continued to be satisfactory, although the number of trains per week has had to be varied from time to time according to the traffic. During the period in question, 1,551 trucks have arrived at Haidar Pasha. The following quantities of merchandise have been conveyed:—

		Brought forward 593 trucks.			
359	trucks of	potatoes.	176	trucks of	tobacco.
3	"	cereals.	32	"	timber.
30	"	pottery.	48	"	fruit.
20	"	tiles.	20	"	silk cocoons.
2	"	vegetables.	42	"	wool.
5	"	eggs.	2	"	nuts.
15	"	apples.	180	"	miscellaneous.
17	"	baggage.	1	"	buffaloes.
3	"	sheep.	2	"	automobiles.
Carried forward 593 trucks.			Total 1,057 trucks.		

The remaining 454 vehicles contained passengers.

2. Relations with the Nationalists have, on the whole, been satisfactory as regards the railway, and they have fulfilled their share of the conditions. It has not been possible to carry out any repair work on the railways in Nationalist hands. Efforts are being made to collect repair material for the destroyed bridges, but no further progress can be made until more accurate information regarding the damage done can be obtained.

3. For the first time since January 1921 the section of the line under direct British administration between Haidar Pasha and Yarimje has paid into the bank a balance of £T 10,000 for the month of June.

4. In any consideration of the future of the Anatolian Railway *vis-à-vis* the Nationalist Government it should be remembered that the British control has in its favour the following important factors with which to bargain:—

(*a.*) That the majority of locomotives and rolling-stock on the line remain in our hands and in working order without which it is practically impossible to expect the line profitably.

(*b.*) That we have the facilities and technical staff to carry out the repairs on the line which the Turks are not in a position to do.

July 20, 1922.

No. 69

Mr. Lindley to the Earl of Balfour. (*Received July 25.*)

(No. 258.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, July 24, 1922.*

MR. HENDERSON'S telegram No. 313 to Foreign Office.

As already reported, I do not believe Greeks have ever seriously considered attack on Constantinople as long as Allies are there, though French are always harping on it. It is not impossible, however, that Greek *démarche* foreshadowed in my telegram No. 257 may include request to be allowed to bring the war to an end by occupying Constantinople.

The subject of such a demand would be that mentioned at end of Mr. Henderson's telegram.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 70

The Earl of Balfour to Sir M. Cheetham (Paris).

(By Bag.)

(No. 245.)
Telegraphic, *Foreign Office, July 25, 1922.*

YOUR despatch No. 1746 of 22nd July. Atrocities Commissions.

From your telegram No. 584 of 19th July it appeared that French Government agreed to immediate despatch to Angora of request for facilities and were instructing General Pelle accordingly. In note of 21st July they speak as though they would only agree to despatch of this request after delegates have been actually chosen.

Please point out to French Government extreme importance of sending notification to Angora with the least possible delay and express to them earnest hope that they will instruct their High Commissioner at Constantinople to proceed with the drafting and despatch of the note from Angora as soon as his colleagues receive similar instructions.

Names of delegates can be communicated subsequently as soon as decision has been reached.

(Addressed to Paris No. 245 (by bag), repeated to Constantinople No. 278 in cypher "D.")

[E 7455/5, 44] No. 71

M. Rizo-Rangabé to the Earl of Balfour. (*Received July 27.*)

THE Greek Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to Earl Balfour, and has the honour, in pursuance of instructions received from his Government, to communicate to his Lordship copy of a letter addressed to-day to His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs by M. Baltazzi, His Majesty's Foreign Minister.

The original document, M. Rizo-Rangabé understands, is being forwarded direct from Athens by the good offices of the British Legation in that city.

Greek Legation, London, July 27, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 71.

M. Baltazzi to the Earl of Balfour.

Monsieur le Ministre, *Athènes, le 14/27 juillet 1922.*

DÉSIREUX de contribuer sans retard au rétablissement de la paix en Orient, la Grèce n'a jamais manqué de donner la preuve de son esprit de plus conciliant, au cours des différentes tentatives les Puissances alliées ont vue en vue de la cessation des hostilités et de l'ouverture des négociations de paix. C'est dans ce même esprit qu'elle n'a pas hésité en novembre dernier d'accepter en principe et *a priori* sous réserve de ratification et d'adhérer à la proposition d'armistice qui lui était faite à Mudros et à d'autres arrangements futurs, propositions auxquelles chacun de ces derniers a trouvé moyen de se soustraire.

Ce n'est donc pas au Gouvernement hellénique qu'il serait en droit d'imputer la prolongation du conflit armé. D'autre part, les massacres et les dépravations des chrétiens s'accentuent, devenant de plus en plus systématiques et risquent d'exterminer totalement les populations d'Asie-Mineure les régions où le pouvoir kémaliste s'est établi. Et ces crimes, qui ont soulevé la conscience humaine, ne sont pas prêts d'être prévenus grâce par la pression exercée jusqu'ici par les Alliés.

Devant cette situation, tant l'incertitude et la prolongation engendrent pour le peuple hellène les plus sources charges et pour le Gouvernement hellénique les responsabilités les plus graves, j'ai l'honneur de m'adresser à votre Excellence pour déclarer, au nom du Gouvernement royal, que la Grèce se voit dans la nécessité d'avoir aux mesures les plus propres à mettre un terme à cet état de choses.

Fidèle toujours à son programme et à la déférence si invariablement manifestée envers les Gouvernements alliés, la Grèce sera toujours prête à examiner et communiquer avec eux toute proposition de paix qui pourrait être entamée sous réserve que la Turquie consente à reconnaître la force des décisions communes des Puissances alliées.

Je vous prie, &c.
G. P. BALTAZZI.

No. 72.

Mr. Bentinck to the Earl of Balfour. (*Received July 27.*)

(No. 260.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, July 26, 1922.*

MR. LINDLEY'S telegram No. 258.

Persistent rumours are being circulated in more or less responsible quarters that a Greek advance on Constantinople is imminent. It is stated that advance is to be made with the tacit consent of Great Britain.

I learn that thousands of cases of benzine have been purchased by Government during the last few days for use in Thrace.

Press informs me that between 3,000 and 4,000 gendarmes are being transferred from Athens to Thrace.

Section of press urges Government to put an end to the war by occupation of Constantinople. It pretends to believe that Allies would not oppose and expresses indifference if they should.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No 73

Mr Henderson to the Earl of Balfour (Received July 27)

(No 316)
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople July 27, 1922.*

MY telegram No 313

General Officer Commanding-in-chief held meeting a day with Admiral Brock and myself preliminary to meeting with his Allied colleagues, to discuss question of Greek concentration in Thrace Greek forces there have been increased by at least two divisions, raising four-fifth Concentration is therefore serious and possibly of sense *coup* being attempted cannot be altogether ignored particularly in view of information contained in Athens telegram No 207

Most probable interpretation of this concentration undoubtedly is legitimate desire of Greece first is to withdraw from Asia Minor to strengthen her position in The event against all eventualities In this respect it is a skilful manœuvre even if has ulterior purpose to exercise pressure abroad It is at the same time a trump card we must have in hand to play immediately returns in other hand for ultimate use if necessary

Nevertheless, while we do not anticipate any rash move on the part of Greece possibility of the following three contingencies occurring must be considered

(*a*) An attempt of Greek Government to occupy Constantinople

(*b*) A demonstration stopping short of actual occupation but involving entry into neutral zone

(*c*) A *coup d'état* by Venizelist nature without sanction (omitted) or (illegible) at any rate avowal of Greek Government

Therefore although I feel that the present moment is hardly favourable for discussion, after all of Near Eastern questions at forthcoming conference in London would appear to be desirable in view of probable danger of any immediate *coup* it seems highly desirable that we should receive as soon as possible definite expression of views of His Majesty's Government as to steps to be taken by British forces here in the event of one of these contingencies occurring

General Officer Commanding-in-chief in his present instructions is bound to resist any attempt on the part of either belligerent to enter neutral zone He is preparing to operate so forces in his power with French forces in Thrace to that end I sent yesterday a note quoted in (illegible) As the same time my advance into neutral zone in Thrace might provoke a corresponding move of Kemalists in Ismid Peninsula it might be desirable to obtain from French Government a guarantee of reciprocal co-operation in that event At the same time I fully appreciate importance of avoiding any incident which might result in loss of Allied lives from Greek bullets and prove irremediable In event of Greeks crossing frontier in Thrace everything should be done to delay their advance without offering actual resistance to it until the last moment necessary for protection of Constantinople itself

Generally speaking, however I would repeat that I still consider contingency of a Greek *coup* here as remote It is, however in the opinion if not of practical points of possibilities I recommend measure taken in last resource

Minister for Foreign Affairs sent his chief cabinet to see me this afternoon to express concern felt by Central Government at Greek concentration Confining myself to observing that while I was not in the least alarmed at danger of any Greek advance, and considered it practically inconceivable that it should take place so long as Constantinople was in Allied military occupation I had already drawn your Lordship's attention to the matter As I consider it not altogether undesirable that an impression of its possibility should be allowed to exist I added that British military authorities were carefully watching the situation and considering measures which it might be necessary to adopt

(Repeated to Athens No 75)

No 74

The Earl of Balfour to Mr Henderson (Constantinople)

(No 280
(Telegraphic) *Foreign Office July 27, 1922*

YOUR telegram No 314 of 23rd July Preliminary conference about the Near East

It is practically certain French would never agree and in present circumstances I deprecate sounding Constantinople Government.

E 6964, 5/44] No. 75

The Earl of Balfour to Sir M Cheetham (Paris)

(No 2359.)
Sir *Foreign Office, July 27, 1922*

I TRANSMIT to you herewith a memorandum regarding the negotiations for a settlement in the Near East, which I request that you will communicate to the French Government in reply to their note of the 13th July enclosed in Lord Hardinge's despatch No 1629 of the 13th July

I am, &c.
BALFOUR

Enclosure in No 75.

Memorandum regarding the Negotiations for a Settlement in the Near East.

HIS Majesty's Government have carefully considered M Poincaré's memorandum of the 13th July in reply to their communication of the proposal preliminary meeting of Allied representatives with delegates of the Governments of Athens, Constantinople and Angora Seeing how important it is that the meeting, if it is to take place at all, should assemble as soon as possible, they regret to find that while in their anxiety to promote what I must think they have consented to make a further concession, and have, however reluctantly agreed to the general principle involved in the French proposal the French Government still declare themselves not satisfied on several minor points on which they maintain that they must continue to insist as essential conditions of the proposed meeting

2 It is material at the outset to the proper presentation of the position to bear clearly in mind the original purpose of the proposal to hold the meeting The French memorandum refers in its first, third and last paragraphs to the preliminary conference but in the subsequent paragraphs it refers to it as the conference contemplated by the three Foreign Ministers in the course of the Paris conversations of last March It would appear as if the French Government regarded the meeting to take place at Boulogne or other spot in the vicinity of Constantinople as first provided for in the Paris programme This can hardly be There is clearly a vital distinction between the conference as originally contemplated at Paris and the meeting as understood by

3 The first was an integral part of the Paris programme and prior acceptance of an armistice and of the peace conditions suggested as the foundation of the proposed preliminary to its assembly, its purpose was not to present the peace conditions to the delegates of the Governments of Athens, Constantinople and Angora but to formulate having been first concluded and the peace conditions already accepted in principle to discuss their detailed application with the delegates of the three Governments, with the view of reducing them to treaty form

4 The meeting now proposed is essentially different in its object and in the conditions under which it assembles It is not preceded by an armistice, and the belligerents who take part in it are not already committed to the Paris proposals. Their object is to ask for explanations of these proposals, not to deal with details of proposals already accepted The Allied representatives could therefore not be expected to do more than receive and explain the Allied offer comprised in the threefold programme elaborated at Paris, and endeavour to persuade the Greek and Turkish delegates to accept this programme Their first duty will be to urge on the Angora Government the conclusion of an armistice, to which the Greek Government have already agreed and to which the Angora Government have, according to M Poincaré,

expressed to Colonel Meade their readiness to agree also. Their next duty will be to recommend and explain to both Greeks and Turks the peace conditions drawn up at Paris.

5. M. Poincaré in his note of the 15th May expressed the confident hope that personal contact would have the result of securing acceptance of these conditions. In this case the preliminary meeting, its objects having been attained, could be transformed into the conference contemplated by the Paris programme for the discussion in detail of the peace conditions and for the elaboration of a preliminary draft of the final settlement.

6. But should M. Poincaré's confidence prove to have been misplaced and should the peace conditions not be accepted in principle, there would remain no question for discussion or negotiation between the Allies and belligerent representatives. At the most the former could take note, for reference to their Governments, of the various and, no doubt, mutually conflicting counter proposals which may be brought forward by the Greeks and Turks. In that case the preliminary conference would come to an end, since the offer proceeding from the Paris Conference of March would have been definitely repudiated.

7. As regards the place at which the preliminary meeting is to be held, His Majesty's Government strongly object to any meeting on Nationalist territory. They are equally opposed, for practical reasons, to a meeting on neutral soil. They see no more reason for considering in this respect the convenience of the Angora Government than that of the Greek Government who have suggested Athens or Corfu for the meeting, nor is it clear that the absence of Mustapha Kemal Pasha in person is necessary, seeing that according to recent reports at Smyrna, Ismid he would be certain to represent the Grand National Assembly of Angora as the sole and responsible head of that body. His Majesty's Government therefore maintain their preference for Boulogne, possibly Principo, as the meeting place, though they would be prepared to consider any alternative suggested by the French Government which would not be open to the objections above explained.

8. His Majesty's Government cannot assent to the doctrine that the resolution passed by the Supreme Council on the 10th August, 1921, either altered or was intended to alter the law of nations with regard to the right of search, but they are quite prepared to consider any selection consistent with that law by which the export of arms to any belligerent which refused to accept the armistice might be checked or wholly prevented.

9. His Majesty's Government trust that the French Government in expressing their desire to accept the straightening of the minority clauses conditional upon acceptance by the belligerents, do not mean to imply that any objection on the latter point would be considered a sufficient reason by the Allied Governments to cease from insisting on effective safeguards. In view of the recent disclosures of atrocities committed against racial minorities, His Majesty's Government deem it essential to demand acceptance of really adequate measures for the protection of surviving minorities in Thrace and Asia Minor. These measures, at present in contemplation, have still to be worked out by experts, and there is no question of the consideration of specific arrangements at the preliminary meeting. The Allied representatives at that meeting should make it clear that, when the moment comes for framing the actual measures, the Allied Governments reserve to themselves the right to the interests of both Greeks and Turks nationals to exercise the widest latitude in the interpretation of the minorities resolution of the Paris Conference.

Foreign Office, July 27, 1922.

No. 76

Mr. Bentinck to the Earl of Balfour. (*Received July 28.*)

(No. 262.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, July 27, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Minister for Foreign Affairs called to-day and handed me note addressed to you, a copy of which was being handed to you to-day by Greek Minister in London, as also to other Allied Governments.

Note sketches recent course of negotiations and states that Greek Government is not responsible for prolongation of conflict.

Massacres and deportations were threatening with extermination entire Christian population of regions under Kemalists occupation. In face of this situation Greece was obliged to consider best measures for putting an end to conflict.

Greece note adds, will always be ready to examine any peace proposal in common with Allied Governments.

Text of note follows by post.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 77

Mr. Bentinck to the Earl of Balfour. —(*Received July 28.*)

(No. 263.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, July 27, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

I asked Minister for Foreign Affairs as to meaning of sentence regarding measures for putting an end to conflict. His Excellency said he was not in a position to tell me but begged me in telegraphing to confine myself to text of note. Delay he said in reaching a settlement was intolerable. I drew attention to rumours that orders had been issued last night for advance on Constantinople.

His Excellency said that such orders had not been given and that measures referred to had not yet been taken. But might be taken at any moment. I then told him, speaking entirely without instructions, that I considered it my duty to remind him of warning conveyed to him last year by Lord Granville that attack on Constantinople would not be tolerated (see Lord Granville's telegram No. 435). He said that he remembered perfectly well what Lord Granville had said and he now took note of my words. I told him I had no reason to suppose that my Government had altered their attitude since last year, and I begged him, lest regret was too late, not to take any measures which would afterwards be regretted.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 78

Mr. Bentinck to the Earl of Balfour. (*Received July 28.*)

(No. 264.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, July 27, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

French Minister believes that Status is pushing Government to consent to advance on Constantinople, but that Cours and Minister for Foreign Affairs are opposed.

He does not believe that Ismet will be pressed if the Allies call a halt. He referred to report telegraphed a few days ago to "Morning Post" that France had made most tempting offer to Greece to desert England and to throw in her lot with France. Minister believed story to have emanated from Palestine with the object of making mischief between Allies. French Minister states that, in addition to gendarmes referred to in my telegram No. 260, two divisions are being transferred from Asia Minor to Thrace.

Are military authorities, Constantinople, reporting to War Office numbers and dispositions of Greek troops in Thrace and elsewhere?

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 79

Mr. Henderson to the Earl of Balfour. (*Received July 28.*)

(No. 317.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, July 27, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 270. Commissioners of Enquiry in Asia Minor.

None of my colleagues have as yet received any instructions though Italian High Commissioner is, it seems, going with out them.

I impressed upon French High Commissioner importance of despatch of notification to Angora without delay and without awaiting names of delegates. He appeared to agree, and will I trust telegraph to Paris in that sense.

United States High Commissioner will not act without definite instructions and I am inclined to think United States Government is withholding its consent until other Governments concerned have ratified theirs. This would be in accordance with procedure followed by us in adhering to original proposal. Meanwhile to gain time I am submitting to my colleagues draft communication to Athens and Angora in English translation of which I give in my immediately following telegram, and which I think I can persuade my colleagues to make in without essentially modifying it.

Communication would be made through National agent here and through Allied and Associated Ministers, Athens who will presumably be instructed to present it jointly to Greek Government.

No. 80.

Mr. Henderson to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 318.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, July 27, 1922.*

FOLLOWING is draft of note referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:

"Governments of French Republic, Great Britain, Italy and United States of America have been deeply moved by accounts of sufferings to which certain elements amongst the population of Asia Minor are alleged to have been exposed. They have consequently considered it indispensable in the interests of humanity and justice that a neutral enquiry should be instituted as soon as possible in order to verify on the spot the truth of allegations of ill-treatment inflicted on these populations, be they Mussulman or Christian. With this object in view International Red Cross has been invited to constitute two commissions composed of neutral delegates who will be charged with prosecution of this enquiry in Eastern Anatolia and more especially in the Black Sea coast regions as well as in territory in occupation of Greek forces.

High Commissioners entertain confident hope that Government of Angora (Greek Government) will notify at earliest possible moment its concurrence in this humanitarian proposal and will undertake to facilitate in every way task of commission."

No. 81.

Mr. Henderson to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 320.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, July 28, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 313.

French and Italian High Commissioners asked me to join them in addressing telegram on similar lines to our respective Governments drawing their attention not only to serious nature of Greek concentration in Thrace but also to consequent danger of disorders in Constantinople itself, and suggesting that joint action should be taken at Athens with a view to ascertaining intentions of Greek Government and warning it against consequences of any rash step.

I did not raise objection and they are so telegraphing adding that Allied military commanders are taking measures to resist by force any encroachment on neutral zone and pointing out that strength of forces here would be sufficient for any serious resistance. I informed my colleagues that I had already reported fully to you, and that I did not believe concentration would lead to any immediate reaction on the part of Greeks, but that I did fear lest some unfortunate incident with far reaching results might occur, and that I strongly insisted that every effort would be made to avoid that eventuality.

(Repeated to Athens No. 77.)

No. 82.

Mr. Henderson to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 321.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, July 28, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

I took advantage of visit to-day of new Greek Chargé d'Affaires to speak most seriously to him of the folly of Greece attempting any rash *coup* in Thrace and of dangers of concentration of large bodies of troops immediately on frontier.

Minister for Foreign Affairs also came to see me this afternoon on the same subject, and was obviously preoccupied as to what would be the attitude of His Majesty's Government and British forces in the event of Greek advance. I told him I had had a meeting yesterday with General Officer Commanding-in-chief and British Admiral at which we had discussed measures to be taken to prevent violation of neutral zone and that so long as Constantinople was in Allied military occupation the British General Officer Commanding would do all that lay in his power to ensure that that neutrality was not violated by either Greeks or Kemalists.

Minister for Foreign Affairs appeared much relieved and said that such Turkish troops as were here were at the disposal of General Harington, and that he could assure me that we would not find them less loyal in that capacity than we would be ourselves in defending Constantinople from attack.

General Hadjianesti was due to arrive at Rodosto from Asia Minor to-day.

Repeated to Athens No. 78.)

No. 83.

The Earl of Balfour to Mr. Bentinck (Athens).

(No. 142.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 28, 1922.*

I HAVE received from the Greek Chargé d'Affaires here an advance copy of a letter addressed to me by the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs the original of which is said to have been handed to you for transmission.

Substance of this letter is that in view of uncertainty regarding present situation Greek Government must consider the most efficacious means of putting an end to the conflict.

We are not clear as to what this means. Have Greek Government in view any particular method of ending the conflict? We are loath to connect this in any way with their request for reference to in your telegram No. 260 of 26th July. But in view of discussion in Greek press of possibility of ending war by occupation of Constantinople I would perhaps do well for you to point out to Minister for Foreign Affairs that Greek attack on Constantinople would be resisted by Allied forces of occupation and might entail the most serious consequences for Greece.

You should add that we hope to be in a position shortly to invite Greek Government to send delegates to a meeting at Brussels or elsewhere with representatives of Allies and delegates from Constantinople and Angora Governments. In present circumstances, therefore, any precipitate action by Greek Government is highly undesirable.

(Repeated to Paris No. 246 (by bag), Rome No. 206 and Constantinople No. 281.)

No. 84.

The Earl of Balfour to Mr. Bentinck (Athens).

No. 143.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Foreign Office, July 28, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 142 of to-day.

I can scarcely believe that Greek Government can do anything so insane as to attack territory in Allied occupation. But tone of telegrams from Athens and Constantinople is increasingly alarmist and you should take any further steps which you think appropriate to prevent such calamity.

(Repeated to Paris No. 249 (by bag), Rome No. 207 and Constantinople, No. 281.)

No 85

The Earl of Balfour to M Karakhan (Acting Commissary for Foreign Affairs Moscow)

(Telegraphic) *En clair* *Foreign Office, July 28 1922*

THE British Government have received with surprise your telegram of 15th July protesting against the action of the Greek fleet in the Black Sea

The fact that the Allied Governments at Genoa invited the Russian Soviet Government to co-operate with them for the purpose of establishing peace in the Near East presupposed a state of war which in fact exists between Greece and Angora and of which belligerent naval operations such as blockade measures and the destruction of the enemy's stocks of munitions even if these munitions have been supplied by a Power which as the protest states is profoundly penetrated by the spirit of peace are perfectly legitimate incidents The Greeks have not so far as the British Government are aware violated any of the recognised rules of war in their naval action in the Black Sea and are clearly entitled to carry on their operations so long as a state of war exists

In regard to the passage of Greek ships of war through the Straits the pre-war arrangements in regard to the neutrality of the latter were terminated by the passage of the Goeben and Breslau through the Dardanelles in 1914 and by the gratuitous entry of Turkey into the war against the Allies and pending new international arrangements the Straits remain open to warships of all nations except in so far as this may be incompatible with the armistice with Turkey of October 1918 The Greeks are therefore perfectly entitled to pass freely through the Straits into the Black Sea

In conclusion I may observe that your present telegram gives no indication that the Soviet Government whilst protesting against the failure of the Allies to prevent hostilities carried on by Greece has on its part made any effort to hinder the Angora Government from continuing warlike operations

---

E 7511 5,44) No. 86.

Lieutenant General Sir C Harington to War Office (Communicated to Foreign Office July 29)

No 9013)

(Telegraphic) P *Constantinople July 27, 22*

I RECEIVED call to-day from new Greek High Commissioner Simopoulos He said formerly to be a Socialist and has just been transferred here from Budapest Impression I conveyed to me was that Greeks were tired of delay and financially embarrassed They want troops in Anatolia for protection of minorities Their object then is to shorten line and relieve expense They are building up in Thrace defensively and have at any rate at present no designs on Constantinople which he agrees would be disastrous He assured me there were no secret organisations going on for arming Greeks in Constantinople My personal opinion is still that concentration is to secure hold on Thrace and Powers to action as they are tired of delay and financial strain is too much for them to keep up.

No 87

Mr Bentinck to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received July 29)

(No 267)

(Telegraphic) *Athens, July 28, 1922.*

I LEARN from what has generally proved to be good source that intention of Greek Government is to issue ultimatum to Mustapha Kemal that, unless he accepts March decisions of Powers, Greeks will occupy Constantinople In view of Allied occupation it is difficult to see how such threat could make much impression upon Mustapha Kemal

(Repeated to Constantinople No 139)

No 88.

Mr Bentinck to the Earl of Balfour —(Received July 29)

(No 269)

(Telegraphic R *Athens, July 29, 1922.*

MY telegram No 262

Minister for Foreign Affairs has just handed to my colleagues and to me long note of which copy was he said being handed to you to day

Note states that Greek Government have come to the conclusion that only the occupation of Constantinople will bring about conclusion of peace and requests Allies to give necessary orders to occupying troops

I told Minister for Foreign Affairs that I was still without instructions and could only remind him of our conversation two days ago (my telegram No 263) Minister repeated that he took note of what I said, and that orders to advance had not yet been issued I again drew attention to need of avoiding any regrettable incidents.

See Mr Lindley's telegram No 258

(Repeated to Constantinople)

No 89

Mr Bentinck to the Earl of Balfour —(Received July 30.)

(No 270)

(Telegraphic) D *Athens July 29, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram

I have just attended meeting with French Minister and Italian Chargé d Affaires

We decided that as we had not warned Minister for Foreign Affairs of possible dangers ahead we could do nothing more than await instructions, and, although we do not anticipate precipitate action on the part of, at any rate, the Government, we cannot close our eyes to the dangers of rash acts on the part possibly of military commanders in view of temptation to Greek army, which French Minister says is already drawn up on Chatalja frontier Both colleagues referred to rumours that England was conniving at Greek advance (see my telegram No 260 I told them of the language I had used to Minister for Foreign Affairs

French Minister thinks the object is to force the Powers to reach immediate decision and to show the Greek people that Government is not asleep or to blame

(Repeated to Constantinople, No 143)

No. 90

Mr Bentinck to the Earl of Balfour (Received July 30)

(No 271)

(Telegraphic) R *Athens, July 29, 1922*

ON receipt of your telegram No. 143 I immediately informed French Minister, and then read substance carefully to Minister for Foreign Affairs and drew his serious attention to second paragraph of Constantinople telegram No 320

Minister for Foreign Affairs authorised me to assure you and Constantinople most positively that there was no cause for alarm Greek forces would on no account enter neutral zone without consent of the Allies Greek Government had asked for Allied consent in their second note and they would await Allied reply before taking further action I referred to grave danger of rash acts on the part of the army at the front Minister for Foreign Affairs said there was no danger, most stringent orders had been issued again this morning to prevent any incidents

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 91

Mr Bentinck to the Earl of Balfour (*Received July 30*)

(No. 273)
(Telegraphic) R
Athens July 29, 1922

YOUR telegram No. 143 reached me before your telegram No. 142.

In view of extreme urgency I took immediate action. On receipt of your telegram No. 142 I embodied both telegrams in an *aide memoire* which I have just handed to Minister for Foreign Affairs. Latter read it carefully and appeared to be relieved at the decided attitude taken by His Majesty's Government. He evidently has difficulty with his colleagues (see my telegram No. 264).

I again referred to dangers which might arise from Greek troops being massed on the frontier but he said that Minister of War said that troops were not on the frontier.

Minister for Foreign Affairs thanked me for news contained in final paragraph of your telegram No. 142 which he said would greatly facilitate matter.

I am keeping in close touch with both my Allied colleagues.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 92

Sir M. Cheetham to the Earl of Balfour (*Received July 29*)

(No. 308)
(Telegraphic) D
Paris July 29, 1922

YOUR telegram No. 245.

French representatives at Constantinople and Athens have been instructed by telegraph to act in their British colleagues in drafting and despatching note to two Governments of Angora and Athens regarding atrocities commissions.

No. 93

The Earl of Balfour to Mr Bentinck (*Athens*)

(No. 146)
(Telegraphic) R
Foreign Office July 29, 1922

YOUR telegram No. 260.

I have not so far received further Greek note but must express my astonishment that request for permission to occupy Constantinople should have been put forward by Greek Government who must from repeated declarations of His Majesty's Government be aware that Allies are quite determined not to consent to such proposal. If very much regret previous telegrams explaining our intentions have not been communicated to the Greek Government.

No. 94

The Earl of Balfour to Mr Henderson (*Constantinople*)

(No. 283)
(Telegraphic) R
Foreign Office July 29, 1922

YOUR telegram No. 318 of 27th July. Draft notification to Angora and Athens regarding atrocities commissions.

I approve proposed draft provided last paragraph should run as follows:

"Greek Government has already signified its acceptance of this proposal and undersigned High Commissioners trust that (to Athens only) it will confirm (to Angora only) Government of Angora will forthwith communicate its decision."

Please repeat to Athens with your telegram No. 318.

No. 95

Mr Henderson to the Earl of Balfour (*Received July 30*)

(No. 323)
(Telegraphic)
Constantinople July 29, 1922

MY telegram No. 320.

Situation has been developing rapidly. General Officer Commanding-in-chief, who made a tour of inspection yesterday along Thracian frontier and held meeting with Allied generals this morning, now takes most serious view.

He is telegraphing to War Office that in light of information which is now at his disposal he considers that movement is directed against Allies. He urges that immediate joint action be taken at Athens to warn Greek Government against folly of step which they to all appearances contemplate.

In addition respects I venture to refer you to his telegram.

French and Italian High Commissioners raised this afternoon question of Greek ships at Constantinople, and asked me to join in telegraphing our Governments to suggest either stricter neutrality of port be at once enforced and ships ordered to leave or that permission for ships to leave should be refused in order that they be treated as hostages against any act of aggression. I agreed to telegraph on the subject of Greek ships' service action to be taken in regard to them in the event of anything occurring was matter for decision of our Governments. I said I would myself prefer Greek ships to remain here as I considered them to be potential hostages. As a matter of fact, their presence here is reassuring rather than otherwise, while their departure might constitute first warning signal of a Greek move. But I pointed out that it was difficult for Allies to take any action prior to such a move.

In point of fact, I presume that in the event of Greek troops coming into collision with Allied forces Greek ships if they are still at Constantinople, will be at once interned by Allied naval authorities here. I have again seen Greek Chargé d'Affaires and warned him against madness of any precipitate action which would bring Greece into conflict with the Allied Powers including Great Britain since we have no intention of permitting any violation of neutral zone.

I told him that Greece had possibly a trump card to play but that if she played it too early she would lose the game. He was somewhat evasive in his replies, but gave me a most hearty assurance that if any action were taken it would be notified in advance to the Powers.

I am still unwilling to believe that Greek troops will cross the frontier without warning. View of concentration given at second paragraph of my telegram No. 313 appears more probable. Greece is undoubtedly determined to force a solution of Near East *impasse*. But her absolute determination in that respect reckless though it may be can scarcely be so reckless as to risk armed encounter with Allied forces.

In any case, I now repeat my delay in giving precise and definite warning at Athens. Position in neutral zone frontier with Greek troops massed on it is such that incident might at any moment occur may grow to very large dimensions. In fact I hear slight incident has already occurred in which one or more Turkish gendarmes were wounded.

(Sent to Athens No. 79.)

E 7554/3873/44 No. 96

Mr. Henderson to the Earl of Balfour (*Received July 31*)

(No. 655. Confidential)
My Lord
Constantinople July 25, 1922

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship with reference to your despatch No. 1469 to Paris of the 16th May last, that I have been shown the summary of what purports to be the text of a secret Russo-Turkish Agreement concluded at Angora on the 26th June last. The agreement is alleged to have been signed on behalf of the Soviet Government by Araloff its representative at Angora, and on behalf of Turkey by

Kiazim Pasha and Yussuf Kemal had to have been ratified by the National Government at the beginning of this month.

2. The agreement as shown to me contains six clauses.

By the first article Turkey undertakes not to make peace with Greece without the consent of the Soviet Government.

The main points of the other clauses are to the following effect:

(*a*) Turkey, in event of her concluding peace with her present enemies, undertakes not to allow Turkish territory to be used in any action which may be taken against Russia.

(*b*) In event of any attack being made on Russia by a Balkan or Caucasian State, Turkey undertakes to intervene in favour of her ally with all her available forces.

(*c*) Turkey undertakes to ratify the Rapallo Treaty between Germany and Russia and any other treaties which the latter may make with other countries, provided those countries engage to accept as the basis of their relations with Turkey the Russo-National Pact of 1920.

(*d*) The Soviet Government undertakes to supply Turkey with all the military supplies necessary for the prosecution of the war against Greece.

3. A Soviet military mission is to be attached to the headquarters of the Nationalist army for the purpose of the supervising the effective execution of the engagement under (*d*).

4. I was also assured that there existed a further clause dealing with the eventual future relations of Turkey with the Western Powers, but of such a secret nature that the agent of my informant has been unable to ascertain its terms.

5. I am unable as to whether to express belief or disbelief in the authenticity of this document. It was sent to me by a friend in whom I have confidence and who procured it from a source which he considers reliable and trustworthy, qualities which, however, do not prevent one from being heartily fooled. My informant however who is an American correspondent, was much impressed by its veracity to telegraph to his paper.

6. It is clear that on the one hand a secret agreement should have been concluded between growing influence of the Soviet Government at Angora is one of the most significant features of the present Near East situation. It would be only natural that Moscow should have been anxious to have secured and have succeeded in persuading the Kemalist Government to give contractual expression to an undoubted state of dependence. The Nationalist movement is so beholden to Russia for all the material resources on which its armies which are indispensable for its successful issue that Mustapha Kemal even though he might prefer not to be bound himself could scarcely have resisted advances on the part of the Soviet Government to round off the Rapallo Treaty with an alliance with Angora.

7. On the other hand, the inherent probability above referred to is in itself sufficient to provoke scepticism. The production of such a document by those interested in such a gross and flagrant breach of the most elementary rules of international usage is likely to be false as to genuine. It is, moreover, difficult to reconcile the existence of such an agreement with the references to be drawn from the public utterances of Mustapha Kemal at the head of Yussuf Kemal at a recent banquet given by the Soviet representative to the newly arrived Persian Ambassador at Angora, that in that respect again public utterances are often to be misleading.

8. I would prefer, therefore, to reserve any definite opinion as to the authenticity of the document which I have had the honour to give you in French a summary until such time as further information from other sources shall have enabled either to confirm or to refute it.

I have &c.

NEVILE HENDERSON,

Acting High Commissioner.

[E 7656 5 44] No. 97

M. Henderson (the Earl of Balfour — Received July 31.)

(No. 650.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, July 25, 1922.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 646 of the 18th instant, I have the honour to state that later information from Angora confirms my belief that the Grand National Assembly rejected altogether the principle of nomination of candidates for the post of commissioner. The proposal that the right of nomination should be vested in a committee was that submitted to the Assembly. The Assembly rejected it, and decided that elections to vacant commissionerships should be made without any preliminary nomination, but that the Assembly should be free to elect any member it chose by secret ballot, meaning that voting should be by ballot and that the member elected must receive an absolute majority.

The most salient explanation since the election of the new Cabinet is believed to be that the prolongation of Mustapha Kemal's functions as commander-in-chief of the army. You, Lordship will remember, he has hitherto been invariably re-elected for periods of three months at a time, and that on the last occasion there was a certain amount of opposition to his having prolonging his command. It is now announced that at the 30th January Assembly unanimously adopted a law conferring the command-in-chief on Mustapha Kemal, but without limitation of action, on Mustapha Kemal. The law is carefully worded so as to assert the supreme authority of the Assembly. It expressly states that the commander-in-chief is vested with the moral personality of the Assembly itself, being the one and only supreme authority in the country, and that what is conferred on Mustapha Kemal is the "effective command." It further states most explicitly that the Assembly may withdraw the powers conferred on him whenever it considers it necessary.

The adoption of the law was preceded by a debate in which Mustapha Kemal himself spoke. He referred to the previous agitation regarding his command. He said that as August the Assembly had elected a temporary commander-in-chief, but that the latter had left the matter entirely with the Assembly, and had charged himself to carry on the war "with our own means," and had begged that the Assembly would, in the event of his being unable to use his powers to such an extent as the exceptional extraordinary circumstances and the reasons why they had for confidence. He thanked them for that confidence. It was by his desire and efforts, he said, that the Assembly had been able to raise the army of the present level. There was no doubt that the enemy would be unable to realise the object of the attack unless they could assemble without extraordinary measures. There was no danger any more to weaken the powers of the Assembly. He urged on the necessity of the dispatches of which the congratulations to-day could not occur. By the fundamental law, which asserts the national sovereignty of the people, the office of commander-in-chief was temporary, and the powers and authority of commander-in-chief were directly vested in the Assembly. The office which they were now to vote might continue most last until favourable results consonant with the spirit of the National Pact were attained. The Assembly had from the start adopted a programme the realisation of which they would doubtless await with impatience, the recovery of Smyrna, of Brousse, of Constantinople, and of the Straits, and the signing of a treaty upon the basis of the National Pact. The coming of that happy time would bring great joy to the Assembly, but it must assure them in advance of the Assembly. I am sure that I may say with confidence for the world it will be the greatest satisfaction of returning to the post of which it was deprived by force. I am certain that no greater oppression than to be afraid only under the body politic. Proof of such has been given for many years past in the scoring of several regions. In conclusion, he begged them to remember that the law which they were about to discuss did away with the powers in question.

4. The new law, as I have advertised here, is a prolongation of Mustapha Kemal's command for the duration of the present session. A careful perusal of the text of it and of his own speech shows that he is really fighting for his position. With his customary skill he is going half-way to meet his difficulties, and covering his gradual loss of unchallenged personal authority by playing on the doctrinaire spirit of the Assembly. It must be left to judge whether by generous concessions to this spirit he will regain the substance of his old power. Much will depend on the attitude of Rouf Bey, the new President of the Council. Various indications show that the solution of the Constantinople question is not a complete success for either Mustapha Kemal or the Opposition. I am inclined to believe that the adversaries of Mustapha Kemal sought to oust a certain number of prominent Ministers, some of whom were re-elected, while two of them, the Commissaries for Eastern and Economic Affairs, were successfully kept out of the Mustapha Kemal's reorganising Cabinet, a particular party, which goes by the name of Left-wing. And it is significant that the two new Commissaries are Younous Nadi Bey the rapporteur of the rejection law on the mode of election of commissioners, and Arif Hikmet, the dispossessed Commissary for Justice.

5 Reouf Bey is regarded in some quarters as a Moderate, in others as a *moyen terme* between Mustapha Kemal's supporters and the Enverist faction, who would appear to be the main element in the Opposition.

6 I have dealt with those internal developments at some length because anything which materially affects Mustapha Kemal's position at Angora must react to some extent on the international situation. It would however be rash to assume that, even if the Nationalist movement finally got out of hand altogether, its opponents before the Greeks leave Asia Minor, any person or group who succeeded them would be less reactionary than he has shown himself. The same spirit to which he is being forced to make concessions of form if not of substance, operates in favour of the utmost resistance on the treaty that Turkey must ever be independence within the armistice frontiers at all costs. It is not likely that Reouf Bey was was second only to Mustapha Kemal himself in zeal for launching the national movement, or Enver Pasha if he returned to power in Turkey with Central Asiatic policy or the Ittihad guard of the Committee of Union and Progress who are now so active, would show an accommodating spirit in dealing with the Allies except under compulsion. Such hope as there is here rests on the likelihood of Moderate men coming into power at Angora, but in the possibility of the Nationalist movement as a whole being weakened by secessions bringing into few, if any, but whom are relatively Moderate and in the further possibility of a struggle for the good character between Angora and Moscow.

7 Meanwhile two points in the semi-official report of Mustapha Kemal's speech, on which the above account of it is based are deserving of attention. He speaks of the necessity of achieving certain results "consonant with the essential spirit of our National Pact," and of the rest of these to be recovered by Turkey he makes no mention of Mosul. Read strictly, his language might be held to imply that the spirit of the Pact was more sacred than the letter, at that concession might be made in certain points, e.g., Mosul, but I should be loath to suggest without any confidence that Mustapha Kemal is one with so keen a conception of it. It may well be that the essential spirit of the National Pact is covered by the phrase, and it is obvious that Mosul, Angora recovery is an essential part of the Pact does not hold the same position for the purpose of a settlement as e.g. Smyrna, Brussa, Constantinople or Thrace.

I have, &c.

NEVILE HENDERSON.

Acting High Commissioner

P.S. I have advertently omitted to mention that Reouf Bey seems to have been promoted to the rank of Pasha after his election as President of the Council. Unless otherwise stated, he contradicted he will in future despatches be referred to as Ismet Pasha. There is no other Pasha of the same importance or prominence at present.

N. H.

E 7553/132/65] No. 98.

Count de Saint Aulaire to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received July 31.)

LE Gouvernement français a été saisi par sa délégation auprès du conseil des représentants des actionnaires de la Turkish Petroleum Company, réunis dernièrement, par Mr. W. Teagle représentant les compagnies pétrolifères américaines.

A cette réunion l'Anglo-Persian Oil Company principal actionnaire de la Turkish Petroleum Company a fait connaître qu'elle ne pouvait admettre d'autre solution que celle sacrifiée consentie par elle aux autres actionnaires et pour ordonner à ses délégués de

L'Ambassadeur de France a été chargé de porter à la connaissance du Gouvernement britannique la position du Gouvernement français.

Le principe de la réduction proportionnelle des parts dans la Turkish Petroleum Company doit faire l'objet de toutes les concessions exigées et des sacrifices spécifiés inscrits par ces actionnaires. Sir J. Cadman négociateur britannique de l'Accord de San Remo, a d'ailleurs donné cette opinion, en faisant le 6 juillet dernier aux actionnaires de la Turkish Petroleum Company, la promesse qu'aussitôt que le Gouvernement britannique aurait obtenu la suppression de l'article 9 de cet accord

L'Accord de San-Remo oblige en outre, le Gouvernement français à consentir gratuitement à la construction de deux pipe-lines avec voies ferrées nécessaires, à travers la sphère d'influence française (article 10 et 11). De plus (article 12) la France doit accorder toutes les facilités d'installation dans le port terminus de pétrole exporté ne devant souffrir aucune taxe d'exportation ni de transit, et les matériaux nécessaires aux installations restent libres de tous droits d'importation et de passage.

Le Gouvernement français ne saurait admettre un procédé ont se réclament aujourd'hui les Américains et l'Anglo-Persian Oil Company que soit le Gouvernement britannique acceptant préalablement la suppression des articles 9, 10, 11 et 12 du Pacte de San Remo le Gouvernement local réservant ses droits vis-à-vis de la Turkish Petroleum Company et comme à cette admis pour l'Etat Irakien au titre de sa souveraineté.

Le Gouvernement français croit d'autre part, devoir attirer l'attention du Gouvernement britannique sur le fait que toute réduction de la part française des pétroles de Mésopotamie représente l'abandon par elle de la contre-partie les avoirs politiques qu'avait la France sur Mossoul. Il est donc à craindre de réclamer avec cette contre partie.

En vue de collaborer comme il a été établissement dans le monde d'une paix au pétrole aussi équitable le Gouvernement français accepterait ce sacrifice s'il obtenait la garantie que toute terre ainsi abandonnée sera réciproquement accordé aux intérêts français par les intérêts pétroliers américains et britanniques en Perse en Turquie au Caucase, dans les régions où les pétrolifères l'ancien Sultan Abdul Hamid de même que dans tous autres régions où les intérêts pétrolifères américains et britanniques ont acquis sur la base d'une concession des accords généraux leur acquisition préférentielle de gisements de pétrole.

Les représentants des deux français dans la Turkish Petroleum Company reçoivent pour instruction du Gouvernement français d'accepter au profit des intérêts français la réduction de leur part proportionnelle à la leur part équitable dans le Gouvernement britannique se sera réduite lui-même par la suppression des articles 8, 10 et 12 du Pacte de San Remo et se sera déclaré prêt à appuyer toute demande de partage pratique sur des bases justes et équitables dans les régions traitées ci-dessus.

Par bases justes et équitables le Gouvernement français entend une part équitable entre la Compagnie prévue au Pacte de San Remo c'est à dire en France et sur un pied d'égalité avec les intérêts britanniques.

Une nouvelle répartition des actions de la Turkish Petroleum Company devrait avoir lieu demain 31 juillet à 3 heures de l'après-midi, M. Poincaré a insisté auprès du Comte de Saint-Aulaire pour qu'il fasse part de ce qui précède sans aucun délai, à sa Seigneurie le Secrétaire de Balfour.

Le Comte de Saint-Aulaire salut, &c.

Ambassade de France. Londres
le 30 juillet 1922.

No. 99

Mr. Bentinck to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received July 31.)

(No. 276.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, July 30, 1922.*

AFTER sufficient warnings which I have now given five times to Minister for Foreign Affairs and most categorical assurances which I have received from him I cannot believe that Greece would risk encounter with British troops, for we are their only hope of subsistence, but it is obvious that immediate decision regarding Eastern question is essential.

(Repeated to Constantinople No. 323.)

No 100

Sir H Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour —(Received July 31)

(No 324)
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople, July 30, 1922*

MR HENDERSON'S telegram No 323 of 29th July

I returned to Constantinople this morning and called a meeting of Allied High Commissioners General Officer Commanding in chief Allied generals and admirals this evening to discuss situation and certain preventive and precautionary measures which General Officer Commanding in chief proposed to take in view of its critical nature General Harington has suggested *inter alia* that Greek warships be ordered to remain at their anchorages that all further movements of Greek troops between Mudania and Rodosto be stopped and that Allied warships should make demonstrations on flanks of Thracian frontier or elsewhere

In view of Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs assurances reported in Athens telegram No 271 of 29th July I was strongly opposed to any action which might force the very issue which we desire to avoid I said that, whereas I considered measures taken by General Harington as wise and adequate and as having materially assisted in preserving Greeks from precipitate action we must now await views particularly of Italy on question of fleet of our Governments which were fully cognisant of whole situation and possible contingencies which might arise out of it

French High Commissioner urged that it was not sufficient merely to reply to Greek Government that the Allies would not permit Greek advance on Constantinople Effective guarantees against such advance should be exacted These might consist in insistence on withdrawal from Thrace of all troops recently transferred there as well as withdrawal of remaining Greek forces to a distance of 5 kilom from frontier as well as re-enforcement of stricter neutrality of Constantinople by suppression of Greek naval base and military mission there

Italian Minister principal danger of situation to be in possible results of a frontier incident I agree that it might be desirable to request Greek Government to withdraw its troops to a certain distance from frontier Whereas also presence of Greek warships at Constantinople has always tended to complicate situation this could be met by supplying Constantinople with still greater force at present juncture

My own opinion is that Greek menace to Constantinople is 50 per cent bluff to 50 per cent serious But in any case I must lay stress on importance of early expression of views of His Majesty's Government on situation as described in telegrams sent from here Exact state of mind of Greek troops in Thrace and possibilities of withdrawal with at least sanction of Government must be taken into consideration and provided for

French general officer commanding states that his latest information from reconnaissance is that there is not there but that there is considerable movement of material on back line

(Repeated to Athens No 80)

No 101

The Earl of Balfour to Mr Henderson (Constantinople)

No 288)
(Telegraphic) R *Foreign Office July 31 1922*

YOUR telegram No 318 of 27th July

International Red Cross after accepting now risking difficulties on ground of political character of proposed enquiries Nomination of commission by Red Cross seems therefore unlikely and terms of draft note to Angora should be amended to run With this object in view Allied Governments have decided to constitute two commissions' &c

E 7631 27 44 No 102

Consul Palmer to the Earl of Balfour —(Received August 1)

(No 71)
My Lord, *Damascus July 18, 1922*

I HAVE the honour to report that a new Italian consul *de carriere* Signor Alberto Tuozzi arrived here a few days ago and took possession of his post on the 14th July

Signor Tuozzi came here from the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, but he had recently been in Angora where he was the guest of Mustapha Kemal

2 According to him, Anatolia is in a fairly desperate condition from the point of view of finance, food supplies and military efficiency He appeared to consider the organised Kemalist military resistance might collapse at any moment, even without Bolshevik aid

3 He considered it significant that Russian gold was now legal currency at Angora, and he produced a Russian gold coin from Angora which he had kept as a souvenir but which was in free circulation there

It was, in fact the legal gold currency according to him

4 Signor Tuozzi informed me that he would be the Italian delegate to the commission of investigation as to Turkish atrocities against the Christians of Anatolia, if such a commission ever materialises

He gave me his personal opinion that there was no doubt that such a reaction had taken place as Portuguese war Prisoners &c, and a large scale attack was making upon every suggestion that the Greeks had also committed such atrocities, declared that he was sure the Turks had really lost so much in men, and suffered they were following a policy of extermination

5 The above is, of course not news to your Lordship's but as coming from the Italian official I have deemed it worth reporting At the same time, in fairness to Signor Tuozzi his remarks should be treated as strictly confidential

I have, &c
C E S PALMER.

[E 7622, 3288 44] No 103

Consul-General Satow to the Earl of Balfour —(Received August 1)

(No 103)
My Lord, *Beirout, July 18, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to confirm my telegrams Nos 28 and 29 of the 15th and 18th instant regarding the arrival at and departure from Beirout of Major General Sir Charles Townshend, K C B M P

He arrived on the 20th July by the steamship "Caesar" coming presumably from Marseilles General Gouraud was not here himself but I whom he had advised of his arrival requested the British Liaison officer to go down with a number of his staff to welcome him After spending a night in Beirout, he went up to Aley in the Lebanon, where a villa had been placed at the disposal of military officers He had an interview with General Gouraud at Aley, and at the 11th July reception at the latter's house I had a brief conversation with General Townshend, who was then on his way to Aleppo By the following day the news had become common property in Beirout

Yesterday I received your Lordship's confirmation of your telegram No 271 to Mr Henderson with instructions to endeavour to induce General Townshead to abandon his journey to Angora In the afternoon I went up to Aley, but found that he had already left for Beirout to take the train for Aleppo that night. Before returning to Beirout I hurried to speak to General Gouraud, and before seeing him I had prepared to meet a French officer Captain Roubaud who told me that he had been detached to go with General Townshend to Aleppo

When I saw General Gouraud I explained that General Townshead was, as a private individual, proceeding to Aleppo and thence to Angora against the wishes of His Majesty's Government, and said that while I could not ask him to stop General Townshead would request me not to do anything to facilitate his enterprise He told me that General Townshend had asked for a French gunboat to take him to Mersina and that he had refused this request since no boat was available He also said that he had only detached an officer to accompany General Townshead because this was

his resto a with vestors of distinction the object being to mitigate the minor difficulties and discomforts of the journey, and that the letter for General de Lamothe, his delegate at Alexandretta, which he had given me to request him to give every assistance might be given to General Tewfik Pasha to have a car from some private garage for the journey to Alexandretta. I suggested that he might withdraw these facilities but he was not apparently disposed to do this. He seemed to feel that he had given his word, and that it was possible was only showing the courtesy which one military officer of high rank had a right to expect from another.

I then went to Berne and found General Townshend on the point of leaving for his journey. I invited him to a meeting but as I expected he declined to do so. His object being by that time well known, it was difficult that having, under his hands, he would have consented to give up his post. He told me that he knew Mustapha Kemal well, that he had been instructed to go and talk with him, that at least Members of Parliament and others with whom he had come in contact in Constantinople had favoured him. He was sure that nothing but good could come of his visit to Angora if what the main opponent was the Foreign Office. As to a promise given when his passport was granted to me I understood him to say that he had never given any assurance that he would not go to Turkey, and finally that he would not go for the present, meaning within a few weeks of his receiving a passport. However he declares that he has essential pieces of his undertaking to fulfil, and he will no doubt presume his own deliberation in due course. I told him frankly what I thought about the Turkish general and the Kemalists in particular, and left it there. As I left he said that he expected to be back in about three weeks and that he would then tell me what and happened. He planned to leave last night for Aleppo.

(Copy sent to Constantinople.)

I have, &c.
H. E. SATOW

[E 7886 6 44]

No. 104

M. Riza-Bengabe to the Earl of Balfour. (*Received August 1.*)

THE Greek Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Earl of Balfour and has the honour to communicate herewith, under instructions from his Government, copy of a note handed to the Right Hon. Chargé d'Affaires at Athens on the 29th instant and addressed by M. Baltazzi, His Majesty's Envoy Minister to His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

M. Riza-Bargabe regrets that, owing to transmission of the despatch in question from Athens, he was impossible to deliver the enclosed copy on Saturday, as he was instructed to do.

Greek Legation, London, July 30, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 104

M. Baltazzi to the Earl of Balfour.

Athens, le 29 juillet 1922.

M. le Ministre,

A LA suite de ma lettre en date du 27 juillet j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence les résolutions auxquelles le Gouvernement Royal s'est arrêté après que les considérations qui font l'objet d'une étude approfondie de la situation à peu près entière nous fait ressortir.

Le conflit armé entre la Grèce et la Turquie n'est évidemment que la continuation de la guerre des Alliés contre cette dernière et a la fois une conséquence de la tentative turque de traiter ses obligations internationales et de rompre contre la volonté des vainqueurs.

C'est dans le but d'imposer aux décisions prises et confirmées par les Puissances alliées le mépris de l'ordre et d'assurer l'existence des chrétiens contre les persécutions kemalistes et turques, armée qui avait pour tâche de tenir par la force l'exécution du Traité de Paix garantissant le libre passage des Détroits aux navires de tous les peuples, d'Orient que le mandat de l'Asie Mineure et de Constantinople et que des forces alliées ont occupé Constantinople pour exercer une pression sur le Gouvernement ottoman.

Mais pendant que la Grèce combattait contre les troupes kémalistes renforcées par tout ce qu'il restait de facteurs militaires et économiques de l'ancien Empire ottoman et qu'elle poursuivait une guerre que les conditions territoriales et la limitation de ses moyens d'action rendaient les plus difficiles, les Puissances ont proclamé la neutralité des territoires occupés par leurs contingents sont en se déclarant neutres elles-mêmes.

Par cette déclaration de neutralité la pression exercée au commencement a perdu forcément son caractère et l'occupation se changeait en une sorte de protection et de sécurité pour le Gouvernement de Constantinople et la capitale de l'Empire. C'était priver la Grèce un de ses moyens les plus efficaces et les plus décisifs et empêcher de juger son action et son effort militaire sur le point vulnérable et le plus sensible.

En effet, par la proclamation de la neutralité, le champ d'action de la Grèce était limité à sa seule défensive et entravait ses mouvements en la privant d'une partie essentielle de ses moyens de pression. Il était clair que le rôle de servir dans le but de maintenir l'ordre et la paix, en vertu de l'encadrement au principe de la neutralité et de la position des autres en l'état actuel, on a égard des belligérants.

Le Gouvernement hellénique n'avait donc pas à se soumettre pratiquement à une décision de neutralité des Puissances et malgré l'infériorité dans laquelle la Grèce était vis-à-vis de l'ennemi commun, elle a épargné à la fois le sang de ses enfants et les ressources du peuple grec et elle s'est imposé la plus extrême tension de ses forces morales et matérielles.

Durant cette longue période les hostilités ses alliés de la grande guerre n'ont pas cessé de devoir lui venir en aide, mais ils prirent l'initiative de propositions de paix qui l'avaient pu mettre, la pacification est devenue de plus en plus problématique et la situation en s'aggravant de jour en jour menace de jeter l'anarchie dans le Proche-Orient.

Je crois ne pas devoir taire que cet état de choses favorise exceptionnellement l'extermination par les massacres et les déportations les grecs orthodoxes de l'Asie Mineure, programme mis en action, depuis longtemps par les Kemalistes et auquel le Gouvernement de Constantinople n'a pas su opposer une réaction morale. Tout au contraire, la sécurité dont ils se voyaient entourés et l'influence kemaliste qui a une de plus en plus ses agissements, l'ont encouragé à continuer leurs œuvres d'horreurs et de menaces à Angora, après avoir consenti au départ pour l'Anatolie de la presque totalité des officiers de l'ancienne armée impériale.

Pour ces raisons et pour mettre un terme à une situation intolérable dans laquelle se débat l'Orient, le Gouvernement hellénique est arrivé à la conclusion que seule l'occupation de Constantinople et capitale de l'Empire, par l'armée grecque imposerait la conclusion de la paix.

Le Gouvernement hellénique a pesé dans cet ordre d'idées toutes ses mesures et a examiné toutes les conséquences auxquelles elles pourraient donner lieu. Il a mûrement considéré les ordres et contre-ordres d'occupation inspirés par la solidarité des garanties offertes et les principes inviolables du droit.

La Grèce n'a rien à craindre et rien à perdre pour l'avenir digne de l'œuvre libératrice qu'elle a accomplie. Et pour elle il est permis d'espérer que les Puissances voudront bien ne pas mettre d'obstacles à sa marche vers la paix qui sera le salut des chrétiens et des races soumises au joug turc et le complément de la paix du monde achetée par ses sacrifices.

Je vous prie, &c.
G. P. BALTAZZI

No. 105

Mr. Bentinck to the Earl of Balfour. (*Received August 1.*)

(No. 278. Telegraphic.)

Athens, July 31, 1922.

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 324 of 30th July.

I entirely agree with views of Sir H. Rumbold in second paragraph.

We have refused Greeks request to enter Constantinople and Greek Government have not I am convinced the slightest intention of acting contrary to wishes of His Majesty's Government. I think my French colleagues here are fully aware of this and appear to take calm and reasonable view of the situation.

danger which we fear as frontier incidents, and everything tending to create excitement should be avoided. In present frame of mind of both Greeks and French latter appear just as likely as former to provoke an incident, but military attaché thinks the whole Greek army as in such a state of terror of Greek Commander-in-Chief that there is little likelihood of an advance without his authority. My colleagues and I propose today to suggest to Minister for Foreign Affairs advisability of withdrawing troops from frontier if they see no way there but I most strongly deprecate any kind of demonstrations on our part or any of the extreme measures mentioned in the first paragraph and third paragraph of Sir H. Rumbold's telegram. My Italian colleague read out a paragraph from a telegram he had received from Constantinople suggesting a naval demonstration against the Greeks. He agreed with me that such a suggestion was ridiculous.

I venture to hope that His Majesty's Government will not countenance any wild measures proposed by either of our allies of an unfriendly nature towards Greece. I see no need to extract effective guarantees. The French High Commissioner at Constantinople suggests Greek Government appear ready and anxious to do whatever His Majesty's Government advise and would at once withdraw from frontier if requested by His Majesty's Government.

At the same time I venture again to impress on you that situation in the country will not permit Greeks to wait on indefinitely for a settlement while French policy seems to date remain to block. News of French Minister reported in my telegram No. 27 of 29th July, appears to me to confirm my misgivings with whom I have discussed situation. I should be glad to have your interpretation of Greek attitude and pleasure shown by Minister for Foreign Affairs at receiving message in last paragraph of your telegram No. 142 of 28th July, which seems to me to be.

Mr. Lindley should reach London today. I think it may agree with above.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 106

Mr. Bentinck to the Earl of Balfour. (*Received August 1.*)

(No. 280.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, July 31, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 278 of 30th inst.

My colleagues have at last received their instructions which are to take joint action. We therefore propose to hand note to Minister for Foreign Affairs this evening by which was in English to the effect that we were instructed to say that Allied Governments must refuse to take measures requested by Greek Government in the second and that orders had been given to their Allied military command to repel by force every attempt to move troops against zone occupied by Allied troops.

Although I had already handed to Minister for Foreign Affairs messages contained in your three telegrams I considered myself entitled in associating myself with my colleagues in view of instructions contained in your telegram No. 143 of 28th July.

We read a personal suggestion to Minister for Foreign Affairs that troops should be withdrawn from frontier to avoid any incident. Minister for Foreign Affairs took notes, and said he would enquire of Greek General Staff as he still maintained that Greek troops were not on frontier and at any rate not in contact with Allied troops.

Minister for Foreign Affairs again enquired whether early decision could be reached on whole Eastern question.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 107

Sir H. Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour. (*Received August 1.*)

(No. 326.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 1, 1922.*

GENERAL Officer Commanding has received instructions to obtain views of His Majesty's Government as to steps that protection could be afforded to Sultan in the event of a Greek occupation of Constantinople.

In view of reassuring nature of Chargé d'Affaires at Athens's recent telegrams, question now seems somewhat academic. In any event I do not believe Greek would be in any personal danger during a Greek occupation except perhaps in first confusion. The General Officer Commanding corps presumably arrange to protect Sultan with Allied troops until Greeks become responsible for maintenance of order.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 81.)

No. 108

Sir H. Chetham to the Earl of Balfour. (*Received August 1.*)

By Bag.

(No. 400.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, July 31, 1922.*

TONIGHT's Temps suggests that in the interests of peace in the Near East, the Greek King and Government should be induced to abandon at once their present policy in Thrace and Asia Minor. Concerted action on the part of Allied Governments responsible for the proposals of 28th March last is necessary for this purpose, and the most effective instrument in the hands of the Allies would be the blockade of Greek ports by British ships. The Greek Government would only be encouraged in their present mistaken policy by any indications of vacillation or indecision. Prompt action appears essential because complete unity does not yet seem reached by the Greek leaders either at Athens or Smyrna.

This very definite expression of opinion by semi-official newspaper suggests inspiration of Quai d'Orsay.

No. 109

The Earl of Balfour to Mr. Bentinck (Athens).

(No. 147.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August 2, 1922.*

YOU should address an urgent note to Minister for Foreign Affairs in the following sense:—

His Majesty's Government received on 31st July copy of the Greek note of 30th July which you communicated in your telegram No. 269 of 29th July, asking for Allied consent to a Greek occupation of Constantinople. They are unable to admit in the arguments by which this proposal is supported and they have in the most significant way modified and the proposal itself is unacceptable. For this reason they still adhere to the standpoint of His Majesty's Government in the direction of their policy in the Near East to bring about peace between the combatants in that region and they therefore welcomed the action of the Greek Government in accepting the recommendations of the Allies. His Majesty's Government deeply deplore the non-success of their efforts and his direction but they have not yet abandoned hope that further negotiations may result in peace and they are clearly of opinion that the military occupation of Constantinople by Greeks army would do nothing towards ending the present war and might be the fruitful parent of new ones.

It has further to be observed that the apparent imminence of a conference at Belgrade or elsewhere, at which discussions would be resumed, makes the proposal of the Greek Government always unfortunate peculiarly inopportune at the present moment. His Majesty's Government therefore feel it incumbent on them to state once again in the most unambiguous manner that they are entirely unable to assent to an occupation of any kind of Greece of Constantinople or of the neutral zone and that any attempt on the part of Greek troops to effect such an occupation would be resisted by force.

(Repeated to Constantinople No. 289 and Rome, No. 212. Copy to Paris by bag.)

No. 110

The Earl of Balfour to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)

(No. 290.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 1, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 324 of 30th July.

For attitude of His Majesty's Government towards Greek proposal see my telegram to Athens No. 147 of to-day.

I concur in view expressed in first sentence of paragraph 2 of your telegram that reply that Greek action, especially as advocated by French High Commissioner might tend to precipitate the very crisis we are most anxious to avoid. I would approve all precautions to repel any attack, but I deprecate at present anything in the nature of a demonstration or the exaction of severe guarantees. I have no objection to requesting the withdrawal of Greek troops to any distance from the frontier that you may consider reasonable. But the request must presumably be made by the three Powers acting together and it must be a request and not a command.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 148, and Rome, No. 213; copy to Paris by bag.)

No. 111

The Earl of Balfour to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)

No. 291.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August 1, 1922.*

PLEASE, if possible, defer action on my telegram No. 288 of 31st July Atrocities enquiry pending further instructions.

No. 112

Mr. Bentinck to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received August 3.)

(No. 282.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, August 2, 1922.*

MINISTER of War told my Netherlands colleague last night that Greeks had not intention of advancing on Constantinople. Reason of threat was as suggested in last paragraph of my telegram No. 270 of 29th July.

Minister for Foreign Affairs declared to me to-day in answer to my question that whole situation had changed so materially since last year that he really had hoped I was not expecting His Majesty's Government would have permitted occupation of Constantinople in order to end the war. As your Lordship did not agree no hoped early decision would be taken by Powers so as to get peace.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 113

The Earl of Balfour to Mr. Bentinck (Athens).

(No. 152.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 2, 1922.*

YOU will see from my telegram to Constantinople No. 290 of 1st August that I am writing to urge the Greek Government with the Allies to withdraw their troops from the frontier of the neutral zone.

I am however impressed with the danger of some frontier incident supervening though I have every confidence in the assurances you have received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

You should therefore inform him of my attitude and urge him not once though unofficially to have action taken spontaneously by the Greek authorities without delay.

(Repeated to Constantinople No. 295.)

No. 114

The Earl of Balfour to His Majesty's Representatives at Paris (No. 256, Telegraphic), Rome (No. 213, Telegraphic) and Washington (No. 244, Telegraphic).

(R.) *Foreign Office, August 2, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 238 to Paris of 18th July. Atrocities enquiry.

I have seen representatives of International Red Cross, who were already negotiating with Angora and Athens for despatch of relief missions. They agree to undertake enquiry to following extent: that their missions, while primarily devoted to improving lot of populations will supply to our Governments report on situation. It is suggested that two commissions should each comprise three Red Cross representatives and two generals five in all.

Red Cross consider it imperative that no public pronouncement be made pending receipt of reply to their suggestions.

Red Cross have not necessary funds and request as a *sine qua non* payment of necessary expenses *in advance*. Their present rough estimate is that cost of two commissions of three members for two months would amount to 100,000 francs or 1,000*l.* from each Government. In view of great desirability of missions proceeding forthwith, you should make immediate representations to the Government to which you are accredited and press for a reply at the earliest possible moment.

Red Cross propose to invite American representatives through Red Cross not through United States Government.

(To Paris only.)

It would be well to inform the French Government before 4th August when Red Cross representatives who leave here 3rd August, propose to pay courtesy visit at Quai d'Orsay on their way to Geneva.

(Repeated to Constantinople No. 294, and Athens, No. 150.)

[E 7571/19/44] No. 115

Foreign Office to International Red Cross Society, Geneva.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August 2, 1922.*

I AM directed by the Earl of Balfour to inform you that the Allied and Associated Governments, having received reports of alleged atrocities in Asia Minor, contemplate the despatch of commissions of enquiry to ascertain the actual facts of the situation. Having, however, entrusted the International Red Cross Society with the consideration of the question of relief work for the unfortunate populations of the regions in question, they desire first to despatch two of these commissions, which, they consider, it will be necessary to pursue the course which they have in contemplation, in fact the enquiries of these missions of the International Society having been formed to ascertain the real position and requirements of the populations in question and to study the appropriate measures for their betterment, will be in a position to supply a reliable report both to the Allied and Associated Governments as well as to charitable organisations. The complete impartiality and recognised neutrality of the International Red Cross make it certain that the report of its delegates will possess an unquestionable authority and enable prompt application of the questions to be formed.

2. Lord Balfour will therefore be glad to receive an assurance from you that—

1. The report received by the International Red Cross Society on the subject will be communicated to the Allied and Associated Governments.
2. That the commissions will be so constituted, in regard both to the number and to the authority of the delegates, as to be enabled to carry out the task entrusted to them thoroughly and expeditiously.

3. His Majesty's Government for their part foresee no difficulty in obtaining the agreement of the other Allied and Associated Powers, to entrust the whole control of the organisation and despatch of the proposed missions entirely to the International Committee of the Red Cross. The latter would, therefore, be responsible for applying to the Governments directly concerned for authority and facilities for the missions to visit the territories to be inspected. They would themselves

appoint the delegates decide upon the period and exact character of the missions activities. His Majesty's Government are fact r prepared to agree to the miss ns working under the sole and direct authority of the Interna al Committee of the Red Cross.

4. His Majesty's Government realise that the organisation of missions on the sca e now proposed must inevitably involve a very heavy burden on the funds of the International Red Cross. Lord Balfour is therefore applying to the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury for authority to contribute a substantial sum to the general funds of the International Red Cross, and is approaching the Governments of the other Allied and Associated Powers with a view to their making a similar contribution. It is hoped that this will enable the International Red Cross to undertake the organisation and despatch of the proposed missions without incurring any financial loss.

I am, &c.
LANCELOT OLIPHANT

E 7718/6/44 No. 116.

Mr Rizo-Rangabé to the Earl of Balfour (Received August 3.)

THE Greek Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Earl of Balfour and has the honour to communicate herewith, in pursuance of instructions received from his Government, the text of a note verbale which His Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs is handing, to-day to the representatives of the three Allied Powers in Athens in reply to the Allied note of the 31st July.

Greek Legation, London,
August 3, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 116.

Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Allied Representatives at Athens.

EN réponse à la note verbale en date du 31 juillet 1922 que M. le Chargé d'Affaires de Grande-Bretagne m'a remise, le Ministre des Affaires étrangères de Grèce a l'honneur de faire remarquer que le Gouvernement hellénique avait, avant l'occupation de Constantinople par les Alliés, par une action dénoncée contre la Capitale turque la priorité de conclusion de la paix.

Les dernières prises par les Puissances alliées se trouvent en obstacle contre le but assumé par le Gouvernement hellénique, qui se propose dans sa résolution d'exercer un droit acquis et de sauvegarder le bien général et qui était assuré par avance l'assentiment de la résistance armée par un effet moral et matériel d'une portée incontestable. Si les Puissances veulent maintenir leur acte d'entre en vigueur, elles tendent à aviver un effort déjà fait et rendent la situation encore plus perplexe.

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères de Grèce croit devoir attirer à plus sérieuse attention des Puissances alliées que tout retard apporté à la conclusion de la paix définitive engendre de nouvelles calamités pour les chrétiens, prépare un état intolérable et expose à de nouveaux dangers tout le proche Orient et augmente les responsabilités de tous les facteurs de la paix.

Le 2 août (21 août) 1922.

No. 117.

Mr Bentinck to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received August 3.)

(No. 287.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, August 3, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 279.

Telegram from Greek Government to High Commissioner, Smyrna, dated 27th July, as published in press states that Western Asia Minor inhabitated by races in which Greek element predominates, in virtue of civilising influence and

historical rights, can never return to Turkish administration. Greece is called to lay foundations of a definite administration, assuring to all without distinction of race or religion the benefits of up-to-date government, and participation of all in administration. Realisation of liberty was to be obtained by utilisation of all local forces, and all inhabitants are invited to collaborate. Then follows proclamation on 30th July referred to in Smyrna telegram No. 63 to Constantinople. Decisions for future organisation of Western Asia Minor have not been published here but Minister for Foreign Affairs has promised me French translation.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 118.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour (Received August 3.)

(No. 329.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 2, 1922.*

ALLIED admirals have addressed joint note to Allied High Commissioners stating in their opinion as precautionary measure Greek Government should be informed officially that Greek vessels of war can no longer be allowed use of waters of Bosphorus or its approaches (i.e. territorial waters of neutral zone). They further consider it desirable that Greek warships, troop transports and auxiliaries should not be allowed to use waters to which Dardanelles gives admission so long as present tension lasts.

I have already communicated to Admiral Brock my telegram No. 324 of 30th July and your telegram No. 290 of 1st August, laying stress on statement of policy at latter, and adding I am better the opinion that proposals of Allied admirals partake of nature of a demonstration which you deprecate.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 84.)

No. 119.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour (Received August 3.)

No. 332.,
(Telegraphic.) R *Constantinople August 3, 1922.*

ON 1st August Greek patrol crossed frontier near and was fired on by Turkish gendarmerie post losing three killed.

In order to prevent recurrence of similar incidents, General Officer Commanding in Chief is sending General Morland in company with British and French officers, to exchange maps with Greek corps commander in order to ensure that frontier is clearly defined and to obtain an undertaking that both sides shall be held back to a fixed distance and that patrols and aircraft shall not cross the line.

Athens informed.

No. 120.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour (Received August 3.)

(No. 333.)
(Telegraphic.) R *Constantinople, August 3, 1922.*

TURKISH Government has addressed to Allied High Commissioners formal protest against Greek proclamation of autonomy of occupied territories in Asia Minor.

Note declares proclamation which prejudices cause of peace to be invalid in fact and in law and holds Greece responsible for its eventual consequences.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 87, and Smyrna No. 62.)

No. 121

The Earl of Balfour to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 296.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 3, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 328 of 1st August.

The Sultan should be afforded any protection that he may need.

(Addressed to Constantinople, No. 296, repeated to Athens No. 153.)

No. 122

Mr. Lentaigne to the Earl of Balfour. (Received August 4.)

(No. 289.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, August 3, 1922.*

MY immediate preceding telegram.

I told Minister for Foreign Affairs that I had come my utmost in reports to you to get a clear view taken of situation and I had faithfully reported the many assurances which he had given me. He expressed appreciation and he renewed above.

He referred to responsibility of Powers for continuation of war, adding that if the Powers had shown a united front and stopped supplies reaching Kemalists no effect throughout the East would have been so great that peace could have been brought about without any resort to force by Allies.

I am informed indirectly that M. Stratos's secretary said that if present *démarche* on the part of Greece has not induce Powers to take serious measures to create intolerable situation within next two months Greeks would advance on Constantinople at all costs.

I gathered that Stratos has support of Minister of War in pushing against Commissioners, who has supporters in Cabinet (see my telegram No. 264).

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 123

Sir H. Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour. (Received August 4.)

(No. 331.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 3, 1922.*

ALLIED Admirals have communicated to Allied High Commissioners a draft joint note which they propose to send to Greek admiral here in the event of Greek troops crossing in force the boundary of neutral zone.

In this note they lay down:

1. That all Greek men-of-war at ports in the Bosphorus or Sea of Marmora are to remain at their anchorage without communication with the shore or by wireless telegraph.

2. All such as are at sea in the Sea of Marmora or Black Sea are to return to their bases. Base for latter to be anchorage at Kavak.

3. All movements of transports or auxiliaries in these waters to cease.

4. No fresh men of war, transport or auxiliaries to pass Dardanelles.

5. Any infringement of these orders will be repressed by force.

6. Further orders will be [? communicated] as regards disposal Greek ships to which forces applied.

I have received further communication from Admiral Brock in which he informs me that Allied naval units in Smyrna are not in sufficient force to protect Allied interests there. He therefore considers it advisable that Allied men-of-war should be withdrawn before any note is presented to Greek Admiral which might provoke reprisals, and has informed Allied Admirals of his intention to withdraw British destroyer from Smyrna before any action is taken respecting Greek naval forces at Constantinople. In the event of a state of war being declared with Greece measure will be taken to deal with Greek naval forces at Smyrna.

(Repeated to Athens No. 86.)

No. 124

The Earl of Balfour to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 297.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Foreign Office, August 4, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 290 of 1st August.

French and Italian Governments have enquired my view as to the possible use of Turkish troops in defence of Constantinople which they both consider undesirable. I am replying that I also consider it undesirable but that in case of a crisis I am content to leave the ultimate decision to General Harington.

E 7759/5/44. No. 125.

Sir M. Cheetham to the Earl of Balfour. (Received August 5.)

(No. 1821.)
My Lord, *Paris, August 4, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the reply of the French Government to the memorandum on the Near East enclosed in your Lordship's despatch No. 2359 of the 27th July.

I have, &c.
MILNE CHEETHAM.

Enclosure in No. 125.

M. Poincaré to Sir M. Cheetham.

Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris, le 3 août 1922.

M. le Chargé d'Affaires,

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser réception du mémorandum relatif aux affaires du Proche-Orient que vous m'avez transmis en annexe à votre lettre du 28 juillet dernier.

Je vous serais reconnaissant de bien vouloir faire parvenir à Lord Balfour la réponse ci-jointe que le Gouvernement de la République fait à ce mémorandum.

Veuillez agréer, &c.
POINCARÉ.

Memorandum.

Le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, a examiné avec la plus grande attention le mémorandum du 27 juillet que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté a bien voulu lui faire parvenir en réponse à sa communication du 13 Juin même mois. Il est heureux de constater qu'il est d'accord avec le Gouvernement britannique sur la nécessité de hâter le plus possible la réunion en Orient de représentants alliés, à laquelle seraient convoqués des délégués des Gouvernements d'Athènes, d'Angora et de Constantinople.

En ce qui concerne le caractère de cette conférence préliminaire, il est évident qu'il serait différent de celui qu'avaient envisagé les trois Ministres des Affaires étrangères alliés en mars dernier, lorsqu'ils ont élaboré les propositions à présenter aux belligérants pour ramener la paix en Orient. Cette "conférence préliminaire," réunie sans attendre la conclusion d'un armistice aurait pour objet de recueillir et d'exposer les propositions déjà formulées et de persuader les délégués grecs et turcs de les accepter. Les derniers événements démontrent que les efforts des Alliés pour convaincre les Grecs n'auraient pas été moins grands pour amener les Turcs à accepter les conditions de paix proposées. Mais c'eût été négliger une occasion de rétablir la paix que de refuser de se réunir dans ces conditions nouvelles. Car la Grèce serait entraînée une grande responsabilité si les efforts des Alliés n'ont pas un résultat satisfaisant, la conférence préliminaire se transformera immédiatement sur place en la conférence prévue par l'article 4 de la Convention de Paris et l'on pourra discuter les détails des propositions à faire et élaborer un projet de texte en vue d'un règlement définitif.

Si, au contraire, ces efforts sont infructueux, les Gouvernements alliés examineront les demandes des Grecs et des Turcs, ils décideront s'il y a lieu ou non d'en tenir compte. En cas de rupture, la responsabilité de celui qui l'aura causée sera nettement établie à la face du monde.

Le Président du Conseil Ministre des Affaires étrangères ne doute pas que le point de vue auquel s'est rallié le Gouvernement britannique ne soit également adopté par le Gouvernement italien

Quant aux pourparlers secondaires par échange entre la France britannique du 11 juillet et rappelés au relevé du 27 juillet M Poincaré espère qu'il ne sera pas difficile d'arriver à un accord

Concernant l'Europe dans sa réponse du 13 juillet, le Gouvernement français désire simplement que le lieu choisi pour la réunion ne soit pas un obstacle à la venue des délégués des différents Gouvernements Il faut réunir cette réunion possible

Puisque le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté considère que pour des raisons pratiques les travaux préliminaires pour cette réunion ne sont pas convenables le Gouvernement français se rallierait à toute proposition du Gouvernement hellénique qui aurait chance d'être acceptée par tout le monde

Il semble y avoir les plus grandes chances pour un accord sur le territoire turc et ce territoire grec Toutes les craintes de l'Constantinople doivent d'ailleurs être écartées, car, à son dernier ultimatum, il a accordé à la capitale turque un état d'inquiétude et d'exaltation qui peut aller jusqu'au désir d'une guerre contre les Alliés Il serait donc heureux de chasser le territoire ennemi et il y a intérêt à ce retour en Orient, tels de Rhodes pourrait revenir aux conditions voulues Smyrne, enfin la Syrie ou, l'Italie Nous se reconnaîtrait par la facilité des communications avec l'Orient qu'avec les capitales alliées

Lorsque concernant les zones la position du Gouvernement français tient à donner aux Grecs quelque latitude pour leur permettre d'atteindre aux règles ordinaires du droit international, ne se refuse à cela pour accord avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté sur cette proposition une procédure qui permettrait d'accorder aux belligérants exercer un droit de visite et d'interdire les contrebande, exportation d'armes et de munitions destinées aux uns et aux autres, pourrait à la décision prise par les Alliés pour la Thrace à la Grèce pour les parties diverses C'est particulièrement dans le cas où la procédure établie par cette convention permettrait de remédier à la demande du maintien de la paix L'attitude à prendre le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté sur la nécessité d'appuyer cette décision aux Grecs comme aux Turcs comporte faire respecter dans les Détroits les règles de la neutralité

Le Gouvernement français ajoute comme le Gouvernement britannique, que les mauvais traitements infligés aux minorités exposant aux représentants alliés le devoir d'insister pour faire respecter par les Turcs et par les Grecs des garanties effectives soient données à ces minorités Il va sans dire cette voie s'engager dans l'espoir de pourparlers aboutissant à un traité définitif de la paix par des négociations comportant les vues exposées précédemment Les dispositions spéciales n'ont effet n'avoir pas été élaborées à Paris la conférence préliminaire cette charge aurait réservée aux experts qui, le concert vous aurait été donné pour les résultats des enquêtes, pourraient, si vous le jugiez opportun, proposer la révision de toutes les clauses relatives aux minorités, aux Gouvernements alliés, sera dans les pourparlers entre les deux gouvernements adopté à la réunion de Paris Il serait prématuré d'entrer dès à présent dans la discussion de ces clauses, ce faits sur lesquels les Gouvernements alliés ont exprimé que les enquêtes étaient nécessaires pour établir leur réalité

Dans ces conditions le Gouvernement français serait reconnaissant au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le bien vouloir lui faire connaître, le plus tôt possible et en même temps qu'au Gouvernement italien, ses propositions pour le lieu et la date de la réunion projetée, ainsi que celle de l'interdiction de l'exportation des armes et des munitions.

le 3 août 1922

No 126

Mr Henderson to the Earl of Balfour (Received August 5)

(No 297)
(Telegraphic) R *Athens, August 4* 1922

YOUR Telegram No 284 and my Telegram No 287

Proclamation of 30th July begins by referring to decisions to be taken for the future organisation and administration of western Asia Minor High Commissioner is authorised to take suitable measures giving effect to such decisions. Reference is then made to inevitable obstacles due to continuation of the war and another proclamation is foreshadowed regarding measures to be taken The most

urgent of these will be introduced first also of those which are practicable in present circumstances and which from an international point of view will be in harmony with regime to be set up united Asia Minor future to a liberated Asia Minor

Works of liberation will not be achieved by decisions of States and treaties but must be constructed by a free people themselves Populations of Asia Minor must forget past and expel religion and race fanaticism and replace it by modern conceptions of work, peace and economic progress Only by moral elevation character and internal and external peace will liberty brought by Greeks be completed

(Repeated to Smyrna)

No 127

Mr Bentinck to the Earl of Balfour (Received August 5.)

(No 298.)
(Telegraphic) *Athens August 4*, 1922

NEWS contained in Constantinople telegram No 331 is somewhat disquieting It is no doubt prudent to have a plan ready to meet any possible danger but I venture to deprecate any measures being actively taken now which might imply mistrust on Minister for Foreign Affairs assurances, or which might appear to exaggerate gravity of situation at present when calm is of such supreme importance The above seems to me to apply to the naval just as much as to the military situation I feel confident that Greek Government will not act contrary to advice of His Majesty's Government, but I much fear lest French may be seeking pretext for trouble possibly in the hope of embroiling us with Greeks

Minister for Foreign Affairs recently told neutral friend that one British soldier could keep back whole Greek army This is probably true but present state of feeling against French is such that sight of a French soldier would be highly provocative

(Repeated to Constantinople)

No 128

Sir H Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour —(Received August 6.)

(No 335)
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople, August 5*, 1922

FOLLOWING summary of Mustapha Kemal's speech may be useful in case Foreign Ministers Paris time to discuss Near Eastern settlement next week

Everywhere would welcome proposal for conference between Allies and belligerents The principal difficulty is to secure agreement as to place Minister for Foreign Affairs just informed me that Constantinople Government is ready to go to Berlin Angora Government is strongly opposed to Berlin but it may be impossible to get it to come there Failing Gulf of Ismid Angora would like meeting attended by Foreign Ministers in western capital Neither Constantinople nor Angora Government can be got to commit itself to general body of Paris proposals of 26th March Assuming Asia Minor is to be evacuated, the greatest difficulty is Turkey Both Governments are utterly hostile to any settlement which would deprive Turkey of effective sovereignty of Adrianople and Dodecanese sovereignty of Gallipoli Peninsula Both will give trouble over their questions, e.g. minorities and capitulations when it comes to preparing definite agreement for signature Angora Government will be much the more attractive of the two on such questions but even Constantinople will go its utmost to avoid definite commitment

Constantinople Government is still too impotent to dare to sign away anything considerable Nothing is Kemalist organisation remains as being The latter is subject to great internal strain Mustapha Kemal's personal ascendancy has undoubtedly been a stabilising Opposition in elected National Assembly and in army which is now important appears to be growing There is however no indication as yet that these internal dissensions mean that any party at Angora is ready to weaken on the National Pact In so far as they affect international situation they will operate indirectly through their effect on the *moral* of the army and perhaps on relations between Angora and Bolsheviks.

If Mustapha Kemal goes under a contingency which must now be reckoned on, (however (though not excepted upon) possible candidates for reversion of his authority are (1) Ex-Sultan. These are not necessarily attitudes exclusive of each other. Indeed if reversion of old Committee of Union and Progress rulers or both assumed control they might well seek to use Sultan; but they would hardly allow him to play a part in their affairs. They would probably give Ad es asm but He is Mustapha Kemal himself from point of view development still most to be desired is that Sultan should regain some real authority. Interviews of sidelong sovereign sight so large as to afford clear backing of Great Britain or Allies or to tell his people that at their instance he is to be installed in what the average Turk considers essential to reasonable peace viz. evacuation of Greeks both from Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace.

Above shows that attitude of Turkish side never uncertain but that there is little in their circumstances to encourage a policy securing acceptance of practical proposals. Latest proposals by enlightened methods only. Nevertheless seems very desirable that Foreign Minister should review situation and hold reduced proposal by conference of Allies and delegates to practical form. Fact that Greeks have greatly strengthened position in Thrace even though they have abandoned intention to capture Constantinople should be useful as means of pressure on Turks.

Consideration that Kemalists are armed to fight with Bolsheviks and that Angora will give French no rest, peace in Syria so long as it remains in present mood may weigh with French.

No. 129

Sir H. Chetham to Earl of Balfour. (*Received August 8.*)

By Bag.

(No. 512.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, August 7, 1922.*

YOUR Telegram No. 256 of 2nd August. Through secretary.

My Government consider objections to the proposals of International Red Cross though useful, not sufficient to justify changing original plan. He cannot, however, advance money required without authorisation of Parliament and thinks that it would be difficult to obtain such by demand to this effect.

Copy of note by bag to-morrow.

(E 7840/5/44) No. 130

Sir H. Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour. (*Received August 8.*)

(No. 388.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, August 1, 1922.*

REFERENCES have been made, in more than one recent despatch from this Higher Commission to the marked renewal of activity on the part of the former leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress. As these references attract attention, it may be well to collect some of the information available for a single report.

2. Amongst Unionists who have returned to Constantinople the most well-known are Kara Kemal Bey, who was Minister of Food during the war, Nejmeddin Molla, Murat Sokor, Ex-Secretary General of the Committee, Javid Bey, Javid Bey and Ismail Jenbolat.

3. Kara Kemal was little at evidence before the war. He is known to be a person of importance, and on the eve of Balkan crisis in Constantinople there he was present active, engaged in creating an organisation in the nature of a network of agents in the cities composed of labourers and lodging-house and fish-stall keepers. He was said at last to journey inland from Adrianople to Asia.

4. Nejmeddin Molla was active the war closely associated with the activities of the Committee of Union and Progress. He was employed during the war in Central Europe and returned to Constantinople in the Spring of 1919. He made frequent attempts to obtain permission to return to Constantinople, but, so long as the Allied control over travellers was stringent, he was refused. He was refused. The [illegible] of the restrictions on the departure and [illegible] is now practically at an end. He is a man of loose character, who is always had a keen eye to his personal interests. [illegible] definite information regarding his present political activities and he would be found [illegible] a revolutionary [illegible] here.

5. Murat Sokor was formerly one of the Unionist leaders who worked in the background. He is understood to be now active in the work between Constantinople and the interior.

6. The representatives of Ismail Bey's group in Constantinople are Dr. Abdullah Djevdet and Ismail Canbolat. The latter has been the subject of several despatches. His arrival was closely followed by that of the Young Bey with whom he was always particularly associated for some years after 1908 onwards. Ismail was for a most powerful member of the Committee of Union and Progress group. He afterwards took office under the Turkish Government as Director of the Public Debt. He is generally held responsible for the repression in Malta and Egypt, as you know perhaps aware, a short time ago. He has now returned to journalism and has begun writing for the Wakit newspaper.

7. Ismail Canbolat was Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in the Ottoman Government at the time of the Armistice. He went to Angora after the Greek landing at Smyrna, but returned to Constantinople when appointed Vali of Adrianople in succession to Hadji Adil Bey who had resigned after a very short tenure of office.

8. Another person who may be regarded as connected with the movement started above is Hilmi Nedjmi Effendi, formerly Grand Rabbi. Young Turkish party was [illegible] to have [illegible] with the Committee of Union and Progress leaders, but has never gone further than a footing of [illegible] and has now ceased to function or to go [illegible]. Angora and Unionist circles were said to be pressing [illegible] several times to be [illegible] to some measure. He is also known to covet the post of Turkish Ambassador at Washington, and it is reasonable to believe that he is looking to many [illegible] and direction by getting himself sent to the United States as a means of securing the [illegible] property.

9. Abdul Ghani Nedjati Bey, the post with more [illegible] associated with the Committee of Union and Progress leaders, has special position as [illegible] to serve any Turkish Government. His present movements are not necessarily part of Unionist plot. [illegible] [illegible] of action exists. Indeed, I am informed by [illegible] source, that the Constantinople Government were to rid themselves [illegible] by getting rid of Ahmed, and that would have [illegible] under [illegible] concession to the United States Government to lay [illegible] to receive [illegible] speak for Angora as well. They did not become strong for Angora [illegible] Mr. Ryan, while [illegible] [illegible] best of us [illegible] pressed [illegible] sentiments regarding the Turkish settlement. Frederick mentioned that while still [illegible] eye [illegible] [illegible] points. [illegible] Dr. Wesson [illegible] [illegible] introduction [illegible] methods [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] conduct on [illegible] showing that future [illegible] some [illegible] with His Majesty's Government.

10. The names of other Unionists [illegible] above are [illegible] Ahmed Riza Bey, as has been reported in my despatches to the Foreign Office, to Constantinople on private matters but [illegible] news [illegible] [illegible] more vaguely that the notorious Dr. Nazim may also return. It is believed [illegible] fact of great importance, as he was [illegible] [illegible] most important of all the Committee of Union and Progress leaders who worked in the background. Kiamil Pasha, Talat Bey, Enver Bey, Djemal Bey, Halil Bey and Jemal Pasha have all been reported to be collecting troops at Anatolia, but I have no confirmation of this. His importance has [illegible] [illegible] absolutely devoted to Enver, who is partisans are the main [illegible] opposition to Mustapha Kemal.

11. What gives [illegible] [illegible] to the [illegible] is that the old Unionists and [illegible] [illegible] with Young Turkey appear to be [illegible] their principal efforts to building up a position in Constantinople. They [illegible] profess great admiration for Mustapha Kemal, but [illegible] more than [illegible] as long as they may be supplanted [illegible] and restore the domination of the Committee of Union and Progress. I do not [illegible] any serious attempt at present as to what they are [illegible] [illegible] but [illegible] express an opinion on the theory held in some quarters that they and Enver are both

being rsily Germany for the realisation of a plot to restore German ascendancy in this country. They have, however, become a factor of considerable importance and their importance is enhanced by the fact that they have made Constantinople itself a main centre of activity. They and their organisation would have to be reckoned with seriously should there be any new development in the political situation here.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD

High Commissioner

[E 7843/5/44] No. 131

Sir H. Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received August 8.)

(No. 685.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, August 1, 1922.*

I RETURNED to Constantinople on the 31st June after my arrival at the summer Embassy at Yenikeui and found a message from the French High Commissioner asking me to call a meeting of the Allied High Commissioners, generals and admirals for that afternoon. I had previously acquainted myself with the telegrams which had been exchanged between your Lordship, the Legation at Athens and this High Commission on the subject of the Smyrna Greek advance on Constantinople. Prior to our meeting, which my colleagues and the Allied admirals and generals, I had a long meeting with General Harington and Admiral Brock.

2. At the meeting with the Allied High Commissioners the very urgent letter from General Harington to the Allied High Commissioners regarding the situation was discussed. I have the honour to enclose copy of this document. On opening the meeting, I accentuated my colleagues and the naval and military representatives with the gist of the more important telegrams which had been exchanged between this High Commission, and in particular with Mr. Bentinck's telegram No. 271 of the 29th July, your Lordship pointed out that General Harington had very wisely already taken precautions which only failed to cover the retreat of the Greeks through an advance into the neutral zone would be resisted by the Allied forces. These precautions were of a character designed to make the Greeks pass before committing themselves to an act which could only bring disaster on Greece. The assurances reported by Mr. Bentinck as having been given to him by your Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs seemed to me to be unsatisfactory, and we could only await the reply of the Allied Governments to the second Greek note. I went on to say that I could not, as far as I was concerned, endorse the demands made by General Harington under (*a*) and (*b*) without explicit instructions from His Majesty's Government.

3. It was evident to me from the outset that the French High Commissioner was exceedingly angry over the situation or else was genuinely alarmed, at the municipal outlook. General Pellé insisted that it was necessary to consider the measures which it would be necessary to take on account of the Greek forces owing perhaps to the rash act of a local commander crossing into the neutral zone in spite of the warning of the Allied naval forces. In such an event the Allied naval forces ought surely to take active measures against the Greek ships at present in these waters.

4. I pointed out that it was necessary for the meeting to consider what would be the effect of the proposals suggested as made under (*a*) and (*b*). If the Greek ships refused to obey the order to remain at anchor would they to be fired upon? Such an act would be that of war, and we had not got to that point yet. It was true that General Harington's advocacy of the proposals he had suggested only in the event of the Greek military operations continuing in Thrace. At this point I recalled the meeting to all of the arguments we had discussed in the past with the Turkish Government to get the Nationalists to accept an armistice on Asia Minor, was that an armistice would keep the Greek forces on the spot and preclude the Greeks from reinforcing their army in Thrace. I said that if the Greek army crossed the neutral zone in spite of warnings to the contrary and to the knowledge that their advance would be resisted by the Allied forces, such action would of itself be of a belligerent character. After some discussion Admiral Brock stated that, I understood from General Harington later, the Greek army had crossed the neutral zone in force and that there had been fighting with the Allied forces, he would consider himself at liberty to take action against the Greek ships.

5. The proposals under (*a*) and (*b*) were not accepted, but my Allied colleagues and I informed General Harington that the suggestion made by the Turkish Minister for

War to provide 2,000 Turkish soldiers already organised, together with 20,000 reservists to be organised and equipped for service under General Harington, could not be entertained. Before the meeting separated I expressed the opinion that it was unlikely that the Greeks would cross the neutral zone.

6. In the course the received a repetition of Mr. Bentinck's telegram No. 274 to your Lordship, which is of a reassuring character. General Pellé, who has just made me a visit, likewise states that he has received a reassuring telegram from Athens. I learn from Hadji Bey Izzet Pasha's "chef de cabinet," who paid me a visit yesterday afternoon, that General Harington's proclamation has had a calming effect on the population of Constantinople.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD

High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 131

Lieutenant-General Sir C. Harington to the Allied High Commissioners

Your Excellencies, *Constantinople, July 29, 1922.*

I HAVE to-day had a meeting with the Allied generals regarding the situation.

As you are aware I have up till now, thought and hoped that the Greek retirement was purely political and defensive, but I am bound to admit that my latest information contains the very serious view held by my colleagues, namely, that an advance by the Greeks on Constantinople may take place at very early date. I have therefore decided to take precautionary measures.

2. I visited the Chatalja lines yesterday for the purpose of making a personal reconnaissance. Unfortunately those lines consist of the main defence of Constantinople but are now in ruins, I have no means of finding barbed wire or sandbags. In 1912 those lines were defended by 80,000 men, whereas at the present time the Allies can produce a total of 4,000 rifles.

3. At the same time I never think it well that a sign of weakness should be shown, and I have decided to send to the Allied force in the shape of a cavalry screen, which I shall be supported by two Allied brigades. I do not offer serious resistance with them but I have hopes that the measures taken will stop the Greeks. Allied cavalry, I will assume, proceed to there, stop any cavalry that may advance across the neutral zone, but they will be engaged with the forces of Great Britain, France and Italy. If a serious attack is made, the Allied forces will retire as a rearguard to defend a contracted position covering Constantinople.

4. Your Excellencies will realise that the available military means at my disposal are limited, and I am very seriously attacked by my colleagues agree with me in the circumstances to ask your Excellencies to support by the strongest diplomatic representation without delay. We therefore consider it within our province to insist that a joint note should be presented to the Government at Athens on behalf of the three Allies, stating in categorical terms that the Allied Governments do not intend to tolerate any decision as regards Constantinople and that the most active preparations should be made to evacuate Thrace must be discontinued forthwith.

5. I have no doubt your Excellencies are aware that the concentration of your Excellencies' troops appear in the local press as being at the request of the Allies and that at the principle of preserving the neutrality of the zone of Allied occupation, and I understand that this communiqué has already had a good effect in cooling down anxiety and misunderstanding as far as it can be done.

At the same time my colleagues concur that I should obtain the concurrence of the Allied Governments to plunging into a free-for-all we think the following measures should the Greek military preparations continue in Thrace:

(*a*) Refusal to permit the Greek ships of war to proceed to the Straits, and to order them under the observation of the Allied navies, and refuse to allow the transfer of troops to Thrace by continuing as we are now convinced that these movements are directed against the Allies.

(*b*) Demonstration by Allied navies, either on the flanks of the Allied military forces or against Athens, or both.

(*c*) Cessation of the activities of the Greek military mission in Constantinople.

(*d*) Application of censorship as regards official communications from Greek diplomatic and military representatives in Constantinople, Athens or elsewhere.

6. In order to demonstrate beyond doubt unanimity amongst Allied representatives here to protect the western frontier of Turkey in addition to the communiqué and the precautionary measures already referred to above, I have sanctioned preparation for such demonstrations as may be necessary of the Orient Railway in order to lay its use to the Greeks. I have made it quite clear to my Allied colleagues that I am prepared to put into force immediately such of the precautions mentioned as are directly within my province.

7. An important point regarding which it seems necessary to have clear instructions from the Allied Governments is command, as the use of Turkish troops in co-operation with Allied troops, for the defence of Constantinople should the necessity arise. The Turkish Minister of War at an official meeting with the Foreign Minister, to-day undertook to provide 2,000 Turkish soldiers as cadre organisers, together with 10,000 reservists to be organised in two divisions, which he has prepared to place under my orders and says he can have ready at the week's notice. I can count on him for certain assistance regarding equipment.

In accepting such an offer it would be preferable for me to know whether there are any political objections.

8. I have the honour to inform your Excellencies that I am telegraphing to the War Office, London, asking for a decision as to policy on the points raised above, but in the meantime, I trust that I may receive your authority to take such steps as may be necessary for the military security of the Allies' forces in case of crisis.

9. In conclusion I do not ignore that a crisis exists, and I strongly urge that we may have the support and guidance of your Excellencies in adopting such further Allied measures as may be necessary to deal with it. For it is clear by absolute necessity of principle and practice that our Allied High Commissioners, and the arrangements that it is possible to cope with a situation such as that in Thrace are prepared to take full responsibility for any actions, which will be carried through in the interests of the Allies as a whole.

I have, &c.

(signed) C. L. HARINGTON *Lieutenant-General*
Commanding-in-chief Allied Forces of Occupation Turkey

No. 132

The Earl of Balfour to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)

(No. 307.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Foreign Office, August 9, 1922.*

FRENCH note just received in reply to ours of 27th July defers to our suggestions to prohibit any meeting taking place on Nationalist territory or on ship-board and expresses readiness to accept any feasible proposal, subject being to select a place to which all three interested parties can send delegates. It considers Greek or Turkish territory are unsuitable and that recent events have made neighbourhood of Constantinople impossible. It therefore suggests the Island of Rhodes or a Swiss or North Italian town.

What are your views?

Please consult with your colleagues and report urgently.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 159, and Rome, No. 217.)

[E 7965/19/44] No. 35

International Red Cross Committee to Foreign Office (Received August 14.)

Monsieur, *Geneva, August 11, 1922.*

J'AI l'honneur de vous accuser réception de votre lettre du 2 août courant. Ainsi que ses collègues M. Werner et M. Schlumpf vous l'ont dit à Londres, le Comité international de la Croix Rouge regrette de différer le départ de ses missions dans la Province d'Ararat, les régions éprouvées des régions d'Ararat et de Thrace et où le pouvoir préparer les secours humanitaires qui permettront une organisation de ces populations.

A la suite des conversations que ces délégués ont eu l'honneur d'avoir à Londres avec le Comte de Balfour et vous-même, et conformément aux demandes contenues dans votre susdite lettre, le Comité international de la Croix Rouge est prêt à donner à ses missions toute l'ampleur désirable pour leur permettre à nouveau de poursuivre leurs investigations de la façon la plus complète et la plus sûre possible.

Le Comité international de la Croix Rouge est par ailleurs disposé à communiquer aux Gouvernements alliés et associés le rapport que lui remettront ces missions sur le résultat de leurs travaux.

Le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge prend acte avec remerciements de la déclaration que vous lui faites dans votre lettre susvisée laquelle constate que des missions de l'importance de celles mentionnées auront besoin sur le Comité international entraînera pour ce dernier des charges que ses finances ne seraient pas à même de supporter. Le Comte de Balfour a sollicité des Lords Commissaires du Trésor de Sa Majesté britannique que les Gouvernements des Puissances alliées et associées de verser au budget général du Comité international de la Croix Rouge une somme lui permettant de pourvoir à supporter les frais résultant pour ces missions humanitaires, frais estimés à une somme maximale de 100,000 francs or.

Le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge attend pour lancer l'expédition de ces missions de connaître dès à présent la forme et selon les mentions que vous ont données M. Werner et M. Schlumpf de recevoir du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique et de celui de tous les Puissances alliées et associées auprès duquel il a été saisi également les assurances que les crédits sollicités par lui seront approuvés, ainsi que le versement à son Trésor de la contribution dont il s'agit incessamment à ses soins. Mais, comptant d'après les affirmations contenues dans votre lettre que notification de cette adhésion et le concours contributoire ne manqueront pas de lui parvenir sous peu, le Comité international de la Croix Rouge poursuit ses démarches auprès des Gouvernements d'Athènes et d'Angora pour obtenir le plus tôt possible les autorisations nécessaires à l'accès et à la libre circulation dans les missions en question.

A cet effet le Comité international a l'honneur d'envoyer en mission en Orient d'une délégation chargée de traiter la question des prisonniers internés de longue date. Malheureusement, ainsi que MM. Werner et Schlumpf vous l'ont signalé lors de leurs visites, le Comité international de la Croix Rouge, à la suite des indiscrétions récentes de la presse, ne trouve aucun renseignement sur le rôle et la qualité exacte des missions déjà prêtées par lui et refusées, l'empressement qu'il a mis à donner suite au désir de vouloir accorder.

Le Comité international de la Croix Rouge très sensible à l'hommage rendu par les Gouvernements des Puissances alliées et associées à son impartialité et à son autorité morale, sera très heureux d'avoir à effectuer, en accomplissant l'œuvre humanitaire qu'il a en vue, leur désir de bénéficier d'une collaboration aussi autorisée.

Veuillez agréer &c.

G. ADOR, *Président.*

No. 134

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 10.)

(No. 340. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 10, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 302.

In present situation and on political grounds I am opposed to request for removal of Turkish effectives mentioned. A demand of this nature might entail fall of entire Cabinet and, still further complicate matters at a juncture when it is essential to avoid complications. I should certainly not carry my colleagues with me nor Ismid Pasha, Chief of Turkish Ministry of War &c. It would moreover, be difficult to make such a demand without disclosing sources of information.

To a certain extent also it would mean closing the stable door after the horse has escaped. General Officer Commanding-in-Chief has drawn attention of Allied generals to these leakages and I do not think further action here is possible. Communication to Allies of thefts of war material is a case of disloyalty on their part, which however it is difficult to bring home to them.

No. 135.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople,

(No. 308.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Foreign Office, August 10, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 307 of 9th August. Near East Conference.
Remainder of French note is to following effect:

French Government are in favour of earliest possible meeting. They agree that it is a preliminary conference, distinct from that proposed at Paris, that it will be called without awaiting the conclusion of an armistice and that its object will be to receive and explain the proposals already made and to persuade the Greeks and Turks to accept them. If it succeeds it will at once turn into the conference foreseen at Paris. If it fails, the Allies will consider whether the Greek and Turkish fleets should be taken into account.

The French Government would accept any arrangement for allowing Greeks right of search, while forbidding the export of munitions to either belligerent, which would satisfy the Allied decision to hold the balance equal between the opposing parties. It also considers it necessary to enforce the rules of neutrality in the Straits.

Regarding minorities on either side French Government consider that safeguards should be made as effective as is compatible with the *amour-propre* of Greece and Turkey, but that guarantees have still to be elaborated by experts, and it would be premature to strengthen the minorities clauses in consideration of facts the existence of which has still to be established.

(Repeated to Rome No. 218 and Athens, No. 161.)

No. 136.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received August 13.)

(No. 344. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 12, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

I consider it very important that my Allied colleagues should receive instructions re the sense of paragraph 4 of your memorandum of 27th June to French Government, and that first duty should be to get Nationalists to conclude an armistice. There is otherwise risk that my French colleague at all events may take too much account of Nationalists' susceptibilities.

No. 137.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Bentinck (Athens).

(No. 165.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August 12, 1922.*

CORRECTED version of your telegram No. 287 of 3rd August has now been received, together with Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 65 to Constantinople giving summary of decisions.

From these it appears that Greek Government have proclaimed that Smyrna (or Western Asia Minor) cannot return to Turkish administration and that they are therefore about to institute another administration and to elaborate an organic statute.

You should join with your colleagues in registering a formal reservation in respect of these claims and proceedings and remind Greek Government that while they are entitled to administer as they see fit the territory of which they are in military occupation they are precluded from anticipating any regime of a permanent nature, inasmuch as the future disposition of the territory in question is dependent on the eventual treaty settlement between the Allies and Turkey.

The French and Italian Ambassadors have been informed of the substance of these instructions.

(Repeated to Constantinople No. 312 (also for Smyrna), Paris, No. 259 (by bag) and Rome, No. 222.)

No. 138.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Washington (No. 249 Telegraphic) and Rome (No. 220, Telegraphic).

(R.) *Foreign Office, August 12, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 311 of 9th August (My telegram No. 215 of 2nd August: Atrocities enquiry).

Formal reply has been received from Red Cross agreeing to despatch to Greek and Kemalist areas of Anatolia and to Thrace missions capable of conducting proper investigation and to communicate subsequent report to four Governments.

Red Cross await notification by His Majesty's Government of acceptance by four Governments of their plan outlined in my telegram No. 256 to Paris and receipt of respective contributions.

Meanwhile, Red Cross are approaching Athens and Angora.

Please inform Government to which you are accredited (to Rome only) and press for reply to my telegram No. 215.

(Repeated to Constantinople No. 311, and Athens, No. 164.)

No. 139.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 13.)

(No. 343.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, August 12, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 307.

My colleagues and I recommend that preliminary conference should meet at Venice as soon as possible. There are objections of a practical character to Rhodes, and a town in Switzerland is too far.

We are also agreed that it is very necessary that there should be no misapprehension as to character and scope of this preliminary conference. This is all the more important in view of French conception of rôle devolving on High Commissioners at conference as defined in the paragraph of French memorandum of 13th July beginning: "Ce que concerne les conditions générales de paix" and ending: "pertinent leur être présentées."

I have drawn attention of my colleagues to paragraph 4 of your memorandum of 27th July offering rôle of Allied representatives at preliminary conference. This differs in very important respects from the French view. My colleagues and I therefore hope to be furnished with precise and confidential instructions defining our duties at proposed preliminary conference.

[E 8065 5/44] No. 140.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 14.)

(No. 699.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, August 8, 1922.*

THE Sultan received me in audience on the 7th August on the occasion of my return from leave. This was my first interview with His Majesty since the 6th April, 1922, as, owing to my somewhat hurried departure from Constantinople early in July, I was unable to pay my respects to him on leaving.

2. The Sultan observed his usual practice of receiving me alone with Mr. Ryan, who acted as interpreter. I found His Majesty less nervous than usual. Otherwise he displayed his usual characteristics: great tenacity in enforcing his main points by frequent reiteration and a tendency to cut short the translation of my own observations by interpolating irrelevant remarks before what I said had been fully repeated to him.

3. The audience lasted nearly an hour and a half. I experience my customary difficulty in reproducing what passed in exact sequence owing to the idiosyncrasies just mentioned, but the following account of the conversation is correct in all essential particulars.

4. After an exchange of preliminary compliments, I told the Sultan that when I had the honour of being received by the King during my visit to London His Majesty

to [illegible] and had charged me with messages for him. The Sultan received this information with the most spontaneous gratification. He took care to assure the King that I had shown him a similar attention. He expressed [illegible] when delivering or receiving a message from a royal personage and expressed standing his thanks for the King's kind interest in him.

After referring to his first interview, the Sultan discussed the subject of the Kings relatives in Greek and English. He recalled an occasion twenty five years ago which he said the late King David had shown him a similar attention. He expressed [illegible] that the King and Royal Family were in good health. He went on to say that the [illegible] which had existed between his House and the Royal family of Great Britain during Queen Victoria's time were well known. On the occasion [illegible] which had for centuries been a question of bargaining the [illegible] assert this country. Austrian and German intrigue had been at work [illegible] to estrange Abdul Hamid from the existing system whereby the Entente Powers [illegible] the House of Osman. There was at the time a [illegible] carrying out Austrian advice to a Turkish prince. A similar [illegible] during the last few years had been mooted still earlier, some forty five years ago, when Mr. Odo Russell [illegible] any such proposal was damaging [illegible] the interests of not only the House of Osman but also to their prestige should the existing system [illegible] a potential heir to the throne. He pointed out the [illegible] to Austrian and German influence. On the second occasion, during the reign of Abdul Aziz, the question of the Order of succession had been discussed between King Edward and [illegible] in that connection that he had conveyed [illegible] to Abdul Aziz. [illegible] to Buckingham Palace. He felt that the Sultan's present position and the [illegible] to British opinion in regard to this question [illegible] the Sultan. He proceeded to convey his warmest thanks to the King for the [illegible] with His Majesty had been good enough to show him. He asked [illegible] to convey to the King [illegible] the new way of the shape in which he put [illegible] from the [illegible] that I proceeded to the [illegible] to which I had referred [illegible] to Buckingham Palace.

On [illegible] the Turks [illegible] that the Sultan had [illegible] the possession of [illegible] letter to the King. I hoped that this would [illegible] for the present. I suggested that as the King's emissaries had been received the Sultan should [illegible] himself with [illegible] passage through the [illegible]. His Majesty [illegible] began, impressed on me his desire that the message of thanks should be [illegible] in such a manner as to do full justice to his feelings of gratitude. I promised [illegible] what has already passed in this respect. As for his own sentiments of past [illegible] story, was still [illegible] that not the [illegible] of which he spoke and I felt [illegible] as reference to King Edward [illegible] there must be some mistake in the [illegible]. I [illegible] to the [illegible] interest in what the Sultan had told me.

7. The Sultan then asked me to point out [illegible] what I thought the gist of the proposals of the Allies [illegible] to me was to the effect [illegible] that His Majesty's Government [illegible] to make a great effort to bring about peace and that if the offer [illegible] hitherto had proved unsuccessful the fault did not lie with us but must be sought [illegible] were at Angora. The Sultan agreed with [illegible] and alluded in [illegible] to the passive attitude of the Nationalist leaders. They were [illegible] and had not taken [illegible] but a collection of rebels and [illegible] countries. They were [illegible] to the [illegible] of Unity and Progress who [illegible] various names, of which Nationalist was the last, had sought for selfish ends to dominate this country. They exploited [illegible] good faith and patriotism of an innocent people. In policy and [illegible] they were willing to [illegible] but Bolsheviks.

8. I observed that unfortunately Angora was a factor to be reckoned with in arriving at a settlement and I asked him what his views were as to the means of [illegible] Allies. I had stressed [illegible] to the difficulty put in the way of a settlement with the rebels at Angora [illegible] to the proposition [illegible] to which I was not [illegible] March. The Sultan replied with [illegible] and which I observed [illegible] interrupted [illegible] to which he replied [illegible] the same things [illegible] to me that it will be [illegible] if [illegible] from the Nationalists [illegible] meeting with [illegible] drawn [illegible] proposals.

9. [illegible] Government [illegible] to [illegible] remedy [illegible] and [illegible] to the [illegible] interpretation of [illegible]. He said [illegible] Nationalists [illegible] to the Allies were [illegible] were [illegible] to [illegible] not win [illegible] but in the wrong direction, they could be [illegible] charged. [illegible] Government were that the peace should [illegible] assure Turkey of her [illegible] independence and [illegible] standing in the Moslem world. The retreat of the [illegible] two

proposal to which I had referred was entirely natural. Those responsible for it were men [illegible] so benefited by the present state of affairs. Not every one at Angora however was opposed to peace. There were among the Nationalists people who really desired it as well as people whose only interest lay in a prolongation of war for their own selfish ends. Enver. There was now dissatisfaction at Angora. The Allies should take a strong line. The strength of the Nationalists was exaggerated. Such as it was it rested on the fact that the Greeks remained in occupation of Turkish territory. Until that [illegible] Government was deprived of the means of asserting its rights. The Sultan said that the Greeks should leave [illegible] the evacuated territory should be handed over gradually to the lawful Government, and the lawful Government should be Allied support in reasserting itself. The situation was one of growing [illegible] the present moment. Three [illegible] the grave danger of allowing it to [illegible]. His Majesty spoke in the warmest terms of the manner in which that [illegible] had been dealt with and expressed the highest appreciation of the kindness shown to General Harington. He nevertheless deplored strongly the [illegible] situation which, if it went on, must be caused by the report [illegible] of similar dangerous occurrences. If the [illegible] were taken by the Allies [illegible] the Sultan made it very clear that by the Allies he meant Great Britain the National [illegible] and [illegible] undermined by internal dissension [illegible] was disintegrate. Let the Allies get their proposals to Angora as well as to the Central Government. He recognised that this must be done through the Central Government itself [illegible] to have no truck with the rebels. If, however, after [illegible] had been made the Kemalists persisted in their resistant attitude, peace should be made with Constantinople and the occupied territories should be evacuated by the Greeks and handed over to the Central Government [illegible] and the latter should be supported in its efforts to suppress the rebels.

10. On [illegible] asking the Sultan in the course of this exposition of the situation what [illegible] to the Armistice, His Majesty spoke not only of the delivery of [illegible] but of the Government [illegible] of facilities for fitting out armed forces [illegible] assistance [illegible] to the Bolshevik danger. Turkish arms and finance [illegible] assist [illegible] to the danger against Soviet Russia. He referred more vaguely to the possibility [illegible] effect but he emphasised the fact that once the Greeks disappeared from the scene the Kemalists would have lost their main prop and little would be needed in the way of [illegible] to make an end of them.

11. My Italian colleague [illegible] appreciate the Sultan's point of view and that two things must be borne in mind firstly that the Paris proposals still held the field, and that there had been a question of modifying them in any essential particular, and secondly that the first point of view of the Allies had to be considered as [illegible] that of Great Britain. His Majesty then [illegible] the latter point with [illegible] and [illegible] attention. He said that Great Britain had ever [illegible] her [illegible] and [illegible] interests, was her position [illegible] more important than our Allies and that if that [illegible] were [illegible] his argument would be doubtful to the general. As for the Paris proposals he said they had not [illegible] were and hardly came into the question. He then [illegible] out to the Sultan that he expected the Allies led by Great Britain to [illegible] to Angora and to evolve new proposals which would ensure Turkey's [illegible] and [illegible] claims [illegible] to the Greeks. I [illegible] my colleague's point of view [illegible] and [illegible] that he hoped for better terms in regard to [illegible] than had been [illegible] at Paris but we could not get from detailed discussion of [illegible] to the Sultan's view acceptable peace terms. Towards the end of the conversation he said, partly that he was always ready to receive any communication which I might wish to make to him not merely through the official channels of the Porte but in a direct and private manner.

12. The Sultan [illegible] to the [illegible] body of his remarks a curious reference to Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt. He said that the situation to-day was exactly parallel to the situation at the time of Mehmed Ali's revolt. The only difference was that [illegible] the then Sultan was struggling against him and at whereas the opposition now to the Nationalists consisted of [illegible] England had then called [illegible] and [illegible] to the conflict. If she were to call a halt now the same result would be [illegible]. I returned to the suggestion that the crises were analogous and said that [illegible] Mehmed Ali was [illegible] whereas the Kemalists were [illegible]. His Sultan insisted that all the two situations were not absolutely identical [illegible] was struck. As [illegible] Mehmed Ali was, if anything, less [illegible] than the Kemalists. He had the desert behind him, and he commanded his Arabs with a whip. The Kemalists were holding the people of Turkey in duress. We did not pursue further this somewhat influctuous discussion.

13. In the course of his onslaught on the Nationalists, the Sultan more than once referred to their hostility to his own person. They had, he said, indulged in every kind of propaganda and calumny against him. They represented him as an ally of the Greeks and a servant of Great Britain. Their vindictiveness was due to personal spite because they had asked him to recognise, as Caliph, the legitimacy of the Grand National Assembly. He had steadfastly refused. His unity as Caliph was not to accept at the expense of such a proposal. Honour would not admit of any compromise between him and the rebel leaders. In developing the thesis that the Angora movement was doomed to certain disintegration once the Greeks were eliminated, His Majesty said that there were three things which kept the movement alive, namely *amour propre*, patriotism and self interest. The first two factors would disappear, hand in hand with the disappearance of the Greeks. Only the third, the self interest of those who looked for personal advantage from the present situation, would remain, and the isolation of this sector would render the task of the Central Government easy.

14. I proceeded to report that the Sultan had said. Before dismissing me he summed up some of his main points. In this summary he added nothing new except the phrase that the shortest cut was a straight line. He mentioned his nephew Prince Sami Bey, who had been attempting to play a political rôle and intimated tactfully that while he had a great affection for the Prince he was insufficiently equipped with political experience and was not a person to whom he could open his whole mind. He thanked me however for some small assistance which I had given the Prince in the matter of the publication in Turkish of a manual for the use of Boy Scouts, in which the Prince is interested. His Majesty wound up with a strong appeal in the name of humanity that the present situation would be brought to an end and that a term should be put to the sufferings of his innocent people. Finally, just as I was leaving, he once more expressed his thanks for the personal interest which the King had manifested.

15. I have, &c., to add very little to comment on my report. It bears out the very unfavourable appreciation of the Sultan's position in paragraph 5 of my telegram No. 330 of the 5th August which was drafted before the interview took place. The Sultan's insistence on the possibility of peace being concluded with the Allies by the Central Government independently of Angora is of more interest as it accords with the language used to Izzet Pasha to Mr. Henderson during my absence. It is undoubtedly disappointing to feel that the Sultan still makes so light of the Paris proposals, and shows such little appreciation of the realities of the situation in Thrace. I fear there is little to be gained by further negotiations with his Government to the exclusion of Angora, however much we should deplore the lack of patriotism displayed by Adrianople in the traditional sovereignty of Gallipoli. It is possible, however, that in every other way he would do all he could to satisfy the Allies if only he could be assured of support afterwards in restoring his authority in Asia Minor. He regards it as essential to this purpose that the Greeks should be got rid of, but he considers it no less essential that the evacuation should be arranged in such a way as to enable the Central Government to take delivery of the evacuated territory. He underrates the difficulty of securing this with a Kemalist army all along the frontier of the territory to be evacuated in Asia Minor. He however builds greatly on the signs of dissension at Angora, and it is by no means impossible that he is already in some sort of touch with the opposition to Mustapha Kemal, even perhaps with the Enverist element in that opposition.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

No. 141

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received August 15*)

(No. 348)
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople, August 14, 1922.*

MY telegrams Nos. 343 and 344.

French High Commissioner to whom I communicated memorandum of His Majesty's Government of 27th July to French Government expressed surprise at statement that Nationalists had expressed to Colonel Morgan their readiness to agree to cessation of an armistice. He said all Colonel Morgan's telegrams

passed through his hands, and that he had not seen any report from that officer to above-mentioned effect. I replied that French Prime Minister had made the statement in question to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris. The French High Commissioner said that there must be some misunderstanding, but I did not admit this possibility.

On reflection I think it most improbable, if preliminary conference comes off that we shall be able to induce Nationalists to conclude an armistice before they have received explanations with regard to Paris proposals. If we insist as our first duty on conclusion of an armistice we risk imperilling from the start the success of the preliminary conference. It would therefore be advisable to give High Commissioners some latitude in this respect.

Although their own position is most unsatisfactory, Nationalists may elect to delay a reply to invitation to a preliminary conference even at Venice in knowledge that Greeks are nearing the end of their resources. In other words they may choose to wait on events. The Nationalists have concentrated considerable forces near Ismid and they may wish before entering a conference to be in a position to threaten Constantinople to the same extent from their side as the Greeks can from Thrace.

[E 7965/19/44] No. 142

Foreign Office to International Red Cross Committee, Geneva.

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 15, 1922.

I AM directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to express to you the thanks of His Majesty's Government for your letter of the 8th instant stating that agents of the International Committee of the Red Cross will investigate the situation of the minorities in Anatolia and Thrace. The Secretary of State notes with satisfaction the assurances which the Committee offers in respect of the conduct of its missions and the eventual communication of their report. As soon as His Majesty's Government are in a position to contribute their share of the expenses and to report the agreement of the United States, France and Italian Governments, a further letter will be addressed to you. Meantime the Secretary of State observes that the communications itself is proceeding the Governments of Athens and Angora.

I am, &c.
LANCELOT OLIPHANT

E 8173/5/44] No. 143

Memorandum handed by the Italian Ambassador to Sir Graham Patrick, August 15, 1922.

(Translation.)

HIS Majesty's Government have considered both the memorandum addressed to M. Poincaré by Lord Balfour on the 27th July and the recent reply that the French President of the Council forwarded to London.

Having examined with the greatest attention the considerations and proposals contained in the two documents the Italian Government have been sincerely gratified to find that the points of view of the French and British Governments approximate as substantially to such a degree that it does not seem as easy to arrive to-day at an early moment an agreement that will allow a fresh and decisive step to be taken towards the re-establishment of peace in the East.

The Italian Government, being firmly convinced that in the common interest of the Allies as well as in the interests of general peace it is necessary to make every effort to bring to an end the Greco-Turkish conflict, and to re-establish normal conditions in the East, desires to express its own views on the matter. The recent events that have occurred in Greece show that the Greek Government is animated by a lively desire to conclude peace to such a point that to attain this object they appear even prepared to take action which, like the proposed occupation of Constantinople, can only meet with the disapproval of the Allies and come to further the situation. On the other hand, the efforts that reach the Italian Government, however difficult it may be to verify them, would also indicate that the

Turks are beginning to consider with increasing impatience the necessity of terminating the war. From this it appears that it is not only necessary in order to avoid further complications but even in the common interest to take advantage of the present moment—which seems to offer itself most favourable—to assemble without further delay the conference to which should be invited of course by joint invitation of the three Allied Governments delegates of the Governments of Athens Angora and Constantinople.

In order to ensure that the latter Governments agree to send their representatives without further hesitation or objection, it is, however, essential to avoid any further insertion of questions which are in reality more of form than of substance and to facilitate in every way possible the meeting of the conference.

The proposals contained in M. Poincaré's note do not appear to conduct with the views of the British Government, and accordingly must present themselves as both because they would allow the immediate meeting of the delegates and also because the preliminary character of the conference, and in any way compromising the value of the Inter-Allied decisions of Paris would afford no easy means of ascertaining the real intentions of the belligerents and the real extent of their objections to those decisions so as to be able with any chance of success to make such modifications as the needs of the moment might show to be indispensable in order to attain peace. And since the Allied representatives at the conference could in no sense give pledges, but only confine themselves to referring to their own Governments there would be no danger of compromising the ultimate action of the latter.

As to the venue of the conference the Italian Government while declaring themselves ready to accept whatever locality may suit the British and French Governments, would see no objection by the Greeks and Turks cannot but observe that in the interests of an early meeting of the conference it is desirable to take into serious account the objections raised by the belligerents who are after all the most interested parties, in the assembling of which they should not be indifferent.

The Italian Government, being animated as they have always declared, by the most sincere and lively desire to re-establish peace in the East are interesting themselves in part to co-operate to this end with the utmost zeal and are prepared to assemble the conference in Italian city if this would facilitate the participation of all concerned or even in the island of Rhodes, subject, however, in this case to the possibility of providing accommodation for the delegates in which point information is awaited from the local authorities.

As to the right of search, the Italian Government desire to state that they would have no objection, rather would be glad, to adhere to any decision that might be taken by common agreement between the Allies as also with regard to the restriction of furnishing arms to the belligerents. They however insert that absolute guarantees of prohibition to export war material, to be examined by a neutral control of the latter would perhaps be the best means of guaranteeing the complete neutrality of the Allies in the Greco-Turkish conflict, but they are ready to examine any other solution that may eventually be submitted to them on the sole condition that the measures to be taken be decided by unanimous consent of the Allies, being above all essential to avoid differences between the attitudes of the three Governments on this question.

Finally the Italian Government also consider that the measures for the protection of the minorities in Thrace and Asia Minor must be such as to assure full security of life and property to these local populations. It will however, be necessary to consider this matter anew, and to strengthen the clauses agreed upon at Paris by the Inter-Allied commissions of enquiry consider more effective guarantees for the future to be necessary.

For the moment, however the Allied representatives at the impending preliminary conference might restrict themselves to informing the Greek and Turkish delegates that the conditions settled at Paris regarding the protection of minorities are subject to the results of the enquiries to be carried out on the spot. While reserving any final decision on this point, it might on the other hand be added, in order not to increase suspicions and distrust on the part of the Governments concerned, that in any case the adjustment of the Paris decisions will not be such as to affect in the least the principles or impinge upon the exercise of their sovereign powers.

Italian Embassy, London,
August 14, 1922.

E 8163 5 44

No. 144

Mr. Bentinck to the Earl of Balfour (*Received August 17*)

(No. 100)

My Lord, *Athens, August 7, 1922.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 288 of to-day, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a third note from the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, stating that the decision of the Powers against the occupation of Constantinople by the Greeks is an obstacle to decisive action on the part of the Greeks for the conclusion of peace. The note draws the serious attention of the Powers to the delay which will result in fresh calamities for the Christian and perpetuate the intolerable state of affairs in the Near East.

An identic note was also handed to my French and Italian colleagues. It is in reply to the memorandum which we handed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 31st ultimo, as reported in my telegram No. 280 of that date, a copy of which is likewise enclosed.

For convenience of reference I have also the honour to transmit copy of a memorandum which I handed to M. Baltazzi on the 2nd instant, before my colleagues had received their instructions as reported in my telegram No. 278 of the 2nd inst.

I am forwarding copy of this despatch and of its enclosures to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
C. H. BENTINCK.

Enclosure 1 in No. 144

M. Baltazzi to M. Bentinck

LA réponse à la note verbale que vous avez bien voulu me remettre le 3 août 1922 que M. le Chargé d'Affaires de la République Française, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Grande Bretagne et moi-même avons reçue par pli du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique concernant l'occupation de Constantinople par les Grecs, porte atteinte décisive contre la question de la paix, à la prompte solution de cette paix.

Les hostilités passées par les Turcs à la suite de leur résistance obstinée contre le but essentiel que le Gouvernement hellénique se proposait dans sa résolution d'exercer un droit légitime et sacré de légitime défense, et qui n'a aspiré par d'autres hautes visées que celle d'une pacification définitive et durable, ont été suspendues par l'effet magique de la force morale contre laquelle aucune résistance n'est plus possible.

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la République croit devoir attirer à nouveau votre attention et celle des Puissances Alliées sur le fait que toute retard apporté à rétablissement de la paix équivaut à de nouvelles calamités pour les chrétiens, perpétue l'état intolérable dans lequel se trouve depuis longtemps déjà le Proche Orient, et augmente les responsabilités de tous les facteurs de la paix.

Athènes, le 7 août 1922.

Enclosure 2 in No. 144

Mr. Bentinck to M. Baltazzi

Memorandum respecting Occupation of Constantinople

ON receipt of a note from the Royal Hellenic Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 27th instant, addressed to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires duly telegraphed the substance to Lord Balfour, informing his Lordship of the personal warning which he had considered it his duty to convey to M. Baltazzi at that occasion.

His Lordship has telegraphed to say that he is not clear as to the meaning of the sentence in the note from M. Baltazzi in which his Excellency refers to the most efficacious means of putting an end to the conflict. His Lordship is loth to connect this in any way with a threat to Constantinople, but, in view of the Greek arguments

of the best way of ending the war by the occupation of Constantinople. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires was directed to point out to his Excellency the Royal Hellenic Minister for Foreign Affairs that a Greek advance on Constantinople would be resisted by the Allied forces of occupation and might entail the most serious consequences for Greece.

Lord Balfour can scarcely believe that the Greek Government can do anything so insane as to attack territory in Allied occupation. The tone of the reports however, which have reached his Lordship is such that His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires is instructed to take whatever further steps he may think appropriate in order to prevent a calamity.

Mr. Bentinck is directed, to add that His Majesty's Government hope to be in a position shortly to invite the Royal Hellenic Government to send delegates to a meeting at Boros or elsewhere with representatives of the Allies and delegates of the Constantinople and Angora Governments. In the present circumstances, therefore, any precipitate action by the Greek Government is highly undesirable.

Athens, July 29, 1922.

Enclosure 3 in No. 144.

Mr Bentinck to M. Baltazzi.

Memorandum respecting Occupation of Constantinople.

His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires has the honour under the direction to instruct this from His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to refer to the request made by the Greek Government to the Allied Governments to order their troops to make way for the Greek Army to proceed to Constantinople and he is to state that the Allied Governments must refuse to take such measures.

Mr. Bentinck is to add that orders have been given to the Inter-Allied Military Command to repel by force every military movement directed against the zone occupied by the Allied troops.

Athens, July 31, 1922.

[E 7759/5/44] No. 111.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 2608.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 18, 1922.

WITH reference to Sir Maurice Hankey's despatch No. 1821 of 4th August transmitting a memorandum from M. Poincaré on the subject of the Near East I request that your Excellency will communicate to the French Government in reply the memorandum and accompanying documents enclosed herein.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 115.

Memorandum for communication to M. Poincaré.

His Majesty's Government have been gratified to receive M. Poincaré's memorandum of the 3rd August and to learn from it that the two Governments are in substantial agreement regarding the proposed preliminary conference on the Near East. They now submit for the approval of the French Government, certain concrete proposals the acceptance of which will they are confident ensure an early assembly of the conference.

2. They suggest that the meeting should take place at Venice. The three Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople are in agreement that this would be the most suitable place and His Majesty's Government have just received a communication from the Italian Government suggesting an Italian town. They propose to reply

to the Italian Government by expressing their appreciation of this offer and by endorsing the recommendation of the High Commissioners in favour of Venice. They trust that this will suit the convenience of the French Government as well as of the Italian Government.

3. As soon as agreement is reached on this point it will only remain to invite the Governments of Athens, Constantinople and Angora to despatch delegates. His Majesty's Government accordingly submit for the concurrence of the French Government a draft identic invitation on the part of the three Allied Governments to be handed by the High Commissioners at Constantinople to the Porte and to Hamid Bey, the unofficial representative of the Angora Government, and by the Allied representatives at Athens to the Greek Government.

4. They further submit for the endorsement of the French Government, draft identic instructions to be despatched by the three Allied Governments to their High Commissioners at Constantinople for their guidance in conducting the conference. It is evidently essential that the latter should be in possession of similar and unequivocal instructions.

5. Both these drafts are also being submitted to the Italian Government for concurrence, and His Majesty's Government earnestly hope that the two Allied Governments will see their way to notify their agreement at an early date and to communicate both the short instructions and the joint invitation to their representatives at Constantinople and Athens for the necessary action.

6. As regards the question of the right of search and the embargo on the export of arms, His Majesty's Government propose to deal with this question in a further and separate communication in order that the meeting of the preliminary conference may not be delayed by any further correspondence. Moreover the results of the conference may affect the decision of the Allied Governments on this question.

7. His Majesty's Government concur in the view of the French Government that the minorities resolution of the Paris Conference of March leaves sufficient latitude to the Allied Governments to interpret it in accordance with the necessities of the situation as they may be revealed by the eventual reports of the commissions of enquiry.

8. Finally His Majesty's Government desire to notify the French Government that they regard the Allied offer to advance the date of the evacuation of Asia Minor by the Greek forces to have lapsed and that they are not prepared to recognise it at the forthcoming conference.

Foreign Office, August 18, 1922.

Enclosure 2 in No. 115.

Draft Instructions to Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople.

FOLLOWING instructions, which are also being communicated to your Allied colleagues by their Governments, are for your guidance in the meeting with the delegates of the Governments of Athens, Constantinople and Angora, which is to take place at Venice.

The present meeting is an informal and preliminary one, its object being to afford explanations regarding the Paris proposals, as distinct from the conference contemplated as the third step in the Paris offer, the purpose of which was after the conclusion of an armistice and the acceptance in principle of the Paris peace conditions, to discuss the detailed application of these conditions with the delegates of the three Governments with a view to reducing them to treaty form.

Consequently the rôle of the Allied High Commissioners or representatives at the preliminary meeting will be limited to reiterating and expounding the Allied offer comprised in the threefold programme elaborated at Paris and endeavouring to persuade the Greek and Turkish delegates to accept this programme.

The first step will therefore be to urge on both belligerents the conclusion of an armistice in Asia Minor and a corresponding immobilisation of the Greek forces in Eastern Thrace.

The second step which may be taken contemporaneously with the first, will be to recommend and explain to both Greeks and Turks the peace conditions drawn up at Paris as incorporated in the agreed text of the resolutions.

In the event of the conclusion of an armistice and the acceptance in principle of the totality of these conditions (subject only to modification of detail in the

subsequent process of elaboration into treaty form) the preliminary meeting its objects having thus been attained would be transformed then and there (should this suit the convenience of the Allied and other delegates) into the conference contemplated as the fourth stage of the Paris programme for the discussion in detail of the peace conditions and for the elaboration of a preliminary draft of the final settlement.

But failing the conclusion of an armistice and the acceptance in principle of the peace conditions there would remain no basis for discussion or negotiation between the Allied representatives and the Greek and Turkish delegates at the most the former could take note for reference to their Governments of any representations on the part of the latter. In such case the present abortive conference would come to an end since the offer proceeding from the Paris Conference would have been definitely rejected and would therefore automatically lapse.

It is desirable that you and your colleagues should, at the outset of the preliminary conference, clearly explain the programme and procedure outlined above to the delegates of Athens, Constantinople and Angora.

Enclosure in No. 144.

Draft Invitation to the Governments of Athens, Constantinople and Angora.

THE Allied Governments invite the Government of Athens, Constantinople, Angora to send a delegate to an informal and preliminary conference with their High Commissioners or representatives which will meet at (*) Venice on

Its object will be to reiterate and expound the Allied offer comprised in the three-fold programme elaborated at the Paris Conference of March last and to urge its acceptance by the Governments of Athens, Constantinople and Angora, to whom it has already been communicated.

The Paris proposals contemplated

(1) Conclusion of an armistice by the belligerents,

(2) Acceptance in principle of the terms of the peace conditions subject only to modifications of detail in the subsequent process of elaboration into preliminary treaty form, and

(3) After the conclusion of an armistice and the acceptance in principle of the peace conditions by the three Governments, a conference for the discussion in detail of these conditions and for the elaboration of a preliminary draft of the final settlement.

If the three Governments accept parts (1) and (2) of the Paris programme as outlined above the preliminary conference would be transformed into the conference contemplated in part (3). Otherwise there would remain no basis for discussion or negotiation between the Allied High Commissioners or representatives and the delegates of Athens, Constantinople and Angora although the former could take note for reference to their Governments, of any representations on the part of the latter. In such case the preliminary conference would come to an end since the offer proceeding from the Paris Conference would have been definitely rejected and would automatically lapse.

It is hoped that after this clear explanation of the purpose and basis of the preliminary conference the Government of Athens/Constantinople, Angora will despatch a delegate furnished with the necessary instructions and with full powers.

No. 146.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 350.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August 18, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 294.

M. Schlemmer the International Red Cross delegate, has arrived here. He has requested Angora Government to consent to despatch of a Red Cross mission to Anatolia and has asked for a reply by 21st August. If no reply is received by that date he intends to go to Angora himself to fetch one. He hopes to start commissions

in early days of next month as he realises that there is no time to be lost in view of lateness of season.

He is addressing me letter asking for communication of all reports we have received of deportations, &c. in Anatolia, Thrace and in regions occupied by Greeks in Asia Minor. I will supply these. Although International Red Cross have asked permission of Greek Government to send a commission to Thrace, they have not yet received a reply and M. Schlemmer suggests that it might be possible for His Majesty's representative at Athens to back request unofficially in order to save time. Red Cross delegate hopes that Governments concerned will put up necessary money without loss of time.

E 7759/5/44] No. 147.

Memorandum communicated to the Italian Ambassador.

HIS Majesty's Government welcome the Italian Government's memorandum of the 15th August, and are gratified to find that their own views and those of the Italian Government coincide as to the desirability of bringing about an early meeting of the proposed preliminary conference. They have accordingly borrowed, for the information of the Italian Government, a copy of a memorandum* that has been addressed to M. Poincaré in reply to his of the 3rd August.

His Majesty's Government sincerely appreciate the suggestion of the Italian Government that the meeting might take place in an Italian town, the more so as they are informed that the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople are agreed in considering that Venice would be the most suitable spot for the conference. They themselves entirely concur in this suggestion, and have so informed the French Government.

If the latter concur, and if this selection meets with the approval of the Italian Government, it will only remain to issue the necessary invitations to the Governments of Athens, Constantinople and Angora to send their delegates. For this purpose His Majesty's Government submit, for the approval of the Italian Government, the draft of a joint invitation to be handed by the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople to the Porte and to Hamid Bey the enclosed representative of the Angora Government, and by the Allied representatives at Athens to the Greek Government.†

In view of the desirability of the Allied High Commissioners being in possession of similar and necessary instructions for their guidance in conducting the conference, His Majesty's Government have prepared draft identic instructions for communication by the three Allied Governments to their representatives at Constantinople. A copy of the draft is transmitted herewith for the consideration of the Italian Government.‡

It is hoped that the latter will see their way to concur in both drafts, and to communicate them to their representatives at Constantinople and Athens for the necessary action.

His Majesty's Government have informed the French Government that with a view to avoiding further discussion at the meeting of the conference they propose to address a separate communication the question of the right of search and of an embargo on the export of arms. Moreover, it is possible that the Allied decision on this matter may be affected by the results of the conference.

As regards the memorandum, His Majesty's Government do not consider that any special communication to the delegates of Athens, Constantinople and Angora is necessary, since the Paris resolution leaves sufficient latitude to the Allied Governments to interpret it in accordance with the necessities of the situation as they may be revealed by the eventual report of the commissions of enquiry.

Finally, His Majesty's Government desire to notify the Italian Government that they regard the offer to advance the date of the Greek evacuation of Asia Minor as having lapsed, and they are not prepared to reconsider it.

Foreign Office, August 19, 1922.

---

* No. 145.

† Enclosure 1 in No. 146.

‡ Enclosure 2 in No. 146.

[E 8293 5 44] No. 148.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received August 21*)

(No. 712) Confidential.

My Lord, *Constantinople, August 12, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a memorandum by M. Sterghiades on the situation in Greece. M. de Blinski, who is manager of the National Bank of Turkey, has just returned from a visit to Athens, which he knows well. He has communicated a copy of his memorandum both to His Majesty's Charge d'Affaires at Athens, through whom it will also no doubt reach your Lordship, but the memorandum is so interesting, and I place so much reliance in the judgment of M. de Blinski, whom I know well, that I venture to forward it to your Lordship on my own account.

2. The impression left on my mind after the perusal of the memorandum is that the Greek Government is rapidly nearing the end of its resources. Only a few weeks separate us from the commencement of the winter in Anatolia. When I was recently in London I gathered that some parts at least of the Cabinet considered that the Greeks would be able to hold on for another winter in their present positions in Asia Minor. I think that this is probably also the effect of the Greek telegrams from time to time to the press, but I feel that they do not take into account the fact that they would be obliged to retire to a shorter line. When these statements are put forward or interpreted at home as an attempt to frighten the Allies, and more especially Great Britain, into the belief that the Greek Government has now really nearly come to the end of its tether, it seems to me important that the preliminary conference should not at the outset possess a handicap.

I have &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 148.

Memorandum on the Situation in Greece.

(Private and Confidential.) POLITICAL.

THE present Cabinet has been steadily losing favour with the public, and especially with the financial and commercial community, whose activities and means of making money have been curtailed, and who fear that the country is going down to ruin.

The public at large, and in particular the people element is utterly disappointed at the non-fulfilment of the wonderful promises of profit and glory which were made to them.

The King himself is said to be very much put out with both his dynastic and political adherents, Mr. Gounaris, Mr. Baltatzis, and others, for having too openly, and in the uncertainty of his own position, made the event of his Cabinet coming to an agreement with the Allies and to the hopes of the Venizelists. All the influence he can command, however, through M. Streit, who is the power behind the Throne, and is said to be most anti-Venizelist, is strongly in favour of a compromise with Venizelists, and with a view to form a solid united Greece which could thus reassume its ambitions, and, having once secured them, return to its national pastime of internal party strife.

There is a very large section of the country who would like to see Sterghiades and Streit at the head of affairs, but such a combination is unlikely, as Sterghiades is of the same type of man as Venizelos. Patriot though he is, he is too self-centred and provincial a statesman to work with a cosmopolitan and despotic, and it is feared that, like Venizelos, he would surround himself with more men for fear of being supplanted otherwise. Moreover, in the case of the present Cabinet or other leading politicians would work together, as each one, though probably a competent judge of what is good for Greece, is only thinking of his own interests and claims to others. On the other hand, Streit, who is both by temperament and by his career to be the power behind the throne with the hereditary instincts and traditions, even under the Revolutionary regime, is somewhat out of touch with the large section of the country which, at present, has been stirred into enthusiasm by the call to arms, and which, in spite of the mystery and the lack of confidence in Chamberlain, believes that

the public with vague promises of great things in store. They have undoubtedly been using every diplomatic device to obtain a favourable decision from the Allies, but, realising the impatience of the public and feeling the necessity of bringing matters to a head, the advance on Constantinople was devised. Stratos, the Minister of the Interior and the stormy petrel of the Cabinet, is credited with having fathered the scheme.

Nominally great secrecy surrounded the project, but in point of fact it was a *secret de polichinelle*. Movements of troops to Thrace were openly made, and large quantities of benzine were ordered to be sent to Dedeagatch. The press of all shades of opinion urged the advance on Constantinople, and, curiously enough, Reuter's agent, who is reputed to be one of Venizelos's principal agents, was assiduously spreading as a very confidential piece of news, the rumour that the troops were to march on Constantinople and that there would be no opposition, at any rate on the part of the British Government. It seemed to add colour to this latter rumour, which had gained currency, that the British Government, or a leading British statesman, had directly or indirectly let it be understood that the British Government would accept a *fait accompli*. Whether this rumour emanated from the Venizelists or not, the fact remains that it was not discountenanced by the Cabinet, and a febrile eagerness was evinced by all Greeks to appear overjoying English men to impress themselves, and everyone so with the earnestness of their conviction that Great Britain would openly declare herself on the side of Greece.

Thus so far as the general public is concerned, others who are, we hear to-day, present credit the Greek Government with cooked-up schemes to persuade or, failing this, to trick Great Britain into coming with Greece.

This Constantinople adventure was taken to mean:—

1. If the British Government did not oppose the advance on Constantinople, the French and Italians would not oppose it by force of arms. The Greeks would march in and be joined by the Greek population in Constantinople (said to be 400,000), of whom the majority of male adults are alleged to be armed, and the French and Italians would then bow to the *fait accompli*.

2. If by assistance M. Poincaré gained the day, and persuaded the British Government to oppose the advance, then the major portion of the British troops would have to be withdrawn from it. As against all of the Bosphorus thus leaving the door wide open for Kemal to advance on Constantinople, in which case the few British troops in the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus would be attacked, and the British Government would be forced into the position of facing the Greeks on the Chatalja lines and yet having to allow the Greeks to help prevent the Kemalists from crossing the Bosphorus—a *reductio ad absurdum*.

3. If either of these solutions failed, then Greece would inform the Powers that, notwithstanding the fact that she had been driven to accept the mandate in Smyrna, she had never ceased to be encouraged and helped to fight the Kemalists, and, as a last resource, that the fact that she would have to abandon to their fate tens of thousands of unarmed Greeks, she would be obliged to withdraw from her present position in Asia Minor. She would say that evacuation would have to commence some time in August, as otherwise she would have to remain another winter in Asia Minor, when her finances would not allow her to do so. Even by commencing evacuation in August, she would probably have to abandon part of her equipment. She would imply that, as retorsion, she would be obliged to destroy the railways she now holds and would throw all the responsibility for the devastation and the massacres which would ensue upon the Allies. The hope underlying this scheme is that an evacuation under such circumstances would not suit the French and Italians, that if there were a massacre of Greeks by British, American and Italian troops, Europe would be roused to fury and action, and that the Allies would be forced to beg Greece to remain on or resume of a speedy settlement, which Greece would have an bargain as to repayment of the expenses of her campaign, rights for the future, to minute territorial advantages in Thrace and autonomy under Greek supervision for the Smyrna and Aidin vilayets.

Rumours are also rife, as mentioned before, that France is now trying to make a pact with Greece to ensure the backing of Great Britain.

In short, every possible scheme is to be attempted to bring things to a head, preferably with the support of England, before Greece comes to the end of her tether.

Whatever may be the rights or the wrongs of the case sympathy cannot be withheld from Greece and even from the Kemalists, for their natural desire for a speedy settlement.

Unfortunately for Greece, Venizelos as a leader is dead, the people will have none of him through Venizelist sentiments to party ends is still a force to be reckoned with. On the other hand, the King has come back to favour and almost *malgré lui* has become a national force. His presence tempers the aspirations of the Greeks and therefore to a modicum of his name is the small asset to them. In his particular case the fact of his forced exile is a point in his favour in the eyes of the Greeks who universally suffer from exaggerated views in respect to Greeks living outside Greece. Had the King been a mere cipher in the affairs of Greece he might have been left. One thing appears certain namely that a reconciliation between Venizelos and the King, or with the members of the present Cabinet is impossible, the latter it is possible that Sir Rennell may desire, for the sake of the unity of Greece.

FINANCIAL.

After a more or less continuous state of war since 1912, the State is to all intents and purposes bankrupt. The Government dare not tell the International Financial Consortium that, but on the printing presses more especially as there would be an immediate and heavy depreciation of the Greek currency with all its concomitant evils. Equally they do not dare to increase the taxes.

The forced loan obtained by cutting the notes in circulation in two is only a temporary palliative. The attempt to stabilise exchange by imposing fixed rates of exchange through a consortium of banks, forbidding the export of drachmas and Greek stocks and shares, the obligation to bring into the country the exchange obtained from the sale of the produce of Greece and her services, have all proved a failure. The conventional rate is at present fixed at 140 to the £, yet exchange is to be obtained outside at rates varying from 195 to 215 drachmas to the £. Transactions outside the consortium are illegal, it is true, but however forbidden of exchange, but because told Greek speculators are expecting a further depreciation of the currency. Exchange, drachmas and stocks and shares are being daily smuggled out of the country. The Government realise that the measures which have been imposed are feeble but dare not adopt drastic remedies for fear that by so doing the price of bread would increase if such is possible, the rate of exchange were to become less favourable than the consortium rate and would the obverse notes. It is stated that the available exchange assets to their credit amount to £4,000,000 of which £1,000,000 is required by the Government for certain purposes of foreign.

But whereas the State is certainly bankrupt there is a great deal of wealth amongst the people, who are generally prosperous. This wealth never comes into the Government. There is hardly a native, down to a bootblack, who does not possess a few francs or Dollars or sterling or stocks and shares abroad which he is hoping to realise to the benefit of the Greek currency will appreciate, at first in the near future, when he will sell for drachmas with the assumption that the latter will eventually appreciate to par or very near par value again, whilst, in the meantime he purchases, with the drachmas at present rates, as regards foreign goods which are fairly high and, as new white paper comes off the presses, local commodities.

Again, for the same reason as above, the remittances of the Greek emigrants to their relatives in Greece are being withheld except for small sums as are required for bare necessities, whereas during the war, when the rate of exchange for £1 was as low as 2 drachmas the remittances were estimated to vary from 400,000,000 to 800,000,000 drachmas per annum.

We have therefore, first the causes which result, to a certain degree, that of Germany, excepting that the case of Greece the wealth is distributed over all classes and that the Greek Government is not sincerely anxious to avoid bankruptcy as the German Government is stated to be only too.

ECONOMIC.

The current and the crops are said to promise very well this year, and exporters are expected to clear off exports unless by exaggerated high prices owing to the existing restrictions referred to previously in this letter. [illegible]

British and Venice goods are reported from the bazaars to be practically sold off at standstill prices, the nearly exhausted stocks being replaced by German and Austrian goods. It would be well to take before Great Britain in regard what was already a good market. I am still better prospects for some of the exports produced in the United Kingdom or the trend of political events as will permit of competition.

[E 8294 5 44] No. 149.

Sir H. Lamb[illegible] to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston — (received August 2.)

(No. 711)

My Lord, *Constantinople, August 19, 1922.*

TWO days ago I received a visit from Mr. Ahmed David Bey, who as your Lordship is aware, has been Minister for Finance on several occasions in the past, and served for some months in that capacity in the Tewfik Cabinet during the war. David Bey has since been living in Switzerland, and has recently returned to Turkey to take up his post as Ottoman Member on the Council of the Debt. David Bey is a very able man, and I was much struck by the exceptional alertness of his mind.

2. After a few preliminary remarks, David Bey proceeded to discuss the present position of the Near Eastern question. He said that Great Britain was deeply interested in two main questions, namely the freedom of the Straits and the protection of minorities. As regards the former question, he affirmed that all Turks admitted that the Straits must be absolutely free, and that there could not be a return to the old conditions. At the same time Turkey was willing to acquiesce in the retention by the Greeks of the Gallipoli Peninsula and of a considerable portion of the northern shore of the Sea of Marmora. Turkey would not object to the Allies holding the northern entrance to the Straits. A possible solution would be to entrust the Gallipoli Peninsula to the League of Nations.

3. I pointed out that there was little or no difference between the view taken by the Constantinople and Angora Governments of the question of Thrace. Both Governments wanted the line of the Maritza with Adrianople. David Bey replied that whilst the Turks would very much like to recover possession of the whole of Eastern Thrace, including Adrianople, they would be especially interested in Nationalists, if necessary, accept the Enos-Midia line.

4. David Bey agreed that adequate safeguards for the protection of minorities. There was similar to the provisions contained in the minority clauses in the treaties with Roumania and Persia. He saw no reason to differentiate in this respect between Jews and Christians. With regard to the recent pogroms of Jews I replied that there was no difference in this respect. To my own knowledge, and to American and British admission, had been sent to Palestine years ago to investigate the alleged pogroms of Jews. Whilst the accusations had not been that between 300 and 400 Jews had been killed by Arabs since the end of the war, the full wages of the armistice, there was not, as far as I can recollect, found that there had been organised pogroms of Jews. With the exception of Russia, from which country I was unable to obtain, the Jews who had lost their lives as a result of the war zone. There could be no comparison between the treatment of the Jews in Palestine and the treatment of the Armenians in Anatolia. It would be necessary to have the most ample guarantees for the protection of those minorities.

5. David Bey replied that the guarantees in question must not infringe the sovereignty and independence of Turkey. The League of Nations might secure the proper observance of the provisions devised for the protection of minorities. A commission of the League might investigate on the spot, and their inspectors might visit the districts. As I pointed out, if there were resident inspectors in the districts in question there was always the danger that, in this country of intrigue, the inspectors would be got at by one or other of the interested parties. I felt this was a specious argument and I did not pursue the subject.

6. David Bey then laid stress on the necessity of securing the economic and judicial Capitulations. He said that it was only by obtaining security for fiscal and judicial that Turkey would be able to meet her obligations. I said that there was always the danger that if the Turkish Government had full financial independence it might get beyond control, and taxes, for instance, might be increased. David Bey replied that foreign subjects would be taxed on the same principles as Turkish subjects in regard to taxes on real estate, &c. He was aware that there had been many abuses in the collection of these taxes. At present the subjects of certain Powers were exempt from the payment of the "Temettu". As this was an important matter, he would be quite ready to agree that it should be collected by the Debt Commission, who would proceed with the necessary safeguards against abuses in its collection.

7. As regards the judicial Capitulations, he suggested that a mixed commission should be formed to draw up, within a specified period, an interim scheme of judicial

reform for application to foreign subjects. At the end of a definite period, say ten years, foreign subjects would become amenable to Turkish justice.

8. I have thought it worth while to report the foregoing to your Lordship because, although Djevad Bey is not connected with any particular party in the State, he is affirmed that he has many friends of his way of thinking both at Constantinople and at Angora.

(Confidential.)

9. I have been struck by the fact that, in the course of two meetings with my Allied colleagues with regard to the proposed preliminary conference, they have expressed the personal opinion that there will be no stable peace in this part of the world as long as the Greeks are allowed to remain at any point on the northern shore of the Marmora, and especially to occupy the Gallipoli Peninsula. They are not in favour of some such solution as that suggested by Djavid Bey. I have pointed out to my colleagues that the Allied Foreign Ministers at Paris had unanimously accepted a frontier in Thrace running from Gaboul to Midia. The Paris proposals provide for the evacuation of Asia Minor by the Greeks. We could not expect the Greeks to evacuate the whole of Thrace as well. I certainly think that the Powers at the instigation, I thought, of the French have decided that they would not apply force to either Greeks or Nationalists. How then do they propose to expel the Greeks from Thrace where there was a large force of Greek troops? The French High Commissioner pointed out that there were other ways of bringing pressure to bear on Greece, that it was well known that the Greek Government was at the end of its resources. It would require financial assistance in order to stabilise its finances. I said that the French High Commissioner no doubt had economic sanctions in mind, but I could tell him straight away that I felt certain that my Government would associate itself with any action of the nature he hinted.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

E 8301/5/44 No. 150

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 11.)

(No. 725.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, August 5, 1922.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 715 of the 1st instant, I have the honour to enclose a letter from Mr. Slade Bilinski covering a report on the economic, political and financial situation of Smyrna and its hinterland. This memorandum is not without interest at the present circumstances.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 150.

M. de Bilinski to Sir H. Rumbold.

Dear Sir Horace, *Constantinople, August 14, 1922.*

FURTHER to the letter dated 1st Greece which I sent you last week I now enclose copy of notes just received from one of my staff in Smyrna, who has on other interests than that of our nationals to look to the prospects of the banks for the next few months.

For your understanding, I wish to make it quite clear that I do not prefer either Greek or Turk, my sole anxiety and preoccupation being the early solution of the Near Eastern question one way or another, as the future of British commercial and private interests in that part of the world is entirely dependent upon it. I hope therefore, that you will absolve me of any wish or intention to interfere in what does not concern me.

Yours sincerely,

S. de BILINSKI.

Enclosure 2 in No. 150.

Report on the Economic, Political and Financial Situation of Smyrna.

Situation économique.

LA situation économique de Smyrne, malheureusement, va en empirant. Ce fait est dû à l'état chaotique dans lequel vit actuellement tout l'hinterland de ce pays.

Les encaissements tant en tabacs qu'en céréales ont subi cette année un recul assez sensible. Les tabacs principalement ont un recul de 50 pour cent sur le rendement de l'année écoulée et le rendement sur les céréales a également subi un recul assez sensible.

On doit chercher les effets de cet état de choses dans les causes suivantes :

(a) Les propriétaires fonciers de religion musulmane sont souvent opprimés par la certitude qu'en cas de mort des autorités militaires saisissent le pays et font un débours de deux ou trois années d'argent, souvent même les font emprisonner pour arriver à ce but.

(b) La question d'une méthode de taxation pouvant servir aux besoins de l'armée et dont le payement irait à qui de droit, n'a jusqu'à présent pas été résolue. Il est à noter que dans les régions des déserteurs de l'armée turque, ainsi que des bandes irrégulières de soldats sont dirigées contre les Turcs.

Situation politique.

La situation politique de Smyrne depuis un an déjà passé ne s'est pas améliorée, au contraire, à la suite des événements ultérieurs existant dans la mère patrie entre venizélistes et royalistes, situation qui est arrivée à un état assez grave. Les Grecs de Smyrne font suivre à leur gouvernement la ligne de conduite qu'il tient pour le parti vénizéliste et arrivent par cette façon à paralyser par diverses questions, surtout financières, tout effort pour leurs aspirations, ne faisant également pas le moindre encouragement en provenance directe ou indirecte de la politique des royalistes.

Un autre courant, également contraire à cette façon de faire, existe chez les Grecs à l'égard des royalistes, consistant à mettre le gouvernement hellénique en garde contre la question des banknotes, cette mesure ayant pour but de diminuer la force monétaire des Grecs de Smyrne.

Cette idée a dans le fond pour but de renforcer la position des Grecs de Smyrne contre les royalistes, car les habitants de ces régions en sont patriotes et ceci est un fait reconnu, qu'à tant qu'il y a à donner le moindre sang, un million versement d'argent.

Les Grecs de vieille Grèce, connaissant également les sentiments de leurs compatriotes de Smyrne, n'ont pour eux aucune estime et, au contraire, ils les détestent.

Situation financière.

Par suite de la mauvaise situation économique du pays et de la situation politique, qui est pour l'heure très tendue, on commence à souffrir le marché de Smyrne va en augmentant.

Smyrne était le seul hinterland qui eut une ressource de richesses, et cette source se tarissant petit à petit dans cette région au point de vie notamment doit s'attendre à une situation économique désastreuse, qui est arrivée aux dépens des banques qui ont vu leur situation économique paralysée depuis que celles-ci sont passées sous le contrôle direct de la mère patrie.

Sauf ce qui avait été fait jusqu'à ce jour, le commerce étant arrêté et les dépôts presque nuls, avant d'y accorder à la mère patrie son commerce d'antan sensiblement et ses affaires, dont le principal trafic était le sang, rentrer les mêmes.

Ce même état de choses existe pour les banques. Chose et de Mytilène. Dans cette dernière ville la richesse du pays consiste dans l'exportation de l'huile à l'étranger, on voit à présent rentrer dans le pays par le fait que l'exportation des huiles est absolument arrêtée et par surcroît les huiles sont requises tournées par les autorités militaires et dont le remboursement envers le propriétaire est aléatoire.

Il résulte donc de ce [illegible] que [illegible] la situation [illegible] politico-financière de Smyrne [illegible] ne [illegible] pas être [illegible] très [illegible], mais [illegible] si cet état de choses se continue pour quelque temps encore Smyrne [illegible] son [illegible] devant [illegible].

Smyrne avec son [illegible] dont elle [illegible] est [illegible] port, est une [illegible] commerciale qui [illegible] des plus florissantes et Smyrne sans son hinterland deviendra en peu de temps [illegible] complètement [illegible] commercial.

E 8302 5 44 No. [illegible]

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. — (*Received August 21.*)

(No. 726.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, August 15, 1922.*

WITH reference to the last paragraph of my despatch No. [illegible] of the [illegible]th instant, I have the honour to report that Izzet Pasha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, called [illegible] yesterday. He [illegible] to talk [illegible] about Mr. Lloyd George's speech [illegible] considerably. Izzet Pasha appeared [illegible] somewhat agitated.

His Highness said that [illegible] was [illegible] to discredit the present Constantinople Government. [illegible] the speech proved that Tewfik Pasha's Government had lost [illegible] Great Britain and that [illegible] for some [illegible] Izzet Pasha [illegible] was [illegible] concerned with the personal aspect [illegible]. He [illegible] Anatolia [illegible] propaganda [illegible] that [illegible] Great Britain was [illegible] Turkey [illegible] propaganda [illegible] Nationalists [illegible] Turks generally [illegible] Great Britain [illegible] that the Prime Minister's speech [illegible] the ground [illegible] under his feet.

[illegible] Izzet Pasha [illegible] that Mr. Lloyd George's speech [illegible] such [illegible] agitation. The speech was [illegible] statement of [illegible] which [illegible] disputed. [illegible] Great Britain attached the utmost importance, namely, the freedom of the Straits and the protection of [illegible]. There was nothing [illegible] speech [illegible] against the Constantinople Government, and I therefore considered Izzet Pasha's interpretation was not justified. [illegible] Izzet Pasha [illegible] Tewfik Pasha's Government [illegible] Izzet Pasha [illegible]. The [illegible] what I [illegible].

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD

E 8307 5 44 No. 52

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. — (*Received August 2[illegible].*)

(No. 733.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, August 15, 1922.*

THE Prime Minister's statement [illegible] the Near East situation in the House of Commons [illegible] August [illegible] naturally given [illegible] amount of [illegible] and spoken [illegible] in Constantinople. [illegible] of the Greek [illegible] regarding an advance on Constantinople [illegible] just [illegible] produced in Turkish circles generally a feeling amounting almost to consternation [illegible] this speech [illegible] a telegraphic summary [illegible] local Greeks to believe that Mr. Lloyd George was [illegible] the way for a [illegible] of His Majesty's Government [illegible] to tolerate a Greek occupation of Constantinople.

2. It is significant that this feeling has not [illegible] in the local Turkish press to anything like the extent that might have been anticipated. This is perhaps to some

extent due to fear of the Allied censorship, and to a desire not to show alarm too openly, but the [illegible] impression derived from a perusal of several articles in the principal Nationalist papers is that a *mot d'ordre* has been received from Angora or from the Angora representatives here to avoid angry or extravagant comment. This impression is confirmed by the fact that the [illegible] Angora Telegraph Agency has not on this occasion followed its usual [illegible] practice of telegraphing summaries of press comments in the Angora newspapers.

3. Several [illegible] writers [illegible] strike the note of defiance, but it is not very loud or emphatic. The strongest statement of [illegible] defiant kind which I have seen is contained in the "Tevhid-i-Efkiar," a paper which, in its general tone pan-Islamic, and which there is some reason to regard as being Enverist rather than Kemalist in its present sympathies. This paper published on the 9th August a leading article which couples the violent and menacing speech of Mr. Lloyd George with recent Greek activities in Thrace and the proclamation of autonomy at Smyrna, and sees in all these developments evidence of [illegible] certain projects. The writer says that even a Greek occupation of Constantinople would [illegible] the Greeks nothing. The failure of the project (which [illegible] form of the article attributes to French opposition) shows [illegible] that the Greeks are [illegible] all their calculations, and the whole [illegible] the state of [illegible] to which they have been reduced. First and last the [illegible] Anatolia to be disturbed by [illegible]. A well [illegible] army of not less than 200,000 men stands waiting in Anatolia, ready [illegible] Turks can [illegible] repeat: "Our position to-day is better than ever [illegible], [illegible] every young, everyone, every [illegible] and every kind [illegible] victory [illegible]."

4. Reouf Ahmed Bey, writing in the "Yeni Sabah" of the [illegible]th August, analyses the Prime Minister's statement at great length. His [illegible] strongly critical, is free from violence. He expresses regret that the full text of the speech has come [illegible] by the telegraphic summary. He recalls Mr. Lloyd George's statement [illegible] Turkey in 1914 [illegible] consistent friend, and says that Britain's [illegible] for Turkey declined steadily from the time of the occupation of Egypt [illegible]. Despite this, and in spite of the association of the *Entente* Powers with Russia, Turkey could have been kept out of the great war, but the [illegible] of the *Entente* and [illegible] of their representatives at Constantinople [illegible] August 1914, forced Turkey into the arms of Germany. He parries the Premier's reference to the participation of other Powers than Great Britain in the decision to occupy Smyrna by saying that whoever took the decision it was a blunder, and no [illegible] settlement of Eastern questions [illegible] like Sir R. Borden, whose [illegible] plea for Versailles to prove anything he [illegible] regarding the [illegible] character of Western Asia Minor.

5. After [illegible] of which these are a fair sample, and taxing Mr. Lloyd George with having [illegible] what he himself said in February 1919 as to the character of [illegible] statement during the war that Great Britain was [illegible] fighting to deprive the Turks of their capital or their homelands, Reouf Ahmed Bey settles down to the [illegible] that the only way to prepare the way for [illegible] to face facts as they are, to [illegible] the truth [illegible] the Turks [illegible] restrictions, and to give them a fair hearing.

6. The other article which deserves particular [illegible] appears in the [illegible] of the 12th August from the pen of [illegible] writer. This paper is [illegible] usually moderate, [illegible] remarkable that the writer is at great pains to emphasise the desirability of getting Great Britain to take a more [illegible] view of Turkish [illegible]. He starts off by saying that the proposals of the 26th March might, "with slight modifications," form the basis of a tolerable peace. In the course of his article he [illegible] pains to show that Turkey is ready for safeguards, including demilitarisation against the closing of the Straits. He recognises that Great Britain is mistress of the seas, and argues that a Turkey, assured of her national and political integrity, could have no [illegible] for being at variance with a Great Power occupying that position. He [illegible] the justice of punishing persons responsible for deportations and massacres and [illegible] the minorities question generally. He advocates [illegible] for the protection of minorities including a revival of schemes for exchange of populations.

7. The [illegible] writer in a later [illegible] of the 14th August, rebuts the theory that the sacrifices made by the Greeks entitle them to special consideration. He argues that the Turks have made equal or greater sacrifices, and that in their case they have been made for a legitimate end.

8. It will be observed that the Ulema writer professes to consider the Paris proposals a possible basis for peace. I have noticed in other Turkish comments since the Greek concentration in Thrace and Mr Lloyd George's speech a tendency to treat the Paris proposals with more respect than was previously shown for them.

9. The only pro-Nationalist paper, the Peyam Sabah, uses the speech as a stick to beat the Kemalists and Unionists with, and represents them as having once more brought Turkey to the edge of a precipice by their disastrous policy. Some little attempt has been made on the other side also to exploit this speech for internal party purposes.

10. The Armenian press hails the Prime Minister's speech as a rebuff to Angora and as a proof that there are still men who strive for justice. The Greek papers view the same sentiments as a reassurance before delaying engage-

11. Although, as I have said, no Angora official comments on Mr Lloyd George's speech appear to have been telegraphed to Constantinople, telegrams have come through in the last few days recording opinions and regret to have been expressed by foreign representatives at Angora that Greek threat to Constantinople. The Russian, Afghan and Persian envoys are likewise mentioned as having condemned the Greek action. The Afghan and Persian representatives are both quoted as having spoken of the deplorable effect on the Moslem world if the Greeks were allowed to occupy Constantinople, and the Russian and Afghan would both appear to have given Great Britain credit for engaging the Greeks on

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

No. 153

Sir H. Lamb (Vienna) *to Sir H. Rumbold* (*Repeated to Foreign Office. Received August 21*)

(No. 45)
(Telegraphic) R. *Smyrna, August 20, 1922*

SMALL Turkish force cut Ada Bazar-Geyve railway near Burhaniye 19th August, blowing up bridge but otherwise damaging a short section of line.

Greeks have sent reinforcements about 1,000 strong but communications are not yet restored.

This is assumed to be a feint possibly presaging real attack on northern front which is known to have been reorganized.

(Repeated to Athens No. 56.)

E 8356/5/44 No. 151

Mr. Lamb to the Earl of Balfour. (*Received August 22.*)

(No. 401. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Athens, August 5, 1922.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 300 of to-day's date I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a memorandum which was handed to me last night by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, giving their views of the situation in Greece.

M. Baltazzi asked me to forward the memorandum to you, Lords, but to treat its existence itself for the present as strictly confidential, for which I beg your Lordship's approval.

2. The memorandum is to the effect that, in view of the conflicting points of view regarding future peace in the future may prove as short-lived as in the past. In that case the war will continue. Greece will no longer be able to rely on her own resources, and will be obliged to appeal. His Majesty's Government for assistance.

In connection with the above I would refer to my despatch No. [illegible] to Mr. Findlay's telegrams Nos. 24 and 244, in which attention is made to the grave financial outlook of the country whose present financial resources will be exhausted by next September–October. When it is remembered that as long ago as April 1922

the Minister of Finance told me that the war could not last longer than three months, as Greece could not hold out financially, one cannot help but admire the way in which the country has carried on in the face of so many disappointments.

I shall hope to report more fully upon the financial and economic situation of Greece in a later despatch.

I have, &c.
C. H. BENTINCK

Enclosure in No. 151

Memorandum

(Strictement Confidentiel.)

LE Gouvernement hellénique est entré dans le vif grief qu'aux yeux du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, par pour ses efforts et par celle de la paix que la Grèce avait secondées le sort était par l'acceptation en principe de la modification des Puissances.

Mais ces efforts malgré toute la bonne volonté apportée par ces deux Gouvernements, n'ont pas abouti à des résultats assurant la paix et la réalisation les buts de la guerre.

Nous avons espéré y parvenir par une pression collective, qui était, même avec la paix, le règlement définitif du sort des détroits dans l'armée grecque reste toujours le seul garant.

Mais les Puissances alliées s'opposèrent à l'occupation, et il est à prévoir que les négociations continueront encore par le passé peut être dont aussi inefficaces, vu les écueils contre lesquels ces négociations se heurtent à cause des influences manifestes ou ingérées des points de vue particulier de chacun.

Le Gouvernement hellénique, à la suite de cette constatation, sera encore appelé à éprouver une prolongation de l'état de guerre qui finira certes par abattre les Kemalistes mais qui aussi gênera contre part à la paix désarmée.

Le peuple hellène, combattant pour remplir sa mission historique et civilisatrice et pour reporter à la fois aux yeux de ses alliés sur le règlement satisfaisant des affaires du Proche Orient n'a pas marchandé aux sacrifices de toute sorte, para à ce point, l'armée continue à avoir pour très forte. Mais il y a les réalités dont il faut tenir compte parce qu'elles peuvent retarder vaines toutes ces qualités de l'armée et du peuple.

Les dépenses que la Grèce a supportées depuis sa part égale et à la guerre pour balancer tout le long de la durée de la lutte en Asie Mineure dépassées et immenses pour épargne grecque sont couvertes par les moyens d'armis par le pays. Mais la continuation de la guerre pour le gouvernement obligatoire pour assurer la perception de ses ressources contre financières, le Gouvernement hellénique ne peut le faire sans voir avec les plus sérieuses atteintes.

Pour toutes ces raisons, le Gouvernement hellénique a l'honneur de demander à Londres le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique de vouloir bien intervenir auprès [illegible] Sir Robert Horne et Mr. Churchill, dans les plus brefs délais, afin que les Etats-Unis puissent dans la nécessité de faire appel de recevoir à notre endroit un geste d'encouragement et de prévoir les premières démarches à entreprendre sur la puissante assistance du Gouvernement britannique, sans laquelle l'accession de la Grèce aux buts de guerre poursuivis par les sacrifices de la nation hellénique et de son armée, pourrait être mise en péril et les probabilités très sérieusement compromises.

Athènes, le 22 juillet 1 août 1922.

E 8333/5/44] No. 150.

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. —(*Received August 22.*)

(No. 1. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Athens, August 11, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to Mr. Findlay's telegram No. 258 of the 24th July, in which the possibility of a Greek demand being made to occupy Constantinople was foreshadowed. Mr. Findlay did not, however, think that the Greeks had ever seriously considered attacking at as long as the Allies were there. Two days later I reported

that persistent rumours were being circulated in more or less responsible quarters that a Greek advance on Constantinople was imminent. It was said that orders had already been given for an advance and that Great Britain approved.

On the 7th July the Minister for Foreign Affairs called in my French and Italian colleagues and myself and handed to each of us a note of what was being handed to Lord Balfour at the same time. The note stated that the Greek Government were not responsible for the continuation of the conflict. The entire Christian population of the regions occupied by Kemal was face to face with extermination, and the free of this Greece was obliged to consider the best measures for putting an end to the conflict. I asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs what these measures of precaution were. His Excellency said that he was in a position to tell me, but that the present situation was serious. I therefore drew his very serious attention to the rumours respecting an advance on Constantinople, and I told him that speaking entirely without instructions, I was inclined at my own to remind him of the warning conveyed to me about that time last year by Lord Curzon to the effect that an attack on Constantinople would not be tolerated by the Allies. I had no reason to suppose that my Government would take any action, and I begged his Excellency to believe that it was too late yet to take any measures which would afterwards be deeply regretted. M. Baltazzi replied that he remembered perfectly well what Lord Curzon had said and that he now took note of my words.

On the 20th M. Baltazzi again called on my colleagues and myself and presented to us a long note to the effect that only the occupation of Constantinople could bring the war and the Turks were accordingly requested to give the necessary orders to the Greek forces for the occupation of the town. He gently urged that I should tell the Minister for Foreign Affairs that I knew what to do. His Excellency then told me that he had already telegraphed to Athens to ask for instructions and would send them to me as soon as he received them. The Minister for Foreign Affairs then congratulated me on the news that I had to await further instructions.

A few minutes later Foreign Office telegram No. 113 reached me to the effect that Lord Balfour considered that the Greek Government should be informed that no attack on Constantinople would be permitted, and that the Greek forces should be withdrawn from the front to await further instructions. This message I immediately conveyed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. I drew his serious attention to paragraph 2 of the telegram from Constantinople that the Allied military commanders were taking steps to resist by force any forward movement of the Greek troops.

In the course of the interview Lord Balfour's telegram No. 112 was read to me, instructing me to tell the Minister for Foreign Affairs that a Greek advance on Constantinople would be resisted by the Allied forces of occupation. I urged that the most serious consequences for Greece herself would follow. Lord Balfour felt that a meeting would probably be held in Paris to discuss the Eastern question.

I again took the liberty to suggest to M. Baltazzi that in both instances as Europe gave the most positive assurance that it was not its intention to attack Constantinople, and that the Greek forces would remain in their present position with the consent of the Allies, I drew his Excellency's attention to the danger of issuing Greek troops at the front, but I found that my suggestion existed in the strongest orders had been issued to prevent any incidents. His Excellency was evidently anxious to be duly instructed, and the departure of his colleague, Monsieur Simopoulos, which was to take place personally MM. Scouloudis and Theotoky, was greatly missed at the moment when a peace conference was to meet shortly. He thanked me for the message which I could only acknowledge the facility of matters.

On Sunday the 30th July I sent my Foreign Office telegram No. 119 Secret, in which, to my astonishment, was expressed the request contained in the second Greek note. Lord Balfour asked that the Greek Government must be aware that the Allies were quite determined not to consent to such a proposal. This further message I at once conveyed to M. Baltazzi. His Excellency said that he understood the situation perfectly and added that there was no fear of Greek troops entering Constantinople or of any rash acts on the part of the Greeks.

Our interview, I may remark, was always of the friendliest, and although I spoke very seriously to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and conveyed to him a point blank refusal on the part of my Government, he always took it so well that I arrived more and more at the conclusion that M. Baltazzi never really expected any other answer, but that the real object of this sudden action on the part of the Greek Government was to force the Powers to speak out immediately and to show the Greek people that the Government were not asleep, and that, if the one decisive stroke

which would end the war were not taken the fact would be, not with the Government, but with the Allied Powers.

On the 31st July my two colleagues and I received their instructions to take joint action. We therefore went together to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and handed to His Excellency identical notes stating that the Allied Governments must refuse to take the measures requested by the Greek Government in their second note, and that orders had been given to the inter-Allied military command to repel by force every military movement directed against the zone occupied by the Allied troops. We added a personal suggestion that the Minister for Foreign Affairs should be withdrawn from the front to ordinary interests. The attitude of the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the presence of the French Minister was remarkable. The friendliness to which I had been accustomed gave place to frigid obstinacy, and I realised that wise as it was to limit front to the Greek Government and people especially in view of rumours of invasion the Allied camp yet when I was really to persuade the Greek Government it would have to be done by His Majesty's Government alone, and that French support would only weaken our case.

On the 2nd August I received a further telegram from Lord Balfour giving a somewhat more detailed reply than that previously given to the second Greek note, and repeating, assuming no threat was refusal now for the Greeks to occupy Constantinople. I handed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a note, as instructed, and at the same time I showed him a telegram just received by the military attaché from General Sir Charles Harington regarding a frontier incident leading to Greek casualties, and I repeated his Excellency the serious warnings which I had already given as to the dangers arising from the continued presence of Greek troops on the Chatalja front. M. Baltazzi, who was at the middle of a Cabinet Council, read my note and telegram to his colleagues, and subsequently both he and the Minister of War suggested that I should telegraph to Lord Balfour to say that the situation created by recent reports of successful attacks. The Minister of War, in answer to my warnings, informed me that the Greek troops were being withdrawn to villages behind the lines and that only frontier guards were remaining at the front.

On the 3rd August I received Lord Balfour's telegram No. 102, suggesting that I should urge the Minister for Foreign Affairs unofficially to have action taken spontaneously by the Greek authorities to forestall an Allied request that they should withdraw their troops from the frontier at once. The Minister for Foreign Affairs quite entered into the spirit of the suggestion and after consulting the principal members of the Cabinet asked me to inform Lord Balfour that the Minister of War had instructed the Greek Commander-in-chief to accept the proposal that the Italian General Mombelli was about to make to the Greek General Vlachopoulos that the front should be laid down and that both sides should be held back to fixed distances.

On the 4th August the Minister for Foreign Affairs sent me a telegraphic report from the Greek Commander-in-chief to the effect that General Vlachopoulos had been instructed to accept a proposal made by General Mombelli that each should withdraw from the front, and that General Vlachopoulos was to take the necessary steps to carry this out. Meanwhile my Italian colleague had received instructions to approach the Greek Government in conjunction with his colleagues to persuade them to retire from the frontier. In view of the above satisfactory arrangement I told my Italian and French colleagues that I was reporting to Lord Balfour that I did not consider any further steps to be necessary. My Italian colleague agreed.

In the meantime, on the 3rd August, my colleagues and I received a third note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as we had expected, pointing out that the decision of the Powers was an obstacle to decisive action by the Greeks for the conclusion of peace, and drawing serious attention to the delay which would produce fresh complications for the Christians of Asia Minor.

On the 4th August the Minister for Foreign Affairs handed to me only a confidential note, drawing the serious attention of His Majesty's Government to the financial needs of Greece.

At the end of all this came the news of the Prime Minister's statement in the House of Commons, about which I am reporting in another despatch.

Before closing this despatch I have the honour to draw your Lordship's attention to the present aspect of the situation:-

1. The danger of frontier incidents appears to have been removed for the moment, but a considerable Greek force remains concentrated in Thrace, practically within sight of the dome of Santa Sophia, the capital of Hellenism.

2 We have now encouraged the Greeks to hope for an early settlement by other means than by the occupation of Constantinople to which we have objected in conjunction with our Allies.

3 The Greeks are not likely to reduce their army in Thrace unless compelled to do so by the Powers.

4 The *moral* of the army is good and will have been improved by Mr Lloyd George's speech, but it is hardly to be expected that an army can be restrained indefinitely within sight of its goal by a force apparently greatly inferior to it and a people cannot be expected to go on merely hoping until the Powers reach a decision whilst the country is bleeding to death.

"Kathemerini" (Government organ) writes to-day in the following sense:—

'Five or six hours are enough for the Greek troops to enter Constantinople. There are many more troops than are required for the purpose. Will it be possible for them to be kept waiting by mere prohibitions and formalities? It will be very difficult."

"Athenaiki" (anti-Venizelist and lately anti-Government) writes:—

"What may be taken as certain is that the Government has arrived at definite decisions to put an end by all means to the situation of suspense independently of any action or decision of the Powers."

5 The longer a decision is withheld the more explosive and dangerous does the situation become between the Greeks and the French.

6 All Hellenism, whether from or unreconciled irrespective of party, looks to England for salvation and the statements attributed to the Premier have encouraged this expectation.

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
C. H. BENTINCK.

No. 156.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received August 22.*)

(No. 352.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 21, 1922.*

SIR H. LAMB reports privately that an Italian steamer which arrived at Smyrna from Mersina on 17th August brought a party of Italians on their way home from Angora where they had been delivering aeroplanes to Mustapha Kemal.

The Italians said openly that Kemal was preparing an offensive somewhere on the Eskishehir front and thought it had a good chance of success. The idea was to drive Greeks out of their present strong positions while the fine weather lasts and keep them on the run until the winter. The Italians stated that French are pouring war material up to the Kemalists through Mersina and that they had seen many French officers serving in Kemalist army.

No. 157.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received August 24.*)

(No. 354.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August 23, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 350.

International Red Cross delegate called again to-day and stated that he expected a definite reply from Angora on receipt by Angora authorities of communication which a Red Crescent had sent by special messenger defining object and scope of proposed Red Cross Mission. He is leaving for Geneva via Athens on 26th August, and will inform Ottoman Red Crescent here that he will interpret failure to receive a favourable reply from Angora by that date as a refusal.

He hopes to constitute commissions at Geneva by 5th September and to start them from Constantinople 15th September. If they cannot get off by that date it is probable that scheme will have to be abandoned for this year owing to lateness of season.

United States High Commissioner informs me that his Government have agreed to provide 1,000*l.* towards expenses of these commissions.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 94.)

No. 158.

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received August 25.*)

(No. 328.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, August 25, 1922.*

MY despatch No. 457.

Athenaiki says that Greek High Commissioner has come to Athens from Constantinople despite all Government denials, in connection with peace proposals from Kemalists. Article adds that Greek Government will not enter into negotiations either with Constantinople or Angora to avoid misunderstanding with Great Britain who is opposed to direct negotiations between Greece and Turkey.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

[E 8497/5/44] No. 159.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received August 26.*)

(No. 1939.)
My Lord, *Paris, August 25, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the note dated the 23rd August but received at His Majesty's Embassy only this morning, of the French Government to the memorandum on the Near East which was enclosed in your Lordship's despatch No. 2606 of the 18th August and forwarded to M. Poincaré on the succeeding day.

Your Lordship will notice that the attitude adopted by the French Government was reported in the "Temps" (see my despatch No. 1961 of yesterday) before the note announcing it reached me.

I have, &c.
HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.

Enclosure in No. 159.

M. Poincaré to Lord Hardinge.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Paris, le 23 août 1922.*

PAR votre lettre du 19 de ce mois votre Excellence a bien voulu me transmettre un mémorandum reportant à la communication que j'avais adressée à Sir Maurice Cheetham le 3 de ce mois, au sujet de la question d'Orient.

J'ai l'honneur de faire parvenir ci-joint à votre Excellence, sur cette même question, et en réponse, un mémorandum, qui est destiné à Marquis Curzon of Kedleston et que je vous serais reconnaissant de lui faire tenir.

Veuillez agréer, &c.
POINCARÉ.

Memorandum.

LE Président du Conseil Ministre des Affaires étrangères, a examiné avec la plus grande attention le mémorandum, en date du 18 de ce mois que lui a fait parvenir le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, en réponse à la communication du Gouvernement français du 3 août. Les propositions concrètes qu'il contient, et qui sont destinées à assurer la

rent la proclamation de la Conférence relative aux Détroits, dans leur ensemble l'approbation du Gouvernement français. Il subsiste cependant quelques modifications sont apportées aux instructions adressées aux Hauts-Commissaires à Constantinople. Il faut également les réserves suscitées par la question de Smyrne, dont il sera traité au dernier paragraphe de son mémorandum.

Le Gouvernement français accepte que la Conférence préliminaire se réunisse à Venise. Il est d'accord avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté que le texte de cette invitation proposé, l'heure, aux Gouvernements respectifs par les trois Hauts-Commissaires réunis à Constantinople devrait être porté à la connaissance du Gouvernement italien, qu'il conviendrait en même temps de remercier pour son bienveillant accueil à la conférence l'hospitalité de son territoire.

Le projet d'invitation devra être soumis par les Hauts-Commissaires alliés en Turquie au Gouvernement de Constantinople et aux représentants du Gouvernement d'Angora, et par les représentants alliés à Athènes au Gouvernement grec. Il ne soulève de la part du Gouvernement français de particulières que sur un point. Il souhaiterait voir ajouter au paragraphe 3 des instructions à Admiral Hope, qui fut remplacé par les mots suivants :

"Au cas contraire, les Hauts Commissaires s'abstiendront de soumettre les demandes des délégations des belligérants aux trois Gouvernements alliés qui décideront d'un commun accord si et dans quelle mesure il y aurait lieu d'y donner satisfaction."

Il serait, en effet, à craindre que la Grèce ne se prévalût de cette conférence préliminaire pour établir que certaines difficultés aient été soulevées à son égard, et pour refuser le retrait immédiat des forces grecques de la Thrace orientale, déjà accepté par le Gouvernement français dans son acte du 11 août. Le Gouvernement français désirerait donc que la Conférence préliminaire, qui aurait à se prononcer sur la question de l'évacuation de la Thrace orientale par les troupes grecques, fût saisie d'une proposition tendant à ce que les Gouvernements alliés fassent connaître à la Grèce leur intention de ne pas s'opposer à ce retrait immédiat. Le Gouvernement français désirerait, après cette décision, que la Conférence préliminaire s'ajournât pour quelques jours, afin de permettre aux Gouvernements alliés de se concerter sur la date à laquelle la Conférence de la paix devrait se réunir à Venise, qu'il souhaite aussi prochaine que possible.

Paris, le 2 août 1922.

No. 160

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received August 27.*)

(No. 331.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, August 26, 1922.*

MY despatch No. 401.

Minister for Foreign Affairs begs for early reply. He asked me to meet Prime Minister and M. Gounaris on the subject of memorandum.

They said that without a loan they could not maintain army in Asia Minor. All they asked was that His Majesty's Government would encourage loan or London market and they thought that Hellenic Bank, which has full details regarding securities which Greece could pledge would be able to float loan.

I am reporting in detail and recommending situation in my despatch No. 456 by bag but Prime Minister promises immediately to supply further information if desired regarding securities which Greece could pledge.

I should be grateful for instructions as to reply which I should return to Minister for Foreign Affairs memorandum.

(E 8538/5/44.) No. 161

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received August 28.*)

(No. 428.)
My Lord, *Athens, August 15, 1922.*

ON receipt of your Lordship's telegram No. 165 of the 12th instant I called on the French Minister and the Italian Chargé d'Affaires to concert with them about approaching the Greek Government as instructed regarding the recent proclamation respecting Western Asia Minor.

We drew up an identic note (prime being in English) which we each of us forwarded to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and I have the honour to transmit copies of my note.

Your Lordship will observe that the first paragraph is somewhat fuller than the wording of your telegram. I consented to this to meet my colleagues who had wanted to word the second paragraph differently, but would defer to my wishes in this respect.

According to a statement in the press, the Minister for Foreign Affairs on receipt of our notes proceeded to inform the King, and subsequently a Cabinet Council was held to discuss the matter.

M. Baltazzi then asked me to call and we discussed various questions. His Excellency referred to the enclosed note and asked me in somewhat injured tone why we had sent it. He had particularly expected the French and myself to be no information beyond your Lordship's telegraphic instructions, and that as the terms of the proclamation did not appear to me to be quite in accordance with the March conference decisions, I could well presume that His Majesty's Government did not wish to appear to recognise a state of affairs which would have to be decided by an eventual peace settlement with Turkey.

His Excellency said that he quite understood this and of course the latter was one for the Powers to decide; but that the object of the proclamation was not so much for the Christian as for the Mussulman population. There was in the district a large Mussulman population which was friendly to the Greeks and not Kemalist. To this M. Stergiadès had been anxious to accord a large share in the administration.

M. Baltazzi proceeded to praise the excellent work done by M. Stergiadès who, he was careful to remind me, had been appointed by M. Venizelos. He said that the Government had complete confidence in M. Stergiadès's ability and probity and had practically given him *carte blanche* in Smyrna.

He then referred to the way in which the French Minister had spoken to him about the Smyrna proclamation and observed that from his language he might have been the representative of Kemal himself. The Italian attitude was different and he believed that they were coming more and more round to look at things in the same light as did His Majesty's Government. This, I may here observe, is also the impression which I had gathered during the recent crisis.

According to a semi-official communication in this morning's press, the Allied note is not looked upon in Government circles as a protest against the Smyrna proclamation. The Powers, it is added, did not wish that their silence should be interpreted as an approval of the measures taken by the Greeks.

This is not however, the view taken by my French colleague who seems to look upon our joint note as a "protest."

I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople and to Sir Harry Lamb.

I have, &c.
C. H. BENTINCK.

Enclosure in No. 161.

Note verbale.

THE proclamation recently issued by the Royal Hellenic High Commissioner at Smyrna, under instructions from the Royal Hellenic Government, would appear, according to the text as published, to deal with "the future organisation and administration of Asia Minor." It is stated that the autochthonal Hellenic element cannot return to the Turkish administration, and that Greece is called upon to lay the foundations of a stable administration, and to elaborate the organic statute," so that "the régime thus created [illegible] shall remain under the guarantee of the liberating Hellenic army."

In obedience to instructions received from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires has the honour to associate himself with the representations which [illegible] in registering a formal reservation in respect of these claims and proceedings, and to remind the Royal Hellenic Government that whilst on the opinion of His Majesty's Government the Hellenic Government are entitled temporarily to administer, as it has done, territory of which they are in military occupation, they are precluded from instituting any régime of a permanent nature by the fact that the future disposition and administration of the territory in question is dependent on the eventual treaty settlement between the Allies and Turkey.

British Legation, Athens, August 15, 1922.

No. 162.

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received August 28.*)

(No. 333.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, August 28, 1922.*

FOLLOWING from Smyrna, No. 60, of 28th August:-

"My telegram No. 58.

Order signed by commander-in-chief appeared in last night's papers summoning all Greeks subjects and also all persons of Greek race residing in occupied area who were born in 1903 to present themselves for enlistment during last week of August, our style failing which they will be prosecuted as defaulters."

No. 163.

Sir H. Lamb (No. 73) to Sir H. Rumbold. (*Repeated to Foreign Office, Received August 28.*)

(No. 49.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Smyrna, August 28, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 70, reported to Foreign Office No. 45.

Greeks retook Bharaich station without difficulty 26th August, and they are now transporting 1,500 men from there by rail to Ushak which strengthens salient but casualties expected on this front.

In security increasing throughout occupied zone and a general feeling of anxiety is spreading, which I fear may easily degenerate into panic.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 59.)

No. 164.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Belgrade (*No. 38 Telegraphic*) *and Bucharest* (*No. 72 Telegraphic*).

Foreign Office, August 28, 1922.

HIS Majesty's Government have received indications that Roumanian and Jugoslav Governments desire to be represented at any conference for revision of Treaty of Sevres which may follow contemplated conference between principal Allies and Greeks and Turks at Venice towards the end of September. Motive for such representation is said to be desire to protest against cession in Turco-Bulgarian frontier in Thrace.

Primary object of Venice Conference is to endeavour to obtain consent of Greeks and Turks to armistice and to the general proposals for peace agreed upon by the three Allied Foreign Ministers at Paris in March last. One of these proposals was to move back Turco-Greek frontier in Eastern Thrace from neighbourhood of Chatalja, as under Treaty of Sevres, to a line running approximately from Rodosto in a north-westerly direction to the Istranja *massif*.

Turks will probably press for return of whole of Eastern Thrace.

You should report local feeling on the subject.

A similar telegram is being addressed to Bucharest (Belgrade).

(Repeated to Athens, No. 174, Constantinople No. 334, and Prague No. 43.)

No. 165.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (*Constantinople, No. 331*).

(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August 28, 1922.*

MY despatch No. 851 of 21st August. Venice Conference.

French Government accept draft instructions to Allied High Commissioners and draft invitation to the three Governments concerned subject, however, to the substitution for the penultimate paragraph of the instructions of the following words. "In the contrary event the Allied High Commissioners will confine themselves to submitting the credentials of the delegates of the belligerents to the three Allied Governments who will decide by mutual agreement if and to what extent satisfaction can be given to them." French Government also propose that as a result of this change passage from the words "otherwise" to "appeal" in the penultimate paragraph of the invitation to the three Governments should be suppressed.

French Government claim that the Italian Government has already accepted generally this point of view and note of Italian Government to us of 25th August seems to bear this out.

The French Government refuse also to accept our view regarding withdrawal of offer made in Allied note to Constantinople Government on 15th April as to advancing date of the evacuation of Asia Minor subject to acceptance of the totality of the peace conditions and reserving the discussion of particular points. French Government consider themselves bound by this promise which can only lapse if the preliminary conference at Venice fails.

(Reported to Athens, No. 172, and Rome No. 228.)

No. 166.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (*Constantinople*).

(No. 335.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 28, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 331.

Result of proposed French modification of instructions and invitation would, of course, be a direct invitation to Angora delegates to refuse Paris proposals and put forward counter-demands. French action at Venice will probably lead to this in any case, and, if His Majesty's Government now insist on the original text of the

draft instructions and invitation proposal to hold preliminary conference may be expected to break down

A possible compromise between British and French proposals would be to suggest to the French suppression in the penultimate paragraphs both of instructions and invitation of the words as to such case to lapse Result of this change would be to permit British emphasise Paris programme as one basis of preliminary discussion while not stipulating for a definite breakup of the latter should the representatives of the three Governments when referred home to the Principal Allied Governments by the three High Commissioners, appeal to the three Allied Governments to maintain possible basis for continuing the negotiations, even though a definite departure from the peace proposals of the Paris Conference might be involved

On the other hand proposed compromise may involve further discussion with French and expedite the meeting of the preliminary conference I am inclined therefore simply to accept the French proposal as it seems essential to bring about agreement together as soon as possible and once the conference meets, resumption of hostilities will be more difficult

Please let me have your observations without delay

I propose in any case, to maintain our view that promise as to advancing date of evacuation as opposed to Angora refusal of 22nd April as obviously must be the result but inform French Government that I would not exclude its reconsideration at the Venice Conference should the Paris proposals be accepted by Angora

Repeated to Athens, No 175, and Rome No 229)

No 167

Sir H Lamb (No 75 Telegraphic) to Sir H Rumbold (Repeated to Foreign Office Received August 29)

(No 52)
(R

Smyrna, August 28, 1922

MY telegram No 73 repeated to Foreign Office No 49

I learn that on 26th August assault Cassaba Cemetery Railway station two miles to the east of Ushak thus isolating Afium Karahissar which is even asserted to-day has been captured by Italians

(Repeated to Athens No 62)

No 168

Sir H Lamb (No 76 Telegraphic) to Sir H Rumbold Repeated to Foreign Office Received August 29

(No 52A)
(R

Smyrna August 29, 1922

MY immediately preceding telegram

Capture of Afium Karahissar is not locally confirmed but it is admitted that heavy fighting has been in progress since 26th August and that about 400 wounded have been brought down to Smyrna or Magnesia Transport of all sorts is being actively requisitioned

Repeated to Athens No 63)

No 169

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received August 30)

(No 336)
(Telegraphic) R

Athens, August 29, 1922

UNREST signs in the press of restiveness provoked by Kemalist offensive the inability of Government to find a solution Kathemerini hitherto staunch supporter of M Gounaris warns the Government that hopes of help from Great Britain or Venice Conference are vain Greece must herself find the solution It

is necessary for internal peace that Greek army winter at home Allies have no army let them remove their flags from Constantinople on the approach of Greek army of Liberation

Other papers call on Government to act, and there are again hints of a possible sudden movement in the direction of Constantinople

Section of press points out that England gives Greece fair words, but that it is France which can give Greece what she wants

(Repeated to Constantinople)

No 170

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received August 30)

(No 338)
Telegraphic

Athens, August 29, 1922

MINISTER of War told Admiral Smith that they were getting rid of French military mission Greeks did not trust mission and would not allow it to go to the front, and it was of no use to them

---

No 171

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received August 30)

(No 339)
(Telegraphic) R

Athens, August 29, 1922

GENERAL Staff communiqué published yesterday evening stated that on 26th August Turkish forces estimated at ten divisions with strong artillery attacked Greek position south of Afium Karahissar from Akar River to Hassan Bei, and that fighting continued day and night

To-day's official communiqué from Army Commander, Asia Minor, announces evacuation yesterday of Afium Karahissar, following heavy Turkish attack Subsequent Turkish cavalry attack was beaten off

(Repeated to Constantinople)

No 172

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received August 30)

(No 340)
(Telegraphic)

Athens August 29, 1922

MY immediately preceding telegram

This morning Chief of General Staff Athens gave military attaché the following confidential information

Special squadrons received by Kemalists from Italians last June enabled Turks of late to penetrate Greek air reconnaissance while Greek cavalry were too few to watch the whole Turkish front, so Turkish concentration south of Afium Karahissar was discovered too late even to allow reinforcement of Greek front from the general reserve 25 miles away Simultaneously with the main attack about four Turkish divisions made a holding attack north of Afium Karahissar Southern group commander was obliged to withdraw first and second Greek corps to line Plusena (on the Akardagh) Eiret (west of Ilsanie station) New line is not fortified but is naturally strong Southern group commander reported that withdrawal had been successfully carried out In the absence of contrary information Chief of the General Staff believed that Greeks had not suffered severe casualties nor lost guns or material

Last news received by General Staff said that Turks had not again attacked, but remained at a distance

Military attaché makes following comment

If Greek general reserve was really unable to intervene in the battle it is unlikely that all guns and road and railway transport can have been withdrawn in time

Chief of General Staff places seven Turkish divisions in northern or Eskishehr area including 1st and is confident that Greek third corps can deal with any possible attack there. There is no intention to re-transfer troops from Thrace.

He persists that there are only twelve infantry regiments in Thrace and that only infantry regiments sent from Asia Minor were the three independent regiments numbered 55, 57, 56 and 62. He emphasised that the fighting army in Asia Minor had been kept intact and that it had not been weakened by sending any divisional regiments either to Thrace or to the Adrianople Railway.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 173

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received August 30.*)

(No. 365.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August 29, 1922.*

NATIONALIST offensive, apparently on fairly considerable scale, has started against Greeks in the Asia Minor. Communications with Anatolia are interrupted, and the only information so far available indicates that railway at Ahum Kara Hissar and Koutaya has probably fallen into Nationalist hands.

General Harington is reporting all details of the situation to the War Office who can keep you informed.

No. 174.

Sir H. Rumbold (No. 58) to Sir H. Lamb. (*Repeated to Foreign Office, Received August 30.*)

(No. 360.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August 29, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 74.

I understand that Nationalists have for the moment closed their ports to vessels of all nationalities and that an Italian ship was refused pratique at Adalia. Nobody has been allowed to proceed to Ismid whether by land or sea during the last two days. These measures are no doubt connected with the offensive now in progress, and although I will take the matter up with Nationalist agent I do not expect any satisfactory result.

(Repeated to Athens No. 96.)

No. 175.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received August 30.*)

(No. 367.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 29, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 335.

Possible compromise mentioned in paragraph 2 appears to me to present little advantage as compared with French suggestions.

In view of importance of holding conference as soon as possible both in the general interest of peace and in order to relieve situation of Greeks sufficiently to deter them from again contemplating desperate measures I share your reluctance to accept French suggestions as it stands. It may involve prolongation of proceedings at Venice especially if Kemalists achieve any marked success in present offensive and consequently come to conference in an elated mood but I think it better to face this danger than to risk further delay.

Offer to advance date of evacuation as drafted by French in April seemed to me too categorical at the time.

Objections which I then entertained against any definite promise to advance date of evacuation are now reinforced by increased importance in view of intervening events of making political guarantees for minorities before evacuation takes place.

I do not think that we should agree beforehand that signal for evacuation will necessarily be given at any particular stage in the discussion at Venice. We might say in order to meet French that when proceedings at Venice reach a point at which prospect of general settlement is assured we shall be prepared to examine question as to whether evacuation can be expedited in anticipation of actual conclusion of treaty without danger of disturbance in the area to be evacuated. Last paragraph of your telegram under reference has reached me in a somewhat corrupt form, but this suggestion appears to be in general accord with it.

It is for consideration whether position in regard to evacuation should not be made clear to Kemalists beforehand in order to obviate misunderstandings and possible charges of bad faith while conference is in progress.

(Repeated to Athens No. 97.)

No. 176.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received August 31.*)

By Bag.

(No. 449.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, August 30, 1922.*

I GAVE M. Poincare this morning the substance of your Lordship's despatch No. 2087 of 29th August regarding the supply of munitions by France to Kemalists. He gave me definite assurances that the reports received by His Majesty's Government as to the supply of munitions to the Kemalists by the French Government or French authorities were absolutely unfounded. He even protested against the thesis that either the agreement or the Government should not supply arms, but should not raise objections to arms being supplied by private firms, that it should be imagined for one instant that the French Government or French authorities had been guilty of acting in violation of the agreement. He pointed out to me that not only were the French Government unwilling to permit and would take steps to prevent any such unfriendly action towards His Majesty's Government but that it would be suicidal in their own interests to do so since eventually any arms used against the British in Mesopotamia might possibly in the long run be utilised against the French themselves in Syria. He begged me to give your Lordship a most definite assurance on this subject.

No. 177.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received August 31.*)

By Bag.

(No. 450.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, August 30, 1922.*

M. POINCARE asked me this morning to inform your Lordship that in his opinion the conference to be held at Venice should be hastened up as much as possible in view of the military events now taking place round Smyrna, and that in his opinion it is extremely urgent that the conference should meet without delay.

No. 178.

Sir H. Lamb (No. 77) to Sir H. Rumbold. (*Repeated to Foreign Office, Received August 30.*)

(No. 53.)
Telegraphic.) R. *Smyrna, August 29, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Greeks now admit that they have been obliged to evacuate Afium Kara hissar. Turkish attempt to cut railway west of Ushak appears to have been repulsed.

(Repeated to Athens.)

No 179

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received August 31)

No 341 Secret.
(Telegraphic) *Athens, August 30, 1922*

CHIEF of General Staff has no fresh news since yesterday from Asia Minor to-day not yet say to what extent Greek reserves have been used up In conversation yesterday with Military Attaché Chief of General Staff said that Turkish counter-attack had only been made possible by the large supplies of war material sent by French and Italians Considered because Greeks were denied right of search that Kemalists obtained that material on credit or at worst, on payment on delivery whereas Greeks had to pay cash with order or they received nothing, quoting recent Greek orders for British aeroplanes as an example, that Greece was really fighting not only Turks but also Western Continent of Europe and Bolshevists She had to rely solely on her own resources and this was proving beyond her powers

(Repeated to Constantinople)

No 180

Mr Benyon to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received August 31)

No 342
(Telegraphic) R *Athens, August 30, 1922*

MINISTER of War left for Smyrna with M Stratos yesterday They are expected back to-morrow night

---

No 181

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received August 31)

(No 343.)
(Telegraphic) R *Athens August 31, 1922*

MY telegram No 330

Government press foresees another diplomatic *demarche* on return of two Ministers from Smyrna requesting support, presumably from us, to counterbalance assistance to Kemalists rendered to enemy by certain Powers If support is not forthcoming then course left to Government will be to take a certain radical measure According to press no request will not only be for financial but also for general support

Athenian Greek papers still supporting Government have been lately suggesting more or less openly necessity to abandonment of Asia Minor Remainder of press of all parties strongly opposes any such idea

(Repeated to Constantinople)

No 182.

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received August 31)

(No 344)
(Telegraphic) *Athens August 31, 1922*

MY immediately preceding telegram

Situation is partially as I with a Government which has lost the confidence of the country almost anything may happen and desperate measures may even be contemplated for the sake of afterwards peace Danger must not be overlooked that pressure on the part of more reckless members of the Government may this time prove too strong for restraining influences

(Repeated to Constantinople)

No 183

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received August 31)

(No 345)
(Telegraphic) R *Athens, August 31, 1922*

MY telegram No. 341

Certain newspapers had stated that French officers had flown Turkish aeroplanes and had commanded Turkish divisions.

French Minister protested against publication of such wilful falsehoods and Ministry for Foreign Affairs have published official denial

(Repeated to Constantinople)

No 184

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston—(Received August 31)

(No 346)
(Telegraphic) *Athens, August 31, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No 174 to Athens, addressed to Belgrade 28th August.

I venture to submit that return to Turkey of the whole of Eastern Thrace would probably produce mutiny in army and possibly a revolution Retrocession to Turkey of strip of the territory mentioned in March proposals would cause profound disappointment but I believe it would be accepted by present Government Government press seems resigned to this loss when proposal was originally mentioned Agitation against even this concession would not however be difficult to work up

(Sent to Constantinople)

No 185

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received August 31)

(No 368)
(Telegraphic) R *Constantinople, August 31, 1922.*

NATIONALIST offensive is causing considerable uneasiness to Constantinople Government which fears that projected preliminary conference at Venice may be prejudiced or unduly delayed thereby Constantinople Government professes to be ignorant of reasons which have prompted this offensive since minor Paris proposals Vratolav was anxious to be restored to the Turks

Minister for Foreign Affairs enquired yesterday whether present fighting would affect proposals of Allied Governments with regard to holding of preliminary conference I replied that I thought not, but that it was not possible to say, now that fighting had started again how Greeks and Nationalists would respond to an invitation to attend conference

(Repeated to Athens, No. 98.)

No 186.

Sir H Lamb to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received August 31)

(No. 54)
(Telegraphic) *Smyrna August 31, 1922.*

MILITARY situation has become serious if not critical.

Ministers of the Interior and of War paid hurried visit to Smyrna yesterday afternoon 30th August leaving again on that evening after discussion with High Commissioner and commander-in-chief latter of whom is reported to have resigned

There is no sign of panic here yet but it may develop at any moment and it might be safer to have some Allied warships in the harbour

(Sent to Constantinople No 78 and Athens. No 65)

No. 187

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 1.)

(No. 347.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, August 31, 1922*

MY telegram No. 344.

Government circles are extremely depressed. Great indignation is expressed against commander-in-chief who was taken completely by surprise and to whose obstinate stupidity present disaster is attributed. I am told that M. Stratos advocates retirement to original mandated frontier while M. Gounaris wants entire evacuation.

It is difficult at present to know how serious the situation really is: there are many rumours but I venture to warn you that abandonment of Asia Minor may be hurriedly decided on and carried out.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 188

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 1.)

(No. 349.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, August 31, 1922*

MY telegram No. 345.

Athens Mail prints a proclamation of sixteen Greek officers from colonels to captains, serving in Smyrna by Kemalist army.

Repeated to Constantinople.

No. 189

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 1.)

(No. 350.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, September 1, 1922*

MY telegram No. 343.

Minister of War told military attaché this morning that Government were now preparing a note to His Majesty's Government explaining situation and recent events.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 190.

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 1.)

(No. 351.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, September 1, 1922*

MY telegram No. 347.

General feeling seems to be taking situation very well. Whole [? Liberal] press observes a highly patriotic attitude in face of danger, but criticism comes from former Government organs. Dockers' strike at Piræus has been spontaneously abandoned in view of situation.

No. 191

Sir H. Lamb (No. 75) to Sir H. Rumbold. (Repeated to Foreign Office, Received September 1.)

(No. 55.)
(Telegraphic.) R *Smyrna, September 1, 1922*

MY telegram No. 77.

Military situation is very obscure but evidently not improving. Ushak is reported to have been evacuated this morning, though this is not officially admitted.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 66.)

No. 192

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris.

[By Bag.]

(No. 270.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 1, 1922*

YOUR despatch No. 1909 of 25th August. Venice Conference.

His Majesty's Government accept changes proposed by the French Government as regards the penultimate paragraphs of the instructions to the three High Commissioners and the invitation to the three Governments respectively.

I am informing Rome accordingly by telegraph to-day and inviting the Italian Government to fix a date convenient to them as early as possible in September for the meeting of the conference, and asking them to inform their representatives at Athens and Constantinople of date chosen in order that Allied representatives there may complete and despatch invitations to the Greek Government and to the two Turkish Governments as soon as possible. Please ask French Government to send necessary instructions to Athens and Constantinople.

His Majesty's Government note the view of French Government regarding the date of evacuation of Asia Minor, but regret that they cannot share it. In their view the offer on this point made in the Allied note of 15th April must logically be regarded as lapsing with the Angora Government's rejection of this offer in their reply of 22nd April. Nevertheless, when proceedings at Venice reach a point at which the prospect of a general settlement is assured His Majesty's Government will be prepared to examine question whether evacuation can be expedited in anticipation of actual conclusion of treaty. Please inform French Government accordingly.

(Addressed to Paris, No. 271. Repeated to Rome No. 233, Athens No. 179, and Constantinople No. 339, in D.)

No. 193

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Kennard (Rome,

No. 234.)
(Telegraphic.) D *Foreign Office, September 1, 1922*

MY telegram No. 270 to Lord Hardinge of 28th August, Venice Conference, and my telegram No. 331 to Constantinople of 28th August, repeated to you.

Please inform Italian Government that we assume that they accept changes in draft instructions and invitation suggested by the French Government and invite them to fix date for meeting of Venice Conference as early as possible in September and to send necessary instructions to their representatives at Constantinople and Athens.

You may also inform them of further expression of our view as to date of evacuation of Asia Minor (see my despatch No. 1121 of 21st August,

---

No 194

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H Rumbold (Constantinople)

No 340)
(Telegraphic) *Foreign Office, September 1 1922*

YOUR telegram No 367 of 29th August Venice Conference, and my telegram No 270 to Paris

Words without danger to evacuated in your proposal regarding date of evacuation seem to me too vague and I have therefore omitted them

I am reluctant at this stage to embark on controversy with French as to whether anything regarding the evacuation of Asia Minor should be added to the invitation to Angora We can be sure that Angora Government will learn our views on the point from the French

(Repeated to Athens No 180)

No 195

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston —(Received September 2)

(No 353)
(Telegraphic) *Athens September 1 1922*

ITALIAN Minister who continues to have reliable information says that military situation is serious but not desperate that total Greek losses amount to 8 800 including prisoners, that Ushak has been evacuated by civil population but that army is still defending it

At Ministry for Foreign Affairs I was told that news was a little better to day, and that the two army corps had succeeded in getting Greeks out of Ushak

Minister of War conferred this morning with military attaché He foreshadowed further retreat both from Ushak and from Eskis near as Greek Government did not consider themselves justified in sacrificing many lives in holding territory which must eventually be given up He had been most anxious regarding separation of 1st and 2nd Corps to south but was now greatly relieved He had no anxiety about north Inexperienced Cavalry is with 2nd Army Corps Losses in the latter were not severe Total wounded 1 500

(Repeated to Constantinople)

No 196

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.— (Received September 2)

No 56 Very Confidential
(Telegraphic) *Athens September 1 1922*

MY telegram No 353

News received from the front is extremely grave It appears that the two army corps have not joined hands before Ushak after all but that one of their lines of retreat cut off and driven north with supplies and ammunition only sufficient for a few days Government are seriously alarmed and private secretary of Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that there was talk of abandoning Smyrna Army seems to have lost *moral* Minister for Foreign Affairs called at 10 30 to night and read me translation of a telegram sent to Greek Legation in London for communication to you He begged me to telegraph also immediately to explain situation but as Greek Legation will communicate full text of message it is unnecessary for me to do so When Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to assistance rendered by Great Powers to Kemalists he declared that he was sure of his facts He included Russia amongst Powers At the end of the message it is stated that army can no longer oppose attacks of the enemy Minister for Foreign Affairs explained in this connection that situation was so grave that Government had telegraphed to commander in chief to suggest asking for an armistice He will let me know reply to-morrow

Minister for Foreign Affairs denies stories circulated against commander in chief, who he says, according to Ministers just returned from Smyrna, has done his duty (see my telegram No 347)

Minister for Foreign Affairs begs that above be treated as strictly confidential for His Majesty's Government only

(Repeated to Constantinople)

No 197

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 2)

(No 357)
(Telegraphic) *Athens, September 2 1922*

MY telegram No 356

My impression as that telegram sent to Greek Legation was drafted early in the day but that arrival of grave news at about 7 30 in the evening may have given rise to the very alarming concluding sentence As it appears from this that complete evacuation of Asia Minor may be very probably decided on I venture to suggest that His Majesty's Government might on humanitarian grounds offer any available transports to help in removing Christian population and that warships might proceed to Smyrna to prevent entry of Turks before evacuation of Christians is completed

French Minister admitted to me two days ago that he considered massacres of Christian population inevitable but he thought machinery was ready at Constantinople to relieve evacuated districts

In view of above I presume last paragraph of your telegram No 179 to Paris is superseded

Last night's grave news I believe, been concealed from everybody excepting His Majesty's Legation

(Repeated to Constantinople,

No 198

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 2)

(No 358)
(Telegraphic) *Athens, September 2 1922*

MY telegram No 356

In connection with possible request for armistice, I venture to submit following for consideration

1 If Kemal should grant armistice it is unlikely he would demand evacuation of troops from Asia Minor to be actually carried by him

2 Evacuation at least of Eastern Thrace

When all possible Greek support to us had thus been removed he would probably march on Constantinople where it is possible that French would not oppose him

On the other hand if he should refuse armistice Greek army in south will be in grave peril but it will probably be found possible to transport at least part of the troops from the north to Thrace

Looking from this second it would appear that defence of Constantinople without aid of Greek troops would be a problem I presume military authorities have considered this aspect of the case

(Repeated to Constantinople)

No 199

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 2)

(No 359 Confidential)
(Telegraphic) *Athens, September 2, 1922*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs has just sent his private secretary to communicate to me sense of two telegrams which are being sent to Greek Legation London for immediate communication to you

No 1 states that High Commissioner Smyrna, has telegraphed that in view of impossibility of defending Smyrna against Kemalists. Powers should be warned to take urgent measures for protection of town in the interests of their nationals.

No 2 that in view of military situation Greek Government would accept proposals for an armistice on the basis of immediate evacuation of Asia Minor Greek Government beg His Majesty's Government immediately to take such steps as they consider necessary in the circumstances.

Message concludes with expression of faith in His Majesty's Government's friendly services

These communications are being made to His Majesty's Government only

(Repeated to Constantinople and Smyrna.)

No. 200.

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 2.)

(No. 360.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, September 2, 1922*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs has sent me word in answer to my enquiry to explain that commander-in-chief has not yet replied to suggestion made to him as to advisability of issuing armistice of Kemal (see my telegram No 356) but that Greek Government have given instructions, in my immediately preceding telegram of their own initiative made definite request to His Majesty's Government to arrange an armistice for them on basis of evacuation which Kemal has demanded since last March but to which up till now Greeks had not been prepared to agree

Chief of the General Staff took military attaché to-day that evacuation of Asia Minor including Brussa would be begun immediately. He advised British Commander-in-Chief Constantinople to know this. He added that troops had practically ceased to fight. He expected troops embarked at Mudania would be sent to [illegible] Rodosto as nearest port.

During recent operations 2 three regiments had been sent from Thrace to Smyrna, elsewhere so that present strength in Thrace is two divisions in Eastern and one division in Western Thrace.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No 201

Sir C. Young to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 2.)

(No. 117.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, September 2, 1922*

YOUR telegram No. 58

My telegram No. 47 and despatch No. 124 reported apparent indifference of Minister for Foreign Affairs at prospect of common Turco-Bulgarian frontier.

Subsequently he was advised yesterday by Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs in absence of Minister for Foreign Affairs to group omitted, also expressed personal view that possession of Constantinople should also possess Adrianople but as personal views are apt to be misleading.

Press has not shown very great interest in question and at present never alludes to it.

Greek Chargé d'Affaires says it was at instance of Greek Government that Roumanian and Serb-Croat-Slovene Foreign Ministers promised to broach the subject with Great Powers at Genoa.

While therefore Serb-Croat-Slovene Government may raise the question in the interests of Greece with whom relations are becoming more intimate there is as yet no evidence that they are likely independently to take up strong attitude or to press for representation at revision of treaty to which they are not signatories, unless they see prospect of obtaining satisfaction on points to which they take much more serious objection than proposed common Turco-Bulgarian frontier.

(Sent to Athens, Constantinople and Bucharest.)

No 202

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 2.)

(No. 370.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 1, 1922*

MY telegram No. 367, paragraph 2.

Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs questioned Mr. Ryan on 30th August regarding report that His Majesty's Government wished to cancel promise to master date of evacuation. His language showed fairly exact knowledge of paragraph 6 of your memorandum of 18th August, but presumably to indiscretion on the part of French. Disclosures of this kind before completion of exchange of views are unfortunate, as they are widely canvassed in Turkish circles and are exploited to create impression that His Majesty's Government are approaching conference in spirit of hostility to Turks, if not of actual bad faith.

No 203

Sir H. Lamb to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 2.)

(No. 56.)
(Telegraphic.) *Smyrna, September 2, 1922*

MY telegram No. 54.

Military situation has become desperate. Ushak has now been occupied and Greek army is in full flight and seems to be incapable of offering further resistance.

Complete chaos may be expected here within the next few hours. Early arrival of warships and strong landing force appears to be the only means to preserve order.

(Repeated to Constantinople No. 80 and Athens, No. 67.)

No 204

Sir H. Lamb to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 2.)

(No. 57.)
(Telegraphic.) *Smyrna, September 2, 1922*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Greek High Commissioner informed me this morning that military position was slightly improved since last night owing to fact that 2nd Army Corps, which had been pushed back to the north has succeeded in re-establishing contact with 1st, on a line slightly east of Afiun-Kara. They are however, being hotly pressed by the enemy and in their demoralised condition it is impossible to count on prolonged resistance.

Troops which were withdrawn and sent to Thrace are shortly expected back and will be used to cover immediate approaches to Smyrna in the endeavour to prevent influx of refugees and fugitive soldiers.

Should these endeavours fail, serious position will certainly arise in Smyrna which is insufficiently provisioned to maintain large number of refugees.

(Repeated to Constantinople No. 81 and Athens, No. 68.)

No 205

Sir H. Lamb to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 2.)

(No. 59.)
(Telegraphic.) *Smyrna, September 2, 1922*

MY telegram No. 57.

I would suggest strong and immediate effort be made to induce Turks to agree to an armistice, pending a decision as to evacuation of Smyrna by Greeks.

If successful this would obviate danger of catastrophe which otherwise appears probable.

(Repeated to Constantinople No. 84 and Athens, No. 69.)

No. 206

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)

No. 344.)
Telegraphic.) D *Foreign Office, September 2, 1922*

GREEK Government announce through Chargé d'Affaires here that in view of military events they would accept proposal for armistice on understanding that immediate evacuation of Asia Minor will be carried out.

They beg His Majesty's Government to proceed without delay to necessary *démarche* to that end in way His Majesty's Government consider opportune.

Apparently request has not been addressed to other Powers.

Instructions to you will follow as soon as possible.

Addressed to Constantinople, No. 344. Repeated to Paris, No. 272, Rome, No. 235, and Athens, No. 183.

No. 207

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)

(No. 345.)
(Telegraphic.) D *Foreign Office, September 2, 1922*

GREEK Chargé d'Affaires states under instructions, that His Majesty's Commissioner at Smyrna telegraphs that owing to inability of Greek army to defend town from invasion, Great Powers should be informed in order that they may take urgent measures for protection of town and of interests of their subjects.

In view of reserve of Sir H. Lamb's telegram No. 56 of to-day, you should concert with Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean for protection and possible evacuation of British colony.

You should also inform your colleagues and Sir H. Lamb.

(Addressed to Constantinople No. 345. Repeated to Paris, No. 273, Rome, No. 236, and Athens, No. 184.)

No. 208

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 362.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, September 3, 1922.*

SMYRNA telegram No. 59.

I hardly agree. Greeks have asked His Majesty's Government to arrange armistice, and do not see why His Majesty's Government will be able to obtain better terms for them than they would themselves obtain by direct request to Kemal (see my telegram No. 360).

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 209

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 3.)

(No. 364.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, September 3, 1922.*

GREA[illegible] represents (word omitted) as grave news is beginning to leak out. Evil of Calogeropoulos is blocked at and possible exit of Mistergiannes to the premiership. World press with two exceptions calls on Government to resign immediately. Meanwhile King remains at Tatoi and Crown Prince in Roumania.

According to press, officers of national defence at Constantinople have again asked to be sent to the front and request has been accepted.

Unwillingness of troops to fight has been a most terrible surprise. Knowledge that in any case Asia Minor would have to be evacuated, coupled with disappointment about Constantinople and anxiety about their families at home, appears

to have undermined their *moral*. Power of Turkish artillery came as a most disagreeable surprise. Greek communistic newspapers recently succeeded in reaching troops at front and no doubt has contributed to weaken the *moral*.

Disagreeable incident was reported yesterday from Piræus, where arrival of wounded was a signal for anti-war demonstration of dockers.

It is probable that some visible measure of support from His Majesty's Government would even now have great moral effect.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 210

Sir H. Lamb to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 3.)

(No. 60.)
(Telegraphic.) *Smyrna, September 3, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 57.

Situation developing slowly but surely along lines indicated.

Greek General Staff admit that there is no possibility of army offering further resistance.

Fully 2,000 refugees have already arrived by Smyrna-Aidin Railway alone.

Seven vessels are now loading stores and ammunition at railway pier and aviation camp is being evacuated.

Town is in state of acute alarm but no disorder has yet occurred. The danger period will be that between order for evacuation and establishment of Turkish authority. If Greek civil administration and police be withdrawn or collapse there should be some authority based on Allied force to bridge over interval.

(Sent to Constantinople No. 85 and Athens, No. 72.)

No. 211

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 4.)

(No. 365.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, September 3, 1922.*

GREEKS ask for your advice whether in the event of it being necessary for them to ask for mediation between belligerents for establishment of peace they should address a request to His Majesty's Government only or to all three Allies.

No. 212

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 4.)

(No. 367.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, September 3, 1922.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs has just informed me that at noon to-day General Trikoupis who with one and a half divisions of his 1st Corps had been cut off with the 2nd Corps, passed unmolested through Usak which was then still in Greek possession. Telegram does not state whom General Trikoupis had with him but military attaché feels confident he would not have left his troops.

Kemalist reports lead Greek Government to fear that portion of 2nd Army Corps has been captured.

Two Greek warships and several transports have left for Smyrna to evacuate materials and troops as no defence at town is contemplated. I gather that no provision is being made for evacuation of civilians.

Third Army Corps is successfully retiring on Brussa and is expected to evacuate in order.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 213

Mr. Beatty to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 3*)

(No. 358)
(Telegraphic)

Athens, September 3, 1922

My telegram No. 360.

In spite of precautions and official denial news of Greek request to His Majesty's Government has leaked out and I gather from Minister for Foreign Affairs that elected Minister had let it be known that an Belgian Minister that though request should not have been made to His Majesty's Government about Mitylene for admission. His Excellency explained to me that request made at His Majesty's Government to arrange armistice on basis after has been chosen ever since March is not a request for mediation between the belligerents.

I cited the point with Minister for Foreign Affairs whether to avoid misleading the French Government it might not be wise to let them know exactly what Greek Government had asked of His Majesty's Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he would do this if asked point blank by French Minister.

Although all official information as to respective attitudes of British and French Governments he and learnt from Greek representatives abroad that His Majesty's Government had in October pressed Greek Government to refrain from [illegible] to Smyrna. He feared it might embarrass His Majesty's Government to appear to weaken [illegible] if he told latter that Greeks had given way on this point. His Majesty's Government might prefer to take the initiative themselves. However we should wish Greek Government to tell French Government of request rather than that His Majesty's Government should do this. Minister for Foreign Affairs could do so at once.

(Repeated to Constantinople No. 361.)

No. 214

M. Wallenberg Drake to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 3*)

(No. 106)
(Telegraphic)

Bucharest, September 2, 1922

YOUR telegram No. 72.

President of the Council has been Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs so I immediately applied in writing for definite statement that I was to hear views of Roumanian Government regarding Greco-Turkish question and more especially frontier in Thrace. President of the Council being ill sent me written reply yesterday in substance of which is as follows:

Any Council regarding matters in question Roumanian Government desire peaceful consolidation based on understanding between the Allies and would endeavour to make their views coincide with those of His Majesty's Government. This would be their aim. Asked to Venice as they consider it just and opportune but they should be because just as essential interest to them will be discussed such as Straits regime.

In reply to my enquiry as to Greek delegate stated that Roumanian Government had made no communication to Greek Government regarding restitution of Thrace or Thracian frontier nor has Greek Government asked for support of Roumanian Government regarding latter but he thought Roumanian Government were more concerned with Straits question (see my despatch No. 96 and my telegram No. 155 last year) which President of the Council's letter since received seems to confirm. First Secretary of Serbian Royal Legation with whom I had chance conversation told me that so far as he knew no communications had passed between His Government and Roumanian Government as to recent events regarding Thracian frontier.

I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning who mentioned that he had returned from Prague yesterday in time for President of the Council to consult him before despatching his letter to myself. He could not make any statement about frontier question at present.

This reticence of Roumanian Government regarding Thracian frontier may be explained alternatively as follows. They may believe their objection to common Turkish Bulgarian frontier may be disagreeable or inconvenient to British, French and Italian Governments, and they may therefore think it preferable not to state it until invitation to conference is secured.

(Sent to Athens, Belgrade and Constantinople.)

No. 215

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 3*)

(No. 371)
(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, September 2, 1922

Mr. RYAN asked Hamid Bey in the course of personal conversation on 30th August whether present offensive was political rather purely military operation by which Kemalists expected to dictate situation in Asia Minor definitely.

Hamid Bey naturally gave no direct answer but said that when giving him advance information about offensive Angora Government had dwelt on fact that Turkey had remained unanswered for four months, and that fresh month's delay since conference at Venice was first source of nothing had happened. Nothing could now be settled before end of fighting season. Four months of what had been allowed might by interference were unsuccessful result would be that Nationalist armies would have to remain under arms to next spring.

Hamid Bey also made pointed reference to message of Prime Minister's speech of 4th August implying that Paris proposals might be altered to disadvantage of Turkey. He still seemed anxious Venice Conference should take place. He asked whether urgent decision might soon be expected and observed that it would take Angora delegates fifteen days to get to Venice.

When justifying Kemalist decision to prevent ingress or egress of all ships having offices at Haidar Pasha, Hamid said that this was the measure which any Government was entitled to adopt in such circumstances. Mr. Ryan observed that right to do so might be affected by armistice of 1918. Hamid Bey at once said that that instrument did not apply in Anatolia. This has of course always been Kemalist view. The bluntness of statement is worth noting.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 163.)

No. 216

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 347)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 3, 1922

COMPLETE evacuation of Asia Minor was one of terms proposed at Paris Conference and would be first subject to be discussed at impending conference at Venice. It was accepted as military necessity by Greek Government who desire immediate transfer on that understanding. His Majesty's Government are naturally anxious to terminate disastrous warfare and to avoid further shedding of blood and will gladly take any steps in negotiation with them likely to secure these objects but they also have to consider political conditions under which evacuation will take place and protection of Christian population. Your advice is requested as to steps to be taken to communicate this offer to Turks and to secure cessation of hostilities pending early meeting of conference. You are at liberty to consult your colleagues if you consider it desirable before replying.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 274 (by bag), Rome, No. 237, and Athens, No. 185.)

No. 217

Mr. Beatty to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 4, 1922*)

(No. 411)
My Lord,

Athens, August 31, 1922

WITH reference to my telegram No. [illegible] of the 25th ultimo I have not received Mr. Lamb Curzon's despatch No. 661 of the 25th ultimo, but I have learnt so far as I am able to ascertain, M. Triandaphyllakos's resignation was brought about immediately by

[illegible] not being anxious about the recent threat to Constantinople which he entirely disapproved [illegible] as soon as he heard of it he came to Athens without previously requesting permission and leaving his post and learning that there was a Ministerial Council sitting, he presented himself at it and gave his opinion that the step he had taken was absolutely explained that his opinion was at first to have been asked M Stergiades is said to have supported him, but to have refrained from pressing his opinions in view of his position as High Commissioner in Smyrna

M Tsaldaris then said that terms with the Government as he had been commissioned to do had to be arranged with the officers of the National Defence with a view to their being accepted in the army He met Generals Joannou and Papoulas and matters [illegible] the Government, instead of employing the officers in Asia Minor as had been agreed, ordered them to come to Athens This they and M Tsaldaris also considered a breach of faith

M Stathatos, Greek consul-general at Constantinople, also resigned, I am told, in connection with the same matter

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople

I have, &c
C H BENTINCK

E 8817 5 44] No 218

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 4)

(No 417)
Sir, *Athens, August 17, 1922*

WITH reference to my despatch No 411 of to-day's date and to your Lordship's despatch No [illegible] of the 28th instant I have the honour to report that M Charalambos Simopoulos former Minister at Budapest who was appointed to succeed M Demetrius Papadopoulos as Greek High Commissioner at Constantinople on the latter's resignation was first secretary to Royal Legation 1920 and should have been in charge Palatianos during M Gennadius's absence, but he was ill with typhoid at the time

M Simopoulos is a well-known Athenian school master He is considered a clever capable official He is somewhat pro-Turkish in politics so far as he ever takes any view of Government policy of the day before him, but is considered to be honest

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople

I have, &c
C H BENTINCK

No 219

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 4)

(No 369)
(Telegraphic) *Athens September 4 1922*

YOUR telegram No 317 to Constantinople

I should be grateful to be informed if Sir H Rumbold decides to consult with his colleagues Monday I inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government have no objection to his asking French and Italian Ministers here to request their Governments to instruct their High Commissioners at Constantinople to join with His Majesty's Government for armistice (see my telegram No 368)?

(Repeated to Constantinople)

No 220

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston —(Received September 4)

(No 372)
(Telegraphic) R *Athens September 4, 1922*

MY telegram No 367

Greek High Commissioner at Smyrna reported late last night that 1st and 2nd Army Corps have gained touch with one another and have succeeded in reaching and occupying positions near Ushak Despite difficulties of ground, operation was carried out in complete order

(Repeated to Constantinople)

No 221

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston —(Received September 4)

(No 373)
(Telegraphic) *Athens, September 4 1922.*

MY telegram No 367

Minister of War told military attaché in confidence that General Tricoupis would to-day be appointed in place of General Hadjimanolis subject to approval of the King

(Repeated to Constantinople)

No 222

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 4)

(No 373)
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople September 3, 1922*

YOUR telegram No 344 and Athens telegram No 358 to Foreign Office

If a proposal for an armistice is made to Nationalists in order to save Greek army from complete disaster we can assume that Nationalists will, as a condition of acceptance ask for whole National Pact including evacuation of Eastern Thrace If Allies intervene on proposal for an armistice Nationalists are quite capable of demanding evacuation of Constantinople & Allied troops

I would not put it past the French to espouse this demand

(Repeated to Athens No 105)

No 223

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 4)

(No 374)
(Telegraphic) R *Constantinople September 3 1922*

FRENCH High Commissioner informed me to-day that his reports from Angora indicate that Nationalists had hesitated for some time before launching their offensive

They had decided to do so as a result of proclamation by Greeks of an autonomous district in Asia Minor coupled with Mr Lloyd George's speech, which they considered foreshadowed a revision of Peace proposals in a sense unfavourable to Turkey Nationalists had therefore decided to settle matters by force of arms.

(Repeated to Athens No 106)

No 224

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 4)

(No 375)
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople, September 3, 1922*

YOUR telegram No 270 to Paris.

Italian High Commissioner is awaiting instructions from his Government French High Commissioner expressed opinion with me to-day that military events in Anatolia had rather changed situation with regard to proposed Venice Conference, which he seemed to infer would be premature at present

(Repeated to Athens, No 107)

No. 225

Telegram (by Telephone) from Paris.—(Received September 4, 1922)

(No. 455)
(Telegraphic)

YOUR telegram No. 270 of 1st September Venice Conference

I have just received note from M Poincaré stating that necessary instructions have been sent to French representatives at Athens and Constantinople in regard to invitation to Greek Government and two Turkish Governments

---

No 226

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr Bentinck (Athens,

(No 19)
(Telegraphic) D *Foreign Office September 4, 1922*

GREEK Chargé d'Affaires was informed to-day of my telegram to Paris No 275. It was pointed out to him that Greek Government should be careful not to imagine that the situation is worse than perhaps it is and how important it is that they should not throw away any cards that they can retain and that may be invaluable in later negotiations

---

No 227

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H Rumbold (Constantinople)

(No 350)
(Telegraphic) R. *Foreign Office September 4 1922*

SMYRNA telegram No. 37 of 2nd September Provisioning of Smyrna

Please invite American Relief Association to do what they can to provision Smyrna and telegraph further action from to send is received in this direction

(Repeated to Smyrna No 15, Athens No 187 Paris by bag), No 270 and Rome, No 239)

No 228.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Paris (No 275 Telegraphic and Rome (No. 238 Telegraphic)

(D) *Foreign Office, September 4, 1922*

MY telegram No 344 of 2nd September to Constantinople Greek request for an armistice.

His Majesty's Government propose that the three High Commissioners should invite Angora Government at once to send competent military representatives to the frontier of the neutral zone to meet Allied Commander in chief and his French and Italian colleagues and competent Greek military representatives with a view

to the immediate conclusion of an armistice. The Allied military representatives should if possible secure that immediate evacuation of Asia Minor by Greek troops takes place by stages and under supervision of Allied officers.

Full discretion in the negotiation should be left to the Allied representatives.

Official Greek reports point to urgent necessity of immediate armistice in order to avoid further bloodshed and possible massacre of Christians as well as danger to foreign colonies in Smyrna

You should urge Government to which you are accredited to send immediate instructions in the above sense to their High Commissioners and military representatives at Constantinople

(Repeated to Athens No. 186 and Constantinople No 348

No 229

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Paris (No 277 Telegraphic (by bag)) and Rome (No 240 Telegraphic (R))

Foreign Office September 4, 1922.

BRITISH naval commander in chief has gone to Smyrna in H M S Iron Duke, and King George V " follows Please inform Government to which you are accredited and invite them to instruct their naval authorities at Constantinople or Smyrna to concert measures for the temporary protection of foreign colonies and refugees, should events render such protection necessary

(Repeated to Constantinople No 351 Athens, No 188 and Smyrna No 16)

No 230.

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 5,

(No 375)
(Telegraphic *Athens, September 4, 1922*

MY telegram No 363

There is a good deal of criticism even in Royalist circles, at inaction of King and Royal Family Not a single member is at Smyrna Prince Andrew is here on a holiday I am told Crown Prince has at last been ordered to return to Greece

My Belgian colleague tells me he has frequently been asked whether abdication would improve matters for Greece

---

No. 231

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 5.)

(No 378)
(Telegraphic *Constantinople, September 4 1922.*

ATHENS telegram No. 362

Armistice is certainly desirable If it can be obtained on condition of evacuation of Asia Minor only, to which Greek Government have already made up their minds, so much the better I cannot however share opinion of Chargé d'Affaires at Athens that His Majesty's Government will be able to obtain better terms for Greeks than they could themselves

In the minds of Kemalists, His Majesty's Government are completely identified with Greece This impression was enormously strengthened by Prime Minister's speech If His Majesty's Government now put themselves forward to ask for armistice Kemalists will be still further confirmed in this impression and will see in our action admission of bankruptcy, not only of Greek cause, but of policy of His Majesty's Government

Our purely moral influence with Kemalists is nil Any idea that they will give Greeks better terms in order to court the favour of His Majesty's Government must be dismissed They still fear us to some extent knowing that if we chose at any moment to exercise our own force we could place greater difficulties in their way

than we have hitherto done We should place no reliance on their willingness to accommodate us. We should do everything to [? omitted keep] alive their fear that even if they dispose of Greeks they will still have to reckon with us

Dangers foreshadowed in my telegram No 373 should be borne steadily in mind If Greeks themselves ask for armistice and Kemalists are disposed to grant it, they will almost certainly demand unconditional evacuation of Eastern Thrace as well as Asia Minor which is tantamount to imposing National Pact on Greeks If however His Majesty's Government put forward request Kemalists will probably either refuse our intervention saying that it is for Greeks themselves to demand an armistice or else seize the opportunity of endeavouring to commit His Majesty's Government themselves to acceptance of pact

I feel that we should keep our hands as free as possible, even at the expense of advising Greeks to seek armistice in the usual military fashion by arrangement between military commanders. This would not prevent us from doing what we can alone or jointly with Allies to reduce danger of chaos in evacuated area e.g., by offering our good offices to both sides to see that evacuation, [? once] agreed on was carried out in orderly fashion

(Repeated to Athens. No 108.)

No 232

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 5.*)

(No. 379.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 4, 1922*

My immediately preceding telegram

I have stated my views in the assumption that Greek collapse is complete I am impressed by indications in Athens and Smyrna telegrams that panic at those places, and especially the former is even greater than panic at the front

A prospect which Greeks have to our consideration, but I do not think by any means that Greeks should lend us to fact that if their collapse is complete whole position of His Majesty's Government themselves in regard to settlement in the Near East is endangered

Hasty evacuation of Asia Minor to one which now seems inevitable, involves dangers to our position at Constantinople and in Mesopotamia which were so much in the minds of His Majesty's Government early in the year If Greeks have to leave Eastern Thrace as well as Asia Minor our policy in regard to the Straits will also be threatened with failure It is doubtful whether French are sound even in Straits question. They are certainly disloyal in every other direction as regards the Near East settlement

Events are moving so rapidly that in my opinion His Majesty's Government would do well to study immediately possibility of comprehensive balance is between themselves and Kemalists Collapse of Greeks may place us in situation in which only alternatives for His Majesty's Government would be complete surrender to Kemalists backed by Greeks or strong independent action I have in mind possibility of such action as occupying Gallipoli Peninsula.

(Repeated to Athens. No. 109.)

No 233.

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 5.)

(No. 380.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 4 1922*

YOUR telegram No 347

Please see my telegrams Nos 373 378 and 379 which were despatched before receipt of your telegram under reference

If Greek army can stand on Alashehr line we may have breathing space in which to devise measures for orderly evacuation of Smyrna area General Harington's latest information shows there are three or four Greek divisions in a condition to fight if they could get a leader On the other hand telegrams received from Commander-in-chief of Mediterranean and dated yesterday report Greek military authorities consider that there is no likelihood of Greek army being able to

hold any line at all This is confirmed by Smyrna telegram No 60 to you, which I have just received We have therefore to reckon with prospect of thousands of refugees pouring into Smyrna and coastal towns.

I am purposely refraining from consulting my colleagues as to communication of Greek offer to Turks because in first place offer would be at once passed on to Nationalist agent by my French colleague and lend still further to weaker Greek position. This would be unfair to Greeks Secondly, because French High Commissioner would almost certainly take line that events must run their course, and that it is for Greek commander-in-chief to ask for an armistice I am clear that French would subordinate intervention with us to secure suspension of hostilities, to acceptance of Kemalist conditions, which would include evacuation of Eastern Thrace I shall however with special reference to last paragraph of Smyrna telegram No 60, and without mentioning Greek offer immediately endeavour to ascertain views of my colleagues regarding steps to be taken to avoid massacres at all events in Smyrna district and will telegraph again

Question of Allied intervention to secure suspension of hostilities would seem to be matter for direct arrangement with Paris and Rome, as were I to raise it here my colleagues would certainly refer to their respective Governments I think Allied intervention might take the form of a notification to Kemalists that Allied Governments will take Smyrna under their protection until evacuation of Greek army and of such civilians as wish to go has been completed

You will have gathered that Greek *débâcle* cannot but prejudice Paris proposals, and that situation has completely changed The French here are even doubting whether there is any basis for a preliminary conference of Venice

(Repeated to Athens No 110.)

No 234

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 5*

(No 381.)
(Telegraphic.) D *Constantinople September 5 1922*

MY telegram No. 380

I have acquainted my colleagues with substance of last paragraph of Sir H Lamb's telegram No. 60 and have discussed with them question of Smyrna and armistice and Venice Conference

Smyrna

My colleagues fully appreciate the considerations advanced by Sir H Lamb, but they are firmly opposed to any action which would bring Allied forces into conflict with Kemalist forces They consider detachments should if necessary be landed from ships to protect our respective colonies in Smyrna town The mere presence of these detachments on land would inspire confidence and prevent excesses should however excesses occur, French High Commissioner considers detachments should put a stop to them in the interests of humanity Detachments might occupy various points in Smyrna and eventually hand these over to regular Kemalist officials My colleagues do not see how we have any practical means of preventing disorders and excesses outside limits of Smyrna town

My French colleague has given great latitude to French Admiral as regards measures for protecting French subjects I am in agreement with foregoing

Armistice

French High Commissioner has now heard of Greek request to His Majesty's Government to bring about an armistice I pointed out to my colleague that speedy conclusion of an armistice would tend to prevent disorders and excesses always attending a disorderly retreat and a hot pursuit Both my colleagues agreed that Allied Governments might very properly intervene to secure a suspension of hostilities and an armistice French High Commissioner considers proper course to be for Allied Governments to recommend Greek Government to ask for an armistice and to inform Greek Government simultaneously that they will use their good offices with Kemalists to back this request Allied Governments would intimate to Angora that suspension of hostilities and conclusion of an armistice had in view the immediate and orderly evacuation of Asia Minor by Greeks I am in agreement with my colleagues about this

Venice Conference

French High Commissioner has now got instructions, but Italian High Commissioner is still without them. The latter states that his Government propose that High Commissioners should fix date of conference. We are all three agreed that it would be wiser to wait a few days before inviting Turks to attend conference so as to allow time for present excitement to subside.

According to French High Commissioner Turks are quite carried away by their victories, and they even talk of recovering *Western* Thrace as far as Seres. We think an immediate invitation to conference would be construed by Turks as a panic invitation and would play straight into the hands of Mustapha Kemal Pasha. We consider proper moment for issuing an invitation to conference would be when or if there is a stabilisation on the front in lieu of on the conclusion of an armistice.

Repeated to Athens, No. 111.)

No. 235

Sir H. Lamb to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 5.*)

(No. 61.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Smyrna, September 4, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 1 Constantinople. Protection of British colony.

Protection having been found impracticable, it has been decided after discussion with naval authorities and Embassy colleagues to ship all British subjects desirous of leaving either to Malta or Cyprus. Number shipped not exceed 1,500 to either place. They will be given water, food for voyage, but arrangements must be made for accommodation on arrival.

Lord [illegible] to give exact numbers which vessels leave.

Repeated to Cyprus and Constantinople, No. 86.)

No. 236

Sir H. Lamb to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September 4.*)

(No. 62.)
(Telegraphic.) *Smyrna, September 4, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 57.

Large number of refugees already arrived, 30,000 more reported to be moving down. Could Red Cross be invited to undertake relief?

No. 237

Sir H. Lamb to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 5.*)

(No. 63.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Smyrna, September 5, 1922.*

PRESENT situation is as follows:

Eskishehr, Afiun Karahissar, Tireh and Sokia are all evacuated. Turkish cavalry are believed to be at Salihli, no irregulars to have taken possession of Aidin Railway Edemish and Tireh remain as far as Ichatas junction.

Greeks are rapidly evacuating all possible material and civil administration is believed to be on the point of leaving.

Greek post offices closed and National Bank of Greece closing.

Refugees are pouring in and scarcity of bread really felt.

Town very agitated but no actual disorders yet.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 87, and Athens No. 73.)

No. 238

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 6.*)

(No. 377.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, September 5, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 373.

Better news has put some backbone into the country. Government announces that it will not abandon its post nor shirk its responsibilities.

General Pallis, Colonel Sarvanis (see Smyrna telegram No. 92 of 15th June, 1921, and Mr. Lindley's despatch No. 352) have been reappointed Chief and Deputy Chief of General Staff in Asia Minor.

General Dousmanis, Greece's strong soldier (annual report 1921, p. 12), has been made Chief of the General Staff of the whole Greek army, replacing General Exadactiles, who resumes his old post of Deputy Chief. Latter was quite unequal to chiefship, but his talent for intelligence work makes him a useful deputy.

Tricoupis has been confirmed in Asia Minor command and promoted lieutenant-general. Appointment of these officers seems to indicate determination by Greek Government to face situation and as far as possible to retrieve it.

Minister of War told military attaché today that Kutahia and Eskishehr had been evacuated and that Greek troops were retiring from latter place. Turks attacked at Kovhitza but were handsomely beaten off by five Greek battalions. Turkish strength unknown.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that Turks had occupied and burnt Alashehr.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 239

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 6.*)

(No. 379.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, September 5, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 191 and your telegram No. 275 to Paris.

I read both telegrams as paraphrase to Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. His Excellency took notes and asked me to thank you.

I then made personal comments to the effect that many people and I thought that Greek Government had been unwise to demand, but that it is morning's news was better (see my telegram No. 377). If armistice were to be arranged for Greek Government obviously they would get better terms if they showed that they had some kick left. I reminded his Excellency that so far as I knew Greeks were numerically superior to Turks. Even though the news of eventual evacuation had undermined their *moral* situation appeared to have distinctly improved. I suggested that he should instruct Greek Chargé d'Affaires to explain this to you.

Military attaché had already on Sunday and Monday, with my approval, endeavoured to encourage Minister of War and General Staff to help themselves and it is possible that this may have had some influence on present appointments.

Minister for Foreign Affairs mentioned that there appeared still to be great confusion at the front until at massacres had already commenced. He feared that retreating Greek soldiers had also been guilty.

Minister for Foreign Affairs does not appear to be recuperating quite as quickly as some of the younger officials.

No. 240.

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 6.*)

(No. 380.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, September 5, 1922.*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegrams Nos. 378 and 379.

First paragraph of telegram No. 379 seems to indicate that His Majesty's High Commissioner has information of state of things at front which has not reached me and which I should be grateful to receive. Last telegram from

Constantinople on this subject referred to reports from Major Johnstone on the situation as it was on 30th August. Gravity of situation was realised here on night of 1st–2nd September when 2nd Corps was reported to be lost and according to official Greek reports on which I am told to depend, Greek troops had ceased to fight. My two telegrams will show what situation was. Has been improving since evening of 3rd September and we believe Greek troops will fight. Cover General Trace plus

I have to acknowledge here of Kemalist attitude I would remind that it strikes me that whether His Majesty's Government have abstained for nearly two years from giving Greeks any material aid to Kemal is not advanced of our neutrality, but still identifies His Majesty's Government with Greek Government and army nothing we can do now will convince Turks to the contrary. So far as we are concerned we might just as well give Greeks effective assistance and gather what profit we can. Had we during last twenty months given Greeks half the assistance in material which Kemal has received from our allies, present catastrophe would most probably not have occurred. Greeks are in material placed at disposal of Greeks would even now have great effect. It is not the policy of His Majesty's Government to assist Greece in any way but I submit in the name of humanity that we should lose no time in evacuating Asia Minor as we now propose doing into Smyrna.

If Greeks were to concentrate in Thrace they could not easily be dislodged. They have command however yet ferry from Smyrna zone.

I submit that His Majesty's Government would obtain better terms for Greeks than Greeks could obtain themselves. If His Majesty's Government have to influence with Kemal their only strong argument. Force is compelling French to exert pressure on French, and Kemal would not force Greece to evacuate any part of Thrace. If His Majesty's Government rejected all effective appeals of His Majesty's Government might probably still retain Greeks to enter Constantinople which would be of great defence of Thrace. France refuse this even if Kemal does not yet.

So far as matter of Greeks is concerned occupation of Constantinople would be of great value. Even defence of Asia Minor with knowledge that it will be abandoned in the end.

I have not lost sight of arguments contained in your telegram No. 117.

Repeated to Constantinople.

No. 241

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 6.*)

(No. 381.)
Telegraphic.

Athens, September 5, 1922.

MY telegram No. 379.

Minister of Foreign Affairs has sent me text of the telegram sent to day to Chargé des Affaires at London with reference to your telegram No. 191.

We can only answer as reliable information as to the condition of the *morale* of the army what reports are received from Minister of War and officers accompanying him to Smyrna.

Until latter is received impossible to say how far continued panic of Government is justified. But flight of refugees must undoubtedly also have its effect on authorities at Smyrna itself.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 242

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 6.*)

(No. 384.)
Telegraphic.

Athens, September 6, 1922.

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 384.

I venture to submit following considerations as situation strikes us at this end.

Question is whether His Majesty's Government can arrange armistice for them to cover evacuation of Asia Minor by Greek army which, according to official statements, is now in course of being prepared to extend to Thrace is quite another

matter (see my telegram No. 346) and was not mentioned in Greek request. Discretionary powers granted to Allied generals it seems to me should not therefore include anything but evacuation of Asia Minor.

2. Until reliable information is received as to *moral* of army (see my telegram No. 381) it is too early to assert definitely that it is not *now* in a position to defend some portion of Asia Minor, and this is still more the case as far as Thrace is concerned (see my telegram No. 380).

3. In my opinion question of armistice which is immediately connected with evacuation of Asia Minor only, whilst objects of eventual conference are to arrange the other matters to which Sir H. Rumbold refers.

4. It was Sir H. Rumbold and I have anticipated (see my telegram No. 358) Kemalist demand as condition of armistice all that he could obtain from most favourable decision of conference left with choice between

(*a*) Surrender to Kemal and French (see last paragraph Constantinople telegram No. 379), or

(*b*) Immediately giving Greeks material aid, which France and Italy have been giving to Kemalists.

2. If Kemal should make excessive demands he has still to show his power to clear anything more than Asia Minor. Without command of the sea he surely cannot dislodge Greek 3rd Army Corps as transferred to Thrace.

3. Has His Majesty's Government are prepared to take strong and independent line would their hands not be strengthened in Near East weakened by exorbitant demands on the part of Kemal?

4. If His Majesty's Government are considering giving any form of material assistance to Greeks see Lord Curzon's telegram No. 298 of 3rd June 1921, [illegible] think most immediate needs would probably be aeroplanes, transporting of rifles, ammunition and supplies. Thinks would have great moral effect but country attached doubts whether Greeks would be able to manage them without expert aid. The 6 fighter new aeroplanes ordered by Greek Government from America are hourly expected to arrive before another month.

Repeated to Constantinople.

No. 243

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 6.*)

No. 388.
Telegraphic.

Constantinople, September 5, 1922.

Your telegram No. 275 to Paris.

While fully appreciating desire of His Majesty's Government to avoid further bloodshed and possible massacre of Christians, General Harrington and I venture to submit following consideration to you.

Your telegram suggested that Allied generals should be granted full discretion in their negotiations with Kemalists for an armistice. This appears to us to throw undue responsibility on generals. We have every reason to suppose that if request is to demand for immediate evacuation of Asiatic Kemalists will demand evacuation of whole of Eastern Thrace and handing over of that province to Angora Government and not to Central Government with formal endorsement by Allied Powers. This would imply evacuation of Constantinople by Allied troops. We assume you have in mind an armistice relating to *Anatolia alone* leaving questions of Eastern Thrace, Straits &c. to be settled at conference. But this is not what Kemalists have in mind even if it is true that they have the Greek army at their mercy. Kemalists have the whip hand of us to an extent in direct proportion to our interest in saving Greeks from disaster and protection of minorities. Terms which it is certain that Kemalists will propose as condition of armistice will go far beyond Anatolia. They have their repercussion on Moslem opinion in Egypt, Mesopotamia and India. We therefore consider it indispensable that Allied generals should be told definitely how far they are allowed to go and whether questions such as Eastern Thrace, Straits, disposal of Greek fleet, security &c. must be referred to their respective Governments.

When I have reason to believe my Italian colleague considers questions of Straits Eastern Thrace &c can best be dealt with at a conference we can safely assure that French generals will be instructed to accept Kemalist terms This would place General Harington and his Italian colleague in difficult position

This telegram has been drafted by General Harington and myself

Repeated to Athens No 112)

No 244

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 6)

No 456)
(Telegraphic) D Paris September 5 1922

YOUR telegram No 275 Armistice proposal

I have received following reply from President of the Council

'French Government agree with His Majesty's Government upon advantage of an immediate armistice between Greek and Nationalist armies They are determined to use the utmost efforts to persuade both sides to put an end to any further effusion of blood

'Intervention of British Commander in chief and his Allied colleagues would be an offer of mediation which would risk rejection and which Allied Powers have neither the intention nor the means to impose

'But French Government are ready to instruct their High Commissioner at Constantinople to concert with his Allied colleagues with a view to conveying through the most appropriate channels to chiefs of the two armies how urgent it is from a human and from point of view to conclude at once an armistice

'It should be well understood that Allied Powers will not cooperate to arrange any step which would lead to evacuation of Greek troops from Anatolia unless on the one hand these troops are not transferred to Thrace and on the other hand, unless Greek forces pledge themselves to the west of the line Ineh Keui Midia retire to the west without this retirement involving in any way question of frontier to be laid down in peace treaty'

No 245

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. Received September 6

No 457)
(Telegraphic) D Paris September 5 1922

YOUR telegram No 277

I have just received a note from President of the Council informing me of presence of Smyrna of Admiral Dumesnil on board 'Ernest Renan' which will be joined to-day by 'Edgar Quinet' These two armoured cruisers are accompanied by two destroyers and a transport

French Admiralty is issuing concerted measures with his British and Italian colleagues and has received instructions to secure protection of French colony

---

No 246

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr Bentinck (Athens)

No 192
(Telegraphic) R Foreign Office September 6, 1922

NABI BEY has informed French Government that Greek troops in retreat are indulging in Cretan excesses every kind

French Government suggest that we should concert with French and Italian colleagues should confirmation of Greek Government to these reports and suggest despatch of orders with a view to prevention of such acts, which must lead to reprisals on part of Kemalists

Unless Ambassador's telegram 4th September to similar reports

You should act accordingly

Have you any corroborative evidence?

(repeated to Constantinople No 353 Paris No 278 and Rome, No 242)

No 247

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston —(Received September 7)

(No 388)
(Telegraphic) D Constantinople September 6, 1922

My Allied colleagues came this morning and raised the questions of Venice Conference and proposed armistice

2 As regards former they strongly urged desirability of awaiting either a stabilisation of the front or the conclusion of an armistice before issuing invitations to conference French High Commissioner pointed out that Nationalist communique of 2nd September speaks of termination of first phase of military operations This would seem to indicate that Turks need a breathing space On the other hand Greeks have a success in the north

3 My colleagues were also of opinion that it is for consideration whether recent military events in Anatolia may not make it necessary to modify terms of invitation to the Turks and Greeks (End of D)

4 With regard to proposals mentioned in your telegram No 275 to Paris a translation of which I have communicated to my colleagues I found that French High Commissioner had telegraphed to his Government in practically the same terms as my telegram No 383 with the omission, of course of the last two paragraphs

(D) 5 Italian High Commissioner is in agreement with our views We all consider that in their present state of exultation Kemalists will either decline intervention of Allied generals in negotiations for an armistice thus inflicting a rebuff on Allied Governments, which would make subsequent intervention on their part very difficult or if they accept Allied intervention it will be with a view to getting Allied endorsement of proposals affecting Eastern Thrace the Straits &c Both of my colleagues are of opinion that Kemalists will not confine their demands to immediate evacuation of Asia Minor but will raise all the other questions as well They are telegraphing in above sense to their respective Governments

(Repeated to Athens)

No 248

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston – (Received September 7)

(No 389)
(Telegraphic) R Constantinople, September 6 1922

SINCE despatch of my immediately preceding telegram I have received Athens telegram No 377 and Smyrna telegram No 63 both dated yesterday Former holds out prospect of a rally, but latter seems to indicate that Greek forces are incapable of resistance

Exact situation at the front is difficult to estimate in view of this conflicting information, but it is noteworthy that Greek Commander in chief has not yet, so far as I am aware expressed desire for armistice either concluded direct or through intervention of Allied representatives

(Repeated to Athens)

No 249

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston Received September 7)

(No 390) Constantinople September 6, 1922
(Telegraphic)

YOUR telegram No 275 to Paris

In view of Smyrna telegram No 63 to you which reveals gravity of military situation and of serious information subsequently received by General Harington from his military representative with Greek forces I decided, after consultation with General Harington to propose to my colleagues that we should act without further delay on your above-mentioned telegram to Paris

Accordingly saw my colleagues this evening with General Harington and read them Smyrna telegram No 63. I pointed out that we should incur grave responsibility if we did not strive endeavour to bring about an armistice I said that we must waive all the considerations set forth in my telegrams Nos 383, 387 and 388

Italian High Commissioner warmly supported me and we had little difficulty in getting French High Commissioner to come into line We have therefore instructed our delegates to see Nationalist representative first thing to-morrow morning and state our proposal for armistice as contained in first sentence of second paragraph of your telegram No 275 to Paris, beginning 'His Majesty's Government' and ending "armistice."

French High Commissioner read us reply of his Government to your telegram No 275 to Paris The Allied High Commissioners and General Harington consider this reply reasonable I also proposed that we should give Allied generals instructions that their intervention was to be confined to securing evacuation of Anatolia, but that they were not to discuss questions of Eastern Thrace Straits, &c

(Repeated to Athens No 116)

No 250

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 7)

(No 391)
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople September 6 1922*

MY immediately preceding telegram

Allegations of Nationalists that retreating Greeks are indulging in wanton destruction should receive some confirmation from other sources It might be well to urge on Greek Government desirability of refraining from excesses which would prejudice chances of armistice

Repeated to Athens No 117)

No 251

Mr Kennard to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston Received September 8

(No 265)
(Telegraphic) R *Rome, September 7 1922*

ITALIAN press as a whole does not express its satisfaction with Greek successes which are described as a disaster of British diplomacy Article of leading Corriere della Sera holds England responsible

If England now proposes compensation for Greece this must be resisted Messaggero says that interests at this juncture are identical with French Italy must be forewarned by British policy

Secolo fears extent of Turkish victory causes apprehension Nation press fears excessive increase of power to France will upset balance in the Mediterranean and calls on Government to take middle course in eventual peace negotiations obtaining concessions both in Anatolia and Dodecanese in return for neutrality This view finds much support No kind of constructive policy is anywhere indicated

---

No 252

Mr Kennard to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 7)

No 266)
(Telegraphic) D *Rome September 7 1922*

MY telegram No 238

Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has only just returned to Rome agrees that every effort should be made to secure immediate armistice and evacuation and has sent instructions to Italian High Commissioner at Constantinople to agree to any joint humane decision as to the best means of attaining these ends He is inclined to French view that intervention of Allied commanders in chief might lead to rejection,

which would be serious blow to our prestige He is further consulting Italian High Commissioner as to other French conditions

He further considers moment is hardly opportune for fixing date of Venice Conference and suggests that final result of Turkish offensive should be awaited

He also expressed view that it was now somewhat rash to send commission to enquire into atrocities I should be glad to learn whether I should still press Italian Government on these two points

(Sent to Constantinople)

No 253

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr Bentinck (Athens,

(No 201)
(Telegraphic) R *Foreign Office September 7, 1922*

PLEASE ascertain as far as possible precise intentions of Greek Government with regard to removal of refugees from Smyrna and in particular whether Greek shipping is to be used up to its full capacity for their evacuation

(Repeated to Constantinople No 363, Rome No 251 Paris No 284 (by bag) and Smyrna No 18, for information of Commander-in-chief)

No 254

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr Bentinck (Athens

(No 202 Confidential)
(Telegraphic) *Foreign Office September 7 1922*

MY immediately preceding telegram

We may be prepared to send some ships at short notice to Smyrna to help in evacuation of refugees, provided accommodation will be found for them either in Greece or Thrace and provided Greeks for their part will use all their available vessels

(Repeated to Constantinople No 364 Rome No 252 Paris No 285 (by bag) and Smyrna No 19 for information of Commander-in-chief)

No 255

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr Bentinck (Athens)

(No 203
(Telegraphic) R *Foreign Office September 7 1922*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No 390 of 6th September

You may inform Greek Government of action taken by three High Commissioners as reported in the third paragraph

---

No 256

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H Rumbold (Constantinople)

(No 360)
(Telegraphic) *Foreign Office, September 7, 1922*

YOUR telegram No. 390 of 6th September Armistice

I entirely approve your act on

Instructions to be given to Allied generals should as you propose make it quite clear that Allied intervention is to be confined to securing evacuation of Anatolia, and that other questions are matters for future conference and not for an armistice

In our view invitations to Venice Conference should not now be sent. When any future conference should be called and its nature must now depend on course of events in Anatolia

Please inform General Harington

(Repeated to Paris, No 282 (by bag), Rome No 248 and Athens, No 199)

No. 257

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Paris (No. 279 Telegraphic (by bag)) and Rome (No. 244 Telegraphic (R.))

Foreign Office, September 7, 1922.

IN view of news of situation created by Greek reverse in Asia Minor His Majesty's Government consider that the task of the Allies in negotiating between Greece and Turkey would be greatly facilitated if the League of Nations were at once invited by the Allied Governments to consider by what advisory means it may seem most appropriate to the League to assist the best method of protecting the minorities in Thrace and Asia Minor. The League should be invited to assist the Greeks and Turks and to make recommendations to the Allies for eventual incorporation in the new treaty with Turkey and in the minority treaty with Greece.

My immediately following telegram contains a draft invitation to the League which you should if you approve invite the concurrence of the Government to which you are accredited.

(Repeated to Athens No. 195, Constantinople No. 356, and Geneva No. 26.)

No. 258

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Paris (No. 280 Telegraphic (by bag)) and Rome (No. 245 Telegraphic (R.))

Foreign Office, September 7, 1922.

THE Governments of France, Great Britain, and Italy invite the Council of the League of Nations at once to consider, in what seems most appropriate method, the best method of protecting the minorities in Thessaly, Western Thrace, Eastern Thrace, and Asia Minor, and after consulting the Greeks and Turks to make recommendations to the three Allied Governments for incorporation in a treaty between the Allies and Turkey and in a minority treaty between the Allies and Greece.

The three Allies suggest that the absolute segregation by them at the Paris Conference of Muslim and non-Muslim populations is stable basis for the League of Nations' scheme.

These suggestions generally comprise—

(a) Guarantees against the expatriation of fresh legislation over the relevant provisions of the Treaties and Protocols annexed to the Armistice of November 1918.

(b) Special Inter-Allied Commissioners with the general control of the High Commissioner of the League at Constantinople to take periodic visits to certain specified zones, namely, Smyrna, Pontus (its eastern and south-eastern valleys), Cilicia, and Eastern Thrace, and Thessaly, and, in concert with the local authorities to take the necessary measures for protecting the minorities in conformity with the guarantees (reserved for order).

(c) The Commissioners to report directly to the Council and also to submit their reports to the annual assembly of the League in order to enable latter to secure faithful execution of provision for which the League will have given its guarantee.

(d) Special protection and adequate representation of the different religious and ethnic elements at Adrianople and Smyrna.

(e) Turkey to be recommended to employ Allied officers for the organisation, control, and instruction of gendarmerie, such officers to be at the service of Turkey according to the new usages.

(Repeated to Athens No. 197, Constantinople No. 357, and Geneva No. 27 to R.)

No. 259

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Paris (No. 283 Telegraphic (by bag)) and Rome (No. 250 Telegraphic (D.))

Foreign Office, September 7, 1922.

PLEASE inform Government to which you are accredited of substance of third paragraph of Constantinople telegram No. 390 and of my telegram No. 360 of 7th September. You should add that position of acting as French Government's suggestion in Paris telegram No. 456 does not now arise.

Repeated to Constantinople No. 361 and Athens No. 200.)

No. 260

Mr. Beatuck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 8.)

(No. 387.) *Athens, September 7, 1922.*
(Telegraphic.) R.

CHIEF of Personnel acting for Minister of War told military attaché to-day that he had received telegram from Minister of War that General Trikoupis and General Digenis with staff were apparently captured by the Turks on 2nd September.

News of capture was first received from Red Crescent.

Repeated to Constantinople and Smyrna No. 65.)

No. 261

Mr. Beatuck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 8.)

(No. 388.) *Athens, September 7, 1922.*
Telegraphic.)

MY immediately preceding telegram.

New Commander-in-Chief General Polymenakos commanded 3rd Army Corps during his summer's campaign. He did fairly well but he has not the drive of Trikoupis. He resigned when General Papoulas was appointed. General Frango is with and in actual command of Greek southern group of eight divisions. Frango commanded 1st division last year. He was good fighter but lacks independent judgment when situation changed.

Chief of Personnel believes 2nd Army Corps is in poor condition. 1st Army Corps, 1st and 12th division in good condition. Second Division of the Corps better than 2nd and 12th division in good condition. Second Division of the Corps is the Attacks are said to be inferior. Contradicts current rumours of Athens soldiers' insubordination.

Constantinople telegram No. 392.

French High Commissioner has presumably confused General Dousmanis with General Digenis, commanding 2nd Corps. I see no use in enlightening him.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 262

Mr. Beatuck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 8.)

(No. 389.) *Athens, September 7, 1922.*
(Telegraphic.)

IDEA is prevalent in many quarters, irrespective of party, that Government have purposely exaggerated gravity of situation, some think with view to inducing Great Britain to take steps for protection of Christians or to intervene in some way. I personally cannot credit this, but it is strange that the people generally take a calmer view of situation than does the Government.

M.

Italian Minister considers situation in Asia Minor as bad as can be French Legation of course paint it in even more sombre colours I reserve further comment until military attaché has been able to see things at Smyrna himself Minister of War approved visit in principle but reserved definite permission until His Excellency had made his own inspection

Government stocks to its post in spite of general call to resign possibly it is awaiting report from Minister of War at Smyrna

(Repeated to Constantinople)

No 263

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston *Received September 8,*

(No 391)
(Telegraphic) R *Athens September 7 1922*

YOUR telegram No 192

My colleagues and I made suggestion as instructed to Minister for Foreign Affairs who promised to telegraph to-night to Minister of War at Smyrna in the sense desired

Minister for Foreign Affairs added that numbers of the enemies other forces were pouring into the towns of Asia Minor

Repeated to Constantinople)

No 264

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston *(Received September 8)*

(No 392)
(Telegraphic) R *Athens September 8 1922*

GOVERNMENT resigned yesterday evening King has entrusted M Calogheropoulos with duty of forming a Cabinet latter has asked for twenty four hours delay before replying

---

No 265

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston *(Received September 8)*

(No 395)
(Telegraphic) R *Athens September 8 1922*

YOUR telegram No 261 and my telegram No 391.

Secretary General of Ministry for Foreign Affairs has just called to make following communication on behalf of Greek Government to Governments of Great Britain France Italy and United States

More than 500 000 refugees have arrived at all the ports of Asia Minor in pitiful condition Greek Government can provide necessary territory but lacks ships means of subsistence and tents Greek Government appeals for assistance on grounds of humanity

United States Chargé d'Affaires thought some supplies and tents could be sent from Constantinople but said that they had no ships on the spot

I had just ascertained from Ministry of Marine that Greek shipping is being used to its full capacity but that Greek ships can begin removal of refugees until transport of escorted troops from Smyrna is completed

Feeling is that as original landing at Smyrna was by mandate of Allies Greeks may reasonably hope for assistance in saving refugees

(Repeated to Constantinople and Smyrna)

No 266

Commander in chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty *(Received September 8 1922)*

(No 279)
(Telegraphic)

GREEK evacuation will be completed to-night Friday though disorderly elements will probably remain Greek headquarters is moving to Chesme Have arranged with Allies to place destroyers at various points along the sea front and am landing a party of seamen at daylight to protect group (undecipherable) and quay if Turks have not arrived by then Greek group (undecipherable) Sterghiades has three groups (undecipherable) evacuation (two groups undecipherable) asked if he could be accommodated group (undecipherable) of His Majesty's ships two groups (undecipherable) replied asking him to go on board HMS "Iron Duke" Greek High Commissioner hopes that his presence may assist in preventing panic amongst the Greek population

(Addressed to Admiralty Repeated to Senior Naval Officer (A), Constantinople, for High Commissioner and for information of General Officer Commanding-in-chief)

No 267

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston *Received September 8)*

(No 393)
(Telegraphic) R *Constantinople September 7 1922*

MY telegram No 390

Dragomans saw Hamid Bey this morning and made communication to the effect that in view of urgency of situation High Commissioners had decided at once to make proposal arising out of communication from Greek Government if Turks desire to conclude armistice Proposal object to which was to ensure evacuation of Asia Minor without useless bloodshed and suffering was that Angora Government should send accredited military representatives to place near Asiatic frontier of neutral zone to meet similar Greek representatives in presence of Allied generals who would lend assistance with view to conclusion of armistice

Hamid Bey was asked to telegraph this to Angora and to communicate reply as soon as possible

He promised to transmit proposal immediately He said that he had heard that telegraph line at place close to neutral zone groups omitted but one thought it would be quickly repaired

Hamid made no comment on proposal but said he had that moment received telegram from Angora in reply to one despatched by him on previous occasion for armistice Angora telegram asked if armistice was being asked for by Greece or by another Power acting on her behalf

Dragomans said that their communication answered this question French dragoman emphasised fact that object of High Commissioners was to avert disorder and avoid stress or danger to colonies at Smyrna In reply to question by Hamid Mr Ryan explained that situation at Smyrna was agitated but not yet disordered

French dragoman referred to proposal previously put forward by French High Commissioner that Kemalists should proclaim amnesty which if one sultan would with armistice would help to reassure population Mr Ryan concurred on my behalf and arising out of remark by Hamid about "criminals" suggested amnesty should be comprehensive

Hamid Bey asked whether Greeks themselves accepted evacuation of Asia Minor, and received affirmative answer

(Repeated to Athens and Smyrna)

No 268

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 8)

No 304,
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople September 7 1922*

MY immediately preceding telegram

Great care was taken to avoid any appearance of humiliating solicitation on the part of Allies and to minimise danger of any eventual refusal of armistice by Angora assuring propositions of revolt to Great Powers themselves It was with object that High Commissioners decided to make communication in form of proposal for meeting of Turkish and Greek representatives in which Allied generals would participate in order to promote conclusion of armistice

Had planned in telegram for transmission within two hours of conversation but I have not yet heard whether line is working

I presume you will instruct His Majesty's representative at Athens to arrange with Greek Government to have military representatives ready for meeting at earliest possible moment if Angora Government accept

I have informed Greek High Commissioner of *demarche* of three dragomans
(Repeated to Athens and Smyrna)

No 269

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 8)

No 305)
(Telegraphic) R *Constantinople September 7 1922*

YOUR telegram No 250

United States High Commissioner as chairman promises all possible help from American relief associations but has practically no facilities for general relief here at Smyrna

(Repeated to Athens and Smyrna)

No 270

Sir H Lamb to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 8

(No 67)
Telegraphic) R *Smyrna September 8 1922*

LAST remnants of Greek army are now approaching the town followed but not attacked by small Turkish force

Within next twenty four hours Greeks will probably have completed evacuation of town which will then be without Government navy and civil officials will be withdrawing simultaneously

Greek High Commissioner has requested Admirals to land patrols, appearance of which would it is hoped at these circumstances suffice to preserve order until a Turkish administration can be formed

Turkish Government should I think be invited to nominate administration officials immediately in order to shorten interregnum as much as possible

(Repeated to Constantinople No 90 and Athens, No 75)

No 271

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr Bentinck (Athens,

(No 254)
(Telegraphic) *Foreign Office September 8, 1922*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No 394 of 7th September Armistice third paragraph

Please act accordingly

No 272

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr Bentinck (Athens)

(No 207
(Telegraphic) R *Foreign Office, September 8 1922*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No 350 of 4th September Smyrna relief and my telegram No 201 of 7th September

Red Cross have no stores within reach of Constantinople, but Disposals Commission have supplies there Owing to adverse Parliamentary comment on precedent of Russians these cannot be handed over for relief of Greek refugees without Treasury sanction For this we shall want further information as to numbers to be evacuated their destination numbers requiring relief kind of relief desired action already being taken by American Relief Association &c, and extent to which Greek Government are prepared to accept financial responsibility

Please ascertain intentions of Greek Government as far as possible, although little can be done until question of evacuation is settled

(Addressed to Athens No 207 Repeated to Paris, No 288 (by bag) Rome No 256 Constantinople, No 367 and Smyrna No 22.)

No 273

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H Rumbold (Constantinople)

(No 366)
(Telegraphic) *Foreign Office, September 8 1922*

COMMANDER IN CHIEF's telegram No 275 of 8th September to Senior Naval Officer, Constantinople

I have full discretion to arrange with your Allied colleagues and Allied Commanders in chief to send such instructions as you consider necessary to Allied consuls at Smyrna regarding local suspension of hostilities You are in the best position to judge all the circumstances There is now plenty of time to complete steps already taken with Angora for general armistice and effective

Please report to Athens any action taken, and ask Mr Bentinck direct for such support as you consider desirable

Addressed to Constantinople, No 366 Repeated to Rome, No 254 Paris No 286 by bag Athens No 205 and Smyrna No 21)

No 274

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Paris (No 287, Telegraphic (by bag)) and Rome (No 255 Telegraphic (I)

Foreign Office September 8, 1922

MY telegram No 366 to Constantinople of 8th September

Please inform Government to which you are accredited explaining that Commander in Chief's telegram suggested that Allied consuls-general at Smyrna be empowered to get into touch with approaching Turkish forces as the only chance of preventing catastrophe at Smyrna This has been impressed on Greek High Commissioner but Greek authorities were unwilling to act.

(Addressed to Paris No 287 (by bag) and Rome, No 255 Repeated to Athens No 206.)

No 275

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 9)

(No 396)
(Telegraphic) *Athens September 8 1922.*

MY telegram No 387

Director of Personnel told military attaché to-day that M Theotokis will return to Athens to-night Greek south-ern army was now close to Smyrna and no longer consisted of divisions but merely of groups of soldiers Third corps [illegible] in the north was in better condition and preparing to embark

F.O. 424 254 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Assistant Director of Intelligence who is not usually optimistic said that southern group was near Magnesia that two divisions were in fairly good fighting order and remainder vary from moderate to bad Before he left Asia Minor, General Hadjianestis ordered one division from Adrianople to Smyrna Whether it is marched or sent elsewhere depends now on General Dousmanis

Neither of above officials could say whether Greeks still held Brussa but British superintendent of Athens wireless station yesterday heard a Greek ship calling Brussa

Repeated to Constantinople

No 276

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 8)

(No 399)
(Telegraphic) *Athens September 8 1922*

MY telegram No 395

Our grounds lack of humanity and policy I cannot resist strongly to support Greek Government's appeal and to beg that transports be sent at earliest possible moment also that Red Cross may charitable organisations be allowed to provide food medical stores and shelter as well as staff for refugees on arrival on Greek territory

Repeated to Constantinople and Smyrna

No 277

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 9)

(No 400)
(Telegraphic) *Athens September 8 1922*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No 390

I shall be very glad to receive any information regarding state of Greek Press which General Harington may be able to communicate (see first sentence of my telegram No 380)

Repeated to Constantinople

No 278

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 9)

(No 401)
(Telegraphic) *Athens September 8 1922*

YOUR telegram No 203

The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs I added personal suggestion in the sense of second separate paragraph of Constantinople telegram No 394

(Repeated to Constantinople)

No 279

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 9)

(No 402)
(Telegraphic) *Athens September 8 1922*

My telegram No 370.

Reports are now being received that internal trouble is brewing I am endeavouring to obtain confirmation King's position is of course not so strong as it was. Hordes of discontented soldiers from Asia Minor encamped round Athens Government are taking steps to keep them away from Athens but yesterday 3rd Brigade was ordered by the men to proceed to Piraeus where it is now embarked for Athens.

Capture of General Tricoupis has had bad moral effect in Athens and presumably at the front but as already stated in [illegible] groups omitted] by news from Smyrna front is practically confined to Greek official sources.

M Calogeropoulos is said to be completely *gaga* and seems hardly a happy choice for the premiership although he has always been pro-*Entente* (see annual report for 1921 pp 10 and 11). I was told confidentially at Ministry of Foreign Affairs to-day that M Stergiadès had been invited to take over that Ministry which would be a most fortunate appointment

Strong man is badly needed, and unless General Dousmanis or new Government can put some backbone into the country it is dangerous to prophecy what may happen I do not wish to appear panicky but consider it my duty to warn you of the possibilities

---

No 279A

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 9)

(No 403)
(Telegraphic) *Athens September 8 1922*

MY immediately preceding telegram

I have learned vital importance of Greek army southern group relying at least [illegible] is to be carried to effect its own embarkation to [illegible] its escape depends Kindly see what can be done to this end I suppose he even more troublesome to His Majesty's Government than to Greece I for his present military attaché and I have urged on Greek Government (see my telegram No 379), and I have urged [illegible] granting of some and [illegible] material support even if only medical (my telegram No 348 and my telegram No 384 Mere news of this would [illegible] heart into troops and country even if actual supplies were too late

[illegible] embarkation Greece requires every available ship, hence need of [illegible] and [illegible] for refugees (my telegram No 399)

The quicker and more effective our support the greater will be our influence with Greek nation and this exercise [illegible] influence on internal situation Effect on our prestige both in Greece and outside will be enfeebled if promise is made and [illegible] before [illegible] internal movement begins

(Repeated to Constantinople)

No 280

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 9)

(No 404)
(Telegraphic) *Athens September 9, 1922*

MY telegram No 402

Situation is developing Acting consul-general at Salonika reports by telegraph arrival there of deputy and a certain political agent who are in active touch with local political league with which Prince Nicholas is said to be connected He adds that Salonika Chief of Police is in Athens conferring on situation Official buildings and bridges in Salonika are guarded by military

Difficulties have arisen in connection with invitation to M Calogeropoulos to form Ministry as those political leagues who owe allegiance to General Metaxas have informed M Calogeropoulos that they will not permit his acceptance of Premiership and I have just learnt that he has given up his task Leagues demand that Metaxas be made Premier They have told the King that they wish to exclude M Stergiadès The latter has not yet accepted Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Ostensible object of all these activities is said to be protection of the King

No. 281

Sir Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 10)

(No. 430)
(Telegraphic) R
Athens, September 9, 1922

YOUR telegram No. 267
Secret telegrams Nos. 395 and 399
Actual numbers will depend on how many of the half-million refugees can be transported to Greece
Relief of every kind will be needed as Greek Government can only provide temporary accommodation to assist foreign staff
Ministry of Foreign Affairs state that Greek Government have no funds and can only provide personal responsibility
Every kind of assistance will be gratefully received and Government will grant every possible facility but no provision has been made for their reception
As soon as there is a Minister of Public Assistance I will enquire further
United States Chargé d'Affaires has telegraphed to enquire what the American Relief Association intended. French Minister thinks refugees had better remain where they are as even there they will have to be fed
(Repeated to Constantinople and Smyrna)

No. 282

Sir Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 10)

(No. 429)
(Telegraphic) R
Athens, September 9, 1922

(No. 398 to Angora.) Your telegram No. 398
I communicated Ministry of Foreign Affairs this morning saying I was acting on instructions. Secretary-General and Head of political section spoke of Greek attitude. Latter thinks Greek instructions had already been given and desired to see if more urgent ones would now be repeated
Repeated to Constantinople.

No. 283

Sir Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 9)

(No. 407)
(Telegraphic) R
Athens, September 9, 1922

YOUR telegram No. 264 and Constantinople telegram No. 394
Secretary-General of Ministry for Foreign Affairs said that telegram had been sent to Minister of War to select officer from Smyrna (my telegram No. 401). No answer as yet, but officer could always be selected from Greek Military Mission, Constantinople if necessary
(Repeated to Constantinople)

No. 284

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 9)

(No. 396)
(Telegraphic) D
Constantinople, September 8, 1922

My telegram No. 390, last paragraph
Neither General Officer Commanding nor Gaiffier from French text of telegram which French High Commissioner read to us, that French consent to armistice proposals was conditional upon their communication through appropriate channels to chiefs of two armies. (See Paris telegram No. 426.)
I understood French reply to be acquiescent in principle and on humanitarian grounds of speedy conference on proposals through Allied military representatives. Hence my view that reply was reasonable

---

No. 285

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 397)
(Telegraphic) R
Constantinople, September 8, 1922.

GREEK High Commissioner here under instructions from his Government notified Allied High Commissioners to-day of suggestion made to Greek High Commissioner, Smyrna, by French and British admirals there that, in order to avoid battle for the town itself Greek Government should appeal to Allied High Commissioners here to make arrangements for evacuation and surrender of Smyrna.
News of this proposal was confirmed by telegram from Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean who expressed the opinion that only chance of saving town from catastrophe was to authorise Allied consuls-general to get into touch with approaching Turkish forces.
In view of extreme urgency of situation my Allied colleagues and I have sent following joint telegram to Commander-in-chief Mediterranean, for communication to Allied admirals and consuls-general:—

As result of application made to them by Greek High Commissioner at Constantinople on behalf of Greek Government the Allied High Commissioners undersigned authorise Allied admirals and consuls-general to concert together with a view to lending the good offices in order to facilitate surrender of town of Smyrna to the Turkish army. (*Signed*) PETRE RUMBOLD. CADORNA.

(Repeated to Athens No. 122.)

No. 286

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 9.)

(No. 398)
(Telegraphic) R
Constantinople, September 8, 1922

THERE is reason to fear lest Brussa, on its evacuation by Greek troops, may suffer the same fate as Eskisheir and Ushak. French High Commissioner read to-day despatch from French consular agent there declaring it to be, in fact, intention of Greeks to burn Brussa.
I need not dilate on inconceivable folly of such action, especially if Green Mosque were injured, not only on consciences which wanton destruction of town so venerated by all Ottoman Turks would entail.
It has been agreed to send Lieut.-Colonel Allen Adair officers to Brussa with a view to exercising general influence to prevent such disaster.
I consider strongest representations should be addressed to Greek Government on the subject. I have already spoken to Greek High Commissioner here in the above sense. Allied Powers cannot be held responsible for safety of minorities if actions of Greeks themselves are such as are to necessitate reprisals.
(Repeated to Athens No. 123.)

No. 287

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 399)
(Telegraphic)
Constantinople, September 8, 1922

YOUR telegram No. 369
Allied generals pointed out that armistice conditions will inevitably comprise clause regarding line behind which Greek troops in Thrace must retire. Apart from Turkish demand this is necessary to ensure safety of Constantinople against Greek attack.
Generals have suggested three lines (*a*) Ganos-Istrandja, (*b*) Enos-Makri, (*c*) Maritza.

District is contained in your above-mentioned telegram coupled with your telegram No 283 to Paris, would preclude discussion of this point during armistice negotiations I recognise however that it cannot be left undecided and undertook to refer it to your Lordship

General Officer Commanding considers Ire *[illegible]* sufficient for the purpose indicated

Repeated to Athens No 124)

No 288

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 9)

(No 401)
(Telegraphic) R *Constantinople September 9 1922*

Yesterday Allied High Commissioners with Allied Generals yesterday refugee question was raised

Allied High Commissioners were unanimously of opinion that nothing should be done to encourage wholesale displacements of population of Anatolia Allied generals pointed out that refugees must be expected to collect principally in the zone of exploitation of Greek Army and on Edremit district If Turks accept armistice proposal generals will endeavour to arrange that food supplies for refugees should be provided by Turkish authorities who could utilise for this purpose Greek and Ottoman resources in any supplies which may be imported Any view that sending ships to Mytilene and Greek islands to embark refugees will encourage flight of Western population

Western press correspondents state that it is necessary the Allies will assist refugees to clear district but my next telegram No 401 tends to contradict this Armenian question is suspected to the Allied High Commissioners Difficulties in bringing Constantinople Armenians who have fled to Russia are great Allied High Commissioners have given answers of a vague kind that they know whether their respective Governments are willing to help evacuation of Armenians but I shall write short Allied High Commissioners do not say where these thousands of refugees are to be sent to and whether they are to pay for their transport to unknown destination which at present constitute an indefinite liability

Latter pressing French High Commissioner to urge on Nationalist representative here the practicability of general amnesty This seems best and only way of helping matters at present The amnesty suggestion originated with French High Commissioner

(Repeated to Athens No 126)

No 289

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 9)

(No 402)
(Telegraphic) R *Constantinople September 9 1922*

CAPTAIN of Italian destroyer who left Mudania at noon yesterday reports that Greeks are holding strong positions on slopes of Mount Olympus and show no signs of evacuating Brussa

(Repeated to Athens No 127)

No 290

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 9)

(No 403)
(Telegraphic) D *Constantinople, September 9 1922*

My telegram No 393

Communication by Ingenuous Herald Hamid Bey on instructions from his Government has asked French High Commissioner whether armistice proposal had been put forward officially by Greek Government and what its object was ie to discuss peace or suspend arms

French High Commissioner has replied to the effect that request for armistice emanated officially from Greek Government and that object was immediate evacuation of Anatolia on conditions to be fixed by representatives of the two armies with a view to preventing further loss of life and devastations

Italian High Commissioner and I have approved his reply

As dragoman's made position perfectly clear in putting proposal forward enquiry of Angora Government would seem undoubtedly to have been made with object of delaying matters

(Repeated to Athens No 128)

No 291

Commander Chatfield to Admiralty (Received September 9 1922)

(No 280)
(Telegraphic)

FOLLOWING from Sir Harry Lamb to Foreign Office

Greek evacuation practically completed during night Turkish cavalry entered town about 11 o'clock a few shots were fired and bombs thrown by Greeks and Armenians and a short panic ensued but Turks were well in hand and in half an hour all was fairly calm A Turkish division of regulars is coming in, and Commanding Officer Ahmed Salahaddin Bey guarantees that no excesses or reprisals will be allowed [two corrupt groups]

(Sent to Admiralty Repeated to Senior Naval Officer, Constantinople for High Commissioner General Officer Commanding)

No 292

Sir R Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 9)

(No 270)
(Telegraphic) R *Rome September 7, 1922*

Your telegram No 244

I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs this evening directly after my arrival and communicated proposal to him I also told him that in your view invitations to Venice Conference should not now recommence

His Excellency took proposal carefully and said that he was not opposed in principle to referring matter to League of Nations but he had to say instructed Italian Ambassadors at Paris and London to submit proposal that Venice Conference should be towards end of month, with a view to re-establishing peace Underlying idea was that if Turks and Greeks were to agree between themselves they might do so to prejudice our Allied interests and it was preferable that Allies should keep some control over negotiations He thought that proposed reference to League of Nations might be tacked on to Venice Conference, which might take place about 25th September His Excellency asked that he might see Fethi Bey this morning and when finally communicating proposal to him had ascertained that, in his opinion, Turks would be ready to come to Venice

He had to-day Fethi Bey with rather exalted ideas, and latter said that in view of Turkish victory Turks had now the right of marching on Constantinople His Excellency has replied that Turks had better be very careful Greeks had found Allies united in opposing their intention to march on Constantinople and Turks would find equally united opposition on the part of Allies should they attempt to do so

I said that principal idea of His Majesty's Government at this juncture was to secure and maintain perfect united action amongst the Allies His Excellency entirely agreed that this was essential I also pointed out that while views of His Majesty's Government and Italian Government on Turco-Greek conflict might not have been identical as regards strong Turkey with exaggerated pretensions would be just as dangerous to Italian interests as to ours His Excellency fully concurred

(Repeated to Constantinople and Athens.)

No 293

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr Bentinck (Athens)

(No 209)
(Telegraphic) R. *Foreign Office September 9 1922*

SIR H RUMBOLD'S telegram No 398 repeated to you No 123 of 8th September

You should either with or even without your Allied colleagues follow up steps taken on my telegram No 192 of 6th September with strongest possible representations to Greek Government on criminality of any such action as destroying Brussa

(Repeated to Paris No 290 Rome No 261 and Constantinople No 372)

No 294

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr Bentinck (Athens)

(No 210)
(Telegraphic) R *Foreign Office September 9 1922*

YOUR telegram No 395 of 8th September and my telegram No 207 of 8th September Smyrna refugees

Question of shipping has been carefully examined Greeks are understood to have about 50 000 tons and foreigners about 70 000 tons idle in Greek ports as well as 50 000 tons chartered by British but with Greek owners

Expert opinion considers (1) C having regard to embarkation facilities for refugees short passage to Greece and relative position of available British ships other than those at Smyrna also careful use of enough shipping including existing vessels to carry all that is physically possible for evacuation of refugees In any case His Majesty's consul general at Smyrna is understood to have detained two British vessels in the harbour of Smyrna in case of emergency

You should therefore urge Ministry of Marine to employ their own resources to full extent already

Repeated to Constantinople No 373 and Smyrna No 25 for information of Consular officers in Crete

---

No 295

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H Rumbold (Constantinople)

(No 370)
(Telegraphic) *En clair* *Foreign Office September 9, 1922*

MY BENTINCK'S telegram No 396 of 8th September Smyrna relief and my telegram No 207 to Mr Bentinck of 8th September

Treasury authorise use for Greek refugees of medical stores clothing and tents now held by Disposals Board at Constantinople

Naval Commander-in-Chief, Smyrna has been instructed to inform you of requirements and destination to which stores should be despatched Please arrange accordingly

(Repeated to Smyrna No 24 and Athens No 208 Retained)

No 296

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 10)

(No 408)
(Telegraphic) *Athens, September 9 1922*

DIRECTOR of Personnel told military attaché to-day that M Tsaldaris was expected to arrive at Athens to-day Assistant Director of Intelligence said that division brought from the north to Smyrna (see my telegram No 396) was not from third corps but was General Serlatos's division from Thrace This division had been sent back to Thrace He had heard stories of these troops refusing to land at Smyrna but could not say whether true There were about 25 000 men fit to fight now in the Greek southern group

---

No 297

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston — Received September 10

(No 412)
(Telegraphic) R *Athens, September 9, 1922*

MY telegram No 404

I may also have heard that M Calogeropoulos has formed Ministry M Gounaris and Stratos fearing advent of Metaxas persuaded him to renew attempt M Stergiadis has definitely refused on grounds of ill-health Cabinet is not expected to be long lived

---

No 298

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 10)

(No 413)
(Telegraphic) R *Athens September 9, 1922*

MINISTRY of Foreign Affairs ask whether there is any objection on Greek Government hiring three British ships now at Piraeus for transport of refugees to Greece Agents did not object provided that your Government consent

I request immediate instructions Ministry are unable to give me written guarantee that troops will not force themselves on board

Question may arise, I should be glad to know what the Greeks thought to requisition British ships for such purposes

---

No 299

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 10)

(No 414)
(Telegraphic) R *Athens, September 9, 1922*

KING has issued proclamation to Greek people After explaining that army has met with persistent rioting at the base of other armies which have been long in the field His Majesty states that he will do whatever the Constitution permits and material interests demand Proclamation concludes with appeal to patriotism and obedience to authorities

---

No. 300

Sir R. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 11)

(No. 410)
(Telegraphic) R. *Athens, September 10, 1922*

My telegram No. 412.

M. Michalakopoulos last night after all failed and M. Triandafillacos late Prime Minister sent for Constantine whose co-operation M. Gonatas and others are now trying to form a Ministry.

It is thought that King will fall back upon General Metaxas.

No. 301

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 10)

(No. 405)
(Telegraphic) D. *Constantinople, September 10, 1922*

My French and Italian High Commissioners and generals this morning. General Harington stated that he had information showing that Nationalist forces are massing on Asiatic shore of Straits. Greeks on Asiatic shore of Bosphorus and also Chanak. He considered that measures should be taken immediately to guard against any coup. He proposed that Italian battleship should be sent to Chanak, French battleship to Bosphorus, and that British battleship should remain at Mudania. He said that Nationalists had asked for guarantee of safety of Asiatic Greeks, and that he had given assurances that this would be done.

French and Italian High Commissioners agreed to despatch of small detachments as requested by Allied High Commissioners in securing their respective zones, but were of opinion that latter should not be extended.

No. 302

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean to Admiralty (Received September 10)

(No. 288)
(Telegraphic) *September 10, 1922*

H.M.S. Northumberland on Saturday here is seen some looting and sporadic firing in streets. Italian marines, French police patrolling town to-night but Greek and American Naval Guards are remaining on shore to-night with consent of Turkish authorities.

Senior Admiral has objected to Senior Naval Officer, Constantinople, for interference of British Commissioner and General Officer Commanding in chief.

No. 303

Consul London to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 10)

(No. 24)
(Telegraphic) R. *Geneva, September 10, 1922*

For Lord Curzon and Balfour. For Secretary of Cabinet.

Council was informed at its meeting yesterday that a telegram had been received from Kemalist representative at Rome through Red Cross Committee describing Greek Army atrocities during their retreat and declaring on behalf of Turkish Government responsibility for consequences which such action might evoke. Council felt that this was intended to prepare excuses for retaliatory atrocities against Christians, and, in acknowledging receipt of communication from the Red Cross, reminded Kemalists that nothing could relieve them of the obligation to carry on war on civilised methods.

No. 304

Consul London to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 10)

(No. 25)
(Telegraphic) R. *Geneva, September 10, 1922*

FOLLOWING for Lord Curzon from Mr. Balfour.

There is a growing feeling of anxiety among delegation to Assembly of course of event in Asia Minor and it has been suggested to French delegation by an independent member that they should propose to Assembly that latter should offer to mediate between Greeks and Turks.

I do not know what French delegation think of the idea, still less what is thought of it at French Foreign Office.

There is a rumour here that a Turkish leaders would greatly value the admission of Turkey to League of Nations, and that it is the right [illegible] influence them in direction of accepting some such proposal.

Independent member in making suggestion was influenced by idea that for obvious reasons proposal would be better received by Turkish Government if it came from us.

I shall be glad [illegible]

No. 305

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)

No. 371
(Telegraphic) *Foreign Office, September 10, 1922*

Your Telegram No. 394 of 8th September: Armistice with Greece.

Greek troops appear to have evacuated Smyrna hinterland, so far as can be ascertained on Greek side, without serious incidents, and to have withdrawn behind Greek forces at Mudania without serious molestation. If Turks refuse an armistice except on return of part of evacuated Thrace, it seems to us reasonable that responsibility for consequences of failure of armistice negotiations should be made to rest with Turkish belligerents who have once agreed to enter into negotiations. Once Anatolia is evacuated belligerents will no longer be in touch. Question may then arise of difficulty of finding discussion of armistice terms are still important Greek forces and material in Anatolia which could only be saved from destruction by some further concession. Greeks will be conscious of that. On general grounds we should be most reluctant to witness any modification of European status which may be invaluable factor in future settlement.

Present state of Greek forces and Greek military prestige. Line of Greek retreat. Costa Rica coup d'état not be seriously regarded. It will doubtless be used by Greek Government and Italians to cover Greek withdrawal, and they may still be hoping for revolt and that Italians are Greek withdrawal. On the assumption, however, that Greeks are genuine and unfounded suspicions of Anglo-Greek collusion. On the other hand, fear of Greeks in Thrace and Constantinople may be an important card in hands of Kemalists with Kemal and Greek support for Allied troops in Constantinople and Straits could Kemalists in event of Turkish refusal to accept armistice terms might also not be negligible factor.

Whether we object to retirement to any of the three lines suggested by generals. Of these last line are clearly inadmissible as far as Greeks are concerned, though less objectionable would contravene principle which it is desirable to maintain and could only be justified by a military necessity which so far as we know has not arisen.

Repeated to Paris, No. 291 (by bag), Athens, No. 212, and Rome No. 262.

[F 9153 5 44]

No. 306

Mr. Millington Drake to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 11)

(No. 470)
My Lord, *Lucerne, September 2, 1922.*

With reference to my telegram No. 169 of to-day's date reporting the views of the Roumanian Government regarding the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres in connection with the forthcoming conference at Venice, I have the honour to transmit herewith,

[9847]

copy of his despatch, which he received from the President of the Council then acting as Minister of Foreign Affairs, in reply to my enquiry. The substance of this letter and my instructions therein were given to me by telegram under reference.

I have &c.
E. MILLINGTON DRAKE

Enclosure in No. 306

Translation of the Council to Mr. Millington Drake

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Constantinople, September 1922*

I have the honour to inform you that the Ottoman Government have received with great satisfaction the proposal for a Conference at Venice.

The Government are of opinion that the only practical method of arriving at a solution lies in the immediate signature of a peace treaty between Greece and Turkey, and that the Conference at Venice should be entrusted with the task of drawing up the terms of such a treaty.

The Ottoman Government are ready to send their representatives to Venice for the purpose of signing a peace treaty with Greece, and they trust that the Greek Government will likewise send their representatives to Venice for the same purpose.

I avail &c.
OSMAN HAMDI

E 9144/27/44, No. 307

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 11)

No. 8
My Lord, *Constantinople, September 1922*

ON the afternoon of the 7th instant the Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me in order that I might communicate to him the substance of your Lordship's telegram No. 787 of the 6th instant regarding the proposed meeting of representatives at Venice.

His Excellency stated that Izzet Pasha was leaving Angora for the purpose of attending the Conference at Venice. His colleagues were consequently awaiting his return before taking a decision as to the attitude which the Nationalists should adopt at the Conference. Izzet Pasha knew what he wished to have conceded to the Greeks, and Nationalists in present circumstances accepted any terms he might bring back.

I replied that I could not think that the recent hostilities would affect the decision of the Allied Governments to summon Greeks and Turks to a conference at Venice as soon as possible. I could not say, however, whether the Greeks and the Nationalists would respect the armistice. His Excellency appeared to be relieved at this, but he could only express further doubts. This appeared to be unnecessary in view of the fact that the Paris proposals provide for the evacuation of Anatolia by the Greeks.

His Excellency then impressed upon me that the Constantinople Government was greatly disturbed regarding the possible consequences of the renewal of hostilities. Whatever Turkish nationalist aspirations may be, at the initial success of the offensive the Sultan and all circles connected with his Ministers came to realise that if the Nationalist army succeeded in further driving the Greek army, to a long prestige of Mustafa Kemal would be completely restored, and he would stand out as the saviour of his country. The fate of Turkey, as far as the Turks can influence it,

will more than ever be decided by Angora, and if the Venice Conference meets, the Nationalists, as victors in the final round of the contest with Greece will play the principal role.

3. There has been much speculation as to the reasons which have prompted the Nationalists to take the field again. One explanation which I have seen is that the failure of your Lordship and the Prime Minister to receive the Deputies who were to have met in London convinced the latter that it was useless to try to come to terms with His Majesty's Government, which was hostile to Turkey, and that the Near Eastern conflict could not be settled by diplomatic means. The Nationalists must therefore help themselves. It is true that this explanation is disputed by the Temps. Harold Buxton's official Nationalist representative at Constantinople in conversation with Mr. Ryan, stated that it was now more than four months since the Angora Government had sent its last note to the Powers on the subject of the Paris proposals. More than a month has elapsed since the proposal for a preliminary conference at Venice has taken shape. No Angora delegate has yet arrived. Four months of the season's fighting would have been allowed to go by, and if the conference failed the Nationalist army would have to remain under arms into next spring. In these circumstances the Nationalists had decided that they must force an issue.

4. It is certain that the speech recently delivered by the Prime Minister on the Near Eastern conflict confirmed the Nationalists in the belief that Great Britain was definitely hostile to their aspirations. They did not think that the speech augured well for the Paris proposals anyhow acceptable to the Nationalists in their present triumphant mood. The treatment of considerable Greek forces from Asia Minor in Thrace must also have operated as a direct encouragement to the Nationalists to proceed with a further trial of strength. Angora gossip speculated that a striking success in the field would enable Mustafa Kemal to approve the peace terms at Venice with dignity.

5. While it is yet too early to form any definite opinion as to the effect of the recent Turkish successes, it would appear that the Nationalists have decided to take full advantage of the present opening stages of their offensive with the object of bringing the Greek General Staff across the table at Venice as soon as possible. The Greek General Staff seems to have been taken completely unawares and at present the situation of the Greek armies in Asia Minor is serious. So far as the Nationalists are concerned, the only way in which a state of war at present could be advantageous to them would be if the offensive of their armies was the prelude to a long drawn out campaign. A real disaster to the Greek arms would be reported and would greatly complicate the prospects of a satisfactory settlement.

6. I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's representative at Athens.

I have &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

E 9148/27/44 No. 308.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 11)

(No. 787)
My Lord, *Constantinople, September 1922*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a note which I have received from Hamid Bey, the Nationalist agent here, and signed by Hussein Raouf, President of the Angora Committee of Union and Progress, protesting against the excesses and massacres being perpetrated by the Greek armies in their retirement.

2. The French High Commissioner mentioned to me this morning that most alarming reports were in circulation as to the conduct of the Greek troops in retreat. It was said that the proof of destroying villages and towns in retreat had been received in the form of photographs showing that the Greek army had shot women and children across its line of retreat. I have also been told that the more statement of the Nationalist foreign Minister that the accusations brought against the Greek army were possibly exaggerated, was an admission for the Nationalists that the excesses of all kinds which the Kemalist army might be expected to perpetrate

I have &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

Enclosure No. 108.

Vice-consul Foreign Minister to Sir H. Rumbold.

Le soussigné, Président du Conseil des Ministres et Ministre des Affaires étrangères, a l'honneur d'exposer à la Conférence de la Grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie à Angora et de porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence les faits suivants, qui viennent de se produire sur le front de Thrace.

Vers la fin d'août après avoir battu en retraite à la suite des victoires remportées par les armées alliées, les troupes grecques, commettent dans toutes les localités par lesquelles elles passent des crimes et des actes de vandalisme qui dépassent tout ce que l'on peut imaginer.

Ainsi, avant de quitter Afion-Karahissar et ses alentours, elles mettent à mort la plus grande partie des habitants musulmans de la ville ou grand nombre de villages environnants ont subi le même sort et le reste a été massacré.

Dans certaines localités, notamment à Odoul-Dagh, près d'Ilgoun, Tacer, tous les habitants, y compris les femmes et les enfants, furent enfermés dans les mosquées et brûlés vifs.

Durant leur retraite de Dinlou, Eski-Cheir, Inallu et Ayet-Kent, les Grecs ont massacré hommes, femmes et enfants sans distinction d'âge et de sexe. Ils ont également brûlé et détruit systématiquement les villages et les villes qu'ils ont traversés.

Les actes de barbarie commis à Bender-Eregli, Kavak et Ak-Keui sont encore présents à la mémoire de tous les habitants de ces localités.

En présence de ces faits, le soussigné croit devoir attirer particulièrement sur eux l'attention de la Conférence, qui ne manquera certainement pas de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour mettre un terme à ces horreurs.

Le Président du Conseil des Ministres
et Ministre des Affaires étrangères,
HUSSEIN RAOUF.

Paris, 31st August 1922.

E 9137 27 44 No. 109.

Admiral Mouchon to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 11.)

Translation.

My Lord, *Italian Embassy, London, September 9, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the Italian Government have always considered it unnecessary that every endeavour should be made to establish peace in the East with this object have repeatedly offered the hospitality of their own territory in order to induce the Greeks and Turks to terminate hostilities on the basis of an equitable peace. In view of the military events in Asia Minor the Italian Government now consider it more than ever necessary that the Allies should take action in the direction of peace, so as to avoid further and more serious complications in the Eastern situation.

The Italian Government, whilst they have already given instructions to their representatives to associate themselves in all such measures as might be considered advisable to decide on an armistice with the Turkish forces, for the termination of hostilities, have never disguised from themselves the fact that the differences of opinion which have arisen in the Inter-Allied Conferences on the matter of the armistice may give rise to discussions which might delay any really effective action on the part of the Allies. It might therefore prove to be conducive to the object in view of putting a speedy end to the present state of affairs if a direct international invitation to the belligerent Governments to despatch their representatives immediately to Venice, where, with the

participation of Allied representatives, the situation that has arisen might be examined and the possibility studied of drawing up the preliminaries of peace.

The Allied Governments might communicate themselves according to the belligerents the stipulations for an armistice previous to the despatch of the representatives to Venice or at least to arrange about as soon as possible a termination of hostilities simultaneously with the commencement of the Conference. This, of course, would be of an entirely different character from the conditions originally proposed and might be limited for the time being to preliminary terms for the purpose of facilitating the conclusion of the Greco-Turkish peace on the basis of the general peace treaty. The invitation to the belligerents to despatch representatives to Angora, which should be sent collectively by the respective Allied representatives, might be in the following terms:

"The Governments of Italy, Great Britain and France, anxious above all that it is necessary in the interests of all to arrive at an early and definite restoration of peace in the East, have the honour to invite the Turkish Government to send their plenipotentiaries to Venice at the earliest possible moment, and might be prepared to be in Angora

In the interest, the Italian Government will doubtless realise that for the moment the presence of the Allied High Commissioners will be more urgently required at Constantinople than at Venice owing to the rapidly changing local situation and the consultations for decisions on the spot which they alone are competent to take

I have, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

No. 311

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received September 11*)

(No. 417)
(Telegraphic) R. *Athens, September 10, 1922*

GENERAL situation is calm but there is certain amount of nervousness, especially in view of difficulty experienced in forming Government and return of discontented troops.

Police have prohibited all open-air meetings or gatherings in Athens and Piraeus.

His Majesty's consul at Volo reports apprehension lest large communistic element there should get sources control. Union of Volo business men has telegraphed to the King urging recall of M. Venizelos to save the country. Similar telegram received from Deputies for Trikala resulted in their arrest.

General Constantinopoulos is taking severe measures to prevent retaliation of counter-revolutionary press.

No. 312

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received September 11*)

(No. 418)
(Telegraphic) R. *Athens, September 10, 1922*

YOUR telegram No. 209 and my telegram No. 406.

Chief Secretary to Cabinet called at 2 a.m. and received instructions from Venizelos that Greek Government would agree to these terms to associate themselves.

Former Ministers will be ready to-day.

Secretary-General replied that everything possible was being done in the desired sense.

Fighting was heavy yesterday, advance proceeding in the neighbourhood of Brussa.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 313

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received September 11*)

(No. 419)
(Telegraphic) *Athens, September 10, 1922*

MINISTER of War returned from Smyrna and told military attaché to-day that practically all military stores had been embarked at Smyrna. Army headquarters and left of Cheshire and troops of southern group covered by second division and cavalry division which were in good condition were passing into Chesme peninsula, where they would be secure to embark. There was no news of independent division which has probably been driven into town groups under Sphendagli Cross mountains and might not escape.

Three Corps in good order. *Morale* of troops in Thrace fair but Scarlatos division has refused to disembark at Smyrna (see my telegram No. 408) and had been sent back to Thasos.

(Confidential)
Minister of War expressed personal opinion that armistice now unnecessary to ensure embarkation of army of Asia Minor. Disaffected troops would be sent to islands for demobilisation. Reliable troops at any rate from northern corps will go to Thrace.

Minister of War mentioned 28th regiment and 5th 42nd Evzones as belonging to Scarlatos division. Even if the name of Evzones regiment is mistaken it seems that information given to military attaché during Thracian crisis was incorrect.

No. 314

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received September 11*)

(No. 420)
(Telegraphic) R. *Athens, September 10, 1922*

YOUR telegram No. 210 and my telegram No. 405.

Ministry of Marine reiterated information given at penultimate paragraph of my telegram No. 405. They added that there are some Greek ships at Piraeus not in use, and mentioned No. 403. They did not state whether ships nominally British but with Greek officers are far from Greece and can only be requisitioned. Three British ships within reach they asked leave to requisition (my telegram No. 413). They have also asked leave to requisition two Italian and one Swedish ships now at Piraeus.

Head of political department of Ministry for Foreign Affairs (see my letter No. 1) with United States Chargé d'Affaires, who appears to have more interest than myself, with Italian and myself to-day. He said that as soon as troops have been embarked he goes and I myself to-day. He said that as soon as troops have been evacuated from south which he expected would be completed to-morrow Greek ships would be used for refugees. They could no longer approach Smyrna as it was practically blockaded by Turkish ships. They would now have to transport refugees from south and foreign ships would have to evacuate refugees at Smyrna, where bulk of them were. He did not think it would be possible to transport more than about 100,000 to 200,000, and he feared that ships would not be forthcoming. In any case he feared it would be better to send them to Greece than to leave them to be massacred. He will give me detailed information of steps he must organise on for receiving refugees.

Repeated to Constantinople and Smyrna.

No. 315

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received September 11*)

(No. 421)
(Telegraphic) R. *Athens, September 10, 1922*

MY telegram No. 415.

I understand M. Frangoulis has now formed Ministry with M. Gregoropoulos Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 316

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September 11*)

(No. 422)
(Telegraphic) R. *Athens, September 10, 1922*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 401.

With all respect to contrary opinions I venture to submit following considerations:—

1. I realise grave responsibility of transporting hundreds of thousands of refugees to this country which as it is can hardly keep its head above water. But Greek authorities say that there is room (my telegrams Nos. 405 and 420). Incidents will probably occur as in the case of Caucasus refugees transported to Salonika and Saloniki.

2. Are not Greek army depots probably already removed or captured by Turks?

3. I do not pretend to know much about Turks but history of their action in Armenian Polish atrocities their treatment of our wounded men after Kut does not assure confidence.

4. If reports true that massacres by Greek army will not safety of Christians left in Asia Minor become still more endangered?

5. If word scourage [illegible] group omitted Asia Minor do we not become responsible for what we left them?

6. Have not we and French in any case grave responsibility?

Repeated to Constantinople.

No. 317

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 11.*)

(No. 823.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, September 11, 1922.*

My telegram of 9th September No. 812.

Following is Government:

Triantafyllakos, Premier and War and Provisionally Marine.
Georgopoulos, Foreign Affairs.
Baltatzis, Interior and provisionally Supplies.
Michalakopoulos, National Economy.
Youlis, Justice and provisionally Refugees.
Mitsos, Communications and provisionally Posts.
Kyriakos, Finance and provisionally Public Treasure.
Skoulas, Education and provisionally Agriculture.

No. 318.

Mr. Young to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. — (*Received September 11.*)

(No. 118.)
Telegraphic.
Belgrade, September 11, 1922.

My despatch No. 390.

Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that although he could not speak officially he had reason to believe that Serb Croat Slovene Government were of opinion that this country could not view with indifference return of Turks to Europe at east to Balkans, and that their point of view appreciated that of Great Britain in regard to conflict between Turks and Greeks, latter being allies of Serb Croat Slovene Kingdom. He laid stress on dangers of common frontier between Turks and Bulgarians. Despatch which went to you yesterday by post shows that Press in the press are advocating views similar to above.

Minister for Foreign Affairs and President of the Council are as you are aware still at front in Bulgaria.

No. 319.

Consul Fenton to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. — (*Received September 11.*)

No. 26.
(Telegraphic.) R. *Geneva, September 11, 1922.*

GENEVA from Lord Balcarres.

My telegram No. 25 16th September.

I have seen M. Hanotaux. He tells me that no further massacres have taken place as Smyrna affair remains the subject of very pressing French telegrams do not propose to engage in personal suggestion of the kind mentioned in any way officially they propose however to inform their Government of President so that if there seems to be any method by which League of Nations can help it shall receive full consideration. They are very much alive to the various difficulties in the way of intervention by the League, even in the modified form of offering good offices to belligerents. They will await further instructions from Paris.

No. 320.

Commander in chief Mediterranean to Admiralty. (*Received September 11.*)

(No. 297. Secret.) *September 11, 1922.*
(Telegraphic.)

ARRANGED to see Noureddin Pasha this evening Sunday as consul general informed me that at an interview he had with him at noon to-day, Sunday [illegible] attitude of Noureddin was not satisfactory and Noureddin was doubtful what the relations between Great Britain and Angora were. Result of interview will follow.

(Repeated to Senior Naval Officer Mudros for information of General Officer Commanding and British High Commissioner.)

No. 321.

Commander in chief Mediterranean to Admiralty. (*Received September 11.*)

(No. 299.) *September 11, 1922.*
(Telegraphic.)

REAR ADMIRAL Commanding 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron by order of staff of British consul general accompanied me this evening, Sunday, when I had an interview with Noureddin Pasha. I commenced by asking him to define attitude of the Grand National Assembly Angora towards Great Britain. He [illegible] answered] that he would like to hear what was Great Britain's attitude first before he replied. Other side my instructions were to discuss situation generally as between Nationalists and Greece, and that as regards Turkey generally the terms of the armistice made four years ago were still in force. I stated emphatically that a state of war did not exist between Great Britain and Grand National Assembly to which he replied similarly Grand National Assembly were not at war with Great Britain. I told him I should inform my Government of this categorical statement. End of part 1.

Repeated to Senior Naval Officer (A) Constantinople for information of British High Commissioner and General Officer Commanding in Chief.)

No. 322.

Commander in chief Mediterranean to Admiralty. — (*Received September 11.*)

(No. 300. Secret.) *September 11, 1922.*
(Telegraphic.)

PART 2 of my No. 299.

I then said that as this point was definitely cleared up I would ask whether he could assure safety of British subjects at Smyrna. He replied Yes and that [illegible] expressing disorder with a strong hand. I informed Noureddin that as he was now in a position to maintain order in the town naval guards were being withdrawn except that at British consulate. He thanked me for this sign of trust. He explained that town was under martial law and no one was allowed to leave town nor to land on shore. This was a military measure, as fighting was still in progress. In reply to a question, he stated that in no way and in no respect would any discrimination be made between British and other nationals. The interview terminated by His Excellency expressing the hope that our relations would become more cordial which I reciprocated. I was impressed favourably with his demeanour. No further British subjects can be embarked pending the removal of military restrictions. Noureddin was not prepared to say that he could guarantee safety of British subjects who have recently arrived. Part of interview. Practically all these people are now collected, those remaining ashore have done so at their own wish. The Maltese colony has also been given every opportunity of embarking, but very few have availed themselves. They are scattered and could not be afforded protection. Addressed to my No. 299.

F.O. 424 234 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

No 323

Commander-in-chief Mediterranean to Admiralty —(Received September 11)

(No 301)
(Telegraphic)

DURING interview this evening Sunday Nov 3rd Admiral asked me to explain why British troops were being sent from Gibraltar to Smyrna which he had gathered from the press He seemed to think they were intended to support Greek army Greek army was without food or munition Mustapha Kemal arrived this evening Sunday and is staying at Cordelio north side Smyrna Bay

Repeated to Senior Naval Officer Afloat Constantinople Foreign Office Paris Rome Athens Berne Belgrade Bucharest Sofia Cettinje

---

No 324

Commander-in-chief Mediterranean to Admiralty (Received September 11)

(No 302)
(Telegraphic)

September 11 1922

Repeated to Foreign Office Paris Rome Athens Constantinople Sofia

(No 69)

Most important Secret received here yesterday afternoon Sunday 10th September and which I shall consider the country interests of the Great Nations Association I should be glad to be instructed as soon as possible to what extent His Majesty's Government has recognised or intends to recognise that Government

Addressed Foreign Office Repeated to Constantinople for British High Commissioner

---

No 325

Sir R Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 11)

(No 271)
(Telegraphic)

Rome, September 10, 1922

MY Telegram No 270

Some Greeks to-day Ossian Nizami Pasha Turkish Ambassador designate to the Vatican views are of some interest as representing those of Fathi Bey who is staying here with me He deeply deplores that His Majesty's Government and Press should receive Fethi who was only private secretary and confidant of Kemal and advocate sent by latter to ascertain our views and wishes This refusal regarded by Kemal as personal insult brought two groups under-plotted by speech has hardened Turks desperate and more than ever bent on offensive which had succeeded beyond their wildest expectations Situation was now very different as Kemal and his army were materially better armed and elated by exalted ideas Kemal would certainly agree to armistice, but only on terms similar to those we had imposed on Germans which would mean our Greeks handing arms and loot to their conquerors He was determined to retake Constantinople and Asiatic Turkey force of arms if necessary he was in touch with various armed 300,000 men splendidly equipped and regarded any Allied threat to stop bluff No effective which could be exerted upon him Europe only be England had no troops to send

On the contrary object of attaining nothing space and of all wing possession of Straits object proposed by intervention of Venizelos Smyrna Nazim Pasha assured me that Angora Government would accept armistice and would be represented by Fathi Bey as principal delegate Delimited Turkey from Paris perhaps but see no possibility other delegates sent from Angora

Such conference should not be confined to Near East question which was now a matter of United States endeavour to secure lasting settlement between Associated Allies Some Powers should be represented Constantinople and Angora are not [illegible] being settled on ethnographical lines it would observe the best solution for detailed examination by experts

Finally Ossian Nizami Pasha speaking, as he declared also in the name of Fathi, besought me to urge His Majesty's Government to change their attitude while there was yet time Turks were naturally irritated with us, their ancient allies and grateful in some degree to France and Italy, but they could never feel the same confidence in latter Powers that they had in us and one friendly gesture on our part might still alter the whole situation in our favour

(Repeated to Constantinople)

No 326

Sir R Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 11)

(No 272)
(Telegraphic)

Rome September 10 1922

FOLLOWING is summary of my immediately preceding telegram

Greeks were proved useless as guardians of Straits, only practical solution was to be that Straits should be guarded by area and to entrust protection to Turks as mandatory of Allies on behalf of League of Nations Turks could be trusted to execute mandate fully and would defend gates against Bolsheviks or any other kind of Russia

Kemal had been forced to accept Russian help but was well aware he was only being used as tool and the Turks detested the Bolsheviks and [illegible] group omitted

Ossian[illegible] practically with an approach to what Ossian Nizami Pasha said to say merely looking [illegible] business at all did point out extreme danger to Kemal of coming to [illegible] with Allies in any attempted *coup de main* against Constantinople

(Repeated to Constantinople)

No 327

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H Rumbold (Constantinople)

(No 374)
(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office September 11, 1922

WILL you ask Sir Charles Harington whether General Harington is fully aware of policy which was approved by Cabinet on Thursday It was while bombarding at Chanak and which can only be altered by conference of Powers concerned at Paris in March and which can only be altered by conference of Powers concerned

Thus, as it was not contemplated to hold a bridge-head on Asiatic shore, it was thought undesirable to put at risk unless which is most unlikely that French and Italians were prepared to give us effective His Majesty's Government do not contemplate withdrawal of Allied troops and War Office have authorised Commander-in-chief to withdraw British troops

On the other hand His Majesty's Government have not the slightest intention of abandoning Gallipoli position and are prepared to send reinforcements to General Harington if trouble arises Hope it will of course be better that this occupation should be a United occupation, and we are addressing French and Italian Governments in this sense If however they refuse we should act alone, and British fleet would assist the operation

As regards the Islands His Majesty's Government do not think it likely that French and Italian troops would co-operate in their defence, and therefore they proposed that Admiral Harington to withdraw British force sooner than incur defeat

In pursuance of principle previously laid down Constantinople should be held at all costs with assistance of necessary of fleet It was deemed agreed that French and Italy would not join in this defence

This statement of policy may be useful to you in present emergency and you should communicate it to Sir C Harington and Admiral Brock

(Repeated to Paris No 293 Rome No 264 and Athens No 213 for their personal information)

No. 328.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir R. Graham (Rome.)

(No. 267.) *Foreign Office, September 11, 1922.*
(Telegraphic.) D.

YOUR telegram No. 275 of 8th September: Venice Conference.

We have received a note from the Italian Ambassador here in the same sense as that which you describe. It is clear that the Italian Government are anxious to secure a final Peace Conference at Venice under the auspices of Italy. In reply we are thanking Italian Government for their suggestion, but pointing out that the three Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople have jointly recommended that it would be helpful if a Conference were called to meet at Angora at this stage, and that in the new circumstances it would be allowed to develop, but are of opinion that the military situation is stabilised before the Allied Governments decide whether a Conference should be held, and if so what its nature should be. We agree with the Italian Government that the Venice Conference as originally conceived is now out of date, but in view of the serious and situation necessitates presence of High Commissioners at Constantinople.

In these circumstances please urge Italian Government to agree at once to proposed reference to League of Nations regarding minorities, pointing out that all we suggest is that the League should make recommendations to the Supreme Council for final embodiment in treaty settlement and that the latter the League begin this task the better.

Repeated to Constantinople No. 376 and Athens No. 210. Repeated Paris No. 295 (by bag).

No. 329.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Paris (No. 294 Telegraphic) and Rome (No. 295 Telegraphic.)

(D.) *Foreign Office, September 11, 1922.*

MILITARY situation is almost desperate. Allied Generals in High Commissioners at Constantinople.

His Majesty's Government hold very strongly the view that since the complete success of Turkish attack on Greek army has placed Asiatic and European Turkey at their mercy, Allied Conference should be held at once to decide on steps to be taken to avert disaster which is threatening the Straits and Constantinople. They suggest there should be Allied Conference at Venice, and they request that the French Government will give the necessary instructions to their military and naval representatives at Paris and Rome to co-operate with the British representatives in taking adequate steps for the protection of the Straits and Constantinople. This is a responsibility which His Majesty's Government will not consent to abandon, and on which they are confident that in receiving the support of their Allies.

Repeated to Constantinople No. 375 and Athens No. 214.

E 9045 19 44

No. 330.

Parliamentary to the International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 11, 1922.*

WITH reference to the telegram addressed to you from this Department on the 25th ultimo, stating that the British and United States Governments were prepared to advance at once their shares of the £1,000,000 gold francs required for the institution of refugees in the country of Eastern Anatolia and Thrace, I am directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to inform you that the French Government have now agreed to advance their share of the gold francs. The French Government however stipulate that the expenditure incurred in the Government of Athens and Angora will be agreed to by the Red Cross

commissions. They have also made it clear that they will regard this advance as recoverable from Greece and Turkey.

2. Further representations will be made to the Italian Government upon the subject of their share of the common expenditure, and it is hoped that it may be possible to inform you of their decision at an early date.

I am, &c.
LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

No. 331.

Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. (Received at Foreign Office, September 12.)

(Telegraphic.) *September 11, 1922.*

HIGH Commissioners have been authorised to transmit to you full text of Foreign Office telegram of to-day's date respecting general policy of Government, main point of which is that Kemalist armies shall not be permitted at any point or under any circumstances to cross from Asia Minor into Europe.

It is hoped to secure Allied co-operation in enforcing this prohibition, but in last resort we must accept responsibility of acting alone with naval resources at our disposal.

Your No. 293 was considered at Conference of Ministers to-day and your view that whole problem largely one of transport was recognised. With regard to your proposal to buy vessels the Prime Minister directs that, in connexion with Allied possibility, but in last resort nothing done by you should exercise necessary surveillance over Turkish shipping to prevent same from being either used or assembled for purpose of transporting Kemalist troops to any port in European side. Destruction however not to be resorted to unless all other means fail. In this connexion it was considered that any undertakings given by Kemalists could be accepted as satisfactory or effective.

With regard to your requirements in the way of naval reinforcements separate telegram follows.

No. 332.

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 12.)

(No. 124. Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, September 11, 1922.*

GRIFFIN General staff state that first corps is arriving to-night at Mudania as Medania is full of refugees awaiting passage.

Repeated to Constantinople.

No. 333.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 12.)

(No. 406.) *Constantinople, September 11, 1922.*
(Telegraphic.)

GRECK High Commissioner informs me that he has requisitioned about 30,000 tons of shipping which he has sent to Mudania to embark army and refugees from Brussa area. He estimates that there are about 60,000 refugees on southern shore of Sea of Marmora.

Now that Greek forces have begun withdrawal from Smyrna and that that town has been occupied by Turks apparently without disorders and excesses question of an armistice appears to have lost its urgency. The three Greek divisions in Brussa area must be able to embark without serious interference, and Kemalists will then have lost the lever which presence of organised Greek forces in Asia Minor would have given their negotiations for an armistice.

Moreover delay of Kemalists in accepting armistice proposal will allow Greeks to transfer any troops they like to Thrace. It would seem therefore, that Greeks now have little if anything to gain by conclusion of an armistice.

(Repeated to Athens No. 129.)

No. 334

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Consul-General London (Greece)

(No. 31, Telegraphic) R. *Foreign Office, September 12, 1922*

Your R telegram No. 25 of 10th September: Greece and Turkey.

Following for Lord Balfour from Lord Curzon:—

[illegible] obliged for your views and suggestions. Mediation between Greece and Turkey by other States, including the Allies, and *b*, the conclusion of peace between Greece and Turkey.

If Allies are unable to settle these questions between themselves it may [illegible] be necessary to refer to the League as in the case of Upper Silesia, but this will, as we feel, be a last resort. We hope to reach [illegible] result by effort difficult as it may prove to solve or likely Allied co-operation.

Question of scope of Turkey's submission to League for what it may be worth [illegible] proposed almost certain effective by Allies as by League to secure Turkey's [illegible] terms and was one that could not be suggested at Paris.

Actual cessation of hostilities between Greece and Turkey seems likely to be secured practically solely by total evacuation of Asia Minor by Greek troops with or without armistice and it may even be that latter will not be required.

E 9217/27/44

[illegible]

(No. 218.) Mo[illegible] *Paris, September 12, 1922*

UPON receipt this morning of your telegram No. 194 yesterday's [illegible] of the Quai d'Orsay, and in the absence of M. Poincaré and Monsieur Berthelot, I saw M. Jonnart. I gave him a free and [illegible] the subject of your telegram. He [illegible] to communicate to M. Poincaré [illegible] Paris to-morrow evening. He informed me that [illegible] had been sent to London and Rome [illegible] stating that M. Jonnart had not appreciated the lessons of the war and the necessity [illegible] rapidly [illegible] question. As regards [illegible] between the Turks and the Allies, after that he proposed [illegible] to hold, although the Turks have crossed [illegible] to the Greeks to the sea, I traced the history [illegible] and I understand [illegible] question of [illegible] Marmora [illegible] Asia [illegible] Constantinople [illegible] to apply, but [illegible] M. Poincaré would [illegible] views on [illegible].

We [illegible] a good deal [illegible] Jonnart [illegible] Embassy [illegible] Quai d'Orsay [illegible] as a ward [illegible] *Intransigeant* [illegible] Premier of the Council [illegible] to read the French papers, where anyone [illegible] of the truth [illegible] Greeks were [illegible] their enemies. Classes of France while the British and Greeks were [illegible] It was remarked [illegible] that, unless checked, would be bound to have [illegible] relations between [illegible] countries.

M. Jonnart [illegible] how regrettable it was, though at the Quai d'Orsay they never failed to preach moderation to the press, it never ceased to [illegible] Government [illegible] Quai d'Orsay every day of the week. He [illegible] of course [illegible] a part to be [illegible].

I have, &c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.

No. 335

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 13.)

(No. 427, Telegraphic.) *Athens, September 12, 1922.*

My Telegram No. 417.

Situation [illegible] somewhat better since formation of new Government which is expected to be conciliatory towards Opposition. Trends, [illegible] considered most unlikely to [illegible] authority is "concentrated" [illegible] great [illegible] and disappointment [illegible] all sides. There are fears about defence of Thrace and possible dangers from Serbia and Bulgaria, and also anxiety lest Mustapha Kemal should take Constantinople.

Some Venizelists have put out feelers as to whether Greece might receive support of His Majesty's Government if she got rid of King Constantine. They realise however that anything but voluntary abdication could only be accompanied by bloodshed.

I have always adopted line that Greece should show strong and united front in view of coming conference and above all things avoid internal disorders, which would be fatal.

Several prominent Venizelists have received communications from Venizelos urging them to avoid disorders.

President of the Council announced to press yesterday that evacuation of Smyrna area had been completed. Demobilised soldiers are returning to Greece by thousands. Many [illegible] refugees have already arrived, and many thousands are filling [illegible] coast of Asia Minor.

No. 337

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 13.)

(No. 428.) *Athens, September 12, 1922.*

(Telegraphic.) R.

MINISTER of War has signed order proceeding to army of Asia Minor, ex officio 3rd Corps in which [illegible] 1912 to 1918 classes [illegible] and 1919 to 1922 classes given fifteen days [illegible] absence [illegible] Greece [illegible] Greek Corps and troops in Thrace. Mixed [illegible] Greece remain for the present [illegible] Minister of War has [illegible] to press that older classes will shortly be released and only [illegible] classes 1919 to 1922 retained.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 338

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 13.)

(No. 429, Telegraphic.) *Athens, September 12, 1922.*

My immediately preceding telegram.

Two classes seem likely to emerge from Minister of War's order.

1. Immediately [illegible] strain [illegible] are being [illegible] released.

2. Another [illegible] when [illegible] classes are due to return from leave. Minister of War expresses confidence that [illegible] present circumstances may be possibly [illegible] Government depends on [illegible] younger soldiers to replace older classes in [illegible] formations, and that failure to return might wreck remainder of army.

Whole situation seems to depend upon whether Greek troops will hold together in Thrace until settlement. Considerable anxiety is felt. I believe with reason that if settlement of Thracian question is not speedily reached or if it cannot somehow

[illegible]

be made clear that Greeks will be allowed to remain there army in Thrace may follow the example of army in Asia Minor and crumble to pieces.

I fully realise difficulty referred to in your telegram No. 267 to Rome but it is my duty to call attention to this danger especially in view of end of first paragraph of [illegible] telegram No. 37 to Constantinople.

Knowledge that Great Britain is reinforcing Gallipoli might have good effect on *morale* of army in Thrace.

Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 339

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 451.) *Athens, September 13, 1922.*
(Telegraphic.)

MY telegram No. [illegible] and my telegram No. 424 immediate. I should be grateful [illegible] instructions.

Ships in question have by now left Piræus but it may be possible to find them at other ports or to hire or requisition other vessels.

His Majesty's consul at Mitylene telegraphed a few days ago that more than [illegible] soldiers [illegible] there [illegible] disbanded. There were besides [illegible] [illegible] sufficient [illegible] soldiers were promptly removed [illegible] which according to press has now happened [illegible] British ships are [illegible] with demobilised soldiers [illegible] Greek Government [illegible] British [illegible] soldiers [illegible] should be considered [illegible] According to Oppenheim's International Law, volume 2, p. 508, [illegible] Greek Government would be justified in requisitioning ships without asking [illegible] consent.

No. 340

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.—(Received September 13, 1922.)

(No. 305.)
(Telegraphic.)

THE following British subjects in "Maine" and two small British steamers approximately: men 105, women 158, children 95, total 358. The food question is [illegible] prospect of their returning to their homes in the course of next [illegible] they can either [illegible] Malta in "Maine" [illegible] "Maine" will discharge about [illegible] hospital [illegible] doubtful whether His Majesty's ships [illegible] be able to [illegible] locally and to supply them [illegible] Constantinople [illegible] "Maine" is being ordered to complete [illegible] "Maine" with three [illegible] frozen meat up to 45 tons and [illegible] provisions for fleet. "Maine" will [illegible] Malta about 18th September by which time I should be able to say whether British subjects should return [illegible] at Malta. Most of them are well [illegible] above appears simplest solution of difficulties and with least expense to Crown.

No. 341

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.—(Received at Foreign Office, September 13.)

(No. 311.) *September 13, 1922.*
(Telegraphic.)

FOR Foreign Office immediate. From British Consul-General, Smyrna, No. 70:—

Mustapha Kemal Pasha whom I met more or less fortuitously this evening, Tuesday, asked me to define my capacity. To my reply that I was the representative of the High Commissioner, Constantinople, he retorted that his Government considered itself in a state of war with Great Britain and therefore did not recognise High Commissioner, Constantinople, or myself either as his representative or as consul [illegible] corrupt group. He would be justified in interning all British subjects. He did not, however, intend to do so, and we were free to leave if we liked. I request instructions urgently as to whether I should embark colony or not. Civil Governor to whom Mustapha Kemal then referred me assured me that I need not be [illegible] regarding their safety until to-morrow night, Wednesday.

(Sent to Foreign Office, repeated High Commissioner, Constantinople.)

No. 342

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean (via Constantinople), to Admiralty.—(Received September 13, 1922.)

(No. 312.)
(Telegraphic.)

FOR British High Commissioner immediate.

In view of Mustapha Kemal's interview with Sir Harry Lamb, I am writing a letter which will be sent to-morrow morning, Wednesday, asking him to confirm statement that [illegible] state of war exists between Great Britain and the Angora Government. This is proposed [illegible] statement. Have you any further instructions?

(Addressed High Commissioner, Constantinople, repeated Admiralty and for information of Foreign Office.)

No. 343

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 313. Secret.) *September 13, 1922.*
(Telegraphic.)

SITUATION in town [illegible] quiet but a great deal of looting and [illegible] is going on. Armenian quarter was [illegible] up last night with [illegible] slaughter. The [illegible] number of women and children this afternoon, Tuesday [illegible] about 400.

Repeated to Senior Naval Officer, Constantinople.

No. 344

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 408.) *Constantinople, September 12, 1922.*
(Telegraphic.) R.

[illegible] Patriarchate reports that there are some 50,000 refugees [illegible] who were without bread yesterday. A delegate from patriarchate [illegible] whether His Majesty's Government would supply flour for [illegible] refugees [illegible] I would ask [illegible] whether they had [illegible] Greek [illegible] England and France [illegible] He estimated that there would eventually be 100,000 refugees at Rodosto.

No 345

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston —(Received September 13)

(No 109)
Telegraphic
SMYRNA telegram No 70 *Constantinople September 13, 1922*

Lest your instructions should not reach Sir H Lamb in time I am repeating to you telegram which I sent my views to him

Subject to the instructions from His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs I consider that Mustapha Kemal's contemptuous attitude in refusing his statement that a state of war exists between Great Britain and Angora Government would embark any British subjects who do not wish to stop in the event of your departure My views should be known to myself We cannot afford to take risks Openly declare intention of His Majesty's Government to hold Constantinople and Gallipoli Peninsula while continuing to further Allied hostility of Angora Government to Great Britain Nationalists are capable of insulting this or British subjects

Kemal's attitude however be regarded that His Majesty's Government have always held themselves neutral in the war between Greeks and Nationalists and that I have received frequent official notes from Angora Government addressed to me in my capacity as High Commissioner How then does he explain his now regarding himself Yours should also assert Britain's attitude of Kemal towards French and Italians In any case possible that Kemal's statement to you was piece of insolent bluff

(Repeated to Senior Naval Officer Constantinople Mudros No 65)

No 346

Sir R Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston —Received September 13

No 275
(Telegraphic) *Rome September 12, 1922*

Although Italian press as a whole considers neutral or interned role policy as between Greece and Turkey is an Italy statesmen whole sentiment is Constantinople Turkish There is no explicit declaration by Italian Government should I consider abstinent from hostile policy should be stigmatised as refusal to fulfil Italy's opposition to Italian intervention is resented

Messaggero to-day says Turkey is completely bankrupt and whereas restitution of Constantinople and all Moslem territories free and neutral Straits Dardanelles and Asia Turkish economic programme is dictated by Britain and Italy's interest

Propaganda in extreme Left press makes it clear that public opinion might favour Italian intervention but would shrink from Italian participation in active measures against Greeks

Latin meantime press is full of interviews with and statements by Father Bevan all be Turkish propaganda agents

---

No 347

Sir R Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston —(Received September 13)

(No 274)
(Telegraphic) D *Rome September 12, 1922*

My telegrams Nos 269 and 267

Minister for Foreign Affairs showed disappointment and surprise He said telegram to High Commissioner did not apply to present Italian proposal for a conference which would at least serve the purpose of giving breathing time and

preventing Turks from precipitate action bringing them into immediate collision with Allied forces In the present exalted state of Turkish feeling he feared such a collision as only too probable We were reverting to the policy of dual which had already proved so disadvantageous

I said that a recent conversation with Osman Pasha had made it clear that Turks desired to convert conference at Venice into an immediate prelude to full peace conference and His Excellency replied that this was not Italian idea but that it would be preferable to immediate war

As regards defence of Constantinople and Straits His Excellency promised to consult expert authorities But he might say at once that Italian force on the spot was very small and that request for reinforcement would cause public opinion in Italy would foil the despatch of reinforcements for the purpose of fighting the Turks. Such a war was the last thing desired here In this connection I see by telegram No 273 I urged his Excellency strongly in the sense of last paragraph of your telegram No 267 He was non committal

Repeated to Constantinople)

No 348

H Rumbold to the Marquess of Kedleston (Received September 13)

(Telegraphic) *Mudros September 12, 1922*

Le Gouvernement russe a adressé au Gouvernement de la Grèce une protestation contre le passage des détroits par les navires de guerre grecs qui se rendaient à Smyrne. Le Gouvernement russe proteste contre le passage des détroits par les navires de guerre grecs, qui ont été interdits aux navires de guerre de tous les pays pendant la guerre de 1914 et qui ont été visités par toutes les Puissances européennes pendant la guerre de 1914 et qui ont été visités par toutes les Puissances européennes pendant la guerre de 1914 et qui ont été visités par toutes les Puissances européennes

Le Gouvernement russe a adressé au Gouvernement de la Grèce une protestation contre le passage des détroits par les navires de guerre grecs qui se rendaient à Smyrne. Le Gouvernement russe proteste contre le passage des détroits par les navires de guerre grecs, qui ont été interdits aux navires de guerre de tous les pays pendant la guerre de 1914 et qui ont été visités par toutes les Puissances européennes pendant la guerre de 1914 et qui ont été visités par toutes les Puissances européennes

Le Gouvernement russe a adressé au Gouvernement de la Grèce une protestation contre le passage des détroits par les navires de guerre grecs qui se rendaient à Smyrne. Le Gouvernement russe proteste contre le passage des détroits par les navires de guerre grecs, qui ont été interdits aux navires de guerre de tous les pays pendant la guerre de 1914 et qui ont été visités par toutes les Puissances européennes pendant la guerre de 1914 et qui ont été visités par toutes les Puissances européennes

No. 349

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Bentinck (Athens)

(No. 218)
(Telegraphic) R. *Foreign Office, September 13, 1922.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 413, 420 and 422 of 10th September and Constantinople telegram No. 401 of 9th September. Refugees and shipping.

We do not wish Greeks to resort to requisition of British vessels owing to our experience in respect of payment for goods requisitioned by Greeks and to possible difficulties as regards payment for delays and of compensation in case of damage or loss. But States have right to requisition foreign vessels in their ports under international law for an urgent national necessity and provided there is proof that all available national shipping is being used.

In present case we would raise no objection to hire if terms are agreed with owners.

Our view is that Greek Government should be encouraged from themselves evacuating such refugees as they wish to Greece and Thrace. We will do what we can to provide medical stores &c. (see my telegram No. 370 of 9th September to Constantinople) and will not prevent Greek Government from hiring British vessels in their ports on agreed terms, but we cannot undertake any financial responsibility for maintenance of refugees on arrival in Europe owing to indefinite extent and duration of liability.

Assumption in last paragraph of your telegram No. 425 of 11th September is correct.

(Repeated to Constantinople No. 381 for information of Smyrna, Rome No. 268 and Paris No. 298 (by bag).)

No. 350

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Consul General

(No. 32)
(Telegraphic) R. *Foreign Office, September 13, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 24 of 10th September. Greek refugees.

Following for Lord Balfour from Lord Curzon.

Our information points to secret [illegible] Greek refugees from the interior having reached ports of Eskisheir and Afyun Karahissar on Smyrna-Panderma Railway, some 100,000 or more of these will be transported by Greek Government to Greece and Thrace, but majority will remain. Can you ascertain whether the Greek or Red Cross, with their present funds, are in a position to undertake any relief by direct arrangement with Greek and Angora Governments? Apparently food, medical stores, clothing and tents and huts are required. Possibly Red Cross may already be moving, but any action now possible should be taken urgently. We are pushing forward a considerable amount of medical stores &c. used by Disposals Board at Constantinople.

(Repeated to Paris No. 299 (by bag), Rome No. 269, Athens No. 219 and Constantinople No. 383.)

No. 351

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Consul London (General)

(No. 32.)
(Telegraphic) R. *Foreign Office, September 12, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 22 of 8th September. Armenia.

Following for Lord Balfour from Lord Curzon.

I do not expect that we can now secure better terms for Armenia than resolution of Paris Conference of March last which comprised recommendation to League

t[illegible] enter [illegible] with Turkey after the conclusion of peace, and assuming [illegible] they then enter the League with a view to create a national home for the Armenians [illegible] guarantees.

Your [illegible] might [illegible] be helpful, though I should welcome a more definite [illegible] willingness [illegible] part of League to interest itself in fate of Armenia."

No. 352

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)

(No. 384.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 13, 1922.*

YOUR [illegible] No. 782 of 11th September: Disposal of "Goeben."

We [illegible] undesirable [illegible] present [illegible] this can be avoided. Nevertheless it is most important that vessel [illegible] hands of Kemalists [illegible] event.

No. 353

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)

(No. 385.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 13, 1922.*

[illegible] Dardanelles [illegible] and [illegible] it would [illegible] military risk. These positions [illegible] held by the Allies, Kemal is not likely [illegible]

No. 354

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir R. Graham (Rome)

(No. 27.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September 13, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 27 of 10th September: [illegible] with Nizam Pasha.

[illegible] Nizam Pasha [illegible] His Majesty's Government refused to receive [illegible] who had been [illegible] Mustapha Kemal [illegible] wishes and [illegible] Kemal [illegible] personal staff. This [illegible] Turkish [illegible] attitude of His Majesty's Government towards [illegible] that [illegible] Bey [illegible] Foreign Minister [illegible] Kemal [illegible] with whom I spent many hours in fruitless conversations in [illegible] Prime Minister to see him. [illegible] His Majesty's Government [illegible] On the contrary, after he had [illegible] with my private secretary, I [illegible] being unable, owing to [illegible] to receive him myself, that he should be specially [illegible] to Foreign Office to make full statement of his case to Sir W. Tyrrell and Mr. [illegible] that he had nothing to propose [illegible] terms of National Pact [illegible] felt unnecessary to pursue the matter, [illegible] Allied High Commissioners with Turks [illegible] represent [illegible] negotiations with Kemal by any single Power had always been regarded by us as inconsistent with loyalty to the alliance. You may make such use of this explanation as you think desirable.

(Repeated to Paris (by bag) No. 302, Constantinople No. 386 and Athens No. 221.)

No. 355

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Lamb (Smyrna)

(Sent by the Admiralty.)

(No. 29.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Foreign Office, September 13, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 70 of 13th September: Colony.

I approve action recommended by Sir H. Rumbold in his telegram No. 409, repeated Smyrna No. 65 of 13th September. You should act accordingly and embark yourself with least possible loss of time, together with as many of colony as you can persuade to accompany you.

In [illegible] whether similar action has been taken by Mustapha Kemal with regard to your colleagues.

(Repeated to Constantinople, unnumbered.)

No. 356

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Paris (No. 301. Telegraphic (by bag)) and Rome (No. 270. Telegraphic (R.))

Foreign Office, September 13, 1922.

MUSTAPHA KEMAL'S attitude.

12th September Mustapha Kemal informed Sir H. Lamb that he considered himself at war with Great Britain and did not recognise His Majesty's High Commission at Constantinople, Sir H. Lamb as Sir H. Rumbold's representative or as consul-general. He said he would [illegible] British subjects but he did not mean to do so.

Civil Governor of Smyrna, however, told Sir H. Lamb that [illegible] for safety of British subjects until night of 13th September.

Admiral Brock has asked Mustapha Kemal to confirm in writing his declaration about state of war.

Sir H. Lamb has been instructed that if Kemal confirms declaration he is to leave Smyrna with all British subjects who wish to accompany him.

Sir H. Rumbold has also been instructed to report Kemal's attitude towards other consuls and to remind [illegible] of His Majesty's Government in [illegible] Kemalist [illegible] that Angora Government have frequently addressed Sir H. Rumbold as His Majesty's High Commissioner.

You should inform Government to which you are accredited.

(Repeated to Athens No. 220.)

No. 357

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 14.)

(No. 432.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, September 13, 1922.*

GENERAL Staff [illegible] message from Army Headquarters, Asia Minor, that independent division reached Dikeli, south of Aivali, on 11th September and by now has probably crossed to Mitylene.

Division has retained its organisation and is believed to have its mountain artillery.

Beyond that its condition is not yet known.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 368 A

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 15)

(No. 438)
(Telegraphic) *Athens, September 14, 1922.*

GOVERNMENT are trying to find 10,000 tons of coal.

They have asked leave to requisition any British coal which they may find either already loaded or on the sea.

Minister of National Economy has promised to pay in sterling for whatever he requisitions. He is ready to put £10,000 at once in the bank for the purpose and to pay at most three weeks' amount ever due which may be due. Provided Minister exhibits promise I see no grounds for objecting in view of your despatch No. 498 that Greek Government are in desperate straits for coal to transport refugees.

No. 366.

Telegram (by Telephone) from Paris.—(Received September 14, 1922.)

(No. 464.)
(Telegraphic.)

MUSTAPHA KEMAL'S statement to Sir H. Lamb.

I communicated to M. Poincaré the sense of your telegram No. 301 and have received in reply a note stating that the French consul-general at Smyrna, in informing his Government of this regrettable incident, added that he intended at the request of his British colleague, to approach Mustapha Kemal on the subject.

No. 367.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 14.)

(No. 276.)
(Telegraphic.) D *Rome, September 13, 1922.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 244 and 267.

Reply just received says that Italian Government would have no objection to League of Nations being invited by Allied Governments to carry out the suggested also after consultations with Greeks and Turks the most appropriate means of protecting minorities for eventual conclusion [*sic*] of new peace treaty with Turkey and of minorities treaty with Greece.

Considering however that it is more than ever necessary on such a question and at the present moment to attain perfect agreement between Allies, Italian Government would be ready to associate itself with invitation to League of Nations on count on that French Government also consents to do so.

Italian Government in such an event would confine itself only to recommending that preparative action to be entrusted to League of Nations for formulation of proposals for protection of minorities should be undertaken in such a way as not to offend susceptibilities of interested parties.

Note ends by affirming view of Italian Government that an early preliminary meeting at Venice is desirable.

Repeated to Constantinople and Athens.)

No. 368.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 14.)

(No. 277.)
(Telegraphic.) R *Rome, September 13, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 273.

There is distinct and noticeable reaction in this morning's press.

Tone is more moderate and reasonable and whole attitude of His Majesty's Government in refusing an immediate conference at Venice is declared several leading papers attempt to understand and even explain. There seems to be increased perception of danger to Italian interests involved in wholesale satisfaction of Turkish pretensions.

My impression is that whole public feeling as a whole remains strongly pro-Turkish unrestricted opinion is hesitating and expectant and can be moulded one way or the other. Which way will depend on Italian Government. If latter wish to avoid acting with us by sheltering behind public opinion they will be able to do so if on the other hand they decide to act opinion will be shaped to follow them without too much resistance.

F.O. 424 254 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

No 369

Sir R Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 14)

No 278)
(Telegraphic) D
Foreign Office, September 13, 1922
YOUR Telegram No 260
Following repeated for information

In connection with recent proposal for surveying and preliminary work at Vathy, Italian Government has sent that in present state of affairs it would be useful henceforth to have Italian officer at Asia Minor in order to prevent it having any repercussion on the Straits

As therefore Italian Government agreed as indeed it does agree with British Government in considering that question of Straits rises above consideration of Turco Greek conflict and is matter for joint action by Allied powers and Regie Guard Petroleum would therefore hope that status quo would be maintained

Instructions in this sense have been issued to Italian naval and military representatives at Constantinople

Repeated to Constantinople and Athens

No 370

Sir R Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 15)

No 279)
Rome, September 14, 1922
Your Telegram
Your Belgrade No 271

As by this secret has been given to all the continental press agencies and presumably was circulated and believed it seems desirable that your Lordship should have an early opportunity of informing the public of the true facts of the case which would appear to be as follows

I will take full responsibility for correctness of information but this is less certain as regards details with both which and their practicability the Italian Government has no

---

No 371

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr Erskine (Sofia)

(No 38)
(Telegraphic)
Foreign Office, September 14, 1922
GREEK Government have fresh information regarding formation of strong Turco Bulgarian force at Thrace and transport of considerable war material 1500 Bulgarians are said to have arrived at Philippopoli and alleged to be receiving military training Greek Government have therefore invited Roumanian and Jugoslav Governments to make strong representations at Sofia and to notify the Bulgarian Government that they have taken military measures to protect themselves and that if Bulgaria takes similar action it will be considered as a hostile act against Greece and will be brought before the League of Nations

Information from Greek sources is to effect that intrigues for Bulgarian interference with Greek reoccupation of Thrace are on foot with object of following up Kemal's success in Asia Minor

Please inform your colleagues and make such representations as you consider necessary with regard to them and telegraph report

(Repeated to Paris (by bag) No 363 Rome No 273 Belgrade No 62 Bucharest No 77 Athens No 225 Constantinople No 388 and Geneva No 54)

No 372

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Bucharest (No 76. Telegraphic) Belgrade (No 61 Telegraphic) and Sofia (No 37. Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, September 14, 1922.

YOU should report at once any developments you may observe with regard to the attitude of the Government to which you are accredited towards the Turkish crisis

---

(E 9325 27 44)

No 373

Sir A Young to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September)

(No 391)
Belgrade, September 10, 1922
My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No 390 of the 7th September, I have the honour to report that the Belgrade press is now showing a keen interest in the crisis in the Turco Greek war and comments are numerous but of differing purport It seems to be taken for granted that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government are not in some way to the French point of view and various articles are appearing deprecating his entanglement I have just returned from a visit to Sarajevo, where the Mussulman element seemed much elated at the Turkish successes, and I learnt that considerable feeling existed against Great Britain for her pursuance of the Greeks I do not, however, suppose that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government will have consideration for the feelings of their Mussulman subjects to influence whatever policy they may otherwise be disposed to adopt towards the question of the retention by the Turks of territory in Europe Since my return to Belgrade I have had no opportunity of sounding any member of the Government, and in truth none of the leading Ministers are away from Belgrade, but I hasten to forward to your Lordship the enclosed analysis of yesterday's press as the development of local opinion in regard to this question is doubtless of the greatest interest to the Foreign Office

The "Politika" yesterday stated that apprehension was felt for the safety of Jugoslavs in Smyrna and that the French Government had been asked to undertake the care of Serb-Croat-Slovene subjects in Asia Minor It is also added that the despatch of a Serb-Croat-Slovene torpedo-boat to the waters of Asia

I have, &c
ALBAN YOUNG.

Enclosure in No 373.

Analyses of the Belgrade Press

BALKAN" (Radical) says that the Greek collapse will whet the desire of the Turks to return to the Balkans This would be an anachronism and a menace to civilisation, and the Serbian people can never allow it Let the Turks remember that there are battalions in the Balkans which, if the Turks dream of Thrace and Asia people, could trace them not only out of Smyrna, but out of Angora The paper adds that the Turks had a cheap victory and was as the Greeks beat culture without heroism is lost a lesson which the Croats and Italians might take to heart

"Cesarica Drevnik" Independent) Democrat) of the 9th September says that, though this country is diplomatically bound to France at present in the Eastern question, be on the side of England The French support of the Turks and Bulgars is a danger to this country It is in the interest of the Serb-Croat-Slovenes to take sides Greek side Let the Greeks withdraw from Asia, let the Turks not set foot in Europe and let the Bulgars stay where they are, in contact with the Turks.

"Tribuna" (Radical, often supports) in an article commenting Greek imperialism beyond which stands England The Greeks will now evacuate Asia Minor, but the English will find their compensation in Europe and get the Greeks to hold Constantinople for them But before this can be done you must first destroy the army of Kemal,

who knows what he wants and how to get it. Such destruction is now most improbable, and the evacuation of Asia Minor Peace is impossible unless the Greeks renounce Thrace.

"Samouprava" (official Radical organ) of the 8th September which expresses the traditional sympathies of England for Greece, but wonders whether the successes of Mustapha Kemal and the troubles among the Mussulman subjects will bring a change of mind. The writer, however, deprecates any exaggeration of the European importance of Kemal's victories. He would only worry the Balkans if he pointed to Europe and tries to excite the principe of the Balkans for the Russian peace. His country is not alarmed.

"Narodni Gospodar" of the 10th September foresees the Turks again in possession of Constantinople. It condemns the Powers for using the smaller States as the Bulgarians will take encouragement from the Greek defeat and may be expected to give more trouble on the southern frontier. This country cannot take up arms to help Greece as peace is of vital importance to it. Asia Minor may yet set Europe on fire.

Bosnia of the 10th September reports from Salonica that the Greek Government has informed Belgrade and Bucharest of an agreement between Kemal and the Bulgarians as to common action when the Turks set foot in Europe, and has drawn their attention to the serious consequences if the Turks are not prevented from crossing from Asia.

"Nasa Pravda" Sarajevo (organ of autonomist Mussulmans), the 10th September says that Kemal's victories are common to all Mussulmans, but that he seems to be actuated by the desire of the Turkish people to show by force of arms its will to live as a free and united nation and to master its own fate. It praises the courage of Kemal's soldiers now fighting Greek troops that have worn out their years of war and further still loves the spirit of ancient Turkish heroes.

"Vreme" of the 10th September comments against the return of the Turks to Europe. Three interests oppose Kemal, not also the Belgrade Starchoisky Congress of 1878 when few days ago since the settlement of the question of England's access to the sea was treated, whether by peace treaty or by agreement, that if he wants to engage to pay for the Balkans now at stake, with the Serbs who helped to drive out the Greek invasion. If he wants to put it at the cost Greek interests to force his way to the Egean sea we must let him clearly understand that we intend to defend the status quo in the Balkans set up by the treaties of Peace.

"Politika" of 11th September speaks in favour of a Bulgarian possession of Adrianople and Gallipoli must follow and on the evacuation of Asia Minor Peace is impossible unless the Greeks renounce Thrace.

No. 374

Mr Beaumont to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 15)

No. 440
(Telegraphic) R
Athens, September 15, 1922

Yesterday American newspaper correspondents arrived here from Smyrna. They had seen Kemal who told them that he hoped that Great Britain would stand over Constantinople question. If we did not do so he would take it.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 375

Mr Beaumont to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 15)

No. 441
(Telegraphic) R
Athens, September 15, 1922

My telegram No. 420.

Ministry of Public Assistance are hard making organisation for reception of refugees. There are already over 10,000 at Samos, Chios, Mitylene. Medical detachment and Red Cross officers are with them. Prefecture of Dikeli. It is hoped to settle 25·4 per cent in the three above-named islands and the rest in Macedonia and Thrace.

At my request chaplain has written to Archbishop of Canterbury asking him to communicate with Foreign Office with a view to possible appeal through the churches on behalf of refugees.

I have no official information from Smyrna, but according to American colony just arrived here massacre of Christians left there was appalling. Cannot His Majesty's Government lend ships to convey those left in other parts of Asia Minor to Greece? (See your telegram No. 202 and my telegrams Nos. 395 and 420.)

No. 376

Mr Beaumont to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 15)

No. 443
(Telegraphic) R
Athens, September 15, 1922

My telegram No. 440.

Young American just arrived following information this afternoon:

He saw Kemal on Sunday 13th September at 10 a.m. Kemal was ready to answer questions and said he would be in Constantinople within eight days. When asked what he would do British opposed him he replied why should they oppose him. He added he agreed with Britain but only with Greeks. But anyhow he would keep Constantinople even if it does come. He was also going to have Thrace up to the River Maritza. When asked how he would get there, he replied across the sea, he had many ships for crossing.

Kemal said he was going to have Mosul. Valuable was brought by Turks but he wanted it. Mosul town was not Turkish but Arab. But must have Mosul town as well as it was necessary to the life of the railway. He had no claim to Mesopotamia and was not trouble for it.

Only question with Kemal would be answer was his intention in regard to Syria. He merely smiled.

Informant had represented himself as a French journalist and does indeed represent French newspapers.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 377

Sir A. Young to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 16)

(No. 119)
(Telegraphic) R
Belgrade, September 15, 1922

It will be difficult for the present to form any certainty what course the Serb Great Slavonic Government may be contemplating owing to the Greek crisis.

Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that only four out of twenty Ministers of State were in Belgrade so far no policy can be authoritatively initiated. M. Nesitch, High Commissioner, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, has been telegraphed to from Paris and Madrid. Papers state that M. Pasitch will proceed to Paris and London. Ministry for Foreign Affairs annul all rumours that M. Nincic will not return for, Geneva before 20th September and all representatives there will doubtless be in contact with him.

No. 378

Mr Millington Drake to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 15)

(No. 113)
(Telegraphic) R
Bucharest, September 14, 1922

My telegram No. 106.

Following passage appeared last night in political article of Viitorul, recognised mouthpiece of present Liberal government:

"Lessons of the war have shown the Allies immense importance to cause of civilisation resulting from closing of Straits. It brought about collapse of Roumania and Russia who were thereby deprived of munitions of war, the entry

inter war of Bulgaria and above all dissolution of Russia and success of Bolsheviks. For this reason Allies will maintain Treaty of Sèvres in its broad lines Roumania is interested in freedom of Straits and cannot admit change in Balkan equilibrium to her disadvantage and declares her solidarity in common interests of all other Allies in maintenance of freedom of Straits.

My despatch No 486 by bag to-day reports that same paper advocates neutralisation of Constantinople and Straits or creation of neutral buffer State there between Greece and Turkey Whole of Roumanian press expressed similar views barring that Roumania must have voice in settlement of Straits question

---

No 379

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 15)

(No 415)
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople September 14, 1922*

YOUR telegram No 267 to Rome

I agree that Venice conference proposal is strongly opposed is now out of date It seems to the most important, however that some conference of Allies must still be arranged as soon as possible

Military situation is already almost entirely [illegible] in sense that it envisaged occupation of Brussa Panderma [illegible] in few days as appears likely Kemalists will no longer be in contact This is the best moment to put forward proposal for conference on basis of the treaty modified to ensure attendance of Kemalists Such a conference will at least give us breathing space If we allow situation to drift, Kemal will not rest content Kemal told me first objective was Mediterranean Second is earnestly desired Press negotiations separate He will endeavour to get there via Constantinople Chanak

We do not trust French much in present situation but they would find it difficult to oppose concrete suggestion for conference and they are sufficiently hesitant to make it up Britain from further commitments to Kemalists before conference took place

If we evacuate post on here and at Dardanelles we have to-day future before us Chanak may be safeguarded by constructive military effort otherwise it cannot be protected Danger of Bolshevism would be aggravated for Kemalists are certainly interested at least outwardly, to the tone reported in the Times of 8th September

The conference I have in view would not be having for its object bringing about formal cessation of hostilities The crisis would be overcome if the Allies could be guarantee of cessation of [illegible] group Cabinet to leave the Straits and Constantinople This need not prejudice decision of policy of His Majesty's Government with regard to Straits, Constantinople &c

I have sent attention to [illegible] telegram of 12th September by correspondent Dicky Mott at Smyrna of his interview with Mustapha Kemal The latter's language although hard is significant

---

No 380

Senior Officer, 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron to Admiralty Received September 15, 1922)

(No 496)
(Telegraphic)

FOLLOWING from Sir Harry Lamb for Foreign Office No 71, and High Commissioner Constantinople

"Your telegram 13th September

Attitude of Mustapha Kemal towards my French and more particularly my Italian [illegible] has obviously been more cordial than to myself, and I do not think he raised [illegible] with them question of official recognition, though I fired both of them considerably embarrassed about ambiguity of their position Situation is now further complicated by the almost entire destruction of all but the

Mussulman quarter of the town, which I am convinced has been [illegible] arranged accordingly] Consulates except Spanish [illegible] Belgian and Norwegian have been burned out and the American consul has already left British colony has been practically all evacuated, and French and Italians are being rapidly embarked I would suggest that I place British interests *pro forma* in charge of Spanish consulate and come As Mustapha does not recognise me officially, I can make no formal notification to him Have sent Vice Consul Hole and part of staff with archives to Constantinople retaining [illegible] Messrs] Gout Urquhart Chalcuas and Miss Routh

---

No 381

Consul London to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston — (Received September 15)

(No 29)
(Telegraphic) R *Geneva, September 14, 1922*

YOUR telegram No 32 Greek refugees
Following from Lord Balfour

League has no funds and International Red Cross is not moving but Dr Kennedy, a League official in Constantinople tells me that Near East Relief American organisation is sending large quantities of supplies with necessary personnel to Smyrna and other centres Their representative, a Mr Berry went to London on 13th September and you can doubtless get into touch with him

Dr Kennedy himself will be in London next week and will be at Foreign Office

There is a notion that Belgian representative will suggest to Assembly that League of Nations should send one or more representatives to see that refugees are not treated improperly but permission of Turks for this would be essential and I do not know what reception such a proposal would be likely to receive

---

No 382

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr Mahaffey Drake, Bucharest)

No 79)
(Telegraphic) *Foreign Office September 15 1922*

YOUR telegram No 113

His Majesty's Government have noted with satisfaction emphatic recognition by Government of Roumania of interest in freedom of Straits and importance of Balkan equilibrium Both those paramount interests are in great danger from menace which threatens Kemalist army is now in position to exert and opportunity should be lost of grasping effectively while there is still time against the danger

His Majesty's Government contemplate early meeting of conference in which the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres will be taken in hand and of Roumanian Government desires to be represented Forces they will be prepared to support the request provided that Roumania herself is willing to assume some share in the responsibility You should see Foreign Minister without delay and consult him most confidentially in above sense enquiring whether his Government will be prepared without delay to place a force of a division at disposal of Allied Commander-in-chief to defend the military point on which the three Great Powers have publicly signified their intentions to maintain, pending final solution of problem

His Majesty's Government are themselves prepared to send large reinforcements But the larger the number of interested states who join in the demonstration the more effective will it be

(Repeated to Paris No 306 16th September)

To Paris only Above is for your information and guidance in your conversation with Ferda)

No 383

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H Rumbold (Constantinople)

(No 393)
(Telegraphic) R *Foreign Office September 15, 1922*

PARIS telegram No 463 of 14th September French attitude as to Straits You should join your colleagues in making the notification

---

No 384

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris)

[By Bag]

No 304)
(Telegraphic) *Foreign Office September 15 1922*

ROME telegram No 276 of 13th September Minorities in Turkey and reference to the League and my telegram No 279 of 7th September

Please ascertain whether French Government agree to the despatch of the telegram to the League text of which was sent you in my telegram No 280 I am anxious to have matter referred to the League as soon as possible and while the Assembly is still sitting

---

No 385

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H Lamb (Smyrna)

(Unnumbered)
(Telegraphic) *En clair* *Foreign Office September 15 1922*

YOUR telegram No 71

You are authorised to withdraw from Smyrna

[E 9350/27/44] No. 386

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 16)

(No. 216.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith to copy Extract from M Poincare dated the 14th September, respecting the attitude of the French Government as to the Dardanelles and Constantinople

Paris September 15 1922

Enclosure in No 386.

Note communicated to Lord Hardinge by M Poincare.

LE Président du Conseil Ministre des Affaires étrangères, a l'honneur d'accuser réception de la note en date du 12 de ce mois par laquelle son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique a bien voulu lui faire connaître les vues de son Gouvernement au sujet de la situation militaire dans le Proche Orient

Le Gouvernement de la République est d'accord avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté pour estimer qu'il y a lieu, sans préjuger des stipulations du futur traité de paix, de maintenir la neutralité de la zone actuellement occupée par les Alliés dans la région de Constantinople et des Détroits Le Gouvernement français est prêt à se

joindre au Gouvernement anglais et au Gouvernement italien pour faire connaître au Gouvernement d'Angora que les Gouvernements alliés comptent que cette zone sera respectée par ses troupes

Des instructions dans ce sens sont adressées au Haut Commissaire de la République à Constantinople qui est invité à se concerter à cet effet avec ses collègues anglais et italien.

Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris
le 14 septembre 1922.

No 387

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 16)

(No 444)
(Telegraphic) R *Athens, September 16 1922*

ALLEGED that Kemal twice declared to newspaper correspondent that he was not at war with Great Britain

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No 388

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 16)

(No 445)
(Telegraphic) R *Athens, September 15, 1922*

EDITOR of Athena told member of Legation that only way to redeem the honour of Greek arms was for Greek army to make a *coup de main* against Constantinople

Member of Legation objected that venture was probably not so easy as it looked Editor replied that there were not many troops there and that they were badly entrusted He added that he had talked matter over with member of present Government and had convinced him

Two newspapers this evening recommend attack on Constantinople

I am informed that Crown Prince favours idea and will go to Thrace for the purpose but I have no confirmation of this

I do not believe present Government will lend itself to anything so insane or take any action contrary to wishes of His Majesty's Government but it is probable that army would fight again if it had hope of Constantinople before it

(Repeated to Constantinople No 109

No 389

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 16)

(No 417)
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople, September 15 1922*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs called yesterday evening to say that Central Government hoped now that Nationalists had liquidated situation in Anatolia Allied Powers would at once take in hand settlement in Thrace, etc The Central Government hope that a conference will be called immediately and in view of fact that it has been suggested in Nationalist quarters that there should be a preliminary conference at Smyrna Central Government consider that Allied Powers should declare at once that conference will be held at Venice As Smyrna has been burnt down a preliminary conference there would anyhow be out of the question It seems to me clear that Central Government, whilst rejoicing at successes of Kemalists over Greeks, are nervous of Kemal and anxious that Allied Powers should serve in some sort as a buffer between themselves and Mustapha Kemal

---

No. 390

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 15)

(No 418)
(Telegraphic) D *Constantinople, September 15 1922*

MY telegram No 415

At the request of my Allied colleagues we discussed the situation this morning I found that they were in entire agreement with views expressed in paragraphs 2 and 4 of my above-mentioned telegram.

On information at their disposal they consider that Mustapha Kemal Pasha will wait a few days to see whether he is likely to obtain by diplomatic means or by a conference what he wants in Thrace &c If, however he comes to the conclusion that Allied Powers are delaying the taking in hand of a settlement he will take advantage of present location of His troops and of remainder of fine season to advance against Constantinople and the Straits This would bring him into conflict with the Allies

The three High Commissioners therefore consider that Allied Governments must face the prospect of war with Mustafa Kemal Pasha unless they act without further delay in the sense of summoning a conference

It is true that as long as Allies maintain control of the seas Mustapha Kemal Pasha cannot transport troops across the Sea of Marmora or Straits but recall by Allies of men of sea for this purpose would be tantamount to a declaration of war against Kemalists

French High Commissioner pointed out that even if Mustapha Kemal Pasha could not transport his troops to Europe he had other means of starting up trouble in Thrace According to his information Greek forces in Thrace are thoroughly demoralised and soldiers are boarding trains and forcing officials to transport them He also said that Greeks are inviting reprisals by arresting Mussulmans in Thrace We have indications that a considerable number of Kemalist sympathisers are prepared for action in Thrace One of the morning papers states that a revolution has broken out in Adrianople and that Greek officers there have proclaimed a republic

If Allied Governments are not prepared to allow Kemalists to impose their conditions on them they should not rest content with withdrawing their troops in the Straits and to Constantinople to the utmost possible extent and in shortest time French High Commissioner lays great stress on necessity for Allied solidarity at the present time

Allied High Commissioners originally recommended that invitations to conference should not be issued until armistice had been concluded, or there was stabilisation of front (see my telegram No 388)

They consider in practice this condition is fulfilled as hostilities have now practically ceased owing to absence of contact of Greeks and Turks They recommend that a conference should be summoned as soon as possible and that it is urgent necessity that three Allied Governments should be in agreement before conference assembles as to extent of concessions they are disposed to make to Turks in Thrace &c

I understand that my colleagues are telegraphing to their Governments on above sense

---

No 391

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston Received September 15)

(No 419)
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople September 15 1922*

MY immediately preceding telegram

Although I did not say so to my colleagues, I wish to point out that destruction of Smyrna by fire which Sir H Lamb considers as deliberate, seems to show that Mahommedan fanaticism is aroused Mustapha Kemal will not be slow to take advantage of this fact

---

No 392.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief Mediterranean (Received at Foreign Office September 16.)

(No 912
(Telegraphic *September 15 1922*

REQUEST you will furnish with as early news as of any information you may have with regard to shipping of all descriptions and to all ports which would be available for Kemalist forces and measures taken to keep vessels under surveillance

---

No 393

Admiralty to Senior Officer, Third Light Cruiser Squadron (Received at Foreign Office September 16)

(No 429)
(Telegraphic) *September 15 1922*

REQUEST early news of situation under following heads for information of government

(a) Extent of fire and principal British losses

(b) How many British subjects are known to have lost their lives Names of any English to be given if known

(c) Extent of massacres

No 394

Commander-in-chief Mediterranean to Admiralty (Received September 18, 1922)

(No 336)
Telegraphic)

UNDERTAKEN to refugees evacuated from Smyrna Steamers 'Megara' (Express) 'Maine' and Bavarian to Malta following were embarked and landed from Smyrna 14th September to steamship Artrosh Sailors 200 English and Cypriots, British subjects, mostly Cypriot artisans Malmedie to Piraeus 1749 Greek refugees in Swedish steamship Smyrna to Smyrna about 300 Greeks numbers are approximate The Greeks were rescued night of 13th 14th September water their deaths by burning otherwise inevitable Written report will follow

---

No 395

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston Received September 16.

(No 421
(Telegraphic) R *Belgrade September 15 1922*

ASSISTANT Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that Greek Chargé d'Affaires told Serbo-Croat-Slovene Government that Greece sees no reason for objecting to participation of Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom in any conference which may have to settle Near Eastern question

Herr Adatchi stated as to desire on the part of Serb-Croat-Slovene Government to participate in such a conference, but it was understood from Rome that owing to views of British Government the idea of an omnibus conference at Venice would have to be abandoned

---

No. 396

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 16.)

(No. 421.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, September 15, 1922.*

MY telegrams Nos. 418 and 419.

In conversation with Mr. Ryan on 14th September Hamid enquired of his own initiative what prospects of conference were. He expressed himself strongly in favour of definite conference as soon as possible.

Referring to published telegrams about attitude of His Majesty's Government he suggested that if end of hostilities were being awaited they had now ended but added significantly: "For the moment." His idea of peace was that right of Turks to whole of Eastern Thrace should be recognised and that the Straits question should be treated separately. If Allied contingents remained at Dardanelles his advice to his Government would be to decline to record protest and enter conference. Later he asked whether there would be two conferences, preliminary and final, or only one, and where.

No. 397

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 16.)

(No. 422.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, September 16, 1922.*

FOLLOWING is repetition of message sent to-day to Sir H. Lamb through Naval Commander-in-Chief:

"Unless you have received contrary instructions direct from Foreign Office Earl of Cavan leaving for Malta in H.M.S. 'King George V.'"

No. 398

Senior Officer, Third Light Cruiser Squadron, to Admiralty. (Received September 16, 1922.)

(No. 499.)
(Telegraphic.)

Your I.R. No. 429.

(a) Wards of town bounded by (1) sea, N.W. as far south as Custom House, (2) foot of Mount Pagus, (3) railway except narrow block of houses line from northern half a mile N.W. as far south as [illegible] (corrupt group) approximate area 1 square mile. British losses include consulate and offices of National Bank of Turkey and [illegible] (corrupt group) Bank offices and warehouses Messrs. Whittall, Patterson Rees, Anglo-Eastern, [illegible] Cadrinan Company and Oriental Carpet Company. Both British and French railways and premises are intact and zealously guarded by Turks. Fire still raging on eastern side of town.

(b) Dr. Murphy, late Indian army [illegible] (corrupt group) British subject murdered by looters in his house.

(c) Estimated 1,000 or [illegible] Allied port [illegible] (three groups corrupt, mostly [illegible] (corrupt group). Believed that only 25 per cent. of Americans living in Smyrna [illegible] have] escaped. No evidences at present whether Boulja [illegible] (corrupt group) [illegible] remainder corrupt].

No. 399

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 16.)

By Bag (from Foreign Office).

(No. 463.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, September 14, 1922.*

MY despatch No. 558.

I have just received note from M. Poincaré stating that French Government are in agreement with His Majesty's Government in considering that it is desirable, without prejudicing stipulations of future treaty of peace, to maintain neutrality of zone at present occupied by the Allies on the region of Constantinople and the Straits. French Government are ready to join British and Italian Governments in informing Angora Government that the Allied Governments expect that this zone will be respected by their troops.

Instructions in this sense have been addressed to the French High Commissioner at Constantinople who has been directed to concert with his British and Italian colleagues with this object.

No. 400

Mr. Erskine to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 18.)

(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sofia, September 16, 1922.*

BELGRADE telegram No. 5.

Serbian Chargé d'Affaires informed me yesterday that while he had some information pointing to possibility of band activity on frontier of Thrace, he considered Greek reports grossly exaggerated.

(Repeated to Belgrade.)

No. 401

Mr. Erskine to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 18.)

(No. 47.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sofia, September 16, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 44.

Referring to these reports, I to-day informed Minister of Justice who is acting as Minister for Foreign Affairs that it was duty of Bulgarian Government not only to refrain from furthering such activities, but to take all possible measures to prevent them. He replied that as he lived at Kirdjali he had made it his special object to ensure order on southern frontier and observance of pacific policy of Government. All officials from Haskovo westward were known personally to me and selected by him, and he had caused all persons likely to cause trouble to be removed from the district East of Haskovo which frontier was a. The Turks and country unsuitable for comitadjis to acquire treasures but I also been taken. He could guarantee that nothing would occur on Bulgarian side of frontier, but as a further precaution he would at once telegraph instructions to exercise greatest vigilance. He impressed me with his complete sincerity. French and Italian Chargés d'Affaires are making similar communication.

(Repeated to Athens, Constantinople, Geneva and Rome.)

No. 402

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 394.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September 16, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 408 of 12th September. Refugees at Rodosto.

Your reply approved.

No 403

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Consul London (Geneva)

(No 38)
(Telegraphic) *Foreign Office, September 16 1922*

YOUR telegram No 29 of 14th September Greek refugees

Following for Lord Balfour —

Distress of Christians of Anatolia and threat to Europe of epidemics breaking out among refugees on littoral of Aegean and Marmora seem to demand international action Kemalists could hardly refuse an offer by League to send medical and relief missions. But it seems undesirable for His Majesty's Government to take the lead openly

Please endeavour privately to encourage Belgian or other suitable delegate to take matter up

---

No 404

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Paris No 307 Telegraphic (by bag)) and Rome (No 274 Telegraphic)

Foreign Office September 16 1922

YOUR telegram No 363 of 14th September (my telegram No 270 of 13th September, Mustapha Kemal's attitude

Mustapha Kemal replied to Admiral Brock that his interview with Sir H Lamb was not an official interview with a representative accredited to Angora He says that although we are not at war formalities are essential before political relations can be opened He suggests unofficially that political relations might well be established between the two Governments

Please inform Government to which you are accredited

(Addressed to Paris No 307 (by bag) and Rome No 274 repeated to Athens No 226)

No 405

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston —(Received September 17)

(No 447)
(Telegraphic) R *Athens, September 16, 1922*

MY telegram No 441

Further reports, which I am not in a position to verify, are reaching Athens regarding appalling massacres in Smyrna and district It is stated apparently on good authority that Armenian quarter has been burnt to the ground after horrors had been looted and inhabitants massacred

Greeks are said to have suffered less only in proportion to their greater numbers

Conduct of Allied men-of-war is highly praised in press, and contrasted with alleged apathy on the part of British as compared with that of French and Italians

It is even stated on good authority that whilst massacre was going on strains of music were heard issuing from band on British man-of-war

To-day's "Politeia" with scorn declares that if refugees are to lose their lives Powers may well save their medicaments

Refugees are arriving by thousands at Piraeus but I understand number left in Smyrna is very considerable and that they are in imminent danger

I should be grateful if I were informed as to what His Majesty's Government are proposing to do in the matter all I know at present is that stores are to be sent (your telegram No 370 to Constantinople but nothing has yet arrived here and British prestige and reputation are suffering accordingly

I have informed Minister for Foreign Affairs of your telegram No 218 and your telegram to Geneva No 32 I have opened relief fund here and have telegraphed American Relief Committee of London for assistance Is there any information that appeal contained in my telegram No 399 is meeting with response? Of course no Greek ships can enter port of Smyrna to take off refugees

---

No 406

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 17

(No 448)
(Telegraphic) *Athens, September 16, 1922*

YOUR telegram No 38 to Sofia

I informed Secretary General at Ministry for Foreign Affairs of action taken by His Majesty's Government, for which he expressed gratitude

He said Serbia was loyal ally, and further details had been communicated to Serb Croat Slovene Government Greek Government would, however be grateful if His Majesty's Government could say word to Serb Croat Slovene Government with a view to their showing a little more activity

Reports are arriving daily from intelligence centres confirming information received and stating that many bands 1200 to 1,500 strong were being formed with a core of ex non commissioned officers.

Greek information was to the effect that power was passing from Stamboliisky's hands into those of the military

Secretary General thought Mustapha Kemal and Bulgarians were bound sooner or later to quarrel over Thrace

Deputy Chief of the General Staff told military attaché that rifles, machine guns and cannon are concealed near Bulgarian Thracian frontier He believed that total strength of bands was between 10,000 to 20,000 men, consisting Turks and Bulgarians under Bulgarian ex officers. He has also definite news of Turkish irregular force forming at Istrandja, and that Constantinople Turkish shipowner has contracted to bring them 10,000 to 20,000 rifles. Minister for Foreign Affairs has just learned that a komitaji raid has been fixed for 25th September

It is impossible for me to obtain very reliable information as to *moral* of Thrace army since I am exclusively dependent on Greek sources, and censorship has been recently extraordinarily severe with regard to news from Thrace It is, however rumoured that *moral* is not good

(Repeated to Constantinople and Sofia)

No 407

Commander-in-chief Mediterranean, to Admiralty.—(Received September 17, 1922.)

(No 339)
(Telegraphic)

CORRECTION Your No. 912

Kemalists have at their disposal in Black Sea, Marmora and Mediterranean ports large numbers of sailing ships capable of holding considerable bodies of men In addition to Bosporus and Dardanelles there are innumerable pulling boats and in the former a service of ferry steamers with Turkish crews running to the islands which would form excellent troop transport if taken to Mudania which no amount of surveillance can stop There are a certain number of steamships at Panderma Smyrna Mersina and Adalia as well as in Black Sea ports No accurate list is available Surveillance which cannot be considered satisfactory method of preventing Kemalist troops from using these ships to cross to European side, is limited at present to air and destroyer reconnaissance of Marmora ports

(End of part 1 Part 2 follows.)

No 408

Commander-in-chief Mediterranean to Admiralty — (Received September 17, 1922.)

(No 340.)
(Telegraphic)

CORRECTION In continuation of my No 339

In event of Kemalists opening hostilities, it is proposed to take the following measures

Black Sea Watch Thracian coast and north entrance to Bosphorus with destroyers

Bosphorus Intern in Golden Horn above the bridges all craft, including ferry steamers

Marmora Watch for with aircraft and destroyer patrol any accumulation of transport capable of conveying troops across the Marmora These ships may have to be sunk if dangerous concentration takes place

Dardanelles Remove all craft from the narrow waters with orders not to return Both ends will then be watched Mediterranean ports, such as Smyrna, Mersina &c watch coasts with light cruisers and destroyers All steamship traffic through Dardanelles and Bosphorus will be strictly controlled and no clearances effected for Kemalist or Soviet ports It cannot be too emphatically stated that all measures are not satisfactory and surveillance by itself will be ineffective It must be clearly understood that to prevent even Nationalists crossing the Marmora in sailing vessels will involve committal of definite act of war as the men will be armed, and vessels will have to be sunk

---

No 409

Commander-in-chief Mediterranean, to Admiralty —(Received September 17, 1922)

(No 342)
(Telegraphic
FOLLOWING received from Senior Officer, Third Light Cruiser Squadron -

'The following resolutions were passed at a conference of Allied admirals and consuls held on board French 'Jean Bart' this afternoon Saturday, to consider the question of relief for the refugees in Smyrna —

1 That the gravity [group corrupt] situation was such that immediate steps must be taken to prevent approximately 200 000, mostly Greeks, from starvation or massacre

2 That an appeal should be sent to the several Governments represented asking that the Greek Government be requested to send ships to Smyrna to evacuate these refugees

'3 That the Italian admiral should call on Mustapha Kemal to-morrow morning Sunday, to obtain his assent to these proposals

4 That in the event of Kemal allowing Greek ships into Smyrna the Allied [group omitted] should provide the necessary shipping The American Red Cross have promised to ensure feeding the [illegible] refugees pending evacuation on the condition that they receive a definite assurance that this will be done at the earliest moment They are already affording relief to 15.000'

No 410

Senior Officer, Third Light Cruiser Squadron to Admiralty —(Received September 17 1922)

(No 501)
(Telegraphic)
FOLLOWING from consul general, Smyrna, to Foreign Office No 72

Spanish and Belgian consulates burned Italian consulate intact Have sent Mr Gout and members of staff to Malta only Urquhart with me on board HMS Cardiff We leave for Constantinople when satisfied no more British subjects remain'

No 411

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 17)

No 424)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 17, 1922*

ATHENS telegram No 445

In view of instructions which Allied Governments have sent [illegible] are sending Allied High Commissioners here to request Angora Government to respect neutral zone at present occupied by Allies in region of Constantinople and territorial waters, recommendation made in some quarters in Athens that Greek troops should attack Constantinople is pure insanity Such action would be the best way of bringing about a catastrophe Best thing Greek Government can do now is to reorganise their troops which have escaped from Asia Minor into Thrace and await events

(Repeated to Athens, No 133)

No. 412.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr Erskine (Sofia)

(No 41)
(Telegraphic) *Foreign Office September 17, 1922.*

ATHENS telegram No 434 of 13th September Bulgarian komitajis.

Please telegraph your observations

E 9440/27/44 No 413

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 18.)

(No. 801
My Lord *Constantinople, September 12, 1922*

ALTHOUGH I have reported by telegraph every important development here during the last few days, it may be useful to describe in broad outline a single sequence the course of events since I wrote my despatch No. 782 of the 2nd September Early a few hours after I had written that despatch I received a telegram from Sir H Lamb to the effect that the military situation of the Greeks had become desperate that Ushak had been abandoned and that the Greek army were flying and appeared to be incapable of further resistance Subsequent events showed that this telegram did not overstate the gravity of the situation so far as the Southern army was concerned [illegible] for a very short time it looked as though the disaster in the neighbourhood of Ushak had not completely demoralised the Greeks and that the bulk of the army might succeed in withdrawing in order to the line of the Meander Valley But the Greeks might find it possible to make a stand on the high ground in the neighbourhood of Aidin or

3. Neither of these hopes was realised The retreat of the Greeks might rally on an intermediate position was disclosed from a report dated the 11th September by a report from the British military representative Smyrna who had personally visited the front, that he had left Dodgeon [illegible] Greek headquarters at Afiun Karahissar and that the troops were in full retreat by way of two routes on the 9th September the Angora representative at Constantinople announced at a meeting of the Allied Representatives at Constantinople that he had received official information from Angora that General Trikoupis had been taken prisoner This news was received with some scepticism It was confirmed on the following day It is said that General Trikoupis received the first intimation of his promotion to the post of commander-in-chief which fell due to the neutrality of Athens from Mustapha Kemal Pasha himself This is not strictly true see [illegible]

4 It is not necessary to dwell on the subsequent military developments during the retreat from Smyrna The Kemalists occupied Smyrna after the Greeks had completed all arrangements to evacuate Smyrna and to withdraw the civil administration by the 9th September the advanced cavalry of the Kemalists entered the city

5 The Greek army in the Brussa area consisting of three divisions, still remains intact The morale of the troops appears to be better than it was in the south, and it seems probable that the Greeks are in a position to liquidate the situation in that region more orderly fashion than in the Smyrna hinterland They are however making all preparations to withdraw their troops as soon as possible

6. The first concern of the Russian authorities here on receipt of the news that the plight of the Greeks was desperate was to leave nothing possible to avert disorder and danger to the British community at Smyrna A Russian Greek left for that place on board the 'Iron Duke' on the 11th September The 'King George V' followed the next day A number of destroyers were also sent The Allied Powers followed suit.

quarters, especially in the shops. Processions of demonstrators have for several days paraded the streets. High-water mark was reached on the evening of the 10th September when an enormous crowd of people surged across the bridge from Stamboul to Galata and made its way to 'Liberty Hill' on the confines of the town at the other side of Pera. A great many windows were smashed in certain quarters, and similar damage has been done on a smaller scale in the course of other demonstrations. As a rule the window-breaking has been indiscriminate. It was mostly taken place in quarters where Christians predominate, but there is no evidence that Christian houses or shops have been expressly singled out, except perhaps in some of the outlying villages. The only important cases which have come to my notice in which particular buildings have been deliberately attacked in the town are those of the Greek Military Mission in the main street of Pera, and the Pera quarters of the Turkish Opposition Party known as the 'Entente Libérale' in Stamboul. Great nervousness prevails among Christians and anti-Kemalist Turks, but on the whole the demonstrations have been conducted in an orderly fashion. It is doubtful whether a similar occasion would have passed off so well in a European capital; at all events it is undesirable that such demonstrations should continue, as they might easily take a higher form. General Harington has given orders that they must be discountenanced.

French officers have been instructed to take no part in the general rejoicing.

I do not anticipate any serious disturbances in Constantinople as the result of the latest news, but I think the above explanation may assist the Kemalist victory as not settling the Near Eastern question. Izzet Pasha's interim cabinet has been severely criticised. On the 9 September I spoke to M. Ryan of its unfortunate origin. He had tried to report that Greeks were not collecting troops there, but he inquired as to the possibility of the Greek forces taking advantage of the difficulties of the Greeks in order to move on Angora. Izzet Pasha's fears that the news that will make Angora more pugnacious is peace between Greece and Turkey. This is a point of view which is affected by Sultan's hostility to Secretary as His Majesty has been consistently at odds with Kemalists. I have not yet had an opportunity of discussing the matter with Mr. Ryan, but I do not think that he will be disposed to take a different view.

I am forwarding copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Representative at Athens, Rome, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

E 9444 27 44 No. 414

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 18)

(No. 2064)
My Lord, *Constantinople, September 12, 1922.*

On the 9th instant I received a telegram from the Moslem Association at Yozgat asking me to convey to the Sultan the offer of the Moslems of Nevshehir, the Turkish successes in Asia Minor, sincere prayers for the complete restoration of the Khilafat and the further victories of Enver Kemal Pashas brave army." A telegram to the same effect, but containing a vow of holy warfare, has been received by Mustapha Kemal from Moslems in Egypt and Java.

I can, I suppose, be informed with certainty that the unexpectedly sweeping successes of the Kemalist army over the Greeks will have stimulated Moslems all over the world to a fervent assertion of Islam versus Christianity. Very much, therefore, seems to depend on local proceedings during the next two or three weeks. Now that we have seen the Greek army appears to be precipitately engaged in extricating itself from Anatolia without further serious armistice scenes, superficial and I cannot but feel shrewdly to this fact. In the present mood of fanaticism on the Kemalists, armistice against its wishes would, however, be a source of embarrassment to the Allied Powers even although the Naval representatives would have no hand to discuss questions touching the evacuation of Anatolia. A consultation by the Kemalists that the command of the seas on the Asiatic coast will effectually prevent the Kemalist army from crossing to Thrace must inevitably have a sobering effect both on the Kemalists and Moslem opinion generally.

3. I have noticed slight indications that the French have been somewhat taken aback and are slightly apprehensive at the extent of the Kemalist successes. They are beginning to realise even although it may be only at the moment, the potential danger of a strong and chauvinistic Turkey. This fear of mine may induce the French to a more loyal attitude in regard to the Near Eastern question.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

E 9401 27/44 No. 415

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 18)

(No. 2174)
My Lord, *Paris, September 16, 1922.*

M. VENIZELOS came to see me this morning. He was much in agitation and excitement. He said that since his arrival Paris had seen nobody except M. Gravereau, the journalist who writes the leading articles in the Temps. He had, however, fully realised that opinion in France was stronger even now than it was before against King Constantine, and that it was useless to expect any support from France to Greek aspirations so long as he remained on the throne. Were King Constantine to abdicate at once, he believed even now public opinion in France would be sufficiently favourable that event to enable him himself with the undertaking of engaging in France to change French opinion entirely in a few months, to cause the Greek armies to be received in the Allied lines during the winter not more particularly the armies operations carried on by Greek troops on the Smyrna front with a view according to General Gouraud had been the ultimate assembly of Greek armies in Europe. Further, in the interests of the dynasty, the abdication of King Constantine would be absolutely necessary, otherwise the dynasty itself would be certainly swept away in the revolution which would have to take place with its fall, and in the event of the King returning at the present moment, the Crown Prince would naturally come to the throne and be recognised as King by the people. He said that no Greek could possibly lose his eyes to the fact that all the misfortunes which have happened to Greece have occurred since the return of the King to Athens and are entirely due to the King and the faults of his Ministers. He quoted, for instance, the case of Gounaris, a criminal piece of folly and he had suggested Greek Ministers to accept the proposals from which has been put forward by His Majesty's Government. He asked me whether it were not possible for His Majesty's Government to persuade the King Constantine that it would be very difficult to arrive at any terms with the Entente in any way compatible with Greek interests in the Near East so long as King Constantine remained on the throne.

I replied that I could not undertake to make any representations to the King on the personal question of King Constantine's abdication. I pointed out that the ex-Kaiser, before the throne, was very serious constitutional difficulties which had been put forward by His Majesty's Government. He asked me whether it were not possible for His Majesty's Government to persuade the King Constantine that it would be very difficult to arrive at any terms with the Entente in any way compatible with Greek interests in the Near East so long as King Constantine remained on the throne.

I pointed out to M. Venizelos that it was quite evident that any future Government would support the proposal of the Meritz as the frontier of Turkey with the exclusion of Adrianople.

M. Venizelos stated at once that this would be a fatal policy, since it would inevitably tend to Bulgarian having a coterminous frontier with Turkey, and neither the Serbians nor the Roumanians would agree to what would be an opening for an alliance between Bulgaria and Turkey, which might reopen the whole of the Balkan question.

I asked M. Venizelos if he had any solution to propose, which might possibly form a basis for a compromise in the event of a difference of opinion between His Majesty's and the French Governments on the subject of Thrace. I argued at length on the Chanak crisis and the present Treaty of Sèvres in order with some very slight modification on the Chatalja line. I asked him what his views were on the suggestion which I had seen put forward as a possible solution both in the French and Greek papers, namely the creation of an autonomous province in Thrace. I replied that I could not regard this as a makeshift and I feared that it would become another Macedonia of which

Bulgaria would not wish to take advantage Bulgaria would pour in her emigrants, and in a few years time there would be the same struggles and massacres of rival nationalities as now disgraced Macedonia under Turkish rule What he would like to see would be the immigration into Thrace of the hundreds of thousands of Greeks and other Christians who will leave Asia Minor as a result of Anatolia which will inevitably become purely Turkish country in the future Were these Christians to be located in Thrace they would form the course of time form a strong barrier against any advance of Turkey westward from Constantinople

M Venizelos said that he had thought of going to London to explain his views about King Constantine to you and to the Prime Minister but he felt that his visit would attract undue attention and might even be embarrassing to His Majesty's Government and he therefore asked me to transmit them to you

I have, &c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST

No. 416

Mr Findley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 28)

(No. 450)
(Telegraphic) *Athens, September 27, 1922*

YOUR telegram No. 225.

Greek troops in Thrace according to 4th Corps state dated 10th September

1st Army Corps (General Vlachopoulos) headquarters at Adrianople

Corps troops Fourth regiment including artillery one group Adrianople one group Demotika Cavalry Mountain artillery from Xanthi division one battery Rodosto One battalion Lozotes Karaagach Depot regiment Dedeagatch Sixty first regiment (remaining against Bulgars) headquarters Uzun Keupri Four battalions at Gumuldjina Havsa Vize and Malgara

Sixth division (General Dimitracopoulos) Divisional headquarters one battery Mountain artillery and 26th regiment Gumuldjina 19th regiment Demotika 21st regiment Xanthi Fifth division (Colonel Pantoulas) divisional headquarters and one battery mountain artillery Kirk Kilisse Sixtieth regiment Adrianople Fifteenth regiment Kirk Kilisse with one battalion at Ergli (*Note*—Believe heavy artillery to have been sent to Asia Minor Alpha division has been split up Fifty fifth regiment went to Gumuldjina 28th and 30th to Chios and Vurla)

Third Army Corps (General Soumelis)—Third and 10th divisions are at Panderma, crossing to Rodosto is complete to-morrow Seventh division with 55th regiment attached was reported 3rd Army Corps. Wireless from Greek flag ship at Panderma indicates that 56th and 55th regiments had reached Panderma by train on roads but that General Kodas with 7th and possibly two 45th regiments and with a number of guns, had been made prisoner near Mudania Truly Kodas will be as great loss as troops Corps troops and services present with 3rd Corps not yet accurately known

Head quarters of cavalry division with two regiments and one group of field artillery have reached Moudania in good order but military attaché has not yet seen the cavalry horses (? Battery of] division is being transported to Salonica According to General Staff it is stated that intact in *morale* and material

(Repeated to Constantinople)

No. 417.

Mr Findley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 28)

(No. 451)
(Telegraphic *Athens, September 27, 1922*

SIR H RUMBOLD'S telegram No. 421

Military attaché has also received reports that Turks are organising forces in neutral zone If it is policy of His Majesty's Government to keep Kemalists out of Europe at any rate until settlement it appears clear that neutral zone should not be allowed to become armed bridge head

(Repeated to Constantinople No. 259.)

No. 418

Mr Villington Drake to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 18)

(No. 113)
(Telegraphic) *Bucharest, September 18, 1922*

YOUR telegram unnumbered of 15th September [? No. 79]

I consulted Minister for Foreign Affairs [group undecypherable] this morning as instructed and impressed on him necessity that if Roumania wished to be represented at conference she should be ready to assume her share of our responsibility

M Duca assured me that Roumania could not admit that Kemal should decide by force of arms question of Straits, which vitally interested Roumania

In principle Roumanian Government consider they ought to participate in military action After Council meeting this afternoon he will give me official reply as to decision taken I gather group committed but Prime Minister agreed on subject and are in favour of immediate action but must consult their colleagues

He said that Serb Croat Slovene Minister was writing probably to enquire as to policy of Roumanian Government and he said that he should urge him to recommend his Government to reply similarly to enquiries in the same sense as Roumania I can see Roumanian Government are ready to support His Majesty's Government at conference in regard to Straits question I pointed out that three Great Powers had publicly announced intention to defend military position pending final solution [? which] proved that in supporting us Roumania need not have friction with France He quite realised situation was clear

---

No. 419.

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 18)

(No. 425)
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople, September 17, 1922*

IN a private letter just brought to me only delivered to us at 5 o'clock this afternoon French High Commissioner informed Italian High Commissioner and myself that on instructions from French Minister for Foreign Affairs group omitted to ask for leave for Smyrna but might report movement of Minister and to assure what remains of the French colony of the solicitude of the French Government for their safety and to investigate origin of fire Both my Italian colleague and I had after noted this morning to get hold of French High Commissioner with whom we were instructed to go into Constantinople French Embassy observe mastery about instructions and this was obviously designed to give him several hours start

This proceeding on the part of French High Commissioner has made unfavourable impression on my Italian colleague and myself We both agree that French High Commissioner has in reality gone to Smyrna to see Mustapha Kemal in order to extricate French Government from embarrassing position in which they now necessarily find themselves French High Commissioner will no doubt appeal to Mustapha Kemal to respect neutral zone in return for promises of support at forthcoming conference The destruction of Smyrna including burning of French consulate and all material damage to French interests have come as a great shock to French here True facts getting out it will be more difficult for the French to support a nation which commits such barbarities British vice-consul from Smyrna, who arrived yesterday is preparing a full report of events there culminating in destruction of the town I will telegraph a summary There seems no doubt that Turks deliberately massacred many Armenians and treasured not the Armenian and European quarters of the town

---

No. 420

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 18.*)

(No. 427.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, September 18, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 393.

Notification to Angora Government in terms indicated in Paris telegram No. 403 will be made to-day through Nationalist agent here.

No. 421

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean. —(*Received at Foreign Office, September 18.*)

(No. 915.)
(Telegraphic.) *September 16, 1922.*

IN continuation of No. 912.

Cabinet authorises you if in your opinion there is any risk of use being made by Kemalists of these shipping facilities to transport troops to Europe to take any action you may think necessary to secure or destroy them.

No. 422

Senior Officer, Third Light Cruiser Squadron, to Admiralty. (*Received September 18, 1922.*)

(No. 504.)
(Telegraphic.)

FOLLOWING from Sir H. Lamb for Foreign Office.

My No. 72. Though I consider my own group omitted more no longer serves any practical purpose, I set it down to show that there remain important interests and property which require watching. I do not think it desirable to abandon this place at present before it becomes imperative. Moreover, I apprehend such total abandonment might be regarded by Turks in hostile intent. In these circumstances I propose to leave Vice-Consul Urquhart who has shown himself resourceful and competent in unofficial charge so long as any British subject is returned here instructing him to come away when H.M. ships withdrawn or to arrange to evacuate with American acting consul so long as latter also stays. Rear-Admiral Commanding Third Light Cruiser Squadron authorises me to state he concurs.

No. 423

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 18.*)

(By Bag.)

(No. 465.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, September 16, 1922.*

THE Serbian Minister for Foreign Affairs called upon me this afternoon and on my informing his Excellency of your Lordship's readiness to see him if he came to London, he expressed his great gratification and stated that he would arrive in London at 7.30 o'clock on Monday evening, but that he would have to return to Paris on Wednesday as M. Pasitch is due to arrive on that day. He will be very pleased if you could see him on Tuesday at any hour most convenient to you.

I spoke to M. Nincitch in the sense of your Lordship's telegram No. 396 (repeating No. 79 to Bucharest), and assured him of our support in the question of the participation of Serbia in the conference which is to take place, on condition of the acceptance of responsibility by his Government in the maintenance of the Balkan equilibrium, and I urged that his Government should agree to send a division of troops to be placed under General Harington's command in order to meet all eventualities.

M. Nincitch said in reply that he had been meeting to-day with the King and M. Poincaré, and that they were all agreed that an end should be put to the Turks with the least possible delay. The Turks were for the moment respecting the wishes of the Allies, but in their present exalted state of mind it was impossible to say what their attitude might be to-morrow. The Serbian Government were greatly preoccupied by the attitude of the Bulgarians, and they were anxious that no opening should be given to the latter to create trouble with the Turks. He would discuss this question with your Lordship on Tuesday, and on his return to Paris on Wednesday would be able with M. Pasitch to arrive at any decision that might be found necessary. He added that of course Serbia would do what was required of her.

No. 424

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 18.*)

(By Bag.)

(No. 466.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, September 16, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 394.

I have just received note from M. Poincaré stating that while appreciating the motives which have led His Majesty's Government to propose reference to the League of Nations of protection of minorities in Thrace and Asia Minor, he considers that there would be objections from the point of view of the responsibility and authority of the League itself to ask it to participate in the drafting of stipulations which are to form part of the future Treaty of Peace and which in consequence must be elaborated by the Powers who are called upon to draw up the clauses of that treaty. Clauses which must subsequently be put into practice under the supervision of the League of Nations.

Copy of note by bag to-night.

No. 425

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 18.*)

(By Bag.)

(No. 467.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, September 16, 1922.*

SINCE despatching my telegram No. 465 this afternoon, I have had an audience with the King of Serbia.

I explained to His Majesty the situation as contained in your Lordship's telegram No. 396 to-day, and urged that Serbian Government should participate in the Allied demonstration in the Near East.

His Majesty, who had already been informed by His Minister for Foreign Affairs of the conversation which we had had this afternoon, expressed his gratification at your Lordship's invitation to see M. Nincitch in London on Tuesday next, and while excusing himself from giving me an immediate answer, assured me that his Government were ready to take any action that might be considered necessary, and that he would be able to give a definite answer after a discussion with his Prime Minister who was due to arrive in Paris on Tuesday or Wednesday.

His Majesty stated that his country was deeply interested in the maintenance of the Balkan equilibrium, and added that, in spite of rumours of Bulgarian activities and their apparent idea of obtaining advantages from the present strained position, he and his Government were determined that the execution of the treaty should be maintained in full.

No. 426.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 18.*)

(No. 280.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, September 18, 1922.*

IT is stated that Fathy Bey is leaving for Angora to consult with his Government after which he will return here.

(Sent to Constantinople and Athens.)

No. 427.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 18.*)

(No. 281.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, September 18, 1922.*

FOLLOWING semi-official communication appeared in 'Tribuna' last night:—

'We have reason to believe that Italy would not participate in the eventuality of military operations which might be provoked in the East should Anglo-French communications be extended to European territory.

Italy would always maintain solidarity with her allies in defending the principle of liberty of the Straits, but she could not employ her military forces should most Illustrious Allies who has made every attempt to avoid by peaceful negotiations be extended in their sense.'

No. 428.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 18.*)

(No. 282.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, September 18, 1922.*

ITALIAN press has contained no allusion whatever to reply of Italian Government regarding Constantinople and the Straits reported in my telegram No. 278. In the meanwhile a Reuter message has been published here expressing our satisfaction at attitude of French and Italian Governments. This assumed that it implied Italian Government to issue communiqué reported in my immediately preceding telegram. They seem terrified of incurring unpopularity by appearing to be in any way in opposition to the [illegible] Turks.

No. 429.

Mr. Erskine to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. — *Received September 18.*)

(No. 5.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sofia, September 17, 1922.*

ATHENS telegram No. 448.

There is no indication whatever of power passing into hands of military.

Major Neate considers statements regarding guns and size of barges ridiculous. He is going to Philippopolis district to-morrow on business of liquidation and I have suggested that on its completion he should make a tour of the frontier.

(Repeated to Athens and Constantinople.)

No. 430.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Bentinck (Athens).

(No. 228.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September 18, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 438.

In the circumstances we consider that previous claimants for requisitioned goods would have legitimate grievance if present requisitions were paid before them. You should therefore do your best to extract payment for earlier requisitions (which only amount to about 80,000*l.*) as a condition precedent to our consent, but naturally not to the extent of risking payment offered for present transaction which we have no means of preventing if it comes to a push.

No. 431.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Lindley (Athens).

(No. 230.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September 18, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 447 of 16th September.

There is not so far as we are aware, the slightest foundation for the disparaging statements concerning British action or inaction at Smyrna which you report and they should be emphatically repudiated. On the contrary His Majesty's Government have warmly supported the proposal of the Allied Admirals and Consuls (*vide* telegram from Commander-in-chief Mediterranean of 17th September repeated to you) to obtain consent of Mustapha Kemal to admission of Greek vessels to Smyrna harbour to evacuate Greek refugees. In case this should prove unsuccessful or inadequate we are making immediate enquiries as to any available British shipping in the neighbourhood and are prepared to charter British vessels for the purpose provided we have assurance that they also will be able to carry out their object and, further that Greek Government will be prepared to receive the refugees on Greek mainland or on the islands.

(Repeated to Constantinople No. 396.)

No. 432.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 895.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 18, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 424.

We assume that you duly received and acted upon our telegram No. 363, authorising immediate representations to Angora Government of Allied policy. What were actual date and terms of this communication, and was it joined only both French and Italian High Commissioners?

No. 433.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 308.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September 18, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 463.

His Majesty's Government welcome very cordially the assurance from M. Poincaré that the French Government are in agreement with them on the supreme importance of maintaining the neutrality of the two occupied zones, and they have gladly joined the French in making the desired intimation to the Angora Government. We earnestly hope that the agreement on this important point may enable us to approach the discussion of the many other questions involved in a spirit of small loyalty and co-operation.

It is in pursuance of the principle thus acknowledged that His Majesty's Government are taking the precautionary measures which have been announced in the press.

[E 9455/27 44] No. 434

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 19.)

(No. 506. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Athens, September 9, 1922.*

WITH reference to my telegrams No. 34 of the 30th ultimo and No. 356 of the 1st instant respectively, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a despatch addressed, to me by the military attaché at His Majesty's Legation regarding the supplies alleged by the Greek Government to have been furnished by our Allies and others to the Turkish Nationalist army.

Your Lordship will observe that Colonel Hoare Nairne has sent a copy of the despatch and enclosed list to the general officer Commanding-in-chief at Constantinople.

I have, &c.

C. H. BENTINCK.

Enclosure No. 434.

Colonel Nairne to Mr. Bentinck.

Sir, *Athens, September 7, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to submit a translation of a paper which was given me a few days ago by the Greek Minister of War in support of his statement that the recent Turkish attack had only been made possible by the arms, equipment and supplies which Mustapha Kemal Pasha had received from the French, Italians, Bolsheviks and elsewhere.

The alleged exports to be scheduled list in three parts (A), (B) and (C), of the items which the Greek Government have been able to trace as having been received by Mustapha Kemal during the months of June and July of this year.

I have no means myself, of checking these figures, but I am sending a copy of this despatch to the general officer Commanding-in-chief, Constantinople, who may possibly be able to comment on the degree of their accuracy.

I have, &c.

E. S. HOARE NAIRNE,
Colonel, Military Attaché.

SCHEDULE of Military Supplies reported by Greek Government to have been supplied to Mustapha Kemal.

(A.)

FRANCE.

Guns.—250 to Mersina from Cilicia.
Machine Guns.—120 from Cilicia.
Rifles. Continuously by motor transport, from Cilicia and Syria to Adana; quantity unknown.
Aeroplanes.—3 from Cilicia.
Uniforms.—18,000 from Cilicia.
Boots.—20,000 pairs from Cilicia.
Shells.—
5 cases gun cartridges to Mersina.
A great quantity, three days in transport, from Alexandretta for Adana.
War Material (gross weight).—Continuous transport and discharge by barges from Cilicia and Syria to Adana.
Sources of Information.
Military mission at Constantinople.
Consul's bureau.
Newspaper reports, Alexandria.
Remarks.—By steamship "Andre Chenier."

RUSSIA.

Guns.—120.
Machine Guns.—80.
Rifles.—16,000 Lebel.
Aeroplanes.—4.

GERMANY.

War Material (gross weight).—A ship's cargo from Hamburg and Esburg.
Source of Information.—Legation at Berne.
Remarks.—By steamship "Elbe."

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Petrol.—14,000 cases from Alexandretta through Cilicia.
Sources of Information.—
Military mission at Constantinople.
Newspaper reports of "Neo Logos," Alexandria.

(B.)

FRANCE.

Horses.—
1,150 from Alexandretta.
66 from Alexandretta to Adana.
Ammunition.—
cases cartridges.
1,[illegible]0 cases from Alexandretta to Adana.
400 tons or more of bombs.
Tank.—1 from Alexandretta to Adana.
Mules.—[illegible]50 from Alexandretta to Adana.
Cars.—
[illegible]0 from Alexandretta.
50 from Alexandretta to Adana.
50 from Alexandretta to Mersina.
Machine Guns.
40 cases from Toulon to Mersina.
10 cases from Alexandretta to Adana.
Rifles.—17,0[illegible] from Toulon to Mersina.
Aeroplanes.—29 scouts to Mersina, 2 from Alexandretta.
Ammunition (approximate supply).—300 tons and 2,000 tons from Alexandretta.
Sources of Information.
Consul at Alexandretta.
Informant at Mersina.
Greek authorities at Smyrna.
Information from Major Melas.
Remarks.
By steamship "Andre Chenier."
By steamship "Saint-Marc" [illegible]name of Ottoman Bank.
Of these, 500 tons by steamship "Soranna" and 200 tons for France left at Alexandretta and subsequently destined for Kemal.

ITALY.

Aeroplanes.—10 from Italy to Mersina.
Source of Information.—Greek military authorities at Smyrna.

GERMANY

Aeroplanes. 23 scouts at Samsoun

GOVERNMENT, CONSTANTINOPLE

Horses. Unknown quantity from Constantinople to Mersina

Ammunition (approximate supply). 3 large ships cargoes (4 bales (Russian ships) through Russia to Samsoun and from Constantinople to Mersina

Sources of information —

Military Mission at Constantinople
Consul at Larnaka

Remarks. By steamship "Avazzia."

NOTE.—Latest information states companies of 6th division are reinforced by 10 French machine guns(?). (Reinforcement is probable, but number 9 is at present too high.)

(C)

Colonel Halil Bey of the Kemalist army is at Alexandretta, he stated in Germany has been sent by the Angora Government to transport by the Adana Railway all manner of material, supplies and military uniforms, stores, &c.

Transported

July 14, 1922		200 rifles, sent from Alexandretta to Adana
" 14	"	25 aeroplanes
" 14	"	50 bales of French uniforms
" 17	"	3 tanks or armoured cars
" 23,	"	8 waggons laden by [illegible] cannons.

According to information derived on the spot from Armenians and Turks, all these supplies were sent by rail from Bagdad to Kermanshah and the Afion front.

Alexandrette, August 5, 18, 1922.

E 9456 27 44 No. 150

Sir Beilby Alston to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 19.)

(No. 507.)

My Lord, *Athens, September 9, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to numerous telegrams which I have sent during the last fortnight reporting upon the ever changing situation at the front and in this country.

A few weeks ago the Greeks were very confident and assured me that, according to their information, the Kemalists were in a bad way, and if only His Majesty's Government could favour some kind of financial assistance being obtained by Greece on the London market, the Greek army would be able to remain on in Asia Minor, and as the country which could hold out longest would prove the victor a loan would enable the Greeks to give to the enemy the *coup de grâce* which the Allies had prevented them from giving at Constantinople.

About the 20th August news began to reach Athens of activity on the part of the Turks. The Smyrna-Aidin Railway was cut by the enemy, but quickly repaired. On the 20th August the Kemalist offensive began. An attack was made east of Ushak and south of Afium Karahissar. There was a fear that Afium Karahissar might become isolated and on the 29th August an official communiqué announced its evacuation. On the 29th August, I reported that there were signs of restiveness in the press provoked by the Kemalists' offensive and the inability of the Government to find any solution. The Venice Conference was spoken of, but in view of the scarcely friendly attitude adopted by France and Italy at previous conferences, the Greeks did not expect that a solution would be found at Venice. Certain sections of the Government press began to point out that the army could not remain on indefinitely in Asia Minor, it must winter at home, and these papers were sent freely to the troops. Another move in the direction of Constantinople began to be hinted at.

In view of increasing anxiety caused by the news from the front, the Minister of War left for Smyrna on the 29th August, accompanied by M. Stratos, Minister of the Interior. There was a feeling of suspense and a consciousness that something was going to happen, and some move on the part of the Government was expected as soon as the two Ministers returned from Smyrna. Complete abandonment of Asia Minor began on the 30th to appear as a possible next move. Great dissatisfaction was expressed against General Hadjianestis, the Commander-in-chief, to whose obstinate stupidity and culpable neglect was attributed the action before Afium Karahissar which as now transpired had been a disaster.

Bad news from the front continued to arrive, and on the night of the 1st September, the Minister for Foreign Affairs sent hurriedly to fetch me at dinner, and begged me to meet him at His Majesty's Legation. His Excellency then read to me an urgent telegram despatched to the Greek Chargé d'Affaires at London instructing him to explain to His Majesty's Government that the *moral* of the army had been undermined by the knowledge that Asia Minor was to be evacuated, and that the army could no longer oppose the attacks of the enemy. Two army corps were separated. The second corps had been driven north-west with one and a-half divisions of the first corps, under General Tricoupis (the best general in the army) without sufficient supplies or munitions for more than a few days. So grave did the situation appear to the Greek Government that they had telegraphed to the Commander-in-chief to suggest approaching Kemal with a request for an armistice.

The next morning the military attaché was told by the Chief of the General Staff that the evacuation of Asia Minor would be begun immediately, as both the troops had practically ceased to fight. On the same day Sir H. Lamb reported from Smyrna that the military situation had become desperate, that the Greek army was in full flight, and incapable of offering further resistance.

That same morning the Minister for Foreign Affairs sent me the text of two telegrams sent to London:

1. To the effect that Smyrna could not be defended, and that the Powers should take urgent measures to protect their nationals.
2. Asking His Majesty's Government to take immediate steps to arrange an armistice for Greece on the basis of the immediate evacuation of Asia Minor.

Great depression was evident on Sunday, the 3rd September, as the grave news began to leak out. The unwillingness of the troops to fight came as a most painful surprise. The fall of the Cabinet was talked of, and a possible call to M. Stergiadès to take over the Premiership. With two exceptions, the whole press called on the Government to resign immediately.

On Sunday evening better news arrived. General Tricoupis, with some other staff officers, had, it was officially reported, passed that day through Ushak, which contrary to reports, was still in Greek possession. Confidence began to revive, especially when, on the following day, the command of the army was taken from General Hadjianestis and given to General Tricoupis, and the High Commissioner at Smyrna reported that that the two army corps had gained touch with one another and had succeeded in reaching and occupying positions near Ushak. The operation was said to have been carried out in complete order, despite the difficulties of the ground.

The Greek people appeared on the whole to have been taking the grave news well, and increasing confidence at home would, it was hoped, infect the army in the field and enable them to make some sort of a stand and not throw away their last cards in the face of an armistice in which Kemal's demands would increase proportionately to the extent of the Greek collapse. The military attaché did endeavour to put more heart into the Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff, and I took the same line with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and His Secretary-General on your Lordship in London with the Greek Chargé d'Affaires. A strange phenomenon which caused a good deal of comment during the next few days was that members of the Government were the worst pessimists, and instead of trying to encourage the people they began to spread alarmist reports. They did, however, recover sufficiently at the news of the junction of the two army corps to announce on the 5th instant that they would not abandon their post, and they

proceeded to make some wise appointments. General Dousmanis, the strong soldier of Greece, was reinstated as Chief of the General Staff, and General Exadactylos resumed his old post of Deputy Chief. Other good military appointments were also made while it was hoped and not come too late. General Pallis was reinstated in the position of Chief of Staff, Asia Minor, which he had left when General Hadjianestis had been appointed Army Commander. Colonel Souyannis's reappointment as Deputy Chief of the General Staff was also important—he is a great driver.

All these appointments appeared to indicate a determination by the Greek Government to face the situation and as far as possible to retrieve it. It was believed that the troops would at any rate fight under General Trikoupis.

The Minister of War with General Dousmanis, therefore proceeded to Smyrna on the 4th instant in order to see for themselves what the real state of the southern army was like. Things looked brighter but the fact that no official reports were signed by General Trikoupis caused the people to be anxious, especially as the ray of optimism which had been produced in the country was not shared by the Government officials. Great was my own disappointment when after trying to encourage the Minister for Foreign Affairs with what appeared to be almost good news his Excellency after consulting his colleagues in the Cabinet sent me the text of a telegram which he was about to despatch to London, for your Lordship saying that the military situation showed no improvement.

Then on the morning of the 6th instant the news became known that General Trikoupis with his staff had been captured by the Turks on the 2nd. The first intimation of the capture having been received in a message from the Red Crescent to the Greek Red Cross. General Polymenakos, who had accompanied the Minister of War to Smyrna, was the senior remaining Commander in chief. The latter had lost the power of control from the moment he became fairly well in the campaign last summer, and it was felt that General Trikoupis was perhaps the one man who could have rallied the troops and saved a rout of the south to form a front which might defend the town of Smyrna during the evacuation. In the north near Broussa things were better. There the *morale* of the army was fairly good and the evacuation was proceeding normally.

Things on the Smyrna front went from bad to worse. Reports of burning of towns, and even of atrocities by the Greek soldiery, began to reach His Majesty's Legation and all tended to prove that the army was completely out of hand.

On instructions from your Lordship, I went with my colleagues on the evening of the 7th to protest to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the reported atrocities committed by the soldiers and M. Baltazzi promised to send an urgent telegram to the Minister of War at Smyrna in the sense desired. But we all felt that it could not really do much good as the army apparently no longer obeyed any orders.

Ten years warfare, the knowledge that whether they defended the country they had occupied or not, they would in any case have to evacuate it in the end, the intense disappointment at the news that they might not occupy Constantinople and thus finish the war, the reports that supplies and military stores were reaching their opponents from France, Italy and Russia and the Bolshevik or Communist propaganda which in spite of all precautions was making steady inroads among the troops at the front, all these combined as a canker to eat away the heart of the army which was unable to withstand a heavy artillery fire followed by infantry and cavalry attacks. It gave way, rose and eventually degenerated into something like a rabble. Stories are told that red flags were displayed by the troops pouring into Smyrna and cheers raised for Lenin.

Until the military attaché is able to proceed to Smyrna and to see things for himself it will be difficult to know what has really happened with the southern army. The Greek authorities do not seem to know themselves, and one story contradicted the other. The Minister of War, though approving in principle the visit has up to the time of writing not yet given his consent, since we fear there may be something which he would prefer to hide from Colonel Nairne.

On the evening of the 7th when my colleagues and I were with the Minister for Foreign Affairs the Cabinet had yielded to the popular clamour and resigned. I personally greatly regret the departure of the Prime Minister, M. Protopapadakis with whom I have had many dealings connected with financial matters and who has always proved helpful and ready to get things done.

Events are moving rapidly. M. Calogeropoulos has at the time of writing been unable to form a Cabinet having, it appears, yielded to the threats of the popular clubs who wish to see General Metaxas at the head of affairs. The future is full of

gloomy forebodings. Discontented troops are being hastily brought back to Greece, where the people are thoroughly sick of the way everything has been mismanaged. General Metaxas may try and impose a military rule and clash with General Dousmanis in the attempt. There is an orderly Royalist section trying to form a Government but afraid of the clubs. There is also a powerful Venizelist section desirous of Constitutional Government. If these two could combine under a strong leader, the country might still be saved.

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
C. H. BENTINCK.

[E 9457/27/44] No. 36

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 19.)

(No. 516. Secret.)
My Lord, *Athens, September 11, 1922.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 507 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of an interesting report from the military attaché to His Majesty's Legation recording the military events connected with the recent collapse of the Greek army in Asia Minor.

Colonel Nairne's report will show your Lordship, as I have already had occasion to state in telegrams, that His Majesty's Legation have had great difficulty in obtaining really accurate and reliable information as to the doings of the Greek army, having been almost exclusively dependent on Greek official information which as the Minister for Foreign Affairs confessed to me was most contradictory and confusing. Colonel Nairne had hoped to have been able to go to Smyrna to see things for himself, but the Minister of War was not prepared to grant him the necessary permission until his Excellency had paid his second visit. By the time M. Theotokis returned it was too late, and Smyrna had been evacuated.

A copy of the military attaché's report is being forwarded direct to the military authorities at Constantinople, and I am forwarding a copy of this covering despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner in case his Excellency should care to ask General Sir C. Harington for the report.

I have, &c.
C. H. BENTINCK.

Enclosure in No. 36.

Colonel Nairne to Mr. Bentinck.

(Secret.)
Sir, *Athens, September 10, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to submit some remarks on the military events immediately connected with the recent defeat and retreat of the Greek army in Asia Minor. I had already partly written a review of the various stages of these events as they were presented to us in Athens, but as you have doubtless recorded a succinct account of them in your despatch I have thought it better to give you the general history of events as related to me to-day by M. Theotokis on his return from his second visit to Smyrna than to recapitulate the doubtful and contradictory versions which reached Athens during the last fortnight and many of which were embodied in telegrams from the Legation.

M. Theotokis left Smyrna on the night of the 8th September and arrived in Athens yesterday evening. During his absence the Greek Government resigned, but as no fresh Government has yet been formed he is still carrying on the work of the Ministry of War.

M. Theotokis was vague about the distinguishing numbers and positions of the divisions in the southern group of the line so his narrative was difficult to follow in detail, but he threw a good deal of light on the general course of events.

The positions of the divisions in the line near Afion Karahissar was probably not very different to those which I saw last June for I asked then how often divisions were relieved and was told that divisions remained practically permanently in the line and that reliefs were only carried out within the divisions.

The [illegible] Division of the 1st Corps were [illegible] Afion Karahissar, [illegible] north and south-west of the town. [illegible] held the [illegible] of the salient [illegible] 1st Division [illegible] its centre [illegible] and further to the south-west [illegible] Division [illegible] General Head-quarters [illegible] with the 7th Division of the IIIrd Corps. Attached to the 1st Corps were the 31st, 49th and 56th Regiments, the last of which had been [illegible]

[illegible] the 1st Corps was [illegible] Corps with the 12th Division [illegible] of the 4th Division.

[illegible] Headquarters were at Afion Karahissar close to the point [illegible]

[illegible] the Turkish [illegible] that [illegible] was not [illegible] expected it [illegible] 1st Division.

On the morning of the 26th August the Turks [illegible] from the Akar River to Hassar [illegible] attack [illegible] that part of the [illegible] to the south of Afion Karahissar. These Greek troops [illegible]

[illegible]

tion of *moral* but General Scarlatos's division which had been sent from Thrace to Smyrna had refused to disembark there and had been sent on to the island of Thasos as a disciplinary measure.

M. Theotokis believed that the [illegible] in the *moral* of the Greek troops [illegible] was due to the conviction borne in on them by the proposals for the Venice Conference that in spite of all their endurance they were to give up the whole of Asia Minor and that no effort of theirs could make any difference. Such was M. Theotokis's story of the Greek disaster. I think his account of the events at [illegible] his review of the active fighting which [illegible] reports [illegible] strengthened by the story of the Afion Karahissar battle told me this afternoon by an officer pilot of the Greek [illegible] Air Service who [illegible] with his squadron at Afion Karahissar. This officer confirmed M. Theotokis's statement that [illegible] good [illegible] of the [illegible] troops were [illegible] and his own squadron [illegible] of the Turkish cavalry which he saw [illegible] A week before the attack his squadron was withdrawn from Afion Karahissar to [illegible] which he evidently much resented and considered was due to General Hadjianestis's jealousy of General Tricoupis, though General Hadjianestis may quite well have had other reasons right or wrong.

He said that the troops had an increasing [illegible] anxiety as the winter came nearer and no settlement was reached or support given to them by the Powers; also General Hadjianestis [illegible] to give the [illegible] M. Vernezos [illegible] But [illegible] the *moral* [illegible] was still good. The first [illegible] 4th Division [illegible] of the 49th Regiment [illegible] as the 4th [illegible]

Now the 49th Regiment [illegible] the [illegible] troops [illegible] if they had been [illegible] when the Turkish troops [illegible] with their attack the Greek 49th Regiment [illegible] Colonel Plastiras [illegible] 10th Evzones [illegible] the fight went on until the 27th August the second day when the Turkish heavy guns came up and [illegible] Afion Karahissar [illegible] the 1st Corps Headquarters [illegible] the town and they were apparently [illegible] troops [illegible] IInd Corps [illegible] 1st Corps were [illegible] Colonel Plastiras [illegible] appear [illegible] was not perhaps [illegible] the battle might have been a Greek victory [illegible] the 27th [illegible] IInd Corps [illegible] the Turkish right flank.

This officer is a Venizelist and his story was [illegible] tinged with dislike of the Royalist Hadjianestis and with admiration for the Venizelist [illegible] Colonel Plastiras [illegible] General Tricoupis and his [illegible] Even so, I think, his story sounds more like the truth than M. Theotokis's. This young officer is one of seven [illegible] planes from Afion Karahissar and [illegible] to Athens. One [illegible] We have still to learn the really [illegible] story of the 26th and 27th August. When it is known it will probably be found that one of the chief factors in the Greek defeat was the position of the southern group and 1st Corps Headquarters close to the point of the salient.

I have, &c.

[illegible] S. HOARE NAIRNE,

Military Attaché

[E 9466/27/44] No. 427

Mr. Erskine to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 19.)

(No. 249.)

My Lord, *Sofia, September 12, 1922.*

MY Greek colleague informed me a few days ago that he had reliable information that various Turkish agents were actively engaged in organising bands in this country for the purpose of causing trouble in Thrace. These bands were chiefly recruited from the Turkish inhabitants of Southern Bulgaria, but separate bands, consisting entirely of Bulgarians, were also being raised. While he did not accuse the Bulgarian Government of direct complicity, he was convinced that they were fully aware of what was going on, and that they made no effort to interfere with the activities of these agents.

He mentioned incidentally that Fuad Bey had not been personally seen in Bulgaria for some time past, and that he believed him to be now in hospital in Vienna. I have received from a secret source confirmation of this statement, so far as the absence of Fuad from Bulgaria during the last four or five months is concerned.

I learn, on the other hand, from the same source that Aziz Bey Jushasian, an ex-colonel of Turkish gendarmerie in Macedonia, visited Bulgaria some little time ago with the object of recruiting men chiefly for espionage service in Thrace. He visited Sofia and Novo-Selo. My informant points out, however, that in the opinion of the Bulgarian police who watch him, he constantly watches, and that he left the country for Constantinople via Bourgas apparently with his mission unfulfilled. This would not, of course, affect any repeated representations to the Bulgarian Government regarding Fuad, as I gave instant definite result as far as concerns that individual, I have not been without effect in regard to other Turkish agents.

It appears probable that the two reports reflect the movements of one person named as I have not been able to identify Mr. Aziz, who is acting as Greek agent. I Affaires, the absence of Mr. Aziz from Bulgaria has not been noticed, I am not in a position to vouch for the accuracy of his version. At the same time it is possible that the Greek Minister may be right, and that Aziz has left the country for a few days, on the assumption that owing to the Greek disaster in Asia Minor he may afford a favourable opportunity for renewed agitation in Thrace, and I propose to keep a careful watch for any opportunity of warning the Bulgarian Government of the danger which would result to them if they should create the impression of tolerating such activities.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Legation Commissioner at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
WILLIAM ERSKINE.

[E 9467/27/44] No. 428

Mr. Erskine to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 19.)

(No. 252.)

My Lord, *Sofia, September 13, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the comments of the Bulgarian press on the Greek disaster in Asia Minor have been numerous and to a certain extent conflicting.

At first the newspapers particularly those of the Government were most guarded in their observations, refraining even from expressing the satisfaction which has undoubtedly been felt at the defeat of the Greeks. They were, further careful to avoid anything in the nature of prophecy of any benefit resulting to Bulgaria from the complete change in the military situation in the Near East. The official 'Echo de Bulgarie' did indeed, quote *in extenso* a leading article in the Temps to the effect that Adrianople and Gallipoli should be returned to Turkey while Bulgaria should receive a territorial access to the Ægean; it was made clear however that the Government organ hoped rather than expected that this solution would be accepted by the Powers.

Subsequently, however, whether or not as a result of the development of the defeat of the Greek army into an entire collapse, the press has become much more outspoken. It is now argued that the status of Thrace may be affected by the Turkish victory in spite of the alleged determination of His Majesty's Government to tolerate no change in the sovereignty of that province. This intention, the contrary one of the French Government, as expressed in the Paris press, the Turkish demands for an immediate evacuation of Thrace, and the declaration which appears to have been made by the Serbian Minister at Rome to the effect that the Little *Entente* would not remain indifferent to any modification of the régime of Thrace and of the Straits are mentioned as conflicting factors in the present phase of the question.

A leading article in last night's 'Echo de Bulgarie' copy of which is enclosed herewith is perhaps the most significant of those which have appeared hitherto, as it openly demands either the division of Eastern and Western Thrace between Turkey and Bulgaria or the constitution of an autonomous State between the frontiers of the two countries. The 'Echo de Bulgarie' also insists that the interests of Bulgaria give her the right to be invited to take part in the forthcoming conference of Venice.

I have, &c.
WILLIAM ERSKINE.

Enclosure No. 1 in No. 428.

Extract from Echo de Bulgarie of September 12, 1922.

LA BULGARIE ET LA THRACE.

A LA nouvelle de l'intention manifestée par la Grèce d'occuper Constantinople et par elle de hâter la solution du conflit oriental, nous avons écrit que, à côté d'autres conséquences, l'entreprise pouvait, cette tentative de la Grèce remettait sur le tapis le problème de la Thrace. Nos prévisions se sont réalisées. La solution définitive de cette question épineuse et d'une portée incalculable pour la paix balkanique va-t-elle enfin être européenne? Cette éventualité a des côtés assez sérieux et constitue le nœud de la paix orientale. Si cet arrangement s'opère sur la Thrace grecque est réduite à un état de régiment de protectorat d'Orient, si comme cela vers, si on veut

Si tous les Gouvernements intéressés sont d'accord, on commence par la restitution de l'Asie Mineure aux Turcs et, comme déjà par ailleurs les choses ne condition *sine qua non* de la paix. Il est bien entendu que ce qui concerne le sort de la Thrace et les Grecs continuent à espérer et à demander certains avantages, comme s'ils avaient eu, en l'état de la guerre, la faculté de leur imposer, en échange pour la paix.

Si cette prétention du Gouvernement grec n'est point surprenante, le seul point de vue d'un état en somme pas intégralement lésé dans les négociations futures, il importe cependant de souligner par les désirata grecs en ce qui concerne les avantages éventuels en Thrace, soit par ouvrages, soutenus par le Gouvernement britannique, qui laisse nettement entrevoir par la presse et par les notes diplomatiques que les concessions accordées à la Grèce en Thrace seront maintenues. Quant à la France, son point de vue sur la politique de Thrace et plus particulièrement sur ces moyens d'assurer la présence effective de la Bulgarie sur l'Égée est connu. A en juger par l'article de fond que le Temps publiait l'autre jour, la France est contre le projet des compensations grecques en Thrace. La Bulgarie disait le grand quotidien français, a contribué par ses territoires à la mer Égée.

Si l'on ajoute à ces points de vue nettement différents la volonté manifeste des Turcs de voir la Thrace évacuée, alors que les démarches que le Ministre de la Yougoslavie à Rome aurait été chargé de déclarer que la petite Entente ne resterait pas spectatrice au cas d'une modification du régime des Détroits et de la Thrace, l'on comprendra aisément toute l'importance et toute la haute portée que revêt le problème de Thrace.

Il y a quelques jours prenant prétexte d'un article de l'Echo de Bulgarie sur le même problème, le journal grec 'Elephteros Typos' écrivait que pour la Bulgarie une question de Thrace ne pouvait exister. Car ajoutait notre confrère la Grèce possède la Thrace occidentale en vertu du Traité de Neuilly et la Thrace orientale en vertu du Pacte de Sèvres. Cette affirmation est évidemment inexacte et nous ne la rappelons que pour profiter de l'occasion de souligner que le Traité de Sèvres n'étant pas ratifié la Thrace n'est nullement juridiquement sous la souveraineté de la Grèce, mais sous celle des Alliés. Aujourd'hui donc que le problème oriental se

pose dans toute son ampleur on ne peut invoquer le Traité de Sèvres depuis longtemps [illegible]. En se tenant sur les conditions de la paix générale avec la Turquie les grandes Puissances sont évidemment obligées de trancher le sort de la Thrace que la Bulgarie leur a cédée en vertu de l'article 48 du Traité de Neuilly.

Nous ne nous serons trop insister sur l'importance que nous attachons au futur régime politique de cette province qui est étroitement liée à une question du plus grand intérêt vital pour notre pays : le besoin d'un débouché à la mer Egée.

À la reprise des négociations qui aura lieu à cette occasion sont dans la presse sont devant des assemblées internationales d'exposer les considérations aussi bien économiques que politiques qui militent en faveur d'une autre solution à donner au problème de Thrace et qui soit conforme aux véritables vœux des populations intéressées et aux intérêts de la paix.

Pour notre part, nous n'espérons pas pouvoir reconnaître deux solutions partageant la Thrace entre la Bulgarie et la Turquie ou érigeant en une province autonome sous le protectorat d'une grande Puissance ou mieux sous celle de la Société des Nations.

Premièrement appliquées, ces deux solutions auraient des avantages. Ces avantages seraient aujourd'hui encore plus appréciables également au point de vue des intérêts de la paix européenne à la suite des derniers événements en Thrace qui ont brillamment confirmé ce danger que constituerait pour l'ordre et pour la paix la présence grecque en Thrace.

La prochaine réunion de la Conférence de Venise aura lieu le 20 septembre et que M. Schanzer a communiqué à cette ville note du succès de ses démarches à Londres et à Paris.

Dans ces circonstances, estimons-nous que la Bulgarie a tout le droit de demander à se faire entendre lorsque les grandes questions qui intéressent ses intérêts et ses droits vitaux [illegible].

[E 9468/27/44] No. 13

Mr. Peake to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 1)

(No. 1567)
Madrid, *September 13, 1922*

With reference to my despatch No. 1562 of to-day's date, I have the honour to report that the subject of press criticism in the Near East is also to the Turkish victory in Asia Minor. I have the honour to enclose herewith a few of the newspapers which give a graphic picture of the reception of the Provisional President of the Turkish National Assembly, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, by the leaders of the Young Turk Party. Mustafa Kemal, who left Angora, is now in Sofia on his return to Constantinople from Lausanne, where he has been attending the Inter-Parliamentary Conference in connection with Bulgaria and Turkey and a common interest in preventing the Straits and the Turkish capital from falling into foreign hands. He further stated that Turkey would not oppose the reoccupation of certain districts in Thrace by the Bulgarians, but would oppose the reoccupation of Thrace by the Greeks. The Turkish proposal were made in this sense at the Conference.

There are other points of interest in the interview, copy of which is enclosed herewith, as they will regard to the attitude of the Turkish Government towards the minor Turkish questions before the Conference and the question of the Straits regime. I am aware that for Mustafa Kemal to have spoken in the name of the Government of Constantinople on the subject of Angora's intransigeant language is in any case a serious matter, especially as it may be responsible for some measure for the improvement which the Turkish press commented has taken place with regard to the improvement which the Turkish Government may expect to effect on Bulgarian prospects of securing territorial access to the Ægean.

I am sending a copy of this despatch and enclosure to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I have &c.
WILLIAM ERSKINE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 13

Extract from Le Matin

LA BULGARIE TURQUE ET LA THRACE. DÉCLARATIONS DE DJAMED MOUKHTAR BEY

De retour de Vienne, où il a présidé la conférence interparlementaire, Djamed Moukhtar Bey, Président du Sénat turc, vient de faire à Sofia un court séjour. Sofia était de tout temps un poste d'observation très important pour la politique turque.

Également sénateur de Constantinople, Djamed Moukhtar Bey a reçu notre rédacteur diplomatique auquel il a fait les déclarations très importantes que voici sur les rapports entre la Bulgarie et la Turquie et la question de la Thrace [illegible].

Il est nécessaire que nos relations avec la Bulgarie soient établies sur la base d'une entente cordiale. Les intérêts communs à la Bulgarie et à la Turquie commandent cette entente. Nous savons bien qu'aujourd'hui nous avons une question à régler avec la Grèce. Nous savons aussi que la Turquie et la Bulgarie ne pourraient pas se passer d'un débouché territorial à la mer Egée, et si vous essayez aujourd'hui de revendiquer vos droits et d'insister pour avoir le littoral de l'Egée, vous serez seuls. Nous serons seuls à vos côtés le jour où vous serez [illegible] de nos frontières.

Les événements qui se déroulent sous nos yeux ne peuvent pas nous laisser indifférents. Nous connaissons parfaitement la question de Thrace. Nous avons [illegible] et nous [illegible] de la Thrace.

La base de ce programme est l'entente des nationalités pour ainsi dire naturelle. C'est ainsi que nous avons reconnu les droits du peuple arménien. Il n'est pas question d'un État arménien, à Moscou ou à Erivan, mais il est question d'un État arménien autonome. La sécurité de la Turquie dépend de la question arménienne.

En ce qui concerne le règlement des détroits, nous ne ferons pas l'obstacle à ce que puissent [illegible] les [illegible] de la mer Noire. Nous ne voulons que la Conférence s'occupe de la question à laquelle la Turquie sera également représentée, dans ses conditions [illegible] une solution équitable à la question des détroits.

Mais en ce qui concerne la Thrace, nous ne pouvons pas accepter la ligne Midia-Enos. Nous devons posséder Andrinople, avoir la Maritza comme frontière, avoir un débouché à la mer Egée. Nous ne pouvons pas supprimer la domination grecque sur la rive droite de la Maritza pour la laisser subsister sur la rive gauche. Et, si la Grèce ne consent pas à ces conditions, nous ferons la guerre à la Grèce.

Sur ce point, nous pouvons nous entendre avec les Bulgares, mais nous préférons que la Thrace occidentale fasse retour à la Bulgarie.

En toutes choses, l'intérêt de la paix veut que nous acceptions la ligne Midia-Enos. Nous avons déjà fait la guerre [illegible] et nous ne cesserons pas les hostilités tant que nous ne serons pas parvenus à nos fins.

Le général Djamed Moukhtar Bey a été chaleureusement félicité par M. Stoïcan Mihaïlovitch, président du Conseil, et M. Stoïcan Mihaïlovitch a déclaré que la Bulgarie ne ferait rien [illegible] qui puisse [illegible] la Turquie.

[E 9464/27/44] No. 14

Mr. Millard Drake to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 19.)

(No. 186)
My Lord, *Bucharest, September 11, 1922*

With reference to your despatch No. 170 of the 2nd instant, in regard to the views of the Roumanian Government regarding the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres, I have the honour to report that the matter has not been freely discussed in the Roumanian press. Papers of all shades of opinion concur in declaring that Roumania is vitally interested in the question of the Straits through reconsideration as to how this is to be secured.

The 'Vitorul,' which is the recognised mouth-piece of the present Liberal Government, writes as follows —

> 'Certainly the Straits and Constantinople must remain international. No Turkish or Greek pretensions can be exclusive. The interested States must take the matter in hand seriously and create a neutral State which can exist 'viabiliter' between Greece and Turkey. In this way the antagonism between the two peoples will diminish and the interests of Europe will be safeguarded. In order to forestall future complications and claims that may eventually be put forward, the Straits question must be definitely settled now with the effective participation of all interested therein. That is to say, they must be internationalised, and free passage must be given to world traffic.'

Another paper, the 'Adevorul,' which is of democratic tone and usually critical of the present Government, declares that when the future regime of the Straits is discussed Roumania must have a decisive say in the matter, as the Straits are the lungs of Roumania's economic life.'

I have, &c.,
HUBERT MILLING-ONSLOW.

[E 9465/27/44] No. 411

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 19.)

(No. 37.)
My Lord, *Berne, September 14, 1922.*

With reference to my despatch No. 361 of the 10th September, I am to-day in receipt of a telegram No. 118 of the 11th September from the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government, in which they state that, in the event of a conflict between Greece and Turkey, they intend to observe a strict neutrality.

2. I have the honour to report that on the 13th instant I called on M. Lahovary, the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had returned from a tour in the provinces and enquired what news he had with regard to the developments in the Near East. M. Gavrilovic replied that the news was not very bad. He then went on to say that though he had no fear of a break with Italy, his special view was that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom could not look with indifference on the return of the Turks to Europe and especially to the possibility of a new recrudescence of war in the Balkans. Her possession of a common frontier with Bulgaria would be a danger to Serbia. I reminded him of their difference when M. Nintchitch professed to regard with indifference the question of the Straits, but, what he called his personal view was somewhat timidly expressed. It was agreed between M. Nintchitch and M. Pasic, as I knew, as Prime Ministers and Ministers for Foreign Affairs respectively, that he could make no official statement. He then went on to say that Turkish views would be reflected in the Bosnian press. M. Gavrilovic said he hoped Mussulmans were Serbs first and Mussulmans after wards, and they had ever fought against the Turks.

3. I can imagine that the Serbs, far from straining their policy in order to please their Mussulman subjects, would regard the closer geographical proximity of the Turks to their subjects as a danger not wholly great with that of proximity to the Bulgars. The Mussulmans are discontented with the Serbian rule and a fairly representative Mussulman, who was a candidate for the Sarajevo Municipality, appeared well versed in politics, asked me why if the British were so active in protecting Christian minorities in Asia Minor they would not extend their protection to the Mussulman minority in Bosnia who, he said, were treated like dogs by the Serbians. I was rather surprised to find religious feeling so seemingly fervent among the Mussulmans of Bosnia and to perceive that the ladies of Sarajevo were more perturbed at being surprised unveiled by the male eye than ever they were in Constantinople. My French colleague seems rather to count on deference to Mussulman feeling in the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom influencing the policy of the Government. I may here mention that M. Clement Simon left yesterday for Paris on a leave of absence long since planned, and not in connection with the political situation.

4. The newspapers seem full of false news. Nothing is known at the Ministry here on the alleged *demarche* of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Minister in Rome asking for the representation of Serbia on any Near East conference. Though the papers in reporting it applaud the action. The newspapers publish a *démenti* from London of news from Belgrade that the British and Greek Chargés d'Affaires had forbidden this Government to intervene to preserve the *status quo* on the Straits. I do not know who can have sent such news.

5. The press continues to show interesting interest in the Near East settlement, though some of the articles are therefore inconclusive and egoistic. The Democratija, the official organ of the Democratic wing of the Coalition, and the Balkan,' the Radical extremist paper, are alone in fearing that the defence of Serbian interests may drag the Serbian people into taking the chestnuts out of the fire for England, as will be seen from the enclosed articles. The 'Pravda' says that the Turkish Angora Government's pretensions to exact the evacuation of Thrace have not only made an impression on the Ententists of the West, but also on the Balkan States, and particularly on the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom. The pretension of Kemal Pasha does not only signify the abolition of the Lausanne treaty, but also the opening up of new military and diplomatic conflicts. Since yesterday our Government is seriously discussing this question. It would seem that the signatories of the treaties of Neuilly and Sevres will be asked to intervene in order to prevent the execution of the Angora Government's pretensions. We believe that we have greater direct interests in participating in a conference like that of Venice than Italy herself. We have the greatest guarantee for the maintenance of peace in the Balkans. For this reason our Government should demand to have its representative at the conference.

6. In the 'Vreme' Belgradski Dnevnik' of to-day M. Gavrilovic has written an article in which he says: The danger of common Turco-Bulgarian action exists not only for Greece but also for Serbia, and it is this circumstance which has engaged me to lay the protest against the Kemal policy in the Near East, which favours the Turkish and Bulgarian aspirations. I must guard emphatically there against the question of the Near East we must go with England, which is opposed to the return of Turkey to Europe. It is well that Lord Alexander is at this moment in London. The best guarantee for peace and liberty in the Balkans is that Constantinople and the Straits should be in the hands of England, who never abuses her superiority.'

7. There is not a single occasional article to Stefanovic, and, as I said on a former occasion, I would not guarantee Serbia's virtue in this respect if a serious *débâcle* took place in Greece itself. In this connection the Greek Chargé d'Affaires had always warned his Government that the essential thing was to keep order at home. M. Dimitrijevic told me yesterday that he had some reason to believe that the Bulgars had again approached the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government with a proposal that they should have Cavalla and the Serbs Salonica.

I have, &c.,
ALBAN YOUNG.

Enclosure 1 in No. 411

Extract from 'Demokratija' of September 14, 1922.

THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION.

ACCORDING to a Reuter report they have been waiting in London 'already a long time' that our State shall put forward the request to be represented on every conference dealing with the Near East of a general political character.' According to the same source such a wish on the part of the S.H.S. Kingdom as also an analogous wish on the part of the other Powers 'directly interested in the Near East question' appears in England to be considered as quite natural and justifiable.

As is well known there have been a number of conferences about the Near East of a general political character but at none of them has our country been represented nor have the other Powers who are directly interested These meetings have been regularly confined to the three Western States England France and Italy and the decisions have only been arrived at when it has been decided at these conferences

The last meeting in the spring at which was drawn up some sort of project for peace was held without the participation of any State and at Bucharest And now at the Venice Conference which was fixed for six weeks ago and about which it is still unknown if the meeting will meet the participation of the Balkan States has not been asked for from which one could infer that such participation was considered a long to be both inutile and necessary

Such matters stood among us the Greek front stood firm in Asia Minor that is to say as long as the Bosporus the Dardanelles and Constantinople were not in danger So long as the Turkish attempts to gain possession of the Straits were successfully warded off by the Greek armies their weight on other States directly interested in the Near East pressed except England France and Italy Such was the point of view of Bonar Law and Poincaré and Nitti These three Powers considered it useless as they decided not to let the Eastern problem and the most difficult problems of the Balkans

I read of what the Greek correspondents reported and I could find that apart from the Great Allies there remained to every one constantly present in Europe a great war that was not over Europe did not breathe Turkey did not grow well Greece did not feel that it had defeated the enemy together with Pentelli Therefore we have come before the great world crisis exactly as before the Balkan Peninsula was made to settle the Eastern problem and the most difficult problems were given over

I am glad that the Government Agency has at last decided that Italy must stand for the first time on the same level as the other great Powers and that our State has a preference of a general political character concerning the Near East which is not based on that which we have to settle the most important of these affairs There is no reason why it should not be so Venice is as well known to us as Lausanne is to Mr Nevertheless, Mr Lloyd George has chosen the first and not the latter for the meeting The reason might be to avoid such subjects of discussion as those which will be treated at Lausanne But it is said that Mr Lloyd George will do all he can to prevent such unfortunate discussions and that he will be helped in this by Mr Poincaré who will not wish to offend a necessary friend and who will therefore not interest himself in any danger from a statement of claims which would not be to his liking Mr Lloyd George will not be starting from Venice on the adventure in the Balkans The preliminaries of the meeting on that point have taken place with the full possibility to everyone of weighing at their leisure and settling it The English Government might after that meeting exercise the influence of the Balkan States in going to the point of intervening if this is to say that it should lead its people to the slaughter solely in order to prevent that Constantinople and the Straits should become the English or Russian or Roper - they would make a great mistake Thank God we are in such a position that we need be under no one's influence The Straits are a European and not a British affair Then let Europe defend them as she is able to do for we will only do what is necessary for the despised Balkans We will put forth all our strength when our Balkan interests are endangered

---

Enclosure 2 in No 441

Extract from the Italian of September 13 1922

THE question of Greece is complete and is developing still further

Is it necessary to save Greece and under what conditions?

A telegram from Rome states that our Minister gave Italy to understand in the name of the Little Entente that as a result of the Greek disaster we shall prevent by force any project on the part of the Turks to enter the *status quo* in the Balkans set up by the Treaties of Peace

We have no interest in letting the Turks return to the Balkans

But we have no interest in coming to blows with the Turks for the sake of Greece or Mesopotamia and Anatolia

If our King is now staying in London and for the purpose of assuring the defence of Mesopotamia with our blood without excessive complications for us they it would be better to break off the visit at once such incidents would be very unpleasant here

We do not need to reward the Greeks First and foremost there would be great harm in this as soon as we get them out of it We need no alliance with the Greeks What do we want with an alliance with this people? Under heated people Greece desires that we should lose sight of our frontier we shall not consider her account of our honour and interests

We shall await the disclosure of the attitude of Turkey if she arrives to send an army to Thrace we shall know what to do

---

E 9461 27 44] No 442

Sir A Crosfield to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received September* 19)

(No 843)
My Lord, *Venice September* 14 22

THE first manifestations of public enthusiasm which followed the Turkish victory have given place to a more reasoned and serious attitude towards the future Public opinion is now gradually becoming conscious of the vast transformations and possible dangers of Italy's present political situation The editorials give the greatest consideration to almost every phase of foreign politics, although a strong censorship has avoided any discussion of the Italian Government's policy by any process of direct attack Comments are being very vigilantly watched

It is worth passing to call the Secretary of State's attention to different expressions of opinion as to the effect of possible intervention by Italy in favour of Greece in order to show the diversity of action seeming to grow out of No 74 of 1920 instead of the full explanation the press comments from three points of view

1 The elements of prejudice sentiment and passion which have to be taken into account
2 Opinions expressed as to policy reported by study of general press
3 The attitude of the Government of the day

The first of these I propose to deal with briefly as it may be said to be complete in many Treaty of peace and alliance to forget and forgive the past is impossible to forget the repudiation of the Treaty of Sèvres do the Marmora Hatred and distrust exists not only against England and for years to come the Turks will regard Italy as the storm centre of prejudice which exists from the Levant or for personal

To this must be added a strong Italian preference for a weak Turkey In this case it was advocated that as Great Britain must not appear to impose limits on the Turkish forces "The only motive for the Turk," writes the Popolo d'Italia, "would be the assistance of the victor"

Various groups of citizens deputations and officers recently coming to the Italian troops of occupation in Anatolia have brought back congratulations to Angora, after the Turkish representatives on these occasions very kind of flattering attentions

(2) While these sentimental considerations were the only ones essential in the earliest press comments there is now a decided tendency to view the matter from a realist standpoint and here the most divergent views are expressed At one extreme the Messaggero' in an article briefly referred to in my telegram No 273 of the 12th September puts forward the thesis that it lies entirely with the maximum Turkish programme It is easy to foresee," writes the paper "what the Turkish demands will be the complete evacuation of Asia Minor of all Thrace up to and including Adrianople, and a common frontier with Bulgaria, as more Ersa-Maritza,

Ismir or expansion down to Seres behind Salonica the restitution without reserve or control of the Straits of Constantinople to the pressure of the international regime on the Straits which now resolves itself into a question first of control of the sea route Later on further demands may well follow in regard to Syria and Mesopotamia In no one of those points do we see any conflict between the Turkish interests and those of France still less with those of Italy The time has come to recognize the figment of collective action The programme of Italy is the statement in a word the reconstruction of Turkey

The 'Corriere della Sera' on the other hand after retracing, as it is right to do, apart from joining in the earliest stages of discussion has now declared itself in language of the gravest moderation It says plainly enough that those who look at the Turkish victory with no other interest than pure sympathy to the Greek arms Is Mesopotamia then the only territory that is to be? Is the alliance of Kemal with Trotsky forgotten, or has possible future importance for Greece The greatest of these points is not the fact that the Turks have retaken Smyrna but that they have done so at the cost of their own efforts The tearing up of the Treaty of Sevres is a serious precedent—the danger now has risen to congratulate itself that Greece is cheated out of Smyrna and did not win the Greek straits

Most newspapers deprecate any attempt to go to Turkey with concessions yet to go on for The Giornale d'Italia, the old Nazionale the Secolo and many others of the same kind Lodovico Scarfoglio, editor of the Mattino strongly Turkey and Europe share to-day at The Times goes further in this direction and is even very specific in its request for peace in the Mediterranean Rather than see France move to gather the Mediterranean, Italy, Europe and the whole world upon Great Britain's unfortunate head it says, must see Smyrna lost to Turkey

Other papers start to Egypt and Rome unanimously come to the agreement as the occasion of day

Most generally Italy take the attitude which Mussolini has just laid down clearly that Italy is ready to work in agreement with Great Britain in all cases, so that consequently Italy defends Straits open to all nations and guarantees from Europe side Dardanelles from Turkey in Asia and from England in Palestine now see she is Against strategic point of view it seems that Italy is to be played the role of the reward given to Mussolini for his attitude Signor Schanzer has now a great opportunity

Given this great variety of opinion which flows naturally out of party exigencies and news obtainable only at long days to day, I would submit that the Italian Government cannot in any case be entirely controlled by the force of public feeling

The 'Stampa' writes in English that it makes it clear that the freedom of the Straits is a fortunate fait accompli No Power can oppose now what becomes generally where is a wide spread recognition of this fact and an irresponsible newspapers a sense of the necessity of the sacrifice of the Dardanelles as well This ought possibly, in certain circumstances to counter to the Turkish sentiment of the country but if interest were such to hold others let us trust there would be little serious opposition.

A mot d'ordre to the press reinforcing the existing currents already indicated, would be sufficient

Until today never by any act of policy which seems to be dictated by England or imposed on a reluctant Government would be better resisted.

There are indications that the Italian Government in its relation to the press is disposed as far as possible to create an impression of solidarity with England Thus semi-officially inspired articles in the Turkish connection the British refusal of the Italian proposal for a Near East conference to discuss of straits of treaty revision Italy realises that the Allied Empire looks at the question from a slightly different point of view, to which she sentimentally and with reserves every respect

In the semi-official press however the British reply was strongly criticised, and a free access of Anglophobia was stimulated by the rumours that His Majesty's Government were inviting Serbia and Roumania to intervention.

I have &c.
R. GRAHAM

No. 443

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 19)

(No. 424)
(Telegraphic) R. *Athens, September 18, 1922*

SIR H. RUMBOLD'S telegram No. 424

I spoke to-day to Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding recommendations made by irresponsible heads here that Greek army should advance on Constantinople. Both Ministers said that idea was insane and was not entertained by any responsible person in Greece. This I believe to be a fact but I asked them to do what they could to prevent such ideas being put forward as they tended to produce bad impression. Both Ministers declared Greek Government had but two ideas—to return army of Thrace as quickly as possible and to carry out wishes of His Majesty's Government.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 444

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 19.)

(No. 435.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, September 18, 1922*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

As regards the future I must warn His Majesty's Government most seriously that Greek army at the present moment is a serious factor in the situation anywhere unless His Majesty's Government are prepared to treat Greece openly as enemy. Policy of keeping Greek army to success of British arms would refuse all help to Greece and group omitted [illegible] and Italians [illegible] Kemal has broken down in good faith. But Greece has now exhausted her moral and material resources as she was bound to do this autumn and her army will certainly not exceed dimensions [illegible] of Thrace would [illegible] as has been hitherto promised to Greece event defends the rest.

Two courses open.

1. To treat with Kemal at once on basis of National Pact and trust that Christians of Constantinople and European Turkey will be treated better than those of Smyrna.

2. To inform Kemal that after experience of Smyrna His Majesty's Government will oppose any return of Turks to Europe and Straits.

His Majesty's Government know the consequences of either course better than Athens, but if the second is chosen I believe even now Greek army would be the cheapest weapon which could be found for carrying it out provided Greece is treated as an ally with supplies, munitions and material and possibly organisers. Events are moving rapidly, and I do not know whether it will be possible to say the same in a fortnight's time.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 445

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 19.)

(No. 436. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic) *Athens, September 18, 1922*

MY telegram No. 451.

Greek General Staff believes that troops surrendered with General Kladas were 17th and 45th regiments, part of 47th regiment and thirty two guns. Third Corps headquarters gave following details gathered from Colonels Zeras and Politis commanding 18th and 55th regiments, and from Captain Melas, commanding rearguard artillery:—

On 13th September when 18th and 55th regiments were approaching Mudania from Gemlek, a French captain told Colonel Zeras that Mudania was neutral and

[illegible] Greeks would hurt on Greeks as they advanced. He said that there were 3,000 Kurd [illegible] and invited Greeks to surrender for account of Kemal. The two Greek colonels refused and during Monday [illegible] their regiments by hiding [illegible] opposition of Kurds. M. S.A.M. Correra Kladas after pressure by the army appointed Madaria to [illegible] and received same intimation from [illegible]. His regiment at Aydin Melas[illegible] incoming his guns withdrew his men at Smyrna from [illegible] brought them to Prademo.

Greeks were [illegible] now [illegible] telegrams on this subject but they wished information kept absolutely confidential they have fear that incident with French [illegible] decipherable [illegible] observe enquiry. Minister for Foreign Affairs [illegible] matter for [illegible] this morning and said attack of French [illegible] Smyrna was [illegible] Kemalists was so [illegible] that Greek Government were rather anxious. He presumed that some official notice would have to be taken of [illegible] letter.

[illegible] to Constantinople.

No. 446.

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Athens to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 19.*)

(No. 457.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, September 19, 1922.*

YESTERDAY we [illegible] out here there are still many thousand homeless persons in Smyrna now being shipped, are expecting disaster. No Greek ships are to go there or to any other port occupied by Kemalists in order to take these people off.

I do not know whether on this circumstance it would be possible for His Majesty's Government to [illegible] further than was proposed in your telegram No. 218.

I should mention that Greek consul yesterday chartered British steamships Wesleyhall and City of Versailles to fetch refugees from Smyrna but no [illegible] would [illegible] [illegible] Greeks who have arrived are extremely afraid that they [illegible] British hostages at Smyrna. They declare that [illegible] flagship was playing when the shore was crowded with people who [illegible] and threatened [illegible] refugees. These refugees compared [illegible] action most unfavourably with that of the French, Italians and Japanese ships. I do not know [illegible] these [illegible] but they are the principal [illegible] that the refugees will [illegible] Greeks are [illegible] and [illegible] to [illegible] others.

[illegible] to Constantinople.

No. 447.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 19.*)

(No. 24.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, September 18, 1922.*

PRESS [illegible] publishes a *démenti* of alleged pro-Turkish statement of M. Nincic to Paris "Matin" and states that Nincic opposed to any territorial modification in the Balkans.

Further [illegible] Nincic is now in London, and that Pasitch will meet him in Paris on his return there. Consequently no decisions will be taken in Belgrade for the present.

Press continues to denounce against [illegible] Bulgarian common frontier, but, in general, public opinion is very calm. Mussulmans have been celebrating Turkish victory.

All reports as to any kind of mobilisation measures on the part of this country are without foundation.

No action has yet been taken in conformity with Greek request for strong pressure to be brought to bear on Bulgaria in regard to bands threatening Thrace.

Bulgarian Chargé d'Affaires has given formal assurances with regard to correct attitude of Bulgarian Government but stated that latter relies on [illegible] Powers] to take the opportunity for settling Thracian question and according to Bulgaria promised outlet to sea.

Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs hears that Greek armies in Thrace are [illegible] discontent at not being demobilised like those returning to Greece.

(Repeated to Sofia No. 6.)

No. 448.

Sir H. Dering to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 19.*)

(No. 116.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, September 18, 1922.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

After seeing Minister for Foreign Affairs I met M. Diamandy just returned from League of Nations, where he has been instructed to remain at hand.

He enquired whether conference on Turkish affairs was likely to take place. I gave no indication what could be expressed the view that Christian people of the neighbourhood would be suitable in order to ensure their attendance of Mustapha Kemal's representative.

No. 449.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 19.*)

(No. 428.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 18, 1922.*

MR. HOPE arrived here on 16th September and supplied following account of recent events at Smyrna.

Intervening Greek [illegible] had undertaken to give possession of the Greek [illegible] but they refused Smyrna in state of extreme [illegible] possession of the port with [illegible] Mr. Hope's knowledge. Evacuation of Greek troops in Smyrna was completed by 8th September. Shortly have 50,000 refugees had also arrived from the interior. Of these more than [illegible] were at Colchester.

On 9th September at 11 Turkish cavalry charged [illegible] which was [illegible] and received by Armenian representatives. They were [illegible] and gave very assurances regarding [illegible] of persons and property. A [illegible] who previous to evacuation had been pleading defenceless condition appeared all over Smyrna and [illegible] to [illegible]. There was [illegible] during the night, but Turkish occupying officer explained as soon as [illegible] suffered [illegible] his disposal city would be tranquillised. On arrival on 10th September [illegible] division of regular infantry in excellent [illegible] and [illegible] was responsible for [illegible] during. Several British houses [illegible] at Boujnabad, were forced and in the streets patrols held up and robbed Armenians.

On 10th September Italian consul-general informed Mr. Hope confidentially that that evening [illegible] secret meeting ascertained of Armenians was to be arrived at to kill Turks. The following day was first of Armenian massacre. Certain Armenians had then [illegible] a pretext for adoption of [illegible] measures by having [illegible] in their possession and [illegible] [illegible] took place. Men were killed in [illegible] and parties were [illegible] and driven off. Sir H. Lamb succeeded [illegible] partially [illegible] Armenian [illegible] and [illegible] twenty bodies in 70 yards.

On 12th September fires broke out at several points in Armenian quarter. Turks asserted that Armenians [illegible] their houses to distract them [illegible] the eyes of Europe. It may however be remarked that first houses fired were all to windward of district and that in the evening when some of fires had died down a new one was started half a mile to windward again. Whole quarter had been surrounded by a Turkish cordon since previous day.

* See Geneva telegram No. [illegible] not printed.

Natural spread of fire was accelerated by new fresh started in European quarter this was particularly noticeable on following morning when, wind blowing now from European quarter half a dozen houses burst severally into flames half a mile to windward

Mr Lowther is no doubt that both massacre and fire, including destruction of European quarter were deliberate work of Turks carried out by order of responsible authorities object of former being vengeance against Armenians who had sided with Greeks in and of latter to root out Christian and foreign influence generally

Plight of refugees as pitiable as they were herded together on narrow quay without possessions as they had been able to save with very little possibility of obtaining water or food and none of shelter About 1500 were since a week crowded into lighters against exterior of breakwater and shot if they attempted to escape

Evacuation of British colony was completed on 12th September Possibly a dozen British elected to remain and a certain number of Maltese One British subject, Mr Murphy was shot in his house shooting regular soldiers and died 12th September So far as Mr Lowther knows, there was no other loss of British life Attitude of Turks towards consular authorities was correct after first trying out of non recognition but Turkish guard was placed outside consulate general

This was not done at the other consulates.

Full report by despatch

No 450

Admiralty to Commander in chief Mediterranean Received at Foreign Office, September 18

(No 924 Secret)
(Telegraphic) *September* 18, 1922

REVENGE has been ordered to leave Besika Bay not to arrive 19th September, to proceed to Rambler Bay Malta to follow after stored

Seventh submarine Flotilla being ordered to Devonport in case Press to proceed if necessary

Cabinet decided this morning that we should be notified that the navy is responsible for preventing so far as lies in its power the passage of Mustapha Kemal's forces into Asia and Europe and you are authorised to take all steps which you deem necessary for the fulfilment of this obligation

---

No. 451

Admiralty to Senior officer Third Light Cruiser Squadron (Received at Foreign Office September 19)

No 341)
(Telegraphic) *September* 18, 1922

CONFIDENTIAL Interpretation of section (c) of your telegram No 496 of 16th September Most immediate information as to extent of massacres that you have been able to obtain

---

No. 452

Commander-in-chief Mediterranean to Admiralty (Received September 19

(No 350)
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople September* 18 1922

REQUEST instructions whether I should survey balance of shipping proceeding to National ports in Mediterranean Smyrna Gulf of Adramyti Adalia, Messina &c, should one be established in order to prevent munitions entering Asia Minor Ports would involve establishing a partial blockade and Nationalists and Allied Powers would have to be informed Presume the latter would assist Trade from Mediterranean to Black Sea and Marmora ports can be controlled at Dardanelles and Bosphorus

No 453

Commander in chief Mediterranean to Admiralty (Received September 19)

(No 352
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople September* 18, 1922

REPORT from Captain D, Seventh Destroyer Flotilla at Pasha [? Liman], states Turks are likely to land on Marmora islands Should this be forcibly prevented ? in view of instructions to prevent Turks crossing to Thrace?

No 454

Admiralty to Commander in chief Mediterranean. (Received at Foreign Office September 19)

(No [928])
(Telegraphic) *September* 19 1922

CABINET considered your No 350 this morning and decided against instituting blockade Desire result present

---

No 455

Admiralty to Commander in chief Mediterranean Received at Foreign Office September 19

No 926)
(Telegraphic) *September* 19, 1922

THE fact that certain Bolshevik vessels have been at disposal of Turkish Nationalists during the operations against Greeks permits the possibility that they may be used against us From our information two submarine chasers and one submarine have been lent to Angora Government Should any Bolshevik submarine chaser or mine-layer appear in the Straits, it should be attacked, and any such craft approaching the Straits on the surface from the Black Sea made the Russian flag should be warned off In the event of risk to any Admiralty vessel any such craft encountered in Black Sea or Straits should be sunk It has not been deemed expedient to warn Soviet Government at present of these orders

Your No 352
Authority contained in Admiralty telegram No 924 justifies you in taking any steps you deem necessary to deal with this situation

---

No 456

Commander in chief Mediterranean to Admiralty (Received September 19 1922)

(No 354)
(Telegraphic)

REQUEST information as to whether it is desired to keep a vessel at Smyrna, observing that the labour is racial Jealousies now that the British subjects have been evacuated there is little reason for the presence of a man of war If vessel is required I will relieve HMS Cardiff by HMS Curaçoa It has also presumed local patrol should be paid by Rear Admiral HMS Curaçoa on Kemalists

No. 457

Commander-in-chief Mediterranean to Admiralty (*Received September 18*)

(No. 555. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *September 18, 1922.*

FOLLOWING message received from Rear-Admiral Third Light Cruiser Squadron:—

"My No. 758.

As result of Italian Admiral's interview Kemal has applied to Angora for further permission for refugees except men between 18 and 36, to be embarked in Greek ships in Smyrna harbour. He states that no refugees will be allowed to leave after 30th September. Fire appears to have burnt out. I was able to see where it began from high roof."

No. 458

Commander-in-chief Mediterranean to Admiralty (*Received September 19, 1922.*)

(No. 505. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.)
"IMMEDIATE No. 931.

Very little accurate direct information. Now believed 2,000 Armenian men were massacred by Armenian quarter before the fire. Since then [illegible] nothing. Many Armenian women and children have been shot or [illegible] drowned. Those who survived are exhausted and are starvation. It is known Hindu and Jewish families are being destroyed by looting and fire in the burnt area. [illegible] these [illegible] Number of Europeans remaining daily."

No. 459

Senior officer 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron to Admiralty. Received September 19, 1922.

(No. 506.)
(Telegraphic.)
From Destroyer Officer from Senior Officer. No. 74.

"My interview with Mustapha Kemal found after [illegible] waiting had gathered for attempted friendly departure from Smyrna. Have since had [illegible] letter. Boy scouts were to the north [illegible] Italian] cruiser. Kemal necessity of passing himself to concessories with a view to avoiding [illegible]. There are indications that a [illegible] Greek force of cavalry and infantry is being sent to it. It is reported that entire station in Greek army still continues at Constantinople [illegible] ping [illegible]."

No. 460

Senior officer 3rd Light Squadron to Admiralty (*Received September 19*)

(No. 507.)
(Telegraphic.) *September 19, 1922.*

YOUR No. 433.

Smyrna [illegible] of 4th [illegible] was as follows:—

"Estimated from 20 to 30 thousand Armenians massacred. Believed only 25 per cent. of Armenians living in Smyrna have escaped. No evidence at present whether Bourdja and Sevkhaner Cordelio Ayos Triadha areas have suffered."

---

* As per cover.

† Re massacres at Smyrna.

No. 461

Commander-in-chief Mediterranean to Admiralty (*Received September 19*)

(No. 362.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 19, 1922.*

I AM giving orders that no clearances from Constantinople and Chanak are to be given to vessels proceeding to Nationalist ports in Mediterranean, Black Sea and Marmora. Such ships would provide Nationalists with [illegible] much] needed transport, and incidentally this will [illegible] prevent] arms and ammunition from leaving Constantinople.

No. 462

Commander-in-chief Mediterranean to Admiralty (*Received September 19*)

(No. 365.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 19, 1922.*

YOUR No. 928.*

Orders referred to in my No. 362 were issued under Cabinet instructions contained in your No. 924. They are being held in abeyance pending further orders.

No. 463

Consul-General Lindley to Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received September 19.*)

(No. 37.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Geneva, September 19, 1922.*

YOUR Telegram No. 38.

Following from Lord Balfour.

"Nansen's further offer of Assembly was briefly suggested:—

1. That organisation of assistance and emigration for Russian refugees at Constantinople should be entrusted to Commission created to refugees from Asia Minor.

2. That in accordance with article 11 of the Covenant council of League should consider possibility of offering good offices to belligerents with a view to arrangements for cessation of hostilities.

First suggestion was considered by fifth committee yesterday afternoon, and it was decided to recommend that Russian refugee organisation should be utilised council being invited to place 1,000,000 gold francs at Nansen's disposal from working capital fund, to be repaid by expenses of necessary administrative measures. Further urgent steps will be taken by other powers.

Appeal for funds will be probably made to Governments.

Number of refugees expected to arrive at Constantinople 150,000 from Smyrna and 70,000 from Brussa.

No. 464

Consul-General to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received September 20*)

(No. 39.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Geneva, September 19, 1922.*

My telegram No. 37, Secret.

Following from Lord Balfour.

"Nansen's second suggestion to invite council to offer good offices to belligerents was referred to assembly [group undecipherable] agreed to [group undecipherable] report to the effect that [group illegible] in favour of subject being sent to sixth committee.

In views on Foreign Office telegram No. 931 are [group undecipherable], it seems to me of greatest importance that I and my French and Italian colleagues at assembly should receive identic instructions.

* Copies of No. 928 were incorrectly circulated as No. 978.

You will of course be aware of telegram from Hughes to Australian delegate about arranging that Dominions represented at Assembly. If I, with France and Italy am still to represent at Assembly League I shall not be able to speak on behalf of the whole British Empire.

At a meeting of British Empire delegation to-night presided over by M. Fisher at which myself was invited to be present unanimous opinion was expressed that neither in Council to offer good offices should not be opposed nor matter of assembly or in assembly itself.

I am strongly feeling personally that you would find France and Italy easier to deal with at Geneva than at a conference *ad hoc* at Venice or elsewhere.

The feeling here is very strong that League would fail to act up to what must be claimed for the covenant if it fails to offer its good offices on this occasion. If other belligerent rejects the offer responsibility will not be on League.

No. 465

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received September* 19)

By Bag

No. 458)
Secret.) *Paris, September* 18, 1922.

I AM sending you cross section of the very wide divergence of opinion in the French press on the George V. policy as regards His Majesty's Government in regard to Constantinople and the Straits. Two papers, the *Journal des Débats* and the *Petit Parisien*, have adopted a very cautious attitude. The former has declared that a Near Eastern settlement effected by agreement by giving way to Turkish aspirations, or that Europe should transfer its seat of Government to Angora, would be a disaster. The latter paper considers that Europe being obliged to come to terms with Kemalist Turkey, the French Government represented by M. Poincaré is right to stand by Great Britain to stand by second Constantinople and the Straits. The *Temps* and the *Liberté* consider that the French Government have been right in their policy. The *Matin* expresses surprise that the French Government should have been kept in ignorance of the conversations of the Cabinet. His Majesty's Government, the paper says, cannot have taken the most important decision of the Cabinet without consulting the Government of the French Republic, the most natural ally of Great Britain in the Near East. The *Matin* further says that while the papers consulted point out British hesitation and vacillation shown by His Majesty's Government during the Greco-Turkish war, they suggest Germany. Mr. Lloyd George's attitude at Genoa is also referred to. The *Petit Parisien* points out that the Near East policy of the Powers will not avail to bring French Government to active support in the defence of Constantinople against Kemalists. The *Matin* says: "Temps" expresses surprise that

to Constantinople Serbia was in a position to do more than Roumania being less under pressure He urged that, in pourparlers of Great Powers, Roumania should participate both in discussions and decisions

He asked for definite assurances as to the command of the Black Sea and for particulars as to the size of the force which Roumania should send He also asked for assistance in war material and sea transport

I gave definite assurances as to the command of the Black Sea and promised assistance as regards sea transport and escort I reserved expression of definite opinion as to size of Roumanian contingent pending your conversations in Paris, but promised a reply on this point within the next few days when we know the results of your conversations I asked him to telegraph to his Government as to the nature of assistance in war material most urgently required, which I indicated in principle we should be prepared to consider favourably if Roumania should send a contingent."

No 470

Telegram (by Telephone) to Paris

Foreign Office September 20 1922

FROM Prime Minister on behalf of Cabinet to Lord Curzon

We are very gratified with firm language you held to M Poincaré and with representation of case of the British Government

---

No 471

Mr Findley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 20)

(No 459)
(Telegraphic) R *Athens September* 19, 1922

ORTHODOX Committee Bishop of Ephesus called this morning to express thanks for being saved at Smyrna by British

He could not give any reliable information as to extent of massacres but said he had to walk on the corpses to escape, that he saw Turkish soldiers with machine guns preventing people leaving houses and other Turkish soldiers feeding the flames with petroleum

There seems no doubt European suburbs and whole town are destroyed except Turkish quarter

Is it of interest for me to report further on this subject?

(Repeated to Constantinople)

No 472

Mr Findley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 20)

(No 461)
(Telegraphic) R *Athens, September* 19, 1922

FOLLOWING is short review of the present situation, based on latest sources of information at my disposal

Internal -There is no serious disorder in the country though quarrel between Royalists and Venizelists is as bitter as ever Prime Minister is doing his best to appoint capable Venizelists to important positions But forces against him are powerful King shows no sign of desire to abdicate, and he will not be forced to do so with out civil war Soldiers who have returned are ashamed of themselves and glad to go home quietly without any questions asked Large Moslem population is quiet and unmolested, but there is intrigue going on between them and Kemalist Bulgarian committees and Bolsheviks Slav and Jew populations are also involved in these intrigues which leave Greeks practically unaffected There is much discontent and inflammable material about but it is quite possible that it will not explode

No. 473

Second Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September [illegible]

[illegible] Secret
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople September 19, 1922*

DAILY Mail Kemalist correspondent has received telegram from Admiralty stating yesterday conference took place of Chiefs that have responsibility for preventing passage of Straits power passage of Nationalist forces from Asia. Telegram stated that crossing of Marmora by Nationalist troops for attack of lines Chanak Ismid Kemalist agent here that transfer of Nationalist forces from Asiatic Europe will not [illegible] above.

I have informed Admiral Brock of Secret intelligence received and with assurance that [illegible] Secret service are keeping close watch with view of preventing [illegible] Nationalist forces from crossing Straits. I am sure that you will agree with me that [illegible] Kemalist agent here [illegible] Nationalist forces from Asiatic Europe will not [illegible] above.

I have informed Admiral Brock of Secret intelligence received and with assurance that

No. 475

Sir H. Loring to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 20.)

(No. 118. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, September 19, 1922.*

VERY immediately preceding telegram.

After conversing with Minister for Foreign Affairs I have good reason to believe that he will make similar request in London, Paris and Rome that Roumania should participate in peace conference on Turkish and Greek affairs. He had previously pointed out that this request was intimated in telegram sent to Prime Minister by M. Bratiano. This initiative should induce Serb-Croat-Slovene Minister for Foreign Affairs to take similar step. I understand that he is on his way to London.

No. 476

Sir H. Loring to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 20.)

(No. 119.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, September 20, 1922.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs called this morning to state that he had seen French Minister after my visit with result that Roumanian Prime Minister wished their message to be delivered to M. Poincaré. Following is translation of note I exchanged with Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, which he considered sufficient for the information of Roumania. Baron Mumm, Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, has been informed.

"We learn with regret that negotiations between Great Britain and Turkey concerning question of Constantinople, Straits and neutral zone in Asia Minor do not yet appear to be definitely settled.

On the contrary, it is observed that Bolshevik wave is due to the help of their Turkish allies.

In these circumstances Roumania would be very much pleased to participate in conference suggested by Constantinople Government on receipt of the unanimous wish of Black Sea States for defence of Straits, Roumania having vital interests in the security of those waters which appear to them that they should stop Kemalist Asiatic nationalist movement, especially that Constantinople, the Straits, Asia Minor and Thrace, as well as Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora and Bosphorus, should be restored to Turkey, thus ensuring peace in Thrace. We consider this a good opportunity at the same time to settle question of neutral zone between Turkey and Bulgarians can be established.

"I have the honour to inform your Excellency of the following essential points quoted in the above-mentioned note:—

Maintenance of Angora French security in the Straits solution.

Avoidance of conflict in Balkan peninsula.

Necessity of Russian concurrence which is most necessary for Roumania as for all Europe."

(Repeated next day by bag to Rome.)

No. 477

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 20.)

(No. 429.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, September 19, 1922.*

YOUR Telegram No. 370.

Sanitary material stores are useless without existing typhoid hospital sheds and eight tents and clothing already sent for Russian relief.

No. 478

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. Received September 20.

(No. 430.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, September 19, 1922.*

NOTE received from Hamid Bey dated 17th September protests that Greeks are moving to Thrace the refugees saved from recent Greek defeat in Asia Minor in order to form there Greek majority and that these refugees are full of atrocities at Adrianople. Greeks are, he says, now preparing to leave Asia Minor.

I assume note was written with view to preparing these refugees was humanitarian.

Repeated to Athens, No. 134.

No. 479

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 20.)

(No. 431.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, September 19, 1922.*

UNITED STATES High Commissioner states that his Government has asked Allied Governments to instruct their High Commissioners here to discuss with him protection of refugees awaiting shipment at Smyrna and other Asiatic ports with a view to working out a scheme which will offer a permanent solution. Italian High Commissioner appears to have received instructions.

No. 480

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 20.)

(No. 432.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 19, 1922.*

YOUR Telegram No. 398.

Joint communiqué respecting neutral zone signed by Ismet Pasha and Commissioners Ismid Bey, High Commissioner and Raouf Bey at conference at Mudania. Generals Harington and Charpy were present as delegates to Ismid Bey at request of Ismet. Secretary for Allied Commissioners to Ismet by telegraph to Angora. See my telegram No. 427. Ismid Bey received at Yalova communiqué.

On instructions of his colleagues and in order to ensure their getting communiqué first, Ismid Bey originally refused to publish, which was somewhat more negative in character than that published, but when they learned would be mere paraphrase at Angora.

Text is briefly summarized as follows, and is to be read with Ismet's telegram:—

No. 481

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 20.)

(No. 433.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 19, 1922.*

LES Gouvernements de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie considèrent qu'il est désirable que sans préjudice des stipulations du futur Traité de Paix la neutralité de la zone à établissement spécial des Alliés dans les régions de Gallipoli et des Détroits soit maintenue. Des ordres de leurs Gouvernements aux Hauts Commissaires assurant de l'exécution de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne et de l'Italie ont été donnés et reçus et des instructions dans ce sens ont été données après Hussein Bey le 17 courant et l'invitation à transmettre au Gouvernement d'Angora le plus tôt possible que les trois Gouvernements Alliés ont confiance que le Gouvernement respectera la zone neutre.

No. 482

Extract from letter from Kedgwin Green received September 20

(No. 434)
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople September 19, 1922*

I called on French High Commissioner this morning and had conversation with him which I reported in my telegram No. 433. Chanak was being immediately [illegible]

[illegible] understanding that [illegible] Kemalists will [illegible] withdrawal of their detachment. Both sides will then abide by Mudania Armistice.

(Repeated to Paris No. 187)

No. 483

Sir H. Rumbold (No. 435) to Mr. Curzon (Received September 20)

(No. 436)
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople September 20, 1922*

(Will Not Be Sent to No. 401)

My French colleague has received instructions to take all possible steps to avert [illegible] and is unable to leave until he receives a more favourable situation. [illegible] Please inform Chanak.

No. 484

Sir H. Rumbold (No. 437) to Lord Curzon (Received September 20)

(No. 438)
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople September 20, 1922*

(Will Not Be Sent to No. 401)

My French colleague has received instructions to take all possible steps to avert [illegible] and is unable to leave until he receives a more favourable situation. [illegible] Please inform Chanak.

No. 485

Sir H. Rumbold (No. 439) to Lord Curzon (Received September 20)

(No. 440)
Telegraphic *Constantinople September 20, 1922*

FOLLOWING for Lord Curzon:

My immediately preceding telegram.

It is more than probable that haste with which French Government has recalled its detachments from Chanak and Asiatic shore of Bosporus indicates that it has received [illegible] reports from French High Commissioners as to Kemal's intentions or [illegible] some arrangement with Kemal.

No. 486

Sir H. Rumbold (No. 441) to Lord Curzon (Repeated at Foreign Office Received September 20)

(No. 442)
Telegraphic *Constantinople September 20, 1922*

FOLLOWING for Lord Curzon:

My immediately preceding telegram.

It is more than probable that haste with which French Government has recalled its detachments from Chanak and Asiatic shore of Bosporus indicates that it has received [illegible] reports from French High Commissioners as to Kemal's intentions or [illegible] some arrangement with Kemal.

No. 487

Sir H. Rumbold (No. 443) to Lord Curzon (Repeated at Foreign Office Received September 20)

(No. 444)
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople September 20, 1922*

FOLLOWING for Lord Curzon:

My telegram No. 439.

Both High Commissioners have informed me that they received similar detachments from [illegible] Asiatic shore of the Bosporus. [illegible] instructions from His Government.

[illegible] conversations which took place between [illegible] and myself, both High Commissioners admitted that my remarks were reasonable. But [illegible] assured me that public opinion in [illegible] would not tolerate possibility [illegible] with Kemal. [illegible] they would not [illegible] upon [illegible] to keep [illegible] Constantinople. He replied that he had asked for [illegible] from his Government [illegible] but that [illegible] by Ismet Pasha [illegible].

No. 488

Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean (Received at Foreign Office September 20, 1922)

(No. 370)
(Telegraphic)

Regret [illegible] to ask for [illegible] vessels in Gallipoli when situation is reported [illegible] No. 1 cable [illegible] Unless [illegible] Turks [illegible] against His Majesty's forces [illegible] notes [illegible] Nationalist [illegible].

No. 489

Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean (Received at Foreign Office September 20)

(No. 933)
(Telegraphic) *September 19, 1922*

YOUR No. 354

Considered essential to keep a British naval force at Smyrna for the present. Rear Admiral should not call on Kemalists.

No. 490.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean. (*Received at Foreign Office, September 20.*)

(Unnumbered.)
Telegraphic. *September 20, 1922.*

YOUR Nos. 362 and 365.

Cabinet decision is Admiralty No. 928 referred to your No. 350, in which a blockade of Nationalist ports in Mediterranean was proposed by you. Admiralty telegram No. 924 gives you free hand in Dardanelles, Marmora and Bosphorus to control all shipping.

No. 491.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 20.*)

(No. 461.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Geneva, September 20, 1922.*

My telegram No. 37.

Following received by Reuter:—

"Angora Government yesterday telegraphed to Constantinople that the Nationalist Government considered it necessary to take the following measures:—

No Moslem subject, especially Turkish citizens, to be called to the colours in Allied countries.

No. 492.

Cross Channel: the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Reuter. (*Sent September 20.*)

No. 12.
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cannes, September 20, 1922.*

FOLLOWING from Lord Balfour.

Your telegram to Lords No. 280.

Position is that Government of Angora, which Nationalist Assembly at Brussa refuses to recognise, has declared that Greek Army must withdraw from Asia Minor, and has called upon Allies to intervene to secure the withdrawal, threatening attack on Allied troops in event of refusal. Government of the day has sent two Ministers to Constantinople to negotiate with Angora Government, and has ordered reinforcements to be sent to Chanak and Asiatic shore of Dardanelles.

Original Nationalist movement was directed against Greek occupation of Smyrna, but Nationalist forces have since overrun Thrace, and have now reached neutral zone of Straits. Allied troops in this district consist of small garrisons at Constantinople, Chanak and Gallipoli, and Greek troops in Thrace. Latter are now engaged in operations against Nationalist forces, and are in danger of being cut off.

No. 493.

Mr. Hodgson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 20.*)

(No. 201.)
Telegraphic. *Vienna, September 20, 1922.*

RAKOVSKY, who is Chief Soviet foreign affairs expert, pays in memorandum great importance to statement in Times expressed yesterday in conversation at British Mission that true basis for negotiations between British and Russian views on New East existed, and he hopes that Russia would be disposed to Turkish gaining control of Straits, on condition that articles and would accept same with small reservations, her latter chief reason for objecting Turkish settlement Soviet Russia might be invited to first conference.

No. 494.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 20.*)

(No. 469.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Paris, September 19, 1922.*

I SAW President of the Council this morning and I gave him purport of your Lordship's telegram No. 1305. He read it carefully but said nothing. I think that he would like to have disputed the second paragraph.

I told him that I had seen with relief that orders had been sent for withdrawal of French troops from Asiatic shore. The Times had also seen it stated in impression that His Majesty's Government had been informed yesterday of fact by French Chargé d'Affaires. I was therefore greatly surprised when received telephonic message from Foreign Office this morning asking for confirmation of news which was published in British and French papers. It seemed to me that His Majesty's Government should have been informed of such important fact as withdrawal of French troops which had been sent solely to emphasise demonstration of solidarity between Allies.

President of the Council replied that he had only just received Chargé d'Affaires and informed me Loreshajer not that there could be no doubt whatever that French Acting High Commissioner at Constantinople would have received his orders as soon as he received the instructions sent [illegible] military authorities to take necessary measures.

I said that once that withdrawal French troops had been sent as a demonstration of solidarity between Allies British troops exposed to any attack that might be made was in opinion of the Government to make a serious derangement to Kemal in showing that solidarity no longer exists. President of Council became very excited and no longer spoke so [illegible] than His Majesty's Government were pursuing a policy of war. I told him flatly that I could not allow him to say that sort. I thought he would see that it was absolutely untrue that the Government of the day desired to be more than His Majesty's Government and the British people. He then calmed down somewhat and said that he was much preoccupied with the knowledge that position at Chanak was in serious danger and that Kemalist troops were advancing in Paris. I at once day afternoon Minister for Foreign Affairs that Kemal would no longer insist on the neutral zone of the Asiatic side of Straits, as he had withdrawn [illegible] reasons advanced by Greek troops, and mentioned Chanak in particular. He replied to that French troops would be withdrawn only in complete agreement with General Harington but there did seem to be [illegible] that situation might [illegible] and that he would not permit the [illegible] to be exposed to risk of attack by Turkish troops and Turkish irregulars.

I remarked that President of the Council thought the best course to pursue would be to call for all the [illegible] between Kemal's troops and Allies would be to invite Kemal with one [illegible] conference.

[End of first part.]

No. 495.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 20.*)

(No. 469 (Part 2).)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Paris, September 19, 1922.*

IT might be done without even taking vote if place where it could be settled later on, but it should become a fact. President of the Council agreed entirely, and added that it was absolutely impossible that Angora delegates would come to conference unless it was clear beforehand that the [illegible] boundaries would be granted. Unless these were granted President of the Council was of opinion that there would be a general [illegible] Greeks, Albanians and Bulgarians would be forced in close alliance. He said that Roumanians and Serbians were also agitated that territorial demands of the Turks must be acceded. I asked him what they were. He said Maritza frontier with Adrianople and Turkish sovereignty over the Straits were mentioned. They would be ready to accept control of League of Nations or of an inter-Allied commission referred to the former, and

they would accept nothing less. I said that in addition to political reasons there were very strong sentimental reasons why Turks should not be allowed in Gallipoli Peninsula owing to number of British soldiers who were buried there. He replied that he had considered that point as regards Iron Duke Graves there and he was of the opinion that territories could be exchanged and made British or French territory. I asked him whether he considered that the safeguards of last March such as restriction of Turkish armaments and forces should be maintained. He answered that all these points must be discussed but that since territorial demands of Turkey had been made he would fancy they would be much more amenable to reason on the most strictly guaranteed group no matter how useless to uphold group committed last March to Turkey military forces would under present circumstances have been withdrawn.

Conversation ended with French High Commissioner undertaking to send me Note which he had received from Venizelos in regard to present movement in Smyrna.

No. 496

Extract from Diary dictated from Fort Rouge at Paris Received September 20, 1922.

(X)

FOLLOWING on the Cabinet from Lord Curzon.

Before I had finished my first conversation of two and a half hours with M. Poincaré it was decided that the Secretary of State would not be asked to express a desire to be present. It was decided that before any step was taken with regard to the proposed Conference at Constantinople there should be a preliminary meeting between the Prime Ministers of France, Great Britain and Italy. The conversation with Prime Minister then proceeded.

At first I asked Monsieur Poincaré to explain to me the meeting and how it had come about. He answered that he had been given to understand that the Greek Government wished to withdraw from Asia Minor. He had therefore sent a telegram to the Allied Governments suggesting that they should withdraw their troops behind the Straits. He had received replies from Italy and Japan agreeing to this proposal. The British Government had replied that they were willing to withdraw their troops behind the Straits provided that the Allied Governments would support them in the event of the Turks attacking them. The French Government had replied that they were willing to withdraw their troops behind the Straits provided that the Allied Governments would support them in the event of the Turks attacking them. The French Government had replied that they were willing to withdraw their troops behind the Straits provided that the Allied Governments would support them in the event of the Turks attacking them.

No. 497

Telegram Message from the Foreign Secretary (Curzon) to Sir Horace Rumbold (Constantinople) (Received September 20)

I HAD a short interview with Venizelos this morning. He explained to me that the object of his visit to Europe was to obtain the support of the Powers for the Greek claim to Smyrna. He said that he had been informed that the Turkish Government had refused to allow the Greek Government to send troops to Smyrna. He said that he had been informed that the Turkish Government had refused to allow the Greek Government to send troops to Smyrna. He said that he had been informed that the Turkish Government had refused to allow the Greek Government to send troops to Smyrna.

---

could be taken up and that they could pass to Europe when they pleased.

I then made a statement to the effect that he was in favour of the object of the meeting and agreed to the proposal that the Conference should be held at Constantinople. There would be need for some preliminary discussion as to the terms of reference and I suggested that the following should be the subjects for discussion: (1) the question of the future of the Straits; (2) the question of the future of the Straits; (3) the question of the future of the Straits; (4) the question of the future of the Straits; (5) the question of the future of the Straits; (6) the question of the future of the Straits; (7) the question of the future of the Straits; (8) the question of the future of the Straits; (9) the question of the future of the Straits; (10) the question of the future of the Straits.

I then asked him what was the position of the Greek Government in regard to the Straits. He said that the Greek Government had no intention of attacking the Straits. He said that the Greek Government had no intention of attacking the Straits. He said that the Greek Government had no intention of attacking the Straits. He said that the Greek Government had no intention of attacking the Straits.

I then asked him what was the position of the Greek Government in regard to the Straits. He said that the Greek Government had no intention of attacking the Straits. He said that the Greek Government had no intention of attacking the Straits. He said that the Greek Government had no intention of attacking the Straits. He said that the Greek Government had no intention of attacking the Straits.

I then asked him what was the position of the Greek Government in regard to the Straits. He said that the Greek Government had no intention of attacking the Straits. He said that the Greek Government had no intention of attacking the Straits. He said that the Greek Government had no intention of attacking the Straits. He said that the Greek Government had no intention of attacking the Straits.

discussing the respective duty for some action that had just been thrust upon us. I said that we were quite prepared to act upon it and that though I had come to Paris to urge Allied action now that the French had openly disavowed this I was perfectly prepared to recommend single action and that my Government would not in respect of the Dardanelles, hesitate to act alone if compelled to do so. We do not want to act alone I said but we are the power to do so and if compelled we will. Effort of this was very late.

Lord Beatty then came in and gave an exceedingly concise and impressive account of the power of the British Navy (a) to prevent the Turkish seizure and armament of their position (b) to keep the Straits open (c) to hold Gallipoli Peninsula against attack (d) to prevent the invasion of Thrace across Marmora and prevent the capture of Constantinople from the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus.

M. Poincaré then with considerable nervousness and using the French Admiral himself as an authority, endeavoured to prove all these propositions which I should myself have admitted to be successful. I then criticised Grasset's argument as to the ease with which the Turks could occupy either position and threaten Europe to emphasise the folly of abandoning the Asiatic shore and conceding to Kemal this great strategic advantage.

Lord Derby very rightly urged the importance of discussing the Polish question at the early peace conference and without committing himself before hearing French and Italian views reserved to the immediate summoning of such a conference to Paris to consider the Turkey Serbia and Roumania question whatever French decision might be as to proceeding with the previous conversations and leaving Ismid in abeyance.

M. Poincaré and Signor Schanzer agreed to summon such a conference at once to Paris. Mr. Venizelos on the other hand appeared to be very disinclined to do this. Lord Balfour also thought that it would be better to postpone the meeting if possible and to arrive if possible at a preliminary understanding between ourselves and the Greek Government before the conference met. Failing this he thought that the Greeks should be told that we could not agree to their proceeding further. I will not now attempt to interpret the lines upon which I hoped to proceed. The extreme cordiality with which the French had accepted these proposals encouraged me to hope that I might be able to induce the Greeks to accept the responsibility which we were prepared to undertake as regards the Straits. I said that it was now all important that there should be no breach with Kemal which I knew to be unwise and to consist from any action which might imperil the success or even the meeting of the conference thus succeeded in the field and might compel Great Britain to act alone. I have not accepted this responsibility and I appeared to be under no illusions as to its success.

I may add that I did not think it would be well to allow Kemal from a prospective military advantage, to think that our strong policy was thus frustrated. I have hardly exaggerated the difference between his attitude at beginning and end of sitting and I began to think we had charge from the very outset. Whether with success. I do not know but I am sure that while maintaining our position we must refrain from any attempt to provoke immediate hostilities.

No. 498

Telegram by Telephone from Lord Hardinge (Paris) Received September 20, 1922, 1

No.

COMMUNIQUÉ for the press —

Lord Curzon and M. Poincaré are agreed to hold a Conference of Allies as soon as possible to consider the Conference of Lausanne with Turkey Greece Jugoslavia and Roumania will be invited and at which the conditions of the future peace will be considered.

No. 499

Lord Hardinge to Consul London (Repeated to Foreign Office by Telephone, Received September 20)

FOLLOWING for Lord Balfour (omitted from Lord Curzon)

Your telegram just received.

I have had important conversations with Poincaré to-day which ended better than I could have expected. Talks to be resumed on Friday. Immediate summoning of peace conference was agreed to for Athens as Serbia and Roumania as well as recent combatants and Great Powers. The bases of discussion at this conference which we are to examine on Friday will undoubtedly include a request to the Greeks to execute power and if not withdrawal. There can be no question of resolutions or compromise or such as you forecast. I am inclined to think that immediate intervention will not at this moment be required.

No. 500

Sir C. Clerk to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 20)

(No. 104.)

Telegraphic. *Prague, September 20, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 47.

No invitation and no suggestion has been received from any country or Great Powers. [illegible] *Intransigeant*.

Czechoslovak Government is anxiously considering question of its attitude especially in the event of Rumania and Jugoslavia taking steps to prevent restoration of Hungarian Habsburgs. Do not know what will be the importance of [illegible] this matter to the *Intransigeant*.

Czechoslovak Government is on [illegible] with Jugoslavia and Rumania and will shortly [illegible] with Jugoslavia. Have [illegible] of my colleagues [illegible] to the Czechoslovak Government [illegible] Rumanian Government.

Prime Minister returns to-morrow and will see me as soon as possible.

E 9746/27/44 No. 501

Mr. Stanchof to the Marquess of Kedleston (Received September 21)

My Lord, *Legation of Bulgaria, London, September 21, 1922.*

I AM instructed by the Bulgarian Government to transmit herewith to Your Excellency the enclosed memorandum containing suggestions of the Bulgarian Government with regard to the settlement of the Eastern question.

The Prime Minister, M. Stamboliisky, is sincerely grateful to Your Excellency for the benevolent attention of your Excellency to the views which he ventures to express.

Trusting that your Excellency will kindly consider the request of the Bulgarian Government, I have, &c.

STANCHOF

Enclosure in No. 501

Memorandum by Bulgarian Government respecting the Thracian question.

AT the present moment, when negotiations are being exchanged between the principal Allied Powers with the object of restoring peace in the Near East, Bulgaria who is in many respects interested in the solution of the problem deems it her duty to make known her point of view, as was previously done at the eve of the drafting of the Treaty of Sèvres and the accord of San Remo.

The Bulgarian Government scrupulously wish to avoid any discussion on the attitude that the Allied Powers will choose to adopt with regard to the matter, but,

...ssing to consider what ... ge ... est ... [illegible] ... situation ... the general interest ... need ... [illegible] ... purposes of ... re ... ents have to come ... interests brought into ... position ... recent events. ... [illegible] ... ssist ... control ... the League ... Nations ... [illegible] ... Georgia ... set ... and ... State ... [illegible] ... control ... the League ... Nations ... [illegible] ... Georgia ... set ... and ... [illegible] ... Turkey ... territory ... between ... [illegible] ... and ... [illegible] ... first ... construct ... [illegible] ... make ... Mosta, ... [illegible] ... restrictions ... [illegible] ... cross ... [illegible] ... [illegible] ... deal ... with ... [illegible] ... present ... difficulties ... [illegible] ... and ... [illegible] ... [illegible] ... [illegible]

No. 504

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—Received September 21.

(No. 463.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, September 20, 1922.*

SIR H. RUMBOLD'S telegram No. 430.

There are probably about 50,000 refugees at present at Thrace and Greek possessions. Authorities do not know any exact details, but there are certainly many thousands in islands, and transit camps of Greece, so that Kemal's allegation is false as regards Greek. Virtually no Greek. In many cases Turkish population is being molested by Greeks, while bucks of Greece are not disposed of their houses and land given to refugees.

Repeated to Constantinople.

No. 505

Foreign Office to Admiralty (Forwarding Report by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—Received September 21.)

(No. 822.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September 21, 1922.*

I HAVE received following telegram from International News Service, Fleet Street, stating that Nationalist forces are to-day, Monday, 18th September, in full retreat from Afyon Karahissar, and are asking for armistice.

I have not had time to examine statement. My impression is that it is somewhat premature, and that Turkish troops are to be congratulated in Paris as result of recent victories.

No. 506.

Admiralty to Foreign Office (acknowledging receipt of telegrams).—Received at Foreign Office September 22.

No. 949. Secret.
(Telegraphic.) *September 20, 1922.*

Reply to your No. 570.

Intention of Commander-in-Chief expressed in telegram No. 949 was that Goeben should not be engaged except as necessary steps to prevent her leaving Golden Horn to sea.

Presume you have taken necessary action to above mentioned telegram. Admiral has instructions to withdraw outside limits of territorial waters, but you have, of course, authority to withdraw ships of Fleet as you may consider necessary to avoid incidents.

Same limitation applies to Italian and other British naval vessels.

Request you will keep us fully informed as to conduct of Goeben's crew, and if you consider that at Constantinople that breech locks should be removed from guns and essential parts from engines rendering offensive action or movement impossible. If this is not the case please give reasons why.

No. 507.

Admiralty to Rear-Admiral Third Light Cruiser Squadron.—(Received at Foreign Office September 21.)

(No. 436.)
Telegraphic. *September 21, 1922.*

Reference your No. 2049 of 20th September.

Reasons for transfer that Kemal's policy is returning refugees except merchant sailors is not to be evacuated now and not evacuation at conclusion of 30th September.

No. 508.

Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean to Admiralty.—(Received September 21, 1922.)

(No. 873.)
(Telegraphic.)
YOUR No. 949.

Goeben is incapable of steaming or taking offensive action. Ships in Golden Horn are in same condition.

No. 509.

Senior Officer Third Light Cruiser Squadron to Admiralty.—(Received September 21, 1922.)

(No. 509.)
(Telegraphic.)
FOR Foreign Office from SIR H. RUMBOLD.

(No. 75.)
My No. 74.

In conversation with British consul yesterday Tuesday Nouredin Pasha insisted strongly on necessity of early conclusion of armistice, declaring even were that not satisfactory solution were not arrived at in few days the Turks were decided to push the neutral zone. There are various indications 30th September has been fixed on as the latest. Cavalry are disposed to wait. Further bodies of troops were seen marching north this morning. Wednesday.

No. 510.

Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean to Admiralty.—(Received September 21, 1922.)

No. 877.
(Telegraphic.)
AFTER assessing situation at G.H.Q. this morning Thursday the Generals are fairly optimistic that evacuation will be carried out to date and plans of conference are to be carried out without delay.

No. 511.

Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean to Admiralty.—Received September 21, 1922.

(No. 876.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople.*

FOLLOWING received from Rear-Admiral Commanding Third Light Cruiser Squadron is passed to Admiralty for information.

"Mustapha Kemal still here. Has been in close consultation with Pelle until after midnight this evening. Wednesday. Several females seen, including General Nouredin three carriage loads great importance is attached to the date 30th September. Any attempt at further evacuation of refugees must be carried out before date mentioned. Nouredin stated that any refugees remaining after the 30th September would be massacred. General detestation of Turks during evacuation was distinctly noticeable yesterday. Trading by fishing craft were arrested near railway pier where evacuation was taking place. Cypriote group troops observed proceeding north wards to-day 8.40 p.m. 20th September."

No 312

Telegram from Chief of Imperial General Staff to General Harington (Received at Foreign Office September 21

No 9360
Secret H.Q. *September 21 1922*

Yesterday's discussion in Paris of which you will have been informed by telegram instructed that Allied forces of the Nationalists should not be fired on if they entered neutral zone pending actual state of hostilities. The road along the Gulf of Adramyti can be watched but no hostile action should be taken against the Turkish forces there.

No 313

Telephone message from Lord Hardinge (Paris) Received September 21 1922)

I am writing to Lord Curzon for Cabinet.

Meeting for tomorrow at 10.30 Foreign Secretary engagement in the morning.

Also suggest we should have early understanding as to conditions under which the Allies would be prepared to approach with doubtless at once request of the Nationalists with whom they are in the closest contact. It will be difficult to ask the French to be picked by France and Italy press for final acceptance. Neutral Powers outside Entente generally may raise several objections, such as source of power protecting a cession of Russian retirement of Greeks from Thrace. Against these pretensions my best arguments are—

1. Absolutely of necessity King's interest that Constantinople and Straits are to be kept out of hands of Russia or Bolshevik and not in those of a new Power.

2. Necessity of terms of peace making a cession of Russian retirement of Greeks from Thrace. Against these pretensions my best arguments are—

1. Absolutely of necessity King's interest that Constantinople and Straits are to be kept out of hands of Russia or Bolshevik and not in those of a new Power.

2. Necessity of terms of peace making a cession of Russian retirement of Greeks from Thrace.

I am now writing that I have asked Lord Curzon to see Venizelos and I will telegraph the result as early as possible. The question to be put to the Cabinet is: Do they propose that we should invite Venizelos to send troops to Thrace? I will do my best.

Constantinople. Here we shall agree to hand back Constantinople and Gallipoli peninsula, sovereignty to the Turks after the Turkish Peace. All the forces will then be withdrawn. Difficulty will be encountered in arranging for arbitration of Asiatic shore of Bosporus, but steps will have to be taken by the supervising League of Nations as provided for later on to secure Straits doorway of Black Sea is not closed by hostile batteries or mine-fields or other obstacles.

2. *Thrace.* Here French will press for the complete and immediate withdrawal of Thrace by the Greeks (*b*) for the re-occupation of the Maritza frontier by Turkish troops. Venizelos yesterday to go so far as on the ground that it would be a humiliating sacrifice. Suggestion made and proposed is that a neutral zone of Ismid Peninsula in respect of which Kemal's Greek forces shall be withdrawn is to be under protection of Constantinople police with the Allied fleet in the Gulf of Ismid.

Alternative is that Greek army of occupation is in a state of considerable demoralisation. Sharp read telegrams showing that Smyrna in a state of complete anarchy and that Greeks are unable either to maintain order or to withdraw. Therefore the danger.

It is very risky therefore to propose some form of Allied occupation. This would mean troops which I am sure that Italy would not provide and which France would not be disposed to furnish.

Immediate recognition of Turkish sovereignty may also be pressed for. But here again I shall argue that this is doing work of conference in advance.

When we come to question of future frontier France and Italy will press for Maritza and will be strengthened by avowed acceptance of that line by Serbia. I will ascertain to-day what are the exact views of Serbian King and Minister and, if possible, assent of Roumania on the subject. Our attitude must be determined by broad considerations of British imperial interests. If we can safeguard Gallipoli position which is cardinal point to us, I do not know that it is of vital importance to us what exact point boundary line is drawn. Much more important will be future form of government and control in Thrace.

Here it may be prudent to revive the idea which was discussed and abandoned in March of creating an autonomous State in Eastern Thrace under League of Nations while allowing symbol of Turkish sovereignty in the shape of a flag or some other innocuous emblem. Success would depend on willingness of League of Nations to accept charge and of interested Powers and States to provide requisite gendarmerie or police. Area would have to be defined to-day. A good deal will depend on the attitude of Serbia and Roumania as to which I will report later.

I shall argue on Friday that it is not for us to fix final boundaries now but merely to form Allied contingent on our own lands. My line is to stress that Turks will be better off as regards League of Nations and less wounding to their pride and as arrangement would not finally be committed to League.

Finally we come to Dardanelles. French think that sooner Italians abandon this post the better we shall like it. Here also I shall argue that Allies yesterday showed that their occupation was a mistake. Allies were not at war with Turkey. Allied occupation was under auspices of League of Nations. I propose to ask Venizelos privately whether they would consent to withdraw troops. Difficulties in case of Italy have been overcome by agreement. Federation of Straits sovereignty might be mentioned at Lausanne if flag flown.

Admiral Grasset entered yesterday that question of Kemalists in Chanak would not be difficult. I believe myself his argument which I believe will be put to Cabinet to-day. I intend myself to be held while battle. Chanak must be secure either as neutral zone or demilitarised as proposed in March. This he could readily agree to. We shall have Italians to engage the attentions of Kemalists in Chanak district while visits, friendly visits, of Italian fleet to Smyrna is being done.

I am afraid that the question of League of Nations will throw every difficulty in the way of guaranteed by Italy and France of the Belgrade Convention which will not alter terms of concession which have enabled Straits to work during last few years.

Foregoing is general sketch of points which I shall like to discuss to-morrow.

I am sorry to trouble you with all this telegraphing. But I would like to discuss it as I have will have the matter before the Cabinet. Use of Kemalists troops in any manner brings a threat to the ground. On the other hand publicly stated intention of Allies to hold very early interview will make it increasingly difficult for Kemal to move.

No 314

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston Received September 21

(No 2561)
(Telegraphic) R *Rome September 21 1922.*

ITALIAN press declares that your Lordship and everything possible to prevent Italian policy being put in Paris conversations in the last two months, assistance of M. Poincaré that was now to be asserted to group unscrupulously, being denounced here. This has created painful impression. Crisis is not over and strength of anti-British feeling which course of recent events is generating here.

(Sent to Paris.)

No 315

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Consul London (Geneva)

(No 45
(Telegraphic) R *Foreign Office September 21 1922*

FOLLOWING from Prime Minister on behalf of Cabinet to Lord Balfour

Your No 37

Lord Curzon's telegram approving resolution of Commission was sent on 19th and I now write to say with the approval of the Cabinet

We should generally welcome help of League of Nations in securing peaceful settlement, and we hope therefore that you can support resolution which is to be moved

---

No 316

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Consul London (Geneva)

(No 47)
(Telegraphic) R *Foreign Office September 21 1922*

YOUR telegrams No 37 and 39 and Lord Curzon's telegram to you of yesterday

At present circumstances evacuation of refugees to Constantinople cannot be allowed. To refuse room for them and their arrival might cause an outbreak. Greek Government are well aware of our proper line of action and we understand Greek Government will act thereon

We are supporting application of Allied admirals to Kemal for permission to Queen ships to enter Smyrna to remove refugees. If this is unsuccessful or inadequate we are making arrangements to evacuate British subjects by stopping neighbouring ships and are prepared to charter British ships provided they can carry out their task

We concur in the recommendation to raise £100,000 for Dr Nansen's disposal. Further sum to be asked in larger estimate for expenditure not exceeding £50,000 in all after that date. Powers will be asked to expend rateably with Great Britain

Addressed to Geneva No 47. Repeated to Paris No 317.

No 317

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Consul London (Geneva)

No 48
(Telegraphic) R *Foreign Office September 21 1922*

YOUR telegram No 42 of 20th September. Turkish atrocities

British, American and French Governments undertook to contribute to proposed atrocities enquiry. Italian Government has failed to reply. Greek Government agreed to admit mission. No reply has been received from Angora

Since Greek evacuation nothing we have heard of Turkish wrongdoing has approached what we have ceased to press at Red Cross delegate however stated to Sir H Rumbold 28th August that it he had not obtained Turkish sanction by 31st the Red Cross would consider this a refusal. Moreover lateness of season makes it practically impossible to carry out enquiry in Asia Minor this year

If occasion arises you should express surprise at the criticism of the Turkish request in view of their recent refusal to permit commission of enquiry and the actions of that Government of the judges of the Angora Government towards prisoners most recently exemplified at Smyrna where it is now reported that deportations is succeeding to massacre

---

No 318

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris)

(No 312 Most Secret)
(Telegraphic) *Foreign Office September 21 1922*

FOLLOWING telegram has been sent tonight to Sir C Harington by War Office —

A summary of the political situation discussed by the Cabinet Ministers in Paris is being telegraphed to Rumbold separately. This will show you the importance of avoiding anything likely unnecessarily to precipitate hostilities. A revised programme of troop movements showing the earliest possible date of arrival of the reinforcements we are expediting by every conceivable means is also being telegraphed. You should receive both these telegrams before you form opinion on what follows in this message. We think it right to set out for your guidance and subject to your better judgment the relative importance which we attach to the various positions committed to your charge. The domination of Asia Minor by the Gallipoli Peninsula and the freedom of the Straits. For this it is of the highest importance that Chanak should be held effectively. Quite apart from its military importance it has become a test of our prestige in the East. Its significance to the prestige of the Empire. We should regard it as a moral defeat if it were to be retained. A withdrawal from Canakkale is a blow at Britain's name wherever Islam and Constantinople are matters of international consequence affecting all the Allies. Compared to Chanak we think Constantinople comes second and Ismid third. Probably the Kemalists will not attack the Ismid position. If they do, the recent Bosphorus Admiral's Note declared they can still prevent the passage of the Turkish army into Europe. If they do Lord Percy has a retaliation on some adjacent area or take other reprisals. We regard the Ismid position as of little the most difficult to hold and the least fateful to lose. Thus it might well be that a Peace Conference would withdraw your troops from Ismid and even Constantinople to Chanak, and thus secure the position there on adequate front and in good time. We have every confidence in your judgment as to what constitutes a secure position at Chanak as necessary alterations should be made. You will consider a request of the above and will be good enough to say that there is a good chance of holding Chanak for two or three weeks whatever happens we shall cordially approve such request. We are referring questions to Paris advisers. Next phase of situation develops. In this case we are ready to refer through the High Commissioners any matter relative to Kemal that may be necessary for the purpose of securing Chanak. For instance you may want to negotiate point affecting the neutral zone in this region and should be glad to do so. It will be Greek troops if forces are needed along the Straits to approach the position held by your troops. We leave to your discretion as to any warning to Kemal. All the above should be taken by you as a guide rather than as a rule for we have the utmost confidence in your comprehension of the whole situation.

Show copy of this to Naval Commander-in-Chief

No 319

Sir R Lyell to Lord Hardinge (Paris)

No 315)
(Telegraphic *Foreign Office September 21 1922*

FOLLOWING from Sir M Hankey for Lord Curzon

My letter to the Cabinet

Admiralty have informed Naval Commander-in-Chief that instructions will be issued to Admiral Dumesnil to keep French ships of war in Straits pending decision as to their withdrawal. This is the only measure to prevent the becoming a naval menace which already applies to other French warships

---

No 320

Sir R Lyell to Lord Hardinge (Paris)

(No 314)
(Telegraphic *Foreign Office September 21 1922*

FOLLOWING for Lord Curzon

Your telegram of 20th September

Cabinet have considered your telegram of today and give you full latitude to deal with the questions of the future of Thrace and Constantinople on the lines indicated in your telegram under reply subject to the following reservation respecting the Straits

We think that the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles is an integral part of the system of maintaining the freedom of the Straits, and that the same regime as is arranged for Gallipoli should also apply to the Ismid zone upon the Asiatic shore. We do not consider that mere demilitarisation tempered by visits is sufficient.

We should not object to the presence of Russia at a conference if the Kemalists desire it.

No. 321

Note from Lord Hardinge (Paris)

(No. 315)

(Telegraphic) *Foreign Office, September 21, 1922*

LORD HARDINGE for Lord Curzon.

"The following Press Message is an important statement on present crisis to Parliamentary Committee of Labour Congress. Statement was attributed to Prime Minister's instructions. Its chief assistance is essential that freedom of Straits must be secured not by mere promise of Turks but by some reliable international guarantee. It is important to bear strongly in mind principles of Straits in various Treaties of Nations. See declaration of Paris on this point. Stat[illegible] not to be published. We shall be glad to receive by to-night the letter of January No. 44.

No. 322

Note from the Secretary of State for Home Affairs to the Prime Minister (Paris) (No. 11) Telegraphic (Foreign Office No. 214 Telegraphic.

Most Secret. *Foreign Office, September 21, 1922.*

LORD CURZON suggests that Soviet Government intends to hold a Congress at Moscow of Asiatic peoples to counteract any alliance with Angora Government and the Nationalists.

Government may look out for such a movement in favour of independence.

E 9735/27/44 No. 37

British Secretary's Notes of Interview between the French President of the Council and the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at 10 Downing Street, September 20, 1922. (Received at Foreign Office, September 22, 1922.)

Present.

For France:

M. Poincaré.
M. Fouchet.

For Great Britain:

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.
Lord Hardinge.

Secretaries:

M. Massigli.
Mr. Forbes Adam.

M. POINCARÉ suggested Lord Curzon to open the conversation.

LORD CURZON said that he would begin by explaining the whole situation briefly and His Majesty's Government's justification for their attitude. He need not refer to past history except to remind M. Poincaré that all attempts to bring Mustapha Kemal to a conference after the Allied meeting in Paris last March had failed. After a long exchange of notes between the French and British Governments Venice had been agreed upon as the place for a conference. Mustapha Kemal had then however decided to attack and the Greek defence of Asia Minor had

collapsed. It became obvious, from that moment, that the territorial question in Asia Minor had been liquidated although the problem of the protection which the French and British Governments were equally pledged to provide for the racial and religious minorities there remained. On the other hand, the European question, i.e. the Straits and Constantinople, was left to be decided. Nothing however, had occurred to modify here the broad principles of agreement reached in March last and in so far as modification would be required it ought to be arrived at in friendly consultation between the Powers either by themselves, or preferably in a full peace conference. His Majesty's Government were unable to accept the view that a decision on these questions could be taken out of their hands by Mustapha Kemal. It was not for him to settle such questions as those of the Straits or even to prejudge them in any way by a military occupation. Nor could he be allowed to rush the position at Constantinople and thus set the whole of the Balkans aflame. These questions must be settled by conference and not by force, by negotiation and not by invasion. They were emphatically matters for the Allies, and there would be nothing more disastrous than a failure to settle them by agreement and co-operation between the Powers. The question would arise later how far other Powers were involved in the question of the Straits; for the moment, it was a matter primarily for the Great Powers alone. Meanwhile action had been taken in two directions, at Constantinople by the three High Commissioners and generals and in Europe by the Allied Governments. It was satisfactory to know that when danger threatened at Constantinople General Sir Charles Harington had elected to cooperate with his French and Italian colleagues who had agreed with him as to the dispositions necessary to represent the Allied flags on the Ismid peninsula on the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles. He had already reported the actual steps taken to place detachments of the Powers in both places. Meanwhile His Majesty's Government had pressed the French Government what was their part of view regarding the defence of the neutral zones around Constantinople, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, and Lord Curzon had received with much satisfaction M. Poincaré's note of the 21st September stating that the French Government thought it most desirable in agreement with His Majesty's Government to maintain the neutrality of the zones occupied by the Allies, without however prejudging the future position of the Straits. A similar concert with the British and Italian Governments to confront the Angora Government that the Allied Governments expected that these zones would be respected by the Turkish troops.

Sir Horace Rumbold had immediately been instructed to make a communication to the Angora Government in conjunction with his Allied colleagues. There was some doubt as to whether these instructions had been acted upon or not, but Lord Curzon had received a telegram that day reporting that the communication to the representatives of the Angora Government at Constantinople had been actually made by the High Commissioners yesterday.

His Majesty's Government naturally drew the only possible conclusion from the terms of M. Poincaré's above mentioned note that the Allied forces were prepared to defend both zones and that now if necessary Kemal would be warned thereof. His Majesty's Government had thought and hoped that the declaration of the Allies would be itself sufficient to deter Kemal from any attempt to violate either zone. At the same time they had continued to receive from their representatives at Constantinople and in the Straits zone warning information as to the intentions of Kemal. His forces were reported to be advancing northwards from Smyrna, and already actually to have reached the borders of the neutral zone. His Majesty's Government had heard further that Kemal had announced his intention of setting the question of Thrace by crossing to Europe and leading in a force of Arabs. They also heard that he was threatening the Ismid position. Meanwhile advice was said to be reaching Kemal from many quarters to settle the whole question at once, without a conference behind the backs of the Great Powers. With this object he was counselled to provoke a rising at Constantinople and to encourage the military bands who were already said to be active in Eastern and Western Thrace. In consequence of these reports and in pursuance of a policy which they firmly believed to be that of the Allies as a whole His Majesty's Government had resolved to reinforce the Allied position at Chanak as more tenable. At Chanak up to the time of that decision there had only been the British battalion, the garrison at Gallipoli comprising a French Senegalese battalion with the establishment of the three flags at Chanak and relying on their presence there, His Majesty's Government had proceeded to order all available reinforcements to that place. There was already a considerable British force there (one squadron of cavalry, two

battalions of infantry and a battalion of field artillery. Further, His Majesty's Government had decided to send as large a naval reinforcement as could be obtained from the neighbouring waters [illegible] Kemal to take the [illegible] the Allies or to cross the Straits at any point. [illegible] Great Britain were ready to support this decision [illegible] to Paris [illegible] purpose would explain to M. Poincaré the [illegible] steps which had been taken by the British [illegible] His Majesty's Government [illegible] confidently believing that Kemal would [illegible] cross the Straits.

[illegible]

[illegible]

M. POINCARÉ began by thanking Lord Curzon for his full and lucid statement. He was [illegible] the March [illegible] were [illegible] existing. [illegible] would soon come [illegible]. In his [illegible] optimistic. In his talks with [illegible] practically [illegible] had been [illegible] and the Turks had [illegible] temptation [illegible] that the Greek [illegible] deserters [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

re Allies stock to the Mint proposals there was no hope at a consultative step in the latter Lordship M Pichon did not believe that they would keep the March pledges were signed Thirteen Great Powers

With regard to the action of the Allied armies at Constantinople in re-establishing the Russian Charge d'Affaires M Pichon expressed that the Government with the Government as to the Grand Duke's status in regard to Russia It was to send to the Argos Government the Allied Ambassadors to respect the neutrality of the two States in Constantinople The French Government however had not agreed to send troops to the Caucasus to protect these zones They had agreed to send troops to the Asiatic shores at the Bosphorus and Dardanelles It was not a question of spot-to-spot spirit but of preventing the Allies from getting the right to send dangerous armaments to the Russian Whites It was in reference to that there were Turkish regiments in the neighbourhood which might be used against the Bolsheviks

M Pichon said that the Allies had to consider the question of how to withdraw their troops from the streets of Moscow It was not desirable that the troops should be withdrawn from the Black Sea

M Pichon referred to the Grand Duke Nicholas and said that he had written to the French Government Most French officers had crossed the Straits to join the Russian Army and it was not desirable that they should be left to the mercy of the Bolsheviks

In these circumstances M Pichon asked whether it was not possible to answer the question what Allied troops were to be withdrawn from Russia It was impossible to say what the Allies would do in the future

Mr Lansing said that the United States Government had no intention of withdrawing its troops from Siberia at present

In these circumstances M Pichon asked whether it was not possible to answer the question what Allied troops were to be withdrawn from Russia It was impossible to say what the Allies would do in the future

Mr Lansing said that the United States Government had no intention of withdrawing its troops from Siberia at present

M Pichon said that the Allied Governments had agreed to send troops to the Caucasus to protect these zones They had agreed to send troops to the Asiatic shores at the Bosphorus and Dardanelles It was not a question of spot-to-spot spirit but of preventing the Allies from getting the right to send dangerous armaments to the Russian Whites It was in reference to that there were Turkish regiments in the neighbourhood which might be used against the Bolsheviks

M Pichon said that the Allies had to consider the question of how to withdraw their troops from the streets of Moscow It was not desirable that the troops should be withdrawn from the Black Sea

M Pichon referred to the Grand Duke Nicholas and said that he had written to the French Government Most French officers had crossed the Straits to join the Russian Army and it was not desirable that they should be left to the mercy of the Bolsheviks

In these circumstances M Pichon asked whether it was not possible to answer the question what Allied troops were to be withdrawn from Russia It was impossible to say what the Allies would do in the future

Mr Lansing said that the United States Government had no intention of withdrawing its troops from Siberia at present

M Pichon said that the Allied Governments had agreed to send troops to the Caucasus to protect these zones They had agreed to send troops to the Asiatic shores at the Bosphorus and Dardanelles It was not a question of spot-to-spot spirit but of preventing the Allies from getting the right to send dangerous armaments to the Russian Whites It was in reference to that there were Turkish regiments in the neighbourhood which might be used against the Bolsheviks

M Pichon said that the Allies had to consider the question of how to withdraw their troops from the streets of Moscow It was not desirable that the troops should be withdrawn from the Black Sea

M Pichon referred to the Grand Duke Nicholas and said that he had written to the French Government Most French officers had crossed the Straits to join the Russian Army and it was not desirable that they should be left to the mercy of the Bolsheviks

In these circumstances M Pichon asked whether it was not possible to answer the question what Allied troops were to be withdrawn from Russia It was impossible to say what the Allies would do in the future

Mr Lansing said that the United States Government had no intention of withdrawing its troops from Siberia at present

LORD CURZON said that he would like to answer at once the question of M Pichon He would agree with the views expressed by Mr Lansing just now as to the withdrawal of the troops from the Black Sea Dardanelles and Bosphorus We had had no intention of suggesting to the Allied Governments that a withdrawal at present should be agreed to The French suggestion of withdrawing all troops from Constantinople by the Allies Governments had not been agreed to by the Allied Governments

Lord Curzon said that he would like to answer at once the question of M Pichon He would agree with the views expressed by Mr Lansing just now as to the withdrawal of the troops from the Black Sea Dardanelles and Bosphorus We had had no intention of suggesting to the Allied Governments that a withdrawal at present should be agreed to The French suggestion of withdrawing all troops from Constantinople by the Allied Governments had not been agreed to by the Allied Governments

Lord Curzon said that he would like to answer at once the question of M Pichon He would agree with the views expressed by Mr Lansing just now as to the withdrawal of the troops from the Black Sea Dardanelles and Bosphorus We had had no intention of suggesting to the Allied Governments that a withdrawal at present should be agreed to The French suggestion of withdrawing all troops from Constantinople by the Allied Governments had not been agreed to by the Allied Governments

the Greeks in Eastern Thrace were trying to fire upon them the French would be compelled to withdraw the right to do so inconsistent with the general line of policy which appeared to be agreed upon at the Spa that there should be no advance to the Greek Army of Occupation in Asia Minor and that except in the case of the Greeks being attacked they should not fire

It is expected that the Greek Army was now to be allowed to advance to Smyrna and that the Greek Fleet had left the shores of the Marmora and the Straits except for the Greek Fleet in Constantinople Every serious matter or Great Britain would discuss

M Pichon referred to the suggestion that Germans should be employed in Russia but not across the Straits of Gibraltar As a matter of fact the attitude of Germany could not be known to the rest of Europe Great Britain knew that Germans were employed in Russia but it was not known to what extent It was stated that the Germans were employed in Russia but it was not known to what extent

Lord Curzon said that Germans were employed in Russia but it was not known to what extent It was stated that the Germans were employed in Russia but it was not known to what extent

M Pichon referred to the suggestion that Germans should be employed in Russia but not across the Straits of Gibraltar As a matter of fact the attitude of Germany could not be known to the rest of Europe Great Britain knew that Germans were employed in Russia but it was not known to what extent It was stated that the Germans were employed in Russia but it was not known to what extent

Lord Curzon said that he would like to answer at once the question of M Pichon He would agree with the views expressed by Mr Lansing just now as to the withdrawal of the troops from the Black Sea Dardanelles and Bosphorus We had had no intention of suggesting to the Allied Governments that a withdrawal at present should be agreed to The French suggestion of withdrawing all troops from Constantinople by the Allied Governments had not been agreed to by the Allied Governments

Lord Curzon said that he would like to answer at once the question of M Pichon He would agree with the views expressed by Mr Lansing just now as to the withdrawal of the troops from the Black Sea Dardanelles and Bosphorus We had had no intention of suggesting to the Allied Governments that a withdrawal at present should be agreed to The French suggestion of withdrawing all troops from Constantinople by the Allied Governments had not been agreed to by the Allied Governments

were to be left to stand alone while Turkey was given every assurance by the French Government that all her demands would be conceded. He could not sufficiently emphasise that the British action in this matter was not based on bluster and bravado. He hoped M. Poincaré would be convinced of this by the statement which Lord Beatty was to make that afternoon.

M. POINCARÉ asked to be allowed to make a further explanation regarding the present difficulty in the matter of the note as to the neutral zones. He recalled that he had refused to send any ultimatum to Angora during the March discussions and Lord Curzon and Signor Scialoja had yielded to this point of view. Nevertheless M. Poincaré had regarded the note which the Allied Foreign Ministers had then sent to Constantinople to Angora and Athens as serious, just as the present note about the neutrality of the Straits was serious. France could not however engage herself to use any forcible action in Asia Minor. In March last it had never been contemplated that Allied troops were to be established on the southern shores of the Straits. As regards Chatalja the French had had a battalion there already when the Greeks threatened the Allies and all they had done was to reinforce it but they had never had any troops south of the Straits. Again, it was a physical possibility to stop the Greek advance, but it was not possible now to stop the Turkish advance and if they really wanted to prevent the Turks from reaching the Straits the Allies must not seem to assume a threatening attitude but do all they can to bring Kemal to a conference. For the rest he M. Poincaré had no wish to give up everything to the Kemalists. There were many points for example minorities the Allied garrison at Gallipoli and the military provisions of the future treaty which would have to be debated at length with the Turks. As regards the Straits that problem would have to be definitely settled one way or another. Possibly the League of Nations would be found the best solution but as regards the territorial provisions of the Armistice the Allies must be prepared to meet the Turks in advance in the measure of even supposing as Lord Curzon seemed to think that the Allies would be found capable of preventing the Turks reaching Europe, the Turks would supply forces against Syria and Mesopotamia. Then Bulgaria would attack Jugoslavia and Russia, Poland and Roumania. In these circumstances it seemed to him an act of blindness to invite the Turks to a conference on the basis of the Mudros proposals. This does not mean that he wished to take the Turkish word as a sufficient guarantee for Gallipoli. Here of course serious safeguards would have to be devised even if the Allies were to accept nominal Turkish sovereignty. As for Thrace the Jugoslav Minister for Foreign Affairs had told him that he would accept a demilitarised Turco Bulgarian frontier and had so stated publicly at the press in Paris. He could only repeat again that it was useless to tell the Turks to come to a conference and simply to rely on Allied justice while in the meantime, taking their counter measures. They must be prepared a settlement on certain points in advance even if others were left for examination and discussion at a future conference. This was the only way to persuade them to come to a conference.

LORD CURZON proposed to discuss the question of the conference later and desired first to return to a point about the seriousness of the document intimating to Kemal the Allied intention to defend the neutral zone. The question of its seriousness could be measured by the fact that it was immediately followed by the French and Italian withdrawal of troops from the two vital places in the zones. M. Poincaré was quite right in saying that the Allied occupation had been confined under the Mudros proposals to Gallipoli and the northern shore of the Sea of Marmora as far as Rodosto. But these were provisions for the final peace settlement and meanwhile under the armistice neutral zones had been fixed by Allied action for the safety of the Straits and Constantinople. Were these safeguards now to be overthrown by one sided French action? Again, how were the Allies to make Turkey accept in the final settlement demilitarised zones south of the Asiatic shores of the Straits if Kemal was to be allowed to advance to occupy the neutral zones which were only part of the larger demilitarised areas contemplated in the final settlement? Lord Curzon trusted that M. Poincaré would again consider the gravity of the French action in withdrawing from Chanak in the light of these observations.

Turning to the question of the conference Lord Curzon agreed that there were several points such as minorities and the military provisions of the treaty, which would have to be discussed in the future conference. But he did not see why all

No. 523 A.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 21.)

(No. 130.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, September 20, 1922.*

Mr. JACKSON, part owner of Colonne Dodge, who sailed at Tuapse coming from Persian ports, arrived here reports that on 8th September it was proposed to save Caucasus with money to meet the grounds that existing revaluation of roubles was based on error. Mr. Carr and Lyon, Soviet authorities were stopped at Batoum. Mr. Solley, of Shell Company, and Mr. Lawrence have been in Tiflis about five weeks but receiving further money from Dodge, who is still under arrest. Edwards and Odell still in prison. Mr. Jackson considers these were all arrested on grounds of being connected, suspected to be connected with espionage, and that there is strong wave of hatred of England throughout Caucasus.

I propose you will continue to press Moscow for their release, as representations through Italian Government ineffective. Zolotareff is returned here and when I see him I will bring above facts to his notice.

the territorial questions, such as Thrace, the Straits, Constantinople and Gallipoli were to be settled in advance of such a conference. It was quite true that we might have to modify the March frontier of Thrace, and he did not even wish to exclude the possibility of a nominal Turkish sovereignty being allowed in Gallipoli—but these were all points for the future conference.

As regards M. Poincare's fears in the direction of Syria and Irak, His Majesty's Government for their part, were prepared to run the risk. They trusted, however, that the French would have no trouble in Syria, and, indeed, they felt confident that, as a result of the Franklin Bouillon Agreement of October 1921, France had a real insurance against such trouble. In any case, a firm display of Allied unity seemed the best way to make the Turks pause if they were really contemplating an attack on Syria and Irak.

M. POINCARE asked to be allowed to add a few words regarding the Allied occupation of the neutral zone. He wished to point out that it was the French Government alone who could settle vital movements of French troops, and it was their view that these troops should not be exposed on the southern shores of the two Straits. Even if British naval action could prevent the Turks crossing the Straits, the force at Chanak was hopelessly exposed. He would emphasise once again that, unprovoked, the conference was told, and that the Turks must be persuaded to come to it. If France were to join with Great Britain in shutting the Straits without agreeing to give the Turks some kind of substantial assistance in the future conference, she would simply be courting disaster in Syria, trouble in her colonies, and a big Moslem upheaval in Asia.

No. 524.

Mr. Findlay to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 22.)

(No. 465.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, September 21, 1922.*

ITALIAN Minister has received disturbing reports from Italian agents in Thrace as regards possibility of general conflagration there.

To some extent Turkish show of strength may be bluff, but Italians have no sources of information whatever as to conditions there. Consular agents being sent to Adrianople and Rodosto.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 525.

Mr. Findlay to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 22.)

(No. 467.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, September 21, 1922.*

I HAVE received a telegram from various organisations at Adrianople expressing serious fears at Smyrna atrocities, saving all Christian Powers to save remainder of Christian population and to avert danger to Thrace as Greeks of Thrace will prefer to burn everything and perish rather than witness invasion of Thrace by Turks. They will take up arms to defend their liberty.

Repeated to Constantinople, No. 272.)

No. 526.

Sir H. Dering to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 22.)

(No. 120.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, September 21, 1922.*

FROM interview with Chief of the General Staff I gather he thinks decision of Roumanian Government to refrain from sending troops outside the country is justified by military position of Roumania.

General Staff although wholly on the side of England with regard to defence of Constantinople are tied to France by want of which they are promised badly-needed additional munitions of war not forthcoming from England

General group omitted Staff Chief of the General Staff left for Paris suddenly yesterday Visit is probably connected with examinations of war

Details by wire today

Repeated to Paris

No 527

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 22)

(No 441 Confidential)
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople September 21 1922*

SERBIAN Minister informed me this morning that he had received a telegram of friendly greeting from his Government

The orientation of policy of Serbian Government in the Near East question was not revealed

If and when Kemalist envoy to Constantinople became imminent Serbian Government would request their Ministers views on their policy

---

No 528

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 22)

No 442 Confidential
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople September 21 1922*

MY immediately preceding telegram

Serbian Minister's government's attitude on situation he had found Italian Government Nationalist agents there

Nationalist agent asked was Serbian Government assisted upon taking part in Near East Conference Serbian Minister replied that Serbia was vitally interested in regard to measures to affect situation in the Balkans He said that Serbia would accept a common boundary between Turkey Bulgaria Serbian Government would view with apprehension passage of French ships from Asia to Europe

Serbian Minister asked what were the intentions of the Nationalists Nationalist agent replied that Turks were out for the whole of the National Pact which included provinces of Western Thrace Serbian Minister suggesting that Angora Government might be willing to concede the whole of National Pact Nationalist agent said that Nationalists were the more willing that the Allies were hostile to them and Turks were on more war which Allies could have if they wished Asked ground on this Nationalists would transport troops from Asia to Europe when Allies had command of seas Nationalist agent said that they would transport their troops to Black Sea

---

No 529

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 22)

(No 443 Confidential)
Telegraphic *Constantinople September 21 1922*

MY immediately preceding telegram

Serbian Minister said that he had instructions from his Government to report fully on situation and asked me to describe it I did so He expressed appreciation of my efforts to make it His Majesty's Government and said that French and Italian policy was calculated directly to encourage Kemalists to come to

Constantinople He expressed personal opinion that Serbo-Croat Slovene Government would have no difficulty in sending one or two Serbian divisions to the Dardanelles in a few days provided transports were available at Smyrna

I have noticed that French and Italians have been increasing the most the size of Mustapha Kemal's army and its armament they quote effectives between 150 000 and 300 000 men I understand that this is a gross exaggeration

French here also profess not to be convinced that Mustapha Kemal cannot be group omitted his group omitted across to Europe

---

No 530

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston Received September 22

(No 444 Secret)
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople September 21, 1922*

GREEK High Commissioner states that he has secret information that Kemal privately asked Serbian Corps Commander to let Nationalists have ships to transport his troops to Europe He also asked Minister of Marine to let him know whether Turkish warships in Golden Horn were fit for service or not whether they were manned This latter enquiry was considered in Council of Ministers as result of which Grand Vizier replied that for many reasons it would be impossible to send ships to Golden Horn

---

No 531

Sir H Rumbold No 23 to Lord Hardinge (R[eceived] to Foreign Office Received September 22)

(No 445)
(Telegraphic) D *Constantinople, September 21 1922*

FOLLOWING for Lord Curzon

Greek High Commissioner who returned from Smyrna this morning was given most full account of his interview with Kemal High Commissioner stated that Kemal received telegram of welcome from Smyrna and that he was unaware of withdrawal of the French detachments from Asiatic shore of the Straits High Commissioner then went on to describe in detail his dealings with the Nationalists generally Kemal began by urging that Christian zones should be established which should be guaranteed by the three most powerful countries in Europe Kemal replied that his troops were already in motion and that he intended to enter Constantinople as soon as possible Whilst High Commissioner criticised Kemal's statement regarding rapidity of Smyrna victories he pointed out that it was admitted that he was master of situation in Asia Minor Kemal said that he must have Eastern Thrace down to the Maritza line He made no mention of Western Thrace He said the idea was to transport a large army to Thrace but that he must send a certain number of troops there to maintain order He said that as he was convinced that England would not agree to modification to any considerable extent of her policy in Thrace he must settle matter by military means He was now in receipt of reports of the part of his army that was to reconquish the west He must either go or send his men at once to finish the business before the winter sets in

French High Commissioner had pointed out that Mustapha Kemal must surely be glad to start to destroy Constantinople but this argument did not seem to weigh much with the Turks

Mustapha Kemal said that he would like to avoid conference but it would not arrest movements of his troops He suggested conference might be at Smyrna

French High Commissioner derived impression that Nationalists only care about territorial question at the present moment Mustapha Kemal and his staff were suffering badly from swelled head Mustapha Kemal and Commander-in-

Ministers to meet at Smyrna. This meeting will probably take place to-morrow. The French High Commissioner thinks it will decide line of policy to be followed.

Mustapha Kemal's sincere fear of being assassinated.

French High Commissioner reported Mustapha Kemal not to negotiate meeting or conference committing any rash act. He also warned him of tenacity of foreign powers once she was engaged in a struggle.

I told French High Commissioner that we were pressing for an immediate interview.

No. 532

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 22, 4 p.m.*)

(No. 446.)

Telegraphic. D. *Constantinople, September 22, 1922.*

MY immediate preceding telegram.

French High Commissioner likewise stated that it might still be possible to induce Mustapha Kemal Pasha from any adventurous action if he were assured that Eastern Thrace up to Maritza would be handed over to Greece. French High Commissioner felt sure that even if Mustapha Kemal Pasha consented to send delegates to proposed conference, he would first make his own interpretation of neutral zone and order advance to the Straits. This conference would take place under the shot of Turkish movements.

French High Commissioner saw comparatively few refugees at Smyrna, and good many had been allowed to remain outskirts of town. Destruction of Smyrna made a considerable impression on Mustapha Kemal Pasha and staff, latter Turks who seemed to understand implications of war. Mustapha Kemal Pasha's own endeavours to restrain excesses by soldiery have been slow to develop unfortunately. French High Commissioner discounted reports that massacres were in any respects on scale of destruction of Smyrna. Deliberate attempt to burn Greek quarter.

No. 533

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty. (*Received September 22, 1922.*)

(No. 381.)

Telegraphic. *Constantinople, September 21, 1922.*

WITH reference to telegram from Troops Gordon No. 9137 also telegram from Commander-in-chief No. 9105 two battleships, two battle cruisers, one light cruiser, and destroyers are now at Constantinople. Vessels of Admiralty control, including ships that have left for Mediterranean, have been ordered to remain at short notice for service in Dardanelles. Request that no ships may be withdrawn from Constantinople without reference to me. Consider that it is desirable to have Navy in command of narrow waters surrounded by guns with which Kemalists are well supplied and also controlled by counter battery fire. Have also considered position of ships in Bosporus owing to restricted water and strength of current at Ichkeli craft are moored in two lines. I have taken steps to clear Bosphorus of craft, but this would seriously interfere with food supply of Constantinople. I should not, in accordance with policy to take no provocative action (*vide* last part of telegram from Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to High Commissioner No. 4041), give order to take this step. It would take some time to do this, as there are thousands of craft.

No. 534

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean. (*Received at Foreign Office September 22.*)

By Cable.

(No. 962.)

(Telegraphic.) *September 22, 1922.*

YOUR No. 381.

As stated in our No. 2430 where power of carrying out transport Kemal cannot cross Gallipoli Peninsula, which case could use passage not entirely removed. Navy has at

its power to remove by destruction or otherwise all floating craft in Bosphorus. In telegrams Nos. 897, 915, 924 you have been given definite instructions that the navy is responsible for preventing the passage of Kemalists' forces from Asia to Europe, and authorised to take all steps necessary to fulfil this obligation which includes removal or destruction of craft which they might use for this purpose. It has never been contemplated that His Majesty's ships should remain in narrow waters after Asiatic shore has passed into Kemal's hands. It is recognised that small force of light cruisers, submarines and destroyers would have to be maintained in Black Sea to prevent advent of other means of transport.

(End of part I.)

No. 535

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean. (*Received at Foreign Office September 22.*)

(No. 964.)

(Telegraphic.) *September 22, 1922.*

WITH reference telegram from Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to High Commissioner to take no provocative action. This does not affect in any way responsibility of navy and I have complete powers vested in me by telegrams Nos. 897, 915 and 924 to deal with transport at Constantinople, so as to prevent it being used by Kemalists to pass into Asia Minor. You will H.M. Commissioner and General Officer Commanding consider the despatch of the vessel to Smyrna as soon as transport arrives there. Take necessary steps.

No. 536

Senior Officer, Third Light Cruiser Squadron, to Admiralty. (*Received September 22, 1922.*)

(No. 511.)

(Telegraphic.)

YOUR No. 436.

Yes, this is confirmed.

No. 537

Lord Hardinge to Sir H. Tyrrell.—(*Received September 22.*)

Beijing.

(No. 471.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, September 21, 1922.*

FOLLOWING for Cabinet from Lord Curzon.

This morning I saw King of Jugoslavia for an hour and explained to him whole situation, pointing out great compliment paid to his country in invitation to conference and urging special interest both in maintenance of Allied military position at Constantinople, settlement of Eastern question and in future military occupation of Dardanelles. I invited from His Majesty assurances in all these respects. These he said he could not give myself though he expressed warmest sympathy, but he then took me to see M. Pasitch who had arrived last night and was in the same hotel. There ensued another hour's conversation between the King, M. Pasitch, M. Nintchitch and myself. M. Pasitch, who was tired from his journey and I detected suspicious, exhibited an obstinate stupidity that was positively amazing and evidently provoked the deepest distrust in his colleagues. He said that Jugoslavia had no interest in these matters except to see that Thrace did not become Bulgarian and that her own frontiers were not infringed; that she would in no circumstances send a contribution to future garrison of Gallipoli which Serbian Parliament would never endorse; that she would send no military forces anywhere until her frontiers were actually attacked; and that she did not even want to be invited to the conference. I said that it seemed to me incredible that upon her first invitation to join the European concert Jugoslavia should make such a response, and

that a thought was shown it would produce the worst possible impression. The Roumanian however remained stolid and unmoved. Realising the impossibility of pursuing the matter in these circumstances, I then asked leave to suspend the conversation and said that if His Majesty, after renewed conference with his Ministers, desired to communicate with any further communication I should be delighted to receive it. M. Nintchitch, who accompanied me to the door asked me not to pay too much attention to his colleague who was liable to these aberrations.

A little later a Roumanian Minister called upon me and took an entirely different line. He was intensely grateful to myself and to the conference and desired to complete identity at all points between British and Roumanian interests in the Near East. I asked him accordingly to explain how it was that after interview with French Minister at Bucharest Roumanian Foreign Minister was apparently attempting to receive from Angora offer of immediate contingent for Constantinople. Were they afraid of the Bolsheviks or had they yielded to French pressure? He responded with the usual arguments as to Bolshevik danger, want of arms, shipping, &c., which I remarked I knew well we were prepared to meet, but we added that the real condition of Roumanian military assistance was that it should be made to an Allied position. Upon this point I gave him the most emphatic assurances that I thought I could honestly give as to the Asiatic shores of the Straits. It was clear we were their best friends at this moment and that they would go on the European beach as they knew that we were prepared to shoulder the Turkish bone little as we might welcome the task. Accordingly there need be no fear that a Roumanian contingent would be a contribution to the Allied force and I proceeded to urge, as I have frequently urged, that while the gesture was still available it would be well that Roumania should demonstrate their sense of the present peril to them by sending a contingent of whatever size to Constantinople without delay in order to show their flag beside the Allies. If the situation developed hopefully as previously spoken of it might follow. But if the worst came to the worst, Roumania promised at once to communicate with Bucharest in this sense.

He left and I was surprised when back came M. Nintchitch accompanied by a Secretary of Minister for Foreign Affairs. The latter explained that his excellent chief had retired to rest personally but he was always at my disposal. He assured me that he was always imagining Minister for Foreign Affairs was short by and did not exist, and that a further conversation had only the effect of making him feel that they ought to be grateful for the honour conferred upon them of the proposal to send a contingent of at least 100 to 200 men if called upon to join an Allied force after evacuation of Dardanelles. I replied that this was all to the good I was glad to hear the view of the future. Why not show the Jugoslav Government that Roumania was ahead of them? The Secretary of Foreign Affairs then proceeded to develop the various views which he expounded at the Council of Ministers, the object of these views which he expounded at the Council of Ministers, the slightest observation during that interview did not go in this direction. It would be a great mistake. The conversation with Mr. Nintchitch, after I had given the Secretary of State's suggestion to their attention, terminated with their very sensible resolve to hear the rest tomorrow.

As I left the Council met. I have every hope that under the influence of the Allied Ministers who have interested themselves in the matter Roumania will not be found wanting in the hour of need. Both Ministers are quite prepared to receive the reply to French pressure which is now being exercised at Angora. But they are afraid of renewed fighting and are anxious to hear the chestnuts pulled out of the fire by the Allies themselves. But with the letter of the compliment paid them and are anxious to testify that they are not traitors to the cause. It is worth while, therefore, to persevere in the course we have set ourselves of getting the right sort of aid.

No. 538

Sir A. Clark to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 22*)

(No. 95.)
Telegraphic. *Prague, September 22, 1922.*

I SAW Prime Minister this morning and found him entirely convinced of importance of keeping Turks out of Europe. He considers that if they return to Thrace whole Balkan equilibrium will be upset and we shall be back to where we were in 1914. M. Benes is disappointed in the present attitude of Jugoslavia and

Roumania who apparently are not averse from the return of Turks to Thrace as being calculated to be an effective check upon any Bulgarian movement. Prime Minister thinks this view very short sighted, for not only is it more likely that Turkey and Bulgaria will work together but behind Turkey stands the Soviet. Roumania should bear Bessarabia in mind. But Prime Minister says that final attitude of his two allies depends entirely on lead as reached between your Lordship and French Prime Minister. Roumania and Jugoslavia will follow any agreement between England and France.

No. 539

Sir I. Geddes to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. *Received September 22.*

(No. 366.)
Telegraphic. R. *Belgrade, September 21, 1922.*

NEAR East situation.

Majesty's Eastern press favour what I understand to be French method of meeting Nationalist action as against Lausanne Treaty, to patch settlement as regards unilaterality which is interpreted as sabre-rattling by Britain. At the same time there is strong current of sympathy with British anxiety to exclude Turks from Europe and sentiment in churches in favour of protection for Christians appears to be growing.

President has promised to press for similar instructions will United States be directed by cable? Mail cross drawing this many leaving papers are beginning to be certificated.

Paris messages are universally propagandist in tone, recording hurrying of supplies to Greeks and that as a result alleged French diplomatic victory Turks returning signed [illegible] concessions in Eastern Thrace. French Embassy are issuing inspired statements in Servian press. French Chargé d'Affaires, Comte de Chambrun, came here from Constantinople.

It would be best if Allied Governments could express sympathy and justifying our policy. There is some case for the State Department are invited to [illegible] propaganda. I leave that to you.

No. 540

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to M. Lindley (Athens).

(No. 244.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September 22, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 401 of 20th September. Refugees.

His Majesty's Government have decided to recommend to the League Assembly to place 1,000,000*l.* at Dr. Nansen's disposal and have agreed to join in larger scheme expected to yield 5,000,000*l.* on condition that other Powers also pay equally.

(Addressed to Athens No. 244, repeated for information to Constantinople No. 419.)

No. 541

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 417.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September 22, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 431 of 19th September. Relief of Greek refugees.

Please discuss with your associated colleagues.

We consider generally that relief of Greeks, whether remaining in Turkey or transported to Greece should come from private organisations. But co-ordination of all efforts is essential and this must best be secured by supervision of High Commissioners.

Save the Children Fund have issued appeal. Russian Famine Fund and Friends' Relief are considering matter. British Red Cross have suggested desirability of international action to International Red Cross Committee and League of Red Cross Societies.

We are ready to charter British vessels for Smyrna directly we hear from Senior Naval Officer that Turks will allow embarkation. It is estimated that twelve to fifteen vessels could arrive in forty-eight hours.

No. 542

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)

(No. 418.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 22, 1922*

YOUR telegram, Very Secret, of 19th September, beginning 'Admiral Brock'. Answer as contained in telegram of 22nd September from Admiralty to Admiral Brock in reply to his telegram No. 381, and embodies Cabinet decision.

No. 543

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Consul-General London (General)

(No. 52.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September 22, 1922*

YOUR telegram No. 41 of 20th September. Greek refugees.
Following for Lord Balfour.

'*September 18.* Mustapha Kemal informed the associated admirals at Smyrna that he must refer to Angora before permitting the 250,000 Greeks who are starving there to be embarked, and that in any case none could leave after 30th September. This is tantamount to condemning them to death, for obviously he would have given permission had he wished it. It is possible that criticisms in the League Assembly might induce him to change. Please take such action as you consider appropriate.'

For report received from His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople leaves no doubt that massacre of Smyrna was carried out with object of exterminating native Christian and Foreign influence.

Repeated to Constantinople No. 114 and Athens No. 241.

No. 544

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Paris (No. 318 Telegraphic (by bag)), Rome (No. 280 Telegraphic) and Washington (No. 284 Telegraphic)

R.) *Foreign Office, September 22, 1922*

MUSTAPHA KEMAL and Greek refugees.

Reply returned by Mustapha Kemal 18th September to associated admirals and consuls through Italian admiral is tantamount to condemnation of quarter million people to death by starvation. His Majesty's Government feel confident that Government to which you are accredited will instruct their naval representative at Smyrna to protest and to press again for permission for embarkation of refugees. British Senior Naval Officer at Smyrna is being instructed to do so.

Please inform Government to which you are accredited.

Sent to Paris No. 318, Rome, No. 280, and Washington No. 284, repeated to Constantinople No. 415 and Athens No. 243.)

(E 9757/27/44.) No. 545

British Secretary's Notes of Conference between the French President of the Council and the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Italian Ambassador in Paris at the Quai d'Orsay, 4 P.M., Wednesday, September 20, 1922.
(Received at Foreign Office, September 23, 1923.)

(Second Meeting.)

For France—
M. Poincare.

For Great Britain.
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.
Lord Hardinge of Penshurst.

For Italy.
Count Sforza.

Admiral Earl Beatty and Admiral Grasset were also present for part of the meeting.

Secretaries—

M. Laroche.	M. Bargeton.
M. Massigli.	Mr. Forbes Adam.
M. Chinecant.	Mr. Leeper.

LORD CURZON, at M. Poincaré's request, opened the conversation. He referred first to a minor point raised by M. Poincaré that morning, namely, the views of M. Ninchitch appearing in the press that morning, notably the 'Matin', about the Turco-Bulgarian frontier. The Serbian Charge d'Affaires had since called at the British Embassy to explain that M. Ninchitch formally denied the version of his interview given in the press; the gist of all that he had said was that Anglo-French unity was essential.

M. POINCARE explained that the declaration of M. Ninchitch to which he had referred last morning was not that given by the 'Matin', but the views which the Serbian Minister for Foreign Affairs had explained to M. Poincaré himself. What he had then said was that he did not care much one way or the other about a frontier Turco-Bulgarian frontier, but that he feared a *bloc* between Bulgaria, Turkey and Russia.

LORD CURZON said that he must now recur to a point of major importance, namely, the withdrawal of France and Italy from Cilicia and Ismid. The arrangement of the Allied troops in the neutral zone had been merely a matter of convenience between the Allied commanders on the spot. Thus, the English had been stationed at Chanak and the French and Italians at Ismid. So much was this the case that when the Greeks threatened Chatalja, or rather, the Chatalja line, General Harington had at once sent British troops to help the French there. He (Lord Curzon) must ask whether M. Poincaré definitely repudiated responsibility for those portions of the neutral zone which lay on the Asiatic shores of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, and if so whether he thought it in accordance with the spirit of the Alliance. Further he would like to know whether because the French held certain views about Kemal's strength and the deference which should be paid to him they were therefore at liberty to withdraw their troops and leave all the responsibility for the defence of these zones on the Asiatic shores to the British alone. If so public opinion would hardly regard this as a just and loyal arrangement. At the same time Lord Curzon did not wish to reproach the French Government but he merely wanted some explanation and he must add that if they really repudiated their responsibilities in the manner that he had outlined his Government with whom he must communicate at once would take a very serious view of the situation.

M. POINCARE said that as Count Sforza was here this afternoon he would go back a little way in order to explain the position of the French Government in the matter. It was quite natural that the local commanders should distribute their troops between the zones, but the French Government had never been consulted about

the Constantinople had never agreed to sending Greek troops to the Asiatic shores of the Bosphorus or the Dardanelles. He was personally prepared to take all responsibility for the decision to withdraw. However grave such a decision might be, a new situation had arisen and England could not be expected to risk the destruction of the Turkish army and the resultant state of chaos. There was no soldier in the world who would stay at Chanak in the event of a withdrawal. Towards only a portion of the defence of the Straits had been entrusted to the Greek army. They would have to withdraw, and it was impossible to leave the Asiatic shore of the Straits. The Straits were divided into two, one part being held by the French and the other by the British. The French would probably withdraw to the Asiatic shore, and the British would possibly withdraw to the European shore. Whatever happened, he wished to be fair.

LORD CURZON, on behalf of Mr. Bonar Law, said that the latter could not adequately understand the gravity of his declaration. Since May 1921 when the full knowledge of the facts and documents which existed could be placed before the Cabinet, Mr. Bonar Law had never made a statement which was more serious than that which the Prime Minister had just made. The troops were going. Why were they going? Because, said the Prime Minister, the British will there would be massacred. Now apparently Mr. Bonar Law did not think that the British would be massacred, but that the Greeks would be massacred. Mr. Bonar Law said that the Greek troops would be withdrawn from the Asiatic shore of the Straits, but that the British troops would remain. Was it intended that the British troops should be withdrawn from the Asiatic shore of the Straits? If so, the Greek troops would be massacred. Mr. Bonar Law said that the Greek troops would be withdrawn from the Asiatic shore of the Straits, but that the British troops would remain. Was it intended that the British troops should be withdrawn from the Asiatic shore of the Straits? If so, the Greek troops would be massacred. Mr. Bonar Law said that the Greek troops would be withdrawn from the Asiatic shore of the Straits, but that the British troops would remain. Was it intended that the British troops should be withdrawn from the Asiatic shore of the Straits? If so, the Greek troops would be massacred.

LORD CURZON, on behalf of Mr. Bonar Law, said that the latter could not adequately understand the gravity of his declaration. Since May 1921 when the full knowledge of the facts and documents which existed could be placed before the Cabinet, Mr. Bonar Law had never made a statement which was more serious than that which the Prime Minister had just made. The troops were going. Why were they going? Because, said the Prime Minister, the British will there would be massacred. Now apparently Mr. Bonar Law did not think that the British would be massacred, but that the Greeks would be massacred. Mr. Bonar Law said that the Greek troops would be withdrawn from the Asiatic shore of the Straits, but that the British troops would remain. Was it intended that the British troops should be withdrawn from the Asiatic shore of the Straits? If so, the Greek troops would be massacred. Mr. Bonar Law said that the Greek troops would be withdrawn from the Asiatic shore of the Straits, but that the British troops would remain. Was it intended that the British troops should be withdrawn from the Asiatic shore of the Straits? If so, the Greek troops would be massacred.

MR. JOYNSON-HICKS explained that he had to save his right hon. friend a most serious situation, and for this purpose urgent action was necessary.

LORD CURZON, speaking later, said that the statement which had been read had been made by His Majesty's Government, and that the troops would be withdrawn from the Asiatic shore of the Straits, but that the British troops would remain.

MR. JOYNSON-HICKS, replying to a question, said that the Government had decided to withdraw the troops from the Asiatic shore of the Straits, but that the British troops would remain. Was it intended that the British troops should be withdrawn from the Asiatic shore of the Straits? If so, the Greek troops would be massacred. Mr. Bonar Law said that the Greek troops would be withdrawn from the Asiatic shore of the Straits, but that the British troops would remain. Was it intended that the British troops should be withdrawn from the Asiatic shore of the Straits? If so, the Greek troops would be massacred.

LORD CURZON, on behalf of Mr. Bonar Law, said that the latter could not adequately understand the gravity of his declaration. Since May 1921 when the full knowledge of the facts and documents which existed could be placed before the Cabinet, Mr. Bonar Law had never made a statement which was more serious than that which the Prime Minister had just made. The troops were going. Why were they going? Because, said the Prime Minister, the British will there would be massacred. Now apparently Mr. Bonar Law did not think that the British would be massacred, but that the Greeks would be massacred. Mr. Bonar Law said that the Greek troops would be withdrawn from the Asiatic shore of the Straits, but that the British troops would remain. Was it intended that the British troops should be withdrawn from the Asiatic shore of the Straits? If so, the Greek troops would be massacred. Mr. Bonar Law said that the Greek troops would be withdrawn from the Asiatic shore of the Straits, but that the British troops would remain. Was it intended that the British troops should be withdrawn from the Asiatic shore of the Straits? If so, the Greek troops would be massacred.

MR. JOYNSON-HICKS, replying to a question, said that the Government had decided to withdraw the troops from the Asiatic shore of the Straits, but that the British troops would remain. Was it intended that the British troops should be withdrawn from the Asiatic shore of the Straits? If so, the Greek troops would be massacred. Mr. Bonar Law said that the Greek troops would be withdrawn from the Asiatic shore of the Straits, but that the British troops would remain. Was it intended that the British troops should be withdrawn from the Asiatic shore of the Straits? If so, the Greek troops would be massacred.

LORD CURZON, on behalf of Mr. Bonar Law, said that the latter could not adequately understand the gravity of his declaration. Since May 1921 when the full knowledge of the facts and documents which existed could be placed before the Cabinet, Mr. Bonar Law had never made a statement which was more serious than that which the Prime Minister had just made. The troops were going. Why were they going? Because, said the Prime Minister, the British will there would be massacred. Now apparently Mr. Bonar Law did not think that the British would be massacred, but that the Greeks would be massacred. Mr. Bonar Law said that the Greek troops would be withdrawn from the Asiatic shore of the Straits, but that the British troops would remain. Was it intended that the British troops should be withdrawn from the Asiatic shore of the Straits? If so, the Greek troops would be massacred. Mr. Bonar Law said that the Greek troops would be withdrawn from the Asiatic shore of the Straits, but that the British troops would remain. Was it intended that the British troops should be withdrawn from the Asiatic shore of the Straits? If so, the Greek troops would be massacred.

than [illegible] ships. In theory Lord Beatty was quite correct in saying that it was easy [illegible] by [illegible] batteries, but experience in the recent war had shown that in practice it was a very different matter.

LORD CURZON enquired whether Admiral Grasset had [illegible] that the [illegible] at Gallipoli was now to be held by the Allies. [illegible] the Admiral's experience [illegible] that Gallipoli could not be [illegible] if the Turks had artillery on the Asiatic shore, the question of keeping the Straits open permanently became [illegible] complicated.

ADMIRAL GRASSET replied that [illegible] positions on the Gallipoli Peninsula during the war, and these had been freely sprinkled with shells from the Asiatic batteries, as well as by batteries from other parts of the Gallipoli Peninsula.

LORD CURZON pointed out that if this were so, the situation created by [illegible] Turks to [illegible] the Asiatic shore would be a very dangerous one, and merely by [illegible] Gallipoli [illegible] find it very difficult permanently to demilitarise [illegible] the opposite coast.

M. POINCARÉ [illegible] distinction should be made between the occupation [illegible] the Asiatic shores. [illegible] in times [illegible] Allied [illegible] Peninsula [illegible] shore [illegible] that it was necessary to [illegible] that [illegible] could [illegible] Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles.

EARL BEATTY [illegible] in 1915 the position [illegible] different from to-day. The Turks [illegible] number of heavy [illegible] Straits. To-day they [illegible] the southern [illegible] shores of the Straits. The British Admiralty [illegible] up were [illegible] there were [illegible] of them [illegible] they could not [illegible] the Asiatic [illegible] difficult [illegible] positions on the [illegible] Peninsula [illegible] the Allies would be [illegible] with the aid of [illegible] in 1915 it should be [illegible] Turkish artillery fire [illegible]

ADMIRAL GRASSET [illegible] were placed [illegible] existed on the front [illegible] dangerous for vessels to pass [illegible] of fire.

M. POINCARÉ asked Earl Beatty [illegible] the Sea of Marmara [illegible] Bosphorus.

EARL BEATTY [illegible] the Marmara was [illegible] vessels. So long as the Allies had [illegible] they could [illegible] any Turkish vessels to cross the Marmara.

LORD CURZON [illegible] on the spot [illegible] exercise such control.

EARL BEATTY [illegible] it was now possible to exercise considerable [illegible] they would be able to establish [illegible]

COUNT SFORZA enquired [illegible] Earl Beatty's optimistic views were [illegible] Admiral Grasset's [illegible] if we were really in a position [illegible] transport [illegible] it might [illegible] be necessary to [illegible] the Allies [illegible] Europe [illegible] the Turkish Government [illegible] On the other hand [illegible] the Straits [illegible] Sea of Marmara [illegible] Bosphorus from time to time and [illegible] the sea the fire [illegible] the water?

EARL BEATTY admitted that the navies could only control the sea, but they could ensure that effective support could not be transferred by the Turks from one side to the other. The rest of the question appeared to him to be [illegible] and political, and not a naval matter. It was true, however, that if Gallipoli were attacked by a European army, the navy could play a very real part in controlling the entry to the Gallipoli Peninsula across the Bulair lines, a distance of about 6 miles. Naval gunfire could be brought to bear from ships both inside and outside the Straits, and it would be almost impossible for any effective attack to be delivered upon the Allied forces holding Gallipoli from Thrace.

LORD CURZON interposed to say that he thought Count Sforza was referring rather to the Bosphorus end of the Straits and the question of stopping a number of small ships and boats from crossing.

EARL BEATTY replied that, provided the naval commanders received clear instructions in plenty of time, they could secure control of all vessels in the Bosphorus. The Turks might build rafts, but it ought to be possible to capture or destroy these. They would then have to swim across.

ADMIRAL GRASSET pointed out that the Bosphorus was very narrow, not more than three times the width of the Seine, and it would be very difficult to stop an infiltration of men and troops across its waters.

EARL BEATTY said that very likely [illegible] might take place, but it might [illegible] the body of troops to pass in that manner.

LORD CURZON drew attention to the fact that the views of both Earl Beatty and Admiral Grasset provided an overwhelming argument for [illegible] to the Asiatic shores of the Straits [illegible] as possible. It was essential, therefore, not to break up Allied [illegible] of the Straits. It was for this reason that he regarded the French and Italian [illegible] following the [illegible] as disastrous.

M. POINCARÉ stated that Marshal Foch's opinion was [illegible] to have [illegible] Straits in the present military situation. To control the whole of the Straits one must have forces echeloned along their whole length. M. Poincaré urged that [illegible] possible [illegible] at Gallipoli [illegible] allowed [illegible] There was no military expert who would now [illegible] that the Allies [illegible] the Asiatic shores against a Turkish attack. [illegible] must not expose ourselves to attack both from the [illegible] By that he referred to the possibility of a revolution in European Turkey. A letter which he had just received from M. Steeg [illegible] Ottoman Bank at Constantinople went to confirm Count Sforza's view as to this danger. The only way which the Allies must [illegible] conference at [illegible]

LORD CURZON remarked [illegible] M. Poincaré [illegible] observations seemed to leave out of account [illegible] Italians [illegible] were on very friendly terms with Kemal, who even Great Britain was [illegible] Kemal, who was a very shrewd person, was not going to [illegible] the whole hypothesis of M. Poincaré that if the Allies did not [illegible] he would be tired [illegible] French and Italians would only [illegible] they would only send [illegible] to Kemal, he would obey it and would not [illegible] but if they retired from Chanak [illegible] they would make Kemal think that he had only to go [illegible] and shoot at the British who were stupid enough to remain. Surely the French and Italian [illegible] to be [illegible] more Kemalist than Kemal, and it would make any successful [illegible] of a conference impossible.

M. POINCARÉ pointed out that Angora might well follow their advice officially, but would let Turkish irregulars do her work for her, or perhaps be unable to stop them from doing it. This had happened to the French in Cilicia. It was partly a danger from Turkish irregulars just as much as from Turkish regulars which had led the French troops to be withdrawn from Chanak. Further, [illegible] had been his principal point, the despatch of these French troops to Asia would have been an innovation and in a sense a provocation to the Turks, and it might have started a war between France and Turkey. He would again repeat that it was essential to have a conference, and that if we merely took a negative attitude towards the Turks about the Straits and were to say nothing positive as to concessions to Turkey in the future, they would not come to the conference.

EARL BEATTY then completed his statement as regards the Bosporus by stating that the two coast roads down the European side to the Straits would be kept open. In effect, a number of ships either from the Black Sea or from the Marmora still are now allowed down the straits. The senate will have before it very recently the British forces still in Constantinople was practically nil. [illegible] general position

[illegible]

LORD CURZON said that what [illegible] was to secure Ottoman possessions against the possible [illegible] of Russia, with the assistance of the Straits and the [illegible] there was an [illegible] agreement between Great Britain and France as soon as [illegible] that part of the Straits should be [illegible] there was also a [illegible] between Great Britain and Italy dated August 1920 [illegible] Sir Robert Cecil that [illegible] Parts of that treaty had [illegible] were [illegible] Most of [illegible] would have [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible] Lausanne [illegible] Ottoman [illegible] [illegible] Ismid [illegible] [illegible] Ismid [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

accept an Allied garrison upon the Gallipoli Peninsula. It seemed advisable to warn the Greeks as well as the Turks off the neutral zones; and he personally was in favour of Greek retirement behind the Maritza.

LORD CURZON replied that even if the Greeks could be persuaded to withdraw beyond the Maritza after the conference had met, the results of the conference would be rendered nugatory if it were impossible for the Allies to do so before the conference met.

M. POINCARÉ replied that he thought it essential that the Turks should be informed that Thrace was to be given back to them. On this point England should use the influence which she possessed with the Greeks.

COUNT SFORZA suggested to Lord Curzon that Sir H. Rumbold should be asked to telegraph at once whether in his opinion there was not a danger of anarchy in Thrace. His information pointed to growing chaos there with continued thefts and murders. If we were sure Sir Horace Rumbold would confirm this, he proposed that for the time being Thrace might be placed under the nominal sovereignty of the Sultan and be occupied by Allied instead of Greek troops.

M. POINCARÉ thought that the question of the Sultan's authority was a question for the Peace Conference.

LORD CURZON suggested that it might be possible to induce the Greeks to withdraw beyond the Gallipoli Peninsula. If they were withdrawn beyond the Maritza the question of the sovereignty of Thrace would, inevitably be prejudged. In any case Lord Curzon preferred to hear the views of his Government on the question of Thrace. It was really a matter for their further discussion on Friday. Meanwhile he would like to urge M. Poincaré to see his influence to calm Kemal.

M. POINCARÉ promised to do his best, but said that he was not sure how far his influence went.

A discussion followed as to the communication to be made to the press and to the nature of the invitations to the Powers to be invited to the forthcoming conference.

LORD CURZON proposed that it was necessary to invite Japan.

M. POINCARÉ expressed astonishment.

LORD CURZON recalled the conference that Japan had participated in the preparation of the Treaty of Sèvres as a Great Power on the Supreme Council, that she was to be represented with two votes on the Straits Commission, and had a High Commissioner at Constantinople.

It was agreed to invite Japan.

The following statement to the press was then decided upon:

Lord Curzon, Count Sforza and M. Poincaré have agreed upon the necessity of bringing together a conference at which will be represented England, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Jugo-Slavia, Roumania and Turkey, and at which will be arranged the conditions of future peace. The conversations will be resumed on Friday afternoon at 2 o'clock.

'At to-day's conference Admiral Beatty gave a report upon the situation in the Straits and the Bosphorus, and Admiral Grasset added some supplementary observations.

No. 546

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 23.*)

(No. 468.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, September 22, 1922.*

'ACCORDING to best opinion here entire Christian population of Thrace will become refugees. Kemalists are committing there Greeks with connections at Constantinople declare same thing applies to that capital.

(Repeated to Constantinople and Paris.)

No. 547

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 23.*)

(No. 470.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, September 23, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 447.

One hundred and fifty three British refugees expected at Piraeus to-morrow on board steamship 'City of Versailles.'

No. 548

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 23.*)

(No. 471.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, September 23, 1922.*

HAVE received following from Navarch, Constantinople:

Following message received from Admiralty, controller via Alexandria wireless station:

'Have two British steamers, Chanwo, 130,000 cubic feet capacity, twin decker, coupled, carrying 2,000 refugees of troops.

'Please cable if acceptable and what rates offered.'

I have replied enquiring where Chanwood is.

No. 549

Sir H. Dering to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 23.*)

(No. 121.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Bucharest, September 22, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 113.

Following further communication appeared in Government papers:

'Victory of Kemalists reopens question of Straits and will increase power in Balkans.

'Roumania has two objects in view closely affecting interests.

'1. Need to see assurance of liberty of International Status of Straits.

'2. Need to see peace in the Balkans maintained because it is clear that new Balkan conflagration would have grave repercussion and might put in question again all treaties on which European situation rested by world war is based.

'In the circumstances of course Roumanian policy must be guided by the necessity for safeguarding these two interests. But naturally Roumania cannot pursue their realisation except in complete accord with her great allies, who are animated always by most practical sentiments.'

No. 550

Sir H. Dering to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 23.*)

(No. 122.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, September 22, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 119.

Following further message from M. Bratiano for communication to Prime Minister:

'Minister for Foreign Affairs requests that Roumanian Chargé d'Affaires also be informed of substance.

'We are already taking concentration and other measures in order to avoid delay and so as not to be taken unaware in case of participation of Roumanian

contingent at Constantinople. For this purpose it is necessary to convey immediately to Greece the eventual cadre of this contingent following materials which it does not possess:

First: Thirty motor lorries or tractors.

Second: All necessary stores for the maintenance of troops during entire time of their reoperation.

This matter should naturally not be confused with that brought by Lord Curzon's communication to Rumanian army in view of Bessarabian danger.

No. 321.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 23.)

(No. 23.)
Telegraphic. *Bucharest, September 23, 1922.*
MY telegram No. 199.
Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs reported this Government discovery of Bolshevik plot to subvert loyalty of discontented Greek troops in Thrace, and stating that steps to propagate Bolshevism have been undertaken from Russia for establishment of Soviet régime there, forwarded copy of telegram from Rumanian Minister at Athens.
Above communication communicated by Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
Repeated to Sofia.

No. 322.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 23.)

(No. 447.)
Telegraphic. R. *Constantinople, September 22, 1922.*
YOUR telegram No. 400.
General Harington reported to Hamid Bey yesterday for the formation of Kemalists determined to defend neutral zone. We consider no further communication with Angora necessary.
General Harington has ordered that Hamid Bey and other emissaries were to be treated as prisoners of war.

No. 323.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 23.)

(No. 450. Secret.)
Telegraphic. *Constantinople, September 23, 1922.*
ADMIRAL BROCK has sent General Harington a memorandum which he received from officer in charge of every description of iron boats so as to prevent Kemalists from crossing to Europe at present moment. He and Admiralist Secretary, with General Harington, and staff officer of Admiral, have taken these measures.
Instructions to Admiral Brock to patrol waters to prevent Kemalists from crossing Dardanelles to Gallipoli Peninsula. Destroyers will be stationed at Kilid Bahr and Chanak. Admiral will assist by all facilities for arriving and departing ships. Responsible officials appointed at Chanak to prevent Kemalists from crossing, but no orders have been given to fire on them. Instructions to Commander-in-Chief to withdraw all British troops.
Have instructions been given to withdraw all troops?
I will see the Rear-Admiral and General Staff officer at once.
Boundaries of Neutral Zone: Ismid Peninsula, Turkish shipping in Bosporus, Dardanelles and Marmora will not be molested. Foreign vessels, Mudania and Ismid excepted, will be allowed to pass. Admiral will do his best to prevent Kemalists from crossing, but cannot undertake to stop every boat. Kemalists will be warned that Admiral has been instructed to resist crossing by force, and that Kemalists crossing will be treated as enemies. Kemalists will be warned that Admiral would prefer that they should not cross.
The operations of the Greek forces in Asiatic Turkey would be such as to give rise to danger to Constantinople, and Greek forces at present constitute no danger. Moreover, General Harington considers there is little chance of Kemalist attack on British troops, or interference with evacuation of Gallipoli.
We recognise great importance of keeping Kemalists as long as possible on Asiatic shore. Kemalists are concentrating their troops in Europe as soon as His Majesty's Government announce that Greeks will withdraw, and it is important that Kemalists should not be aware of this intention. The Admiralty have given orders to carry out these measures ordered by Admiralty, have effective. Last vessel with British troops will be withdrawn. Hostilities between Greeks and Kemalists are not to be resumed under any circumstances as this would be dangerous.
Last sentence dealt with will be noted.
Therefore, in order to withdraw troops, it is necessary for Greeks to withdraw their troops first. Greeks are very difficult for Admiral to carry out his instructions. He requires
We have no means of transporting all Greek troops, consequently Admiral suggests Greeks should withdraw troops gradually, and that transport should be provided by Allies.
We cannot remove all Greek troops. Boundaries will also require measures to prevent Admiral from stopping everything going to Kemalists. It will therefore be necessary to notify Allied and neutral shipping that they must be prepared to leave Dardanelles twenty-four hours notice. I understand that it would be practicable with a period of three days to intern Turkish shipping in

contingent at Constantinople. For this purpose it is necessary to convey immediately to Greece the eventual cadre of this contingent following materials which it does not possess:

First: Thirty motor lorries or tractors.

Second: All necessary stores for the maintenance of troops during entire time of their reoperation.

This matter should naturally not be confused with that brought by Lord Curzon's communication to Rumanian army in view of Bessarabian danger.

No. 321.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 23.)

(No. 23.)
Telegraphic. *Bucharest, September 23, 1922.*
MY telegram No. 199.
Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs reported this Government discovery of Bolshevik plot to subvert loyalty of discontented Greek troops in Thrace, and stating that steps to propagate Bolshevism have been undertaken from Russia for establishment of Soviet régime there, forwarded copy of telegram from Rumanian Minister at Athens.
Above communication communicated by Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
Repeated to Sofia.

No. 322.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 23.)

(No. 447.)
Telegraphic. R. *Constantinople, September 22, 1922.*
YOUR telegram No. 400.
General Harington reported to Hamid Bey yesterday for the formation of Kemalists determined to defend neutral zone. We consider no further communication with Angora necessary.
General Harington has ordered that Hamid Bey and other emissaries were to be treated as prisoners of war.

No. 323.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 23.)

(No. 450. Secret.)
Telegraphic. *Constantinople, September 23, 1922.*
ADMIRAL BROCK has sent General Harington a memorandum which he received from officer in charge of every description of iron boats so as to prevent Kemalists from crossing to Europe at present moment. He and Admiralist Secretary, with General Harington, and staff officer of Admiral, have taken these measures.
Instructions to Admiral Brock to patrol waters to prevent Kemalists from crossing Dardanelles to Gallipoli Peninsula. Destroyers will be stationed at Kilid Bahr and Chanak. Admiral will assist by all facilities for arriving and departing ships. Responsible officials appointed at Chanak to prevent Kemalists from crossing, but no orders have been given to fire on them. Instructions to Commander-in-Chief to withdraw all British troops.
Have instructions been given to withdraw all troops?
I will see the Rear-Admiral and General Staff officer at once.
Boundaries of Neutral Zone: Ismid Peninsula, Turkish shipping in Bosporus, Dardanelles and Marmora will not be molested. Foreign vessels, Mudania and Ismid excepted, will be allowed to pass. Admiral will do his best to prevent Kemalists from crossing, but cannot undertake to stop every boat. Kemalists will be warned that Admiral has been instructed to resist crossing by force, and that Kemalists crossing will be treated as enemies. Kemalists will be warned that Admiral would prefer that they should not cross.
The operations of the Greek forces in Asiatic Turkey would be such as to give rise to danger to Constantinople, and Greek forces at present constitute no danger. Moreover, General Harington considers there is little chance of Kemalist attack on British troops, or interference with evacuation of Gallipoli.
We recognise great importance of keeping Kemalists as long as possible on Asiatic shore. Kemalists are concentrating their troops in Europe as soon as His Majesty's Government announce that Greeks will withdraw, and it is important that Kemalists should not be aware of this intention. The Admiralty have given orders to carry out these measures ordered by Admiralty, have effective. Last vessel with British troops will be withdrawn. Hostilities between Greeks and Kemalists are not to be resumed under any circumstances as this would be dangerous.
Last sentence dealt with will be noted.
Therefore, in order to withdraw troops, it is necessary for Greeks to withdraw their troops first. Greeks are very difficult for Admiral to carry out his instructions. He requires
We have no means of transporting all Greek troops, consequently Admiral suggests Greeks should withdraw troops gradually, and that transport should be provided by Allies.
We cannot remove all Greek troops. Boundaries will also require measures to prevent Admiral from stopping everything going to Kemalists. It will therefore be necessary to notify Allied and neutral shipping that they must be prepared to leave Dardanelles twenty-four hours notice. I understand that it would be practicable with a period of three days to intern Turkish shipping in

Golden Horn It must be recognised that this is only a delaying measure as it and when Kemalists arrive on Asiatic shore shipping in Golden Horn will be at their disposal The wholesale destruction of shipping in Golden Horn would I am convinced, produce an explosion which would have most far-reaching consequences without compensating advantages because means of crossing Bosphorus can always be extemporised

The situation here necessarily varies from day to day and subject to general instructions from His Majesty's Government I trust Admiral Brock, General Harington and myself may be given full latitude to deal with it to the best of our ability

General Harington is in entire agreement with above

(Repeated to Paris No 26, for Lord Curzon)

No 556

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston — Received September 23)

(No 451 Private and Secret)
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople September 23, 1922*

WHILE I recognise that my telegram No 450 is not very helpful I am sure you will appreciate very difficult situation in which orders from Admiralty place Admiral Brock General Harington and myself The destruction by fire or otherwise of thousands of small craft, guns, & c besides being exceedingly difficult would produce such an explosion of rage here as would lead to an outburst which we cannot control in present circumstances We could count on support of our allies over this If General Harington's force is sufficient to prevent a Kemalist advance on Constantinople, necessity for drastic measures prescribed by Admiralty as regards Bosphorus will not arise in an acute form Their adoption would lead to cessation of Government life of the city

I suggest it is to our interest to hang on to Constantinople as long as possible and do our best to work for the moment in order to achieve this end It is to remain as quiet as we can while exercising necessary vigilance

Repeated to Paris No 27 for Lord Curzon)

No 557

Commander in chief Mediterranean to Admiralty (Received September 23)

(No 392)
(Telegraphic) *September 22 1922*

FOLLOWING received from Rear Admiral Third Light Cruiser Squadron No 791

"Evacuated 4 407 refugees naval wireless station 153 British subjects from City of Versailles Wolsley Hall, expected daylight to morrow Saturday 2,700 cavalry and camel transports left to-day Friday via Bournabat One train carrying troops also left north bound Normal local service of trains running on French lines Admiral Pepe says that he had good authority for stating that Turks would attack Chanak to-morrow Saturday

---

No 558

Commander in chief Mediterranean, to Admiralty Received September 23)

No 393 ,
(Telegraphic) *September 23. 1922*

REAR ADMIRAL Fourth Battle Squadron reports Turkish cavalry advancing on Eren Keui Ships are taking up bombard stations Am recalling H M S "Curacoa"

No 558A

Lord Hardinge to Sir H Dering (Bucharest) and Sir A Young (Belgrade) (Repeated to Foreign Office, Received September 23)

By Telephone]

(No 475)
(Telegraphic) *Paris September 23 1922*

YOU should obtain from your French colleague the text of the telegram sent to-day by the three Principal Allied Governments to the Government of Angora inviting its representatives to a conference

The English text is being telegraphed by Reuters

(To Bucharest and Belgrade only)

You should communicate a copy to Minister for Foreign Affairs

---

No 559

Admiralty to Senior Officer, Second Light Cruiser Squadron, Smyrna.—(Received at Foreign Office September 23.)

(Telegraphic) *September 23, 1922*

ARE Greek ships admitted to Smyrna for evacuation of refugees? Early reply requested

---

No 560

Senior Officer, Second Light Cruiser Squadron, to Admiralty.—(Received September 24, 1922.)

(No 434.)
(Telegraphic.)

YOUR No 2132/23

Understand that Turks have stated that Greek ships would only be allowed to enter if operating directly and under control of Allied or American authorities

---

No 561

Senior Officer, Third Light Cruiser Squadron, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.—(Received September 23, 1922.)

(No 511.)
(Telegraphic.)

FOLLOWING for Foreign Office from Sir H. Lamb

"(No 75.)

"Your telegram No 30

"Asl. family and Mrs. Webber were embarked long ago. have no knowledge of Miss Walters. Practically all known British subjects have been evacuated, except five or six, who refused to budge."

No 562

Mr. Grant Watson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 23.)

(No 91.)
(Telegraphic.) R *Lisbon, September 22, 1922*

I HAVE received informal enquiry from officers of Portuguese Railway Battalion as to how British War Office would regard offers from the battalion of co-operation in the Near East.

The battalion served in France under British generals and their Portuguese commander is Lieutenant Colonel Esteves, D.S.O.

Officers would serve as volunteers

No 563

Lord Hardinge to Sir R. Tyrrell.—(Received September 23.)

By Bag

(No 472.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, September 22, 1922*

FOLLOWING from Lord Curzon

"Have just returned from meeting of quite unprecedented description. Our object was, I understood, to discuss terms of possible general agreement between ourselves as to bases of future conference, and indications that might be given in issuing invitation to Kemal. Accordingly, I began by expounding main propositions concerning Constantinople, Thrace and Straits, for which I sought and received approval of Cabinet yesterday

As regards Thrace I was particularly anxious that any invitation given to Kemal should not wholly prejudge question or leave room to think that Turks would regain entire pre-war frontiers on Maritza. I thought Enos-Midia line would afford a buffer State under League of Nations in Eastern Thrace. Poincare commenced by reading memorandum of military position of most menacing description, declared that the sole chance of peace was to make overtures to Kemal at Mudania, since he would absolutely decline to come to Europe and that indispensable condition was immediate provision of Maritza frontier and Adrianople. He wanted this declaration to be made to-morrow without any reservation or qualification. I criticised Poincare's account of military situation, and remarked incidentally that it was as he said, and if Harington were forced to evacuate which I did not believe the reproach would not be his, but that of those who had abandoned him.

Poincare then commenced a second speech by a bitter attack on Harington whom he accused of having deliberately misrepresented to his colleagues the attitude of the French and Italian Governments. I instantly and indignantly repudiated this charge whereupon Poincare lost all command of his temper and for a quarter of an hour shouted and raved at the top of his voice, putting words into my mouth which I have never uttered, refusing to permit the slightest interruption or correction saying that he would make public the insult to France quoting a telegram from Athens to the effect that the British Minister had asked the Greek Government to arrest 60,000 men for the defence of Adrianople and the Straits and behaving like a cantankerous schoolmaster screaming at a naughty schoolboy. I have never seen so deplorable an undignified scene. After enduring this for some time I could stand it no longer, and, rising, I broke up the sitting and left the room. M. Poincare shortly afterwards sent me a most humble apology explaining that he had been exasperated at the language that I had adopted towards him, to which for my part I declined to say I regretted, though I suspect that the sting lay in the contemptible fact that I had by my report this second time upset the pernicious character and ingenious calculations of the man with whom I was dealing. I should not have thought it possible for anyone to assume a position of greater humiliation than that of the Prime Minister of France, who, in order to save his face, was compelled to make overtures to me to intervene between him and the man whom he had insulted.

After this scene was over I recruited my mind and the discussion was resumed. M. Poincare's attitude on this occasion was broadly that Russian support to Kemal had altered the whole meaning of the Armistice, and had restored to Turkish sovereignty up to the old frontiers of 1914, the only limitation to this being the Straits and the Neutral Zone. Turkish sovereignty must also be restored on the Greek side of the same line in Western Thrace. Whether question of sovereignty was to be left to interpret the sentence at his own will, I asked whether M. Poincare was ready to permit the pre-war régime to be restored, Roumania would accept such solution. In reply he categorically declared that the Serbian King and Ministers had yesterday given him assurances in the most absolute terms that they would not attack Roumania and that Roumania would do the same.

Seeing that we were now approaching the *impasse* I said that I must decline the Poincaré statement which he proposed after all involved an absolute surrender to Kemal on the most important point of the whole dispute, leaving everything else unsettled. But I then produced a formula which I had prepared in which we admitted in general terms the limits to which I was prepared to go, leaving out this as the touchstone. It closes with a proposal that Harington should go to Mudania to meet Mustapha Kemal and endeavour to arrange the recognition of the neutral zone which the Turks and Greeks are respectively to stand in Asia and Europe pending final conference. Poincare said that he could not accept any formula without submitting it to his Ministers and he suggested that if we could not agree we might send the invitation in our own terms and the French and Italians in theirs. He even asked if we might assure Kemal that though holding back now there was a good chance of our falling in to the later on. I declined all these suggestions and said I was willing to stay in Paris and resume discussion of Britain's text to-morrow afternoon after M. Poincare had consulted his colleagues in the morning. This was agreed to, and a meeting is fixed for 2 p.m. I shall do my best to secure a collective invitation if that be possible and even if the French choose to add a private gloss of their own. If not we must each address Kemal in our own way.

The British Cabinet will I trust appreciate that by these steps we have gained another day both here and at the other end, and that Mudania will mean several days more. Before the end of this time our preparations should be complete,

and in any case the prospect of an attack upon Chanak or Ismid seems now to be receding.

I grieve to have to report to my colleagues an experience so painful as that which I have passed through this afternoon and which I hope never to be compelled to repeat.

I communicated to Poincare that if conference were to discuss question of future military occupation of Chanak side of Straits upon which we are taunted me with departure from terms of March last. I replied that military situation was now wholly changed as had been admitted by his own generals and admirals. In fact he himself always declined to be bound by anything that was settled in March.

Since writing above I have received a request from Count Sforza to consider whether in lieu of general phrases about Thrace I cannot accept to-morrow a definite reference to the Maritza and Adrianople line in the draft formula suggested. He will of course support Poincare and I have pointed out desirability of several notes to Turks, the certainty that concession has ultimately to be made, so we will get the entire credit. This afternoon I argued that this might produce violent explosion by Greek army and Greek population in Europe, and would leave us a complete surrender to Turkish demands. I am reluctant therefore to make concession, but cannot act without Cabinet authority. I will await your decision.

E 9783/27/44 No. 564

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 25)

B. Bag

(No. 476.)

Foreign Office, *Paris, September 23, 1922*

FOLLOWING is the English version of the Note which the three Allied representatives to the Angora Government

The three Allied Governments request the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey to inform them if they are ready to send without delay a representative with full powers to a meeting which will be held at Mudania or elsewhere to which will be invited a delegate from each of the Dominions of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Roumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and Greece. This meeting will have for its object such arrangements as are necessary for the Government entrusted with this duty will be instructed to conclude with the Turkish representative a convention for the Allied Powers. In this Convention the Governments concerned will declare that they view with sympathy the desire of Turkey to recover Thrace as far as the Maritza and Adrianople.

On condition that the Government of Angora consents to send its representative to the neutral zones before the ratification of the Peace Treaty has been proclaimed by the Allied Governments, the three Governments will bring their support to the restoration of these frontiers to Turkey, it being understood however that steps will be taken for the immediate protection of the neutral zones and the safeguard of the interests of Turkey and the neighbouring countries with a view to the maintenance of peace certain zones to be fixed to guarantee the peaceful and orderly re-establishment of Turkish authority and finally as soon as effectively under the auspices of the League of Nations the freedom of the Dardanelles the Sea of Marmara and the Bosporus as well as the protection of religious and ethnical minorities are secured the three Governments will willingly support the admission of Turkey to the League of Nations.

They are in agreement in reaffirming the assurance which they gave at Mudania to withdraw troops from Constantinople as soon as the Peace Treaty comes into force. The three Allied Governments will set in motion to procure before the opening of the conference the removal of the Greek forces, three to six days by the Allied generals agreement with the Greek and Turkish military authorities. In return for this intervention the Government of Angora will undertake not to send troops or other forces during the conference into the zones which have provisionally been declared neutral and not to cross the Straits or the Sea of Marmara.

In order to fix the above mentioned line a meeting might immediately take place between Mustapha Kemal and the Allied generals at Mudania or at Ismid

The Allied Governments are convinced that their appeal will be listened to and they will be able to collaborate with Turkey and with their Allies to re-establish a peace for which the whole civilised world is longing

(Repeated to Constantinople)

No. 565

Sir G. Clerk to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 23)

(No. 106)
(Telegraphic) *Prague September 23, 1922*

MY telegram No. 105

I gather from M. Benes that my French colleague put views of his Government in regard to Turkish question before him yesterday. Prime Minister replied that views of Czechoslovak Government depended on line taken by Roumania and Jugo-Slavia who were more directly interested but that his personal view was as stated in my telegram referred to above

---

No. 566

Sir A. Geddes to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 23)

No. 372
(Telegraphic) *Washington September 23, 1922*

MY telegram No. 366

Statement of Mr. Hughes issued yesterday as produced excellent effect and sentiment of press is an increasing one in favour of which French propagandist messages are no longer given the same prominence

New York World which has published for this evening's Globe to-day an important article attacking Kemal though it does not go as far against permanent British occupation of two of territories affected. Even Hearst press to-day is ordeal to our case

General Pershing now specially in Washington returns to recognise Britain as bulwark of Christendom and thought expressed in Chamber of Deputies, there is no readiness to accept this share of responsibility or American Ground-swell in Washington public opinion as a result of rough insistence of announcement made on October 16th. Statement appears to me premature but is signed

---

No. 567

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Lindley (Athens)

(No. 248)
(Telegraphic) *Foreign Office September 23, 1922*

WE have chartered five vessels for evacuation of Greek refugees and we are trying to find out if Greek vessels are admitted to Smyrna. If they are not there might be possibility of our chartering other vessels. But I am sure you will insist that Greeks must make every effort themselves

---

No. 568

Sir H. Tyrrell to Lord Hardinge (Paris)

(No. 320)
(Telegraphic) *Foreign Office September 23, 1922*

FOLLOWING for Lord Curzon

Cabinet this morning agreed upon the following version of your draft note with which we were in general accord. In the event of its being impossible to secure agreement with France and Italy on the British text it would not be in our opinion, in

our opinion to make this communication separately and directly to Great Britain to the Government of Angora. We think also that you should press them to say that before this note is sent jointly the assent of Roumania and Serbia should be secured. If France and Italy definitely oppose it you should avoid recording your protest at exclusion from consultation of these Powers so vitally interested. In the event of your having to make a separate communication you will no doubt do so to them directly yourself

The Cabinet have read with great regret the account of your painful interview with M. Poincare and desire formally to congratulate you upon the firmness and self restraint with which you bore yourself as the representative of Great Britain

---

No. 569

Sir H. Tyrrell to Lord Hardinge (Paris)

(No. 321)
(Telegraphic) *Foreign Office September 23, 1922*

FOLLOWING for Lord Curzon

My immediately preceding telegram

Paragraph 1. For save the honour on behalf of their Governments substitute desire

Paragraph 2. The British French and Italian Governments desire at the same time to take this opportunity of declaring that they are prepared at the coming conference to meet the desire of the Government of Angora for the return of Eastern Thrace including Adrianople to Turkish sovereignty. Their efforts will be directed in this matter only to securing guarantees for the protection of the interests of the neighbouring States and the peaceful and orderly re-establishment of Turkish authority. It will be necessary however for the enforcement of such agreement upon two further points first effective guarantees are and specially for the security and protection of the Christian minorities and of the freedom of the waters between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea secondly demilitarisation of the territories are necessary for the protection of Christian and religious minorities generally. Both these objects are attainable under the League of Nations whose agents if the Government of Angora have already declared their willingness in principle to accept. The Allied Governments recall the assurances given on the 11th March last to withdraw the troops from Constantinople pari passu as the Treaty of Peace

Paragraph 3. The Allied Powers are prepared while the arrangements for the Venice Conference are being made to use all their influence to procure the withdrawal of Greek forces behind the line of the Maritza provided always that the Government of Angora take no advantage during the peace conference, not to enter the neutral zone or attempt to cross the river Maritza

Paragraph 4. After the words could be arranged add without delay

---

No. 570

Sir H. Tyrrell to Lord Hardinge (Paris)

(No. 322 Secret)
(Telegraphic) *Foreign Office September 23, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 474

Following for Lord Curzon from Prime Minister and Secretary of State for War with reference to Sir H. Rumbold's private and secret telegram repeated in your telegram under reply

We are very anxious you should obtain immediate and categorical statement suggested by Sir H. Rumbold with regard to the intentions of the French and Italian Governments to allow their respective contingents at Constantinople to assist in the maintenance of law and order in that city

No 571

French Text of the Invitation addressed to the Government of Angora by the Governments of France, Great Britain and Italy September 23, 1922

LES trois Gouvernements alliés prient le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de vouloir bien leur faire savoir s'il serait disposé à envoyer sans retard un représentant muni de pleins pouvoirs à une réunion qui se tiendrait à Venise ou ailleurs et à laquelle seraient également invités avec les représentants de la Turquie les plénipotentiaires de la Grande Bretagne de la France, de l'Italie du Japon de la Roumanie de l'Etat serbe croate-slovène et de la Grèce Cette réunion aurait lieu dès que les dispositions nécessaires auraient été prises par les Gouvernements intéressés Elle aurait pour objet de négocier et de conclure le traité de paix définitif entre la Turquie la Grèce et les Puissances alliées

Les trois Gouvernements alliés saisissent cette occasion pour déclarer qu'ils considèrent avec faveur le désir qu'a la Turquie de recupérer la Thrace jusqu'à la Maritza et Andrinople A la condition que le Gouvernement d'Angora n'envoie pas son armée pendant les pourparlers de paix dans les zones dont les Gouvernements alliés ont proclamé la neutralité provisoire les trois Gouvernements soutiendront volontiers à la conférence l'attribution de ces frontières à la Turquie, étant entendu d'ailleurs que des mesures seraient prises d'un commun accord dans le traité pour sauvegarder les intérêts de la Turquie et ses voisins pour démilitariser en vue du maintien de la paix certaines zones à déterminer pour obtenir le rétablissement paisible et régulier de l'autorité turque et enfin pour assurer efficacement, sous les auspices de la Société des Nations la liberté des Dardanelles, de la mer de Marmara et du Bosphore ainsi que la protection des minorités de race et de religion Les trois Gouvernements appuieront du reste volontiers l'admission de la Turquie à la Société des Nations Ils sont d'accord pour renouveler l'assurance déjà donnée aux neutres de la mer que les troupes alliées seront retirées de Constantinople aussitôt que le traité entrera en vigueur

Les trois Gouvernements alliés useront de leur influence pour provoquer avant l'ouverture de la conférence le retrait des forces grecques sur une ligne qui sera fixée par les généraux alliés d'accord avec les autorités militaires turques et grecques En retour de cette intervention, le Gouvernement d'Angora s'engagera à n'envoyer ni avant ni pendant la conférence de troupes dans les zones qui ont été provisoirement déclarées neutres et à ne pas franchir les Détroits ni la mer de Marmara

Pour déterminer la ligne dont il est question plus haut une réunion pourrait immédiatement avoir lieu entre Mustapha Kemal et les généraux alliés à Mudania ou à Ismid

Les Gouvernements alliés ont la conviction que leur appel sera entendu et que la Turquie voudra collaborer avec les Alliés pour le rétablissement d'une paix à laquelle aspire toute l'humanité civilisée

POINCARÉ CURZON SFORZA

Le 23 *septembre* 1922

No 572

Mr Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 24)

(No 473)

(Telegraphic) R *Athens, September* 23 1922

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs informed me this morning that American Legation at Constantinople had invited Greek Government to send ships to Mudania to take off 150 000 refugees Ships to fly no flag Greek Government had accepted offer and would send all available vessels Minister for Foreign Affairs added that Kemalists stipulated that all refugees should be taken off within seven days which was impossible Kemalists were putting many obstacles in the way of departure of refugees and he believed that they would not let any of military age leave They had also kept over eighty Greek officers in prison on five days without food or water and he had asked French Minister to make a representation

(Repeated to Constantinople)

No 571 A

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H Rumbold (Constantinople)

(No 421)
(Telegraphic) *Foreign Office September 23, 1922*

WE desire to carry with us full and free provisions for a naval force of about 4,000 men could be provided by Roumanian authorities and whether latter will permit use of Constanza as a base

---

No 573

Mr Findley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 24)

(No 474)
(Telegraphic) R *Athens September 23, 1922*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs informed me to-day that Greek Government were prepared to put all their resources at the disposal of His Majesty's Government if latter desired their help as an ally

I thanked His Excellency, and replied that my information was all to the effect that His Majesty's Government desired peaceful solution of Near Eastern question

(Repeated to Constantinople)

No 574

Mr Hodgson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 24)

(No 207)
Telegraphic R *Moscow September 24, 1922*

YESTERDAY demonstration to celebrate Turkish victories was held in Moscow organised by University for the Toilers of the East Various Communist delegates welcomed at Hotel Luxe where it proceeded to Commissariat for Foreign Affairs Representative of Near Eastern Department alluding to Turks having overthrown Executioners of English capitalism, foretold day when toilers of the world will become the executioners of their lords

At Argonaut Empress crowd was addressed by first secretary and delegates from Mussulman territories In the evening entertainment passed by British missions to Afghan Embassy Beyond Turkish flags shown at procession can be no incident worthy of report Crowds as on numerous similar occasions produced little excitement and no question of damage occurred

---

No 575

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 24)

(No 452)
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople September 24, 1922*

NEWS was received last night that [illegible] 1,000 Turkish cavalry had advanced on Erdek Kou which is well within neutral zone at entrance of Dardanelles Other German Engineer officers at Mudania say that Turkish cavalry must retire on Brusa which would be free of Greeks He has since changed meeting under a flag of truce which was to take place this morning not before Wednesday result

I consider Greek Commanding Officer makes show of great resistance only to impress on us view of your telegram sent from Paris instructing Greeks to Angora Government

We shall however be faced with difficult situation if Turks do not move this night every effort will be made to avoid conflict

---

No 576

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received at Foreign Office September 24)

No 453)
(Telegraphic) R *Constantinople September 24, 1922*

HAVING heard two days ago that Greek Minister Georgios Averoff was about to return to Constantinople I told Greek High Commissioner, that in my opinion his return would be most inadvisable at present juncture as it would reinforce

argument which Kemalists are using to the effect that Greeks are allowed to use Constantinople as a naval base whilst Turks are forbidden to cross neutral zone. Greek High Commissioner promised to telegraph to his Government on the subject.

'Georgios Averoff' has now returned here. Admiral Brock and I consider her presence here at present moment is provocative and I urge that instructions should be sent to have her recalled. Latter as well as Greek destroyer which is also here.

Repeated to Athens.

No. 577

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 24.*)

(No. 454.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 24, 1922.*

THE AR from a fairly trustworthy source that decisions taken at meeting of Angora Government at Smyrna on Friday were of a most important character. It is stated among other things that Angora Government will insist upon immediate evacuation of Constantinople and withdrawing troops from Thrace.

These decisions would however have been taken before receipt by Angora Government of telegram Allied Governments sent last night from Paris.

No. 578

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 24.*)

(No. 455.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, September 24, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 411.

No. 447 see my telegram No. 448.

Whittall arrived here on 21st September and was introduced by a Mr. Barrow. On 17th September Soles was put into solitary confinement and Lawrence and Morison. Harcourt of Lord Mayor's Fund expected here shortly may have additional information which at present is very conflicting.

No. 579

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 24.*)

(No. 456.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 24, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 452.

Kemalist forces have withdrawn from neutral zone and Chanak.

No. 580

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 24.*)

(No. 457.)
Telegraphic. K. *Constantinople, September 24, 1922.*

PARIS telegram No. 474.

French High Commissioner has today communicated invitation for conference to Angora Government and to Grand Vizier on behalf of Allies.

(Repeated to Paris.)

No. 581

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 25.*)

(No. 459.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, September 24, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 412.

Arrangements have been made to embark British colony at short notice if necessary.

No. 582

Commander-in-chief Mediterranean, to Admiralty. (*Received September 24, 1922.*)

(No. 402.)
(Telegraphic.)

NEUTRAL zone is reported clear of Turks.

H.M.S. 'Curaçoa' is returning to Smyrna.

No. 583

Lord Hardinge to Sir H. Tyrrell. (*Received September 24.*)

By Bag.

(No.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, September 23, 1922.*

FOLLOWING from Lord Curzon for the Cabinet.

'I am very grateful for wire recently given me by your instructors. I have also attended meeting at Quai d'Orsay which lasted for four hours and resulted in preparation and signature of joint note which was communicated to press at 8.30 p.m. and will presumably appear in London papers tomorrow. Cabinet will see that every one of its desiderata was retained, although French idiom in fact being language of note compelled departure in several words of English formulas originally framed. In two respects I refused to go as far as I was authorised. First by suppression of mention of Mantzikert instead of geographical area of Eastern Thrace. I was able to secure for Greece or several districts of Eastern Thrace between that river and Bulgarian frontier which may be useful level to them in coming discussions. Secondly by refraining from inserting precise line to which Greek troops will presently be asked to retire, some latitude will be left to Allied commanders in projected meeting at Mudania to make whatever arrangements are thought best. On the other hand conditions imposed upon Kemalists are very precise and a phrase was introduced providing for demilitarisation of various zones unspecified a point which I had forgotten in my draft. A sentence was also included about admission of Turkey to League of Nations. I declined to allow the Mudania meeting to be converted into anything but a military conference on a single and narrowly defined point.

It is of course possible that Kemalists may endeavour to secure suspension of reinforcements or withdrawal of British troops as a condition of attending peace conference. But no legitimate hope to this is left in text of note and it can therefore be resisted and relied on its own merits.

'In expectation that I would not meet him on subject of Thracian frontier, M. Poincaré had prepared a note for despatch by the French alone. This contained declarations of wider compass. Nevertheless I think he was greatly relieved to find that a single pronouncement was possible and I believe that French Government are genuinely anxious, for reasons of self interest, to see the invitation accepted and the conference summoned.

'Sforza lent no aid throughout the proceedings and was little beyond a shadow in wake of the French. Had it been possible to obtain the concurrence of the Serbian and Roumanian Governments before issue of the note this would have been done. But the Serbian Ministers have already dispersed and are not to meet in Belgrade

til Wednesday. Such a delay would have been disastrous. Accordingly I proposed and it was agreed to telegraph the text of note to them at once and express earnest hope that they would concur.

'In reply to Prime Ministers telegram communicating action at Constantinople, which I said had not alarmed Italian Government, I have at once telegraphed to Graham at Rome requesting Italian Government to telegraph orders to their representative to assist in maintenance of order. Pomeranians being addressed in same sense.

'I return to London to-morrow and will report to Cabinet if thought desirable on Monday morning.

'Lord Hardinge left me valuable assistance throughout.

No. 384

Lord Hardinge to Sir R. Graham (Rome). (Repeated to Foreign Office.) Received September 24.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 477.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, September 23, 1922.*

FOLLOWING from Lord Curzon:—

Repeated telegrams from Constantinople that there is imminent danger of instant war with which our allied military forces may find it difficult to cope. Many members of city which might be controlled would be left in absolute calamity. Please see Italian Government at once, and ask them to give immediate instructions to their commanders to conduct possible joint operations to maintain order and safety of Allied interests in that district.

No. 385.

Extract from Telegram from Lord Hardinge (Paris). (Received September 24, 1922.)

(No. 478.)
(Telegraphic.)

[illegible] Government to see M. Poincaré to-day, but French Government are natural[ly] very [illegible] associate themselves with any measures to which they object to ensure [illegible] of Constantinople, though [illegible] resolves, aware of there being serious [illegible] under the present circumstances, to [illegible] Rumour they are sending instructions to [illegible] High Commissioner to General Charpy to concert with Admiral Dumesnil measures of precaution against outbreak of trouble in the town, [illegible] account possible of [illegible] under present circumstances by measures which have been authorized as being of a local character and as being likely to avoid [illegible] position.

Copy of note [illegible] by mail.

No. 386.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 24.)

(No. 285.)
Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, September 23, 1922.*

I SPOKE to Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning in the sense of your Lordship's telegram of yesterday and took occasion to complain of whole tone of Italian press, which is indulging in regular anti-British campaign. He replied that whatever your Lordship's intentions might have been your endeavour to meet Poincaré at this juncture without presence of Italian representative could only be regarded here and throughout the world as an attempt to shelve Italy and settle question in which she was vitally interested without her participation. His own views on the subject were expressed in correspondence between Count Sforza and Lord Hardinge. Tenor thereof not tone of Italian press was entirely justifiable and he could not possibly issue *démenti* nor could he advise me to do so unless I wished to aggravate situation. He would however in order to meet me send at once for all representatives of Italian press and insist on modification of tone towards Great Britain. This is more important than a *démenti* nor can I foresee one in terms which will be accepted here and will not lead to violent contradiction and recriminations.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that we had always favoured a close understanding and co-operation with His Majesty's Government but that fulfilment of any such policy was not out of the question. Italian public feeling after Genoa had been strongly pro-British and anti-French but reverse was now the case. This was due to our attitude towards Italy which had inflicted on her a series of failures, slights and humiliations. He was personally convinced from that His Majesty's Government set little store on Italian friendship. On my combating this and recalling instances he quoted recent Paris incident of refusal of immediate conference of Versailles Council, all success in London and Lord Balfour's attitude at Geneva regarding Austria.

No. 387.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 25.)

(No. 286.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, September 3, 1922.*

FOLLOWING is extract from my immediately preceding telegram:—

[illegible] I consider discussion of Eastern situation during which his Excellency seemed to secure us in pleading popular feeling as an excuse for evading contractual obligations. I impressed on him that policy of prompt and scrupulously paid indemnity with Orientals that attitude of His Majesty's Government was perfectly firm was supported by whole British Empire and [illegible] disapproval of the whole Empire and that if in this we stood [illegible] the fleet alone against the Turks *Entente* was obviously at an end.

Continuation of my [illegible] following telegram.

No. 388.

Sir R. Graham to Lord Hardinge (Paris). (Repeated to Foreign Office. Received September 24.)

(No. 287.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, September 23, 1922.*

FOLLOWING is extract of my immediately preceding telegram:—

'He declared that France and Italy were deluging Kemal with good advice, and he trusted and believed hostilities would be avoided. Thrace was the danger point as Greek civil and military administrations there were in full dissolution and Turks had already succeeded in introducing large numbers of disguised officers and emissaries.

His Excellency promised to do everything possible for Smyrna refugees (your telegram No. 280), and said that Italian naval authorities had already incurred [illegible] for transporting more Greeks than Italians.

He enquired whether I knew anything of French proposal to send Franklin Bouillon to Angora to negotiate on behalf of all the Allies and strongly deprecated it.

'Finally he begged me to assure you that you could count on his full support in all efforts to secure peaceful solution of present crisis.'

No. 589

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 24.*)

(No. 288.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, September 24, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 246.

Italian Government agrees to pay 25,000 gold francs as its contribution to commission of enquiry.

(Sent to Paris.)

No. 590

Sir A. Geddes to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 24.*)

No. 373.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Washington, September 23, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 284.

State Department had already instructed their High Commissioner to take up this question with Angora representatives in Constantinople. They will now inform him of substance of your telegram, and will authorise him to take such further steps as he may judge necessary to further entente.

No. 591

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Findley (Athens).

No. 250.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September 24, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 248 of 23rd September. Transport of Greek refugees.

We are anxious to help as much as we can. But in view of heavy charge which will fall on British Exchequer we must have very positive assurance that Greeks are themselves doing all they possibly can.

No. 592

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Vice-Admiral Hardinge (Paris).

No. 323.
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 24, 1922.*

FOLLOWING timed 7.30 received tonight by Admiralty from Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean.

"Rear-Admiral Commanding Fourth Battle Squadron reports Turkish cavalry advancing on Eren Keui. Ships are taking up bombardment stations.

Eren Keui is about 3 miles south of Chanak.

E 9882/27/44. No. 593.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 25.*)

(No. 822.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, September 16, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Izzet Pasha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, called on me on the 14th instant to urge the desirability of the Allies immediately taking in hand by means of a conference the settlement of the questions of Eastern Thrace, the Straits &c. I have reported in my telegram No. 417 what his Highness said on this subject.

2. There is no doubt that the Sultan's Government is genuinely anxious that the Allies should summon a conference to meet as soon as possible at a place of their own choosing. One reason for this eagerness for a conference is anxiety as to Mustapha Kemal's next move. Should Mustapha Kemal attempt to advance on Constantinople, and even owing to a weakness of the Allied forces, succeed in reaching Scutari, a serious situation would arise. It is to the interest of the moderate elements in the Turkish Government, and especially of those who wish to maintain the present Sultan, that the territorial questions, other than that of Anatolia, should be settled before the Kemalists take control of the capital.

3. In the course of our conversation I mentioned to Izzet Pasha the substance of the telegram sent by the correspondent of the "Daily Mail" to his paper after his interview with Mustapha Kemal. I alluded to the way in which Mustapha Kemal had spoken of the probability of a change in the person of the Sultan. Izzet Pasha admitted that the present Sultan was looked upon with hostility by many of his subjects. Mustapha Kemal could not do away with the House of Osman, but Izzet Pasha implied that a change of sovereign was not improbable.

4. The outlook for the Sultan is indeed gloomy. His Majesty has steadily refused to telegraph his congratulations to Mustapha Kemal on the latter's victory over the Greeks, although I understand that his Government advise him to do so. He attended a service at the mosque in the grounds of the Seraglio Palace for those who had fallen in the recent fighting, and he went to the Mosque of the Conqueror yesterday where a similar service was held. It is significant that at least two of the important Turkish papers have ceased this week to observe silence. Indeed, the Turkish press in the capital is now entirely Nationalist or Committee of Union and Progress in colour. The one anti-Nationalist paper which was formed from a combination of the "Pavam" and the "Saban" has been dissolved.

5. I asked Izzet Pasha how he thought that the fusion between the Central and Angora Governments would be brought about. He was not very explicit in his reply. He affirmed with considerable emphasis, however, that he himself would never make any advances to the Nationalists. The Grand Vizier might take steps in that direction. He thought that a Grand Vizier would be appointed who would be acceptable to Turks of all shades.

I have &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD.
High Commissioner.

E 9886/27/44] No. 594

Mr. Dering to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September 25.*)

(No. 493. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Bucharest, September 18, 1922.*

ON receipt of your telegram of the 15th instant instructing me to enquire most confidentially of the Roumanian Government whether they would be willing to place a division without delay at the disposal of the Allied commander-in-chief for the purpose of aiding their Allies in defending the military position at Constantinople in view of the menace which Kemal is in a position to exert, I lost no time in endeavouring to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

2. M. Duca received me at the earliest possible opportunity this morning on his return from Sinaia. He informed me at once, privately, that M. Bratiano had reported having received a telegram from Mr. Lloyd George on the same subject, so that he was prepared for the enquiry which I had been instructed to make. I found M. Duca entirely favourable in principle to the idea of Roumanian military participation for the defence of the Straits, the complete freedom of which he observed, was a matter of such vital importance to this country. He made no reference at all to Thrace. He said, however, that it was first necessary to consult his colleagues of the Cabinet, who, the Prime Minister said, he would do to-day. He would send me their official decision this evening. It would also be despatched to Mr. Lloyd George by the Premier in reply to his telegram. M. Duca stated his view that Kemal must not be allowed to settle the question of the Straits in advance by force of arms. I replied that this was the view of the Great Powers also. In reply to his enquiry whether the latter were in accord on the subject, I quoted your Lordship's telegram to the effect that the three Great Powers had publicly signified their intention to defend the military position pending the final solution of the problem. His Majesty's Government would be able to support a request by the Roumanian Government to be represented at an early conference, provided that

Roumania proved willing to assume some share of the responsibility by offering military assistance.

3. I added, as a personal and confidential observation, that there need therefore be no fear that Roumania's support of His Majesty's Government at the conference should she took part in it, need in any way cause friction with France. M. Duca agreed and said that unfortunately a good measure of Kemal's present military success must be attributed to certain assistance which he received secretly from certain quarters, a circumstance which made it all the less appreciated the present situation. It thought it opportune to express satisfaction at the considerations which Mr. Lloyd George by his present telegram to M. Bratiano evidently desired to maintain with the Roumanian Premier. M. Duca replied that it was his desire also to afford M. Bratiano the keenest pleasure. He then stated confidentially that if Roumania was represented at a forthcoming conference on Turkish affairs we may count on Roumanian support for the British point of view.

4. M. Duca said he believed that we had made a similar suggestion of military support to Jugoslavia. The Serbian Minister was at that moment in the antechamber at the Roumanian Government. I observed that M. Nintchich, from what I had been able to gather from perusal of telegrams in his secret cipher since my return, has as yet not appeared to take any lead and came out well, perhaps do so when he heard the views of the Roumanian Government. The Minister for Foreign Affairs evidently that M. Nintchich's position resembled that of M. Pashitch was somewhat different. The latter was failing in health, passing alternately lethargic and apt to take unexpected line which embarrassed his Minister for Foreign Affairs. His reluctance to take any decision was to a certain extent due to be detected in Jugoslavia whether it would not be better to receive him soon from Government. If M. Take Jonescu had now come to ascertain what the reply of the Roumanian Government would be to any suggestion of military support of the Great Powers, he could tell him that Roumania in principle was favourable and that the Cabinet would consider the matter and reply without delay. He would encourage the Minister to advise his Government to take a similar line.

5. M. Duca was extremely frank and cordial throughout our conversation, and I feel sure that he was desirous of keeping in close touch with us. It should therefore not be difficult so far as I can at present anticipate, to obtain from him expression of opinion from the Roumanian Government we may require. I should judge that they will probably press for their immediate representation on the Straits Commission, counting on our support in the matter. It seemed to be no moment at this to ask for any expression of opinion as to Thracian boundaries which primarily do not interest the Roumanian Government so greatly as the Straits question.

6. It would not surprise me if Roumania should decide to attend a conference to secure M. Duca himself as their representative. I met him in the antechamber of Jean M. Duca. He was accompanied from Paris colleague, and stopped me to enquire what I thought of the Turkish situation and whether a conference could take place. I was grateful for the opportunity and ascertained that he had just returned from a meeting of the League of Nations and had been instructed to remain here, so as to be available if required for further work. He seemed to think that an early conference and the presence there of Mustapha Kemal or his representatives were desirable. Constantinople or some neighbouring locality might be found the most suitable. My reply indicated that the Governments concerned would probably settle upon their course.

I have, &c.

HERBERT G. DERING.

E 9883 27 44. No. 59.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 25.*)

(No. 823.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, September 18, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a report by Mr. Hole, Vice-Consul at Smyrna, on the events which have recently taken place in that town. I would draw your Lordship's particular attention to the remarks made by Mr. Hole with regard to the atrocities committed by the Greeks during their retreat. Mr. Hole has intimated to me verbally that he has reason to believe that

statements to the effect that the Greeks in some places collected Moslems in mosques to which they subsequently set fire are accurate. Admiral Brock has spoken to me in terms of the strongest reprobation of the conduct of the Greeks.

2. On the other hand, the period of order and discipline which followed on the arrival of the Turkish troops at Smyrna was short lived. The Turks soon reverted to type and began a massacre in the Armenian quarter. It appears that certain Armenians had furnished themselves with bombs from the military supplies left by the Greek forces. Mr. Hole's account of the origin of the fire, which commenced in the Armenian quarter and ended in destroying the European quarter of the town, leaves no doubt as to the deliberate intention of the Turks to destroy the Christian quarter. This proceeding is a conclusive proof of the Xenophobia with which the Turks are inspired. It is probably their intention that the future Smyrna should be a purely Turkish town, free from foreign elements. The circumstances attending the destruction of Smyrna have produced the worst impression in Constantinople, and are causing grave anxiety in the foreign colonies there.

3. I cannot close this despatch without putting on record the tribute paid by Admiral Brock to the conduct of Sir Harry Lamb during these crisis. Sir Harry Lamb showed great personal courage and left no stone unturned to see to the safe removal of the British colony. Although it is hardly within my province to speak of the devotion of the landing parties from His Majesty's ships I have heard nothing but praise of the manner in which those landing parties rescued and brought away members of the British colony and refugees.

I have &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure No. 59.

Memorandum by Mr. Hole on Events in Smyrna.

THE situation at Smyrna had become critical by the beginning of September, when it was evident that the Greeks had given up all idea of fighting and were in disorderly retreat. As they came down from the interior they burnt every town they passed through and there is conclusive evidence of atrocities committed by them. Two British railway employees were caught at the evacuation of the troops occupying the Meander Valley and accompanied them during their work of systematic devastation. Every village within sight of the railway was burnt, and such inhabitants as failed to escape were slaughtered. This free lootings reached Smyrna on the 10th and surrendered after a short engagement.

Evacuation was hurried on as fast as the Greek soldiers reached the town they were put on transports and removed. It had been feared that on their arrival they would do a great deal of damage, but they were in such a state of complete and exhaustion that their one desire was to get away. No case of excesses on their part in Smyrna was ever reported to me.

By the evening of the 9th the military evacuation was complete and the Greek High Commissioner and the Greek fleet left the town. In spite of the gloomy previsions of the population, which in particular by the Mufti were wished on protection for the unarmed Turkish community, the night was perfectly quiet. A Greek cavalry division passed through on its way to Cassaba without any disorders.

At 11 on the 9th, Turkish light cavalry entered Smyrna and took possession of the Konak. The entry was carried out in complete discipline, the troops being so thoroughly in hand that even when an Armenian threw a bomb at the head of the column wounding an officer and some troopers, there were no reprisals. The commanding officer gave every guarantee to the Allied consuls that their nationals would be in no way interfered with. The defenceless Turkish civilians, however, appeared on the scene with a rifle and 200 rounds apiece, and took advantage of the situation to indulge in a certain amount of hooliganism. The Turkish commander deplored these excesses, which he said he would stop as soon as he had sufficient troops at his disposal. However, the arrival on the following day of a regular infantry division seemed rather to multiply the incidents and Armenians were being killed on the Turkish patrols in the main streets and relieved of their money. There was a good deal of trouble in Burnabad, a village mainly inhabited by rich British merchants and many houses were forcibly entered and looted.

It was not, however, till the 11th that it became clear that more serious disorders were impending. On the previous day I had been told by Count Senni, the Italian

consul general who was far more in the confidence of the Turks than ourselves that an important meeting was to be held that evening at the Konak for the purpose of coming to a decision with regard to the deportation of the Armenians. The result of this meeting was evident on the 14th, when the whole of the Armenian quarter was surrounded by a cordon of Turkish soldiers and a systematic round organised. A large number of Armenians were shot out of hand, a continuous fusillade being maintained while women and children were herded together and marched away. In this connection it is interesting to note that on the night of the fire, when boats were sent in to take off refugees, out of about 900 who were collected in the destroyer "Serapis" there were not a dozen women between the ages of 15 and 35.

On the second day of the massacre the Turks proceeded more discreetly and apparently orders were given and strictly enforced not to fire but to use the butt or the blade. The American consul-general told me of women stabbed at his consulate steps and a constant stream of fugitives came to the consulate to seek shelter and recited their sufferings. The procedure was uniform: the Turks knocked at the door and on gaining an entry said they had come to look for bombs: then followed looting, rape and murder. Much of this was observed from our ships by officers on deck who were able to follow through their glasses the course of the massacre at an Armenian house on the sea front. Sir Harry Lamb himself succeeded in penetrating the cordon in an attempt to reach a British house in the Armenian quarter which was reported to be in the hands of looters: he found the streets strewn with bodies. He counted twenty in 50 yards. He was, however, not allowed to push on.

On the morning of the 15th fires were started in several points in the Armenian quarter, mostly on the windward, some on the Turks asserted that this was done by the Armenians themselves, with the object of bringing the Turks into discredit, but it is far more probable that the battue was not entirely complete, and that the Turks wished to burn out any surviving fugitives who had succeeded in evading their or merely to cover up their tracks. In any case, serious efforts—if indeed any effort at all was made to deal with the fire—did not begin during the evening, when the fire died down and only a few embers were left upon the ashes. It was on the part of the quarter which had so far failed to burn. The conflagration was encouraged to spread to the Greek quarter on the morning of the 15th. The street that runs parallel with the sea-side was saturated with petrol, and the refugees on the sea front must also have been sprayed with petrol, for at about 1 in the morning when the flames burst into fierce activity I saw a line of fire completing the circle from one end of the quay to the next.

The following morning the deliberate intention of the Turks to burn down the Christian quarter became even more apparent. The wind had changed completely during the night and was now blowing straight back during its original course. Nevertheless, sheets of flame from the quay half a mile to windward of the nearest point of the conflagration were seen to leap from the roofs of existing houses, obviously by the application of ordinary means.

I should say that I have experienced a certain difficulty in fixing the latest date to which I have referred, but the above events all occurred

British High Commissioner, Constantinople
September 18, 1922.

[E 9885/27/44] No. 59

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 27.*)

(No. 820.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, September 19, 1922.*

THE Italian High Commissioner called on me two days ago and developed the following policy which seems to me worth while reporting to your Lordship.

2. Marquis Garroni stated that his reports showed that the Greek army in Thrace is in a state of complete demoralisation. There was a regular mutiny in the army and amongst the Greek frontier guards. He had heard that some 10,000 Greeks had crossed into Bulgarian territory. To all intents and purposes Eastern Thrace was now derelict territory without proper masters. As such it should revert to the Allied Powers. He threw out the suggestion that the Allied Powers should hand Eastern Thrace with Adrianople back to the Sultan's Government, thus regularising the situation and fortifying the prestige and authority of the Sultan and his Government.

3. Although the *moral* of the Greek troops in Thrace is probably bad, I have no information to show that these troops have completely gone to pieces and that the Greeks would be willing to give up Eastern Thrace, but I thought that my Italian colleague's suggestion was sufficiently ingenious to report it to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner.

[E 9887/27/44] No. 597.

Mr. Dering to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 27.*)

(No. 491.)
My Lord, *Bucharest, September 19, 1922.*

WITH reference to my confidential despatch No. 493 of yesterday's date in regard to the situation at Constantinople, M. Duca has just made clear to the French press his views on the subject. The Havas-Radio correspondent reports an interview given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Bucharest correspondent of the 'Temps,' whose probable object in seeking it was to ascertain Roumanian views on the subject of revision of the Treaty of Sèvres. M. Duca's remarks are sufficiently illuminating to be worthy of mention, as they prove the desire of Roumania to participate in every dealing and disturbance of matters in the Balkan Peninsula, in other words to maintain Bessarabia, the *statu quo* in Transylvania, and to attract the co-operation of the Allies to the *Entente* and Poland.

M. Duca is stated to have said:

"The signatories of the Treaty of Sèvres, and all the decisions of the Supreme Council, were brought to effect without our knowledge, and sometimes in opposition to the Roumanian point of view which we were making known at the time. From the very first we deplored the Graeco-Turkish conflict, which was to be foreseen but not to intervene and left to the Great Powers the responsibility for their own work, so long as it could be hoped that the theatre and object of that conflict would be localised to the Near East.

"We should not be able to consider with sufficient patience any possibility of disturbance, and information in the Balkan Peninsula, from which we are already engaged in consolidating peace, and could not contemplate the renewal of consequences of fresh armed conflicts in that part of the world which we should estimate as not to be tolerated. Similarly we could not tolerate alterations of the present state of things here in Europe without the consent and agreement of all the Allies, with whom as subject as well as on behalf of all that concerns the general interests of the continent, she intends to participate in that agreement in order to facilitate it.

"For this reason Roumania, fully aware of the large and permanent interests which must ever be the standing obsession of the peace of the continent and the world.

"I have no reason to reply to [illegible] on the side of our Allies, Poland, Jugo-Slavia and Czechoslovakia, but I am certain to be in harmony with them in adhering to any intention to work against any cause of fresh disturbance and on behalf of the consolidation of peace and the maintenance of the *Entente* between the Great and Little Allies."

I have, &c.
HERBERT G. DERING.

E 9888 27 44] No. 598.

Mr. Doring to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 21.)

(No. 495. Most Confidential.)

My Lord, *Bucharest, September 19, 1922.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 493 of yesterday's date respecting the participation of Roumania in the defence of Constantinople, I have the honour to state that M. Duca did not communicate to me last night, as he had promised, the reply of the Roumanian Government to the suggestion that Roumania should take part in the effective defence of the Straits by placing a division at the disposal of the Allied Commander-in-chief. He asked me instead to call on him this afternoon.

On my arrival he informed me that the decision of the Roumanian Government coincided with what he was really told me, and that he would read to me the text of the telegram sent to M. Djuvara by M. Bratiano in reply to Mr. Lloyd George's personal telegram, which reply I had already seen in the Premier's hands. I have already telegraphed its substance to your Lordship as M. Duca did not allow me the text but read it over twice at my request.

As your Lordship will have noted, the Roumanian Government are preoccupied for the safety especially of their Eastern frontier on the Dniester and also of their Bulgarian frontier, either of which, it would M. Duca said, be safe to denude. The bulk of the Roumanian troops were therefore required there. I will refer to this cause for anxiety in the Bulgarian frontier later in this despatch.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that this would not prevent Roumania from providing a contingent, in accordance with the suggestion of the British Government. I enquired if this letter stated that the troops could be used at Constantinople, for I did not observe that the locality was mentioned in the Roumanian telegraphic reply. M. Duca answered in the affirmative and I omitted to make specific mention of Constantinople, as I supposed Lord Curzon's reply to your Lordship's despatch would make this understanding clear. He added that Jugoslavia had not the same extent of frontier needing guarding as Roumania, and should therefore be able to offer a much larger contingent for Constantinople if required.

I asked him to explain the last passage admitting the interest of Roumania in the settlement of the Straits question, and I remarked that the Roumanian Government evidently desired to be consulted when the final settlement of the dispute between Turkey and Greece was being discussed, in so far as their interests were affected. M. Duca replied that this was what the telegram was intended to convey, and that Roumania would wish to be represented at the Peace Conference. This being so, I observed I would venture to take the opportunity privately to enquire unofficially of him whether it would not be advisable for the Roumanian Government to prefer their request simultaneously and very soon to the Peace Conference. It would be well not to run the risk of forcing the susceptibilities of our Late Allies by intimating a desire to represent that the reference to Great Britain only. M. Duca appeared pleased at this, and thanking me for the hint, said he would make use of it if this point arose. I thought it would be a proper course to pursue. I have no doubt that he will ask this question as well. I also pointed out privately, but that my communication was unofficial, that I was convinced public opinion in this country would be wholly agreeable to His Majesty's Government at once stating that Roumania had expressed her readiness to join in the defence of the Straits. I presumed that the Jugoslavian Government would probably have and would express similar desire. M. Duca said that they would certainly also wish to attend the conference, and mentioned that M. Nincic had just left for London.

It was a consequence of this portion of our conversation that I despatched my second telegram to-day stating my conviction that the Roumanian Government would take *à fond* part in the above scheme at the three capitals.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs asked what the French Government were doing and what view they took. I said I had no information to the effect that the Allies appeared in agreement that Kemal must not be permitted to attack Constantinople. I hoped that, owing to the broad lines of principle were established, any divergence of opinion between the Serbs and the French could be satisfactorily removed by discussion at the Peace Conference. If the Roumanian Government participated I had no doubt that their representative, together with one from Jugoslavia would be useful as a means of reconciling opinions which might not quite coincide. 'Just as we were able to do at Genoa,' observed M. Duca, to which I replied with a compliment to the tact of M. Bratiano.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me that while Roumania was totally concerned in the Straits question, she would be strongly opposed to any alteration of the Treaty of Sevres which would give Turkey and Bulgaria a joint frontier. Too many intrigues were in progress already between the Turks and Bulgarians. I replied that this objection would probably arise at the conference but that it was as well to know the Roumanian view now. M. Duca said that only to-day he had received news from Sofia of a secret meeting last night at Philippopolis of some 3,000 ex-military officers who had decided to re-organise attacks by three Bulgarian bands on the Thracian frontier and if possible bring about a revolution in Sofia as well, involving the fall of the Stamboliisky Cabinet. It was to this determination to create trouble on the Bulgarian frontiers that he begged me to invite your Lordship's special attention, in connection with the present crisis between Turkey and Greece, for he felt that a protest by the Great Powers should again be made at Sofia, and that one from Great Britain would carry most weight. He feared that this movement had the connivance of the Bulgarian Government. The result of this meeting might equally be to render the Bulgaro-Roumanian frontier insecure, and he felt that it could not be left unguarded.

I said I would duly report to your Lordship, but that I understood that only recently a protest had been made by most of the Allies to the Bulgarian Government concerning alleged Turco-Bulgarian activity and intrigues near the Greek frontier. I had no doubt that the Bulgarian Government would deny all complicity, but I thought it would be quite feasible for them to prevent irregular bands of these ex-officers, who were out of a job, thoroughly discontented and ready for any desperate action. When I remarked that M. Stamboliisky was apparently looking for Geneva, M. Duca expressed the view that he might be designedly absent in order to avoid any appearance of complicity in a pro-Turkish movement. From my personal knowledge of the Bulgarian Premier's mobile but wily character, he is as likely as not to be playing a double game.

I trust that I shall have your Lordship's approval for the private action which I have pursued to M. Duca in regard to an early intervention requesting admission of the Roumanian to the Peace Conference. I asked him where he thought that the conference could be summoned. He suggested Lausanne, but thought the Constantinople would be unsatisfactory, and observed that it ought to be possible to secure Konia as a centre of Kemal's power in the west. He said that he would not be surprised if the Soviet Government claimed the right to be present at such conference which would seriously complicate matters, in view of the unofficial negotiations with Mustapha Kemal.

I have, &c.

HERBERT G. DERING.

E 9889 27 44 No. 99.

Sir H. Dering to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 21.)

(No. 496. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Bucharest, September 20, 1922.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 495, Most Confidential, of yesterday's date, respecting the situation at Constantinople, I received a visit this morning from the Minister for Foreign Affairs who stated that he had a communication to make on the subject of Roumania's participation in the defence of Constantinople against possible attack by Kemal Pasha.

M. Duca said that after we had seen me yesterday he had received a visit from the French Minister from whom he had gathered that the British and French Governments were now in complete accordance in regard to the policy to be pursued. After consultation with M. Bratiano, it was therefore decided to despatch a further telegram to Mr. Lloyd George from the Roumanian Premier through the Foreign Office, in modification of that previously sent by M. Bratiano direct to Mr. Lloyd George, the substance of which I had the honour to telegraph to your Lordship yesterday.

The precise text of the new message is delivered by M. Duca as enclosed herewith. He specially begged that it might be telegraphed from this Legation for the information of His Majesty's Government, as he considered this means preferable to despatching it through the Roumanian Charge d'Affaires in London, who he requested might also be informed of its contents. I regret to note that the French Minister's visit has had the effect of causing the Roumanian Government to withdraw their offer of immediate military assistance on the ground of present lack of munitions. They appear to consider

that the French assertion of ability to confine Kemal Pasha to the Asiatic side of the Straits, provided no fresh military demonstration were undertaken at Constantinople, affords a reasonable solution of the difficulty.

M. Duca laid further stress on the importance to Roumania of the Russian menace, which required that she should guard her eastern frontier with all her available forces. On reading in the message which he asked me to transmit the reference to lack of munitions, I enquired whether these outstanding munitions were to be obtained from France. M. Duca replied that they were in part to be had from the French and the remainder from wherever they could be got. It will be recollected that Colonel Duncan's military reports has already pointed out the defective condition of Roumanian armament and equipment. M. Duca stated that he had also been perturbed by the recent news of the arrival of fresh consignments of arms for the Bulgarians at Bourgas, coming from Odessa, which demonstrated the connection between the Bulgarian and Soviet Governments.

Moreover there were strong indications that the Soviet Government were again seeking excuse to pick a quarrel with Roumania. I should, remember he said, that some four months ago two Bolshevik military aviators had been obliged to land in Bessarabia and had been taken prisoners by the Roumanian authorities, who had discovered on them incriminating documents proving that they had come to distribute Bolshevik propaganda in connection with the contemplated advance across the Dniester, which were a Roumanian source of preoccupation. I duly reported these circumstances at the time.

He begged me to bring to your Lordship's notice the fact that the Roumanian Government had just received a telegram signed by the acting Foreign Affairs Commissary of Ukraine, with whom but hitherto no communication had been established. M. Duca then read to me the original French text of the telegram which was framed in offensive and unmeasured terms similar to those employed by Chicherin from Moscow, whose previous messages to M. Take Jonescu have often been reported by me to your Lordship.

The telegram referred to a previous message of the 6th August never received by the Roumanian Government on the subject of two Russian military aviators, whose names were given, and who, having accidentally lost their way, had been obliged, owing to machine defects to descend at Beadin in Bessarabia. It asserted that these aviators had been arrested and brutally maltreated by the Roumanian authorities, stripped and imprisoned, that in consequence of this brutality one of them had broken the bones of his ear broken, and that it was added even that the officers were in prison at Kishineff though the Ukranian Government were in certain as to their whereabouts.

M. Duca observed that the accusation of brutality was a most offensive language was absolutely false and that there had been no injury to the head of the ear of any of the prisoners alleged.

The telegram protested that the Roumanian authorities should grant violation of the part of neighbouring Government, whereas, remarked M. Duca, the aggressor on this occasion, the Russians had in defiance of treaties crossed the Dniester by Soviet Island and the waters which had not been open to peaceful navigation. At each step was to be met by Ukranian Government.

I enquired whether he proposed to send an answer. The Minister said that the Roumanian Government would consider whether they should do so. It was significant that the Ukranian Government after allowing four months to elapse without reference to the arrest of the aviators, should resuscitate the question now, when it was obviously intended to provoke a quarrel with the Roumanian Government at this particular moment. His intention, he declared, would therefore be necessary for the Roumanian Government to remain at the alert on their eastern frontier and not be taken by surprise. He was personally optimistic and he did not believe that this telegram represented more than a bluff, planned by Rakovsky to prevent Roumanian interference at Constantinople, but at the same time he felt that with the reported unrest in Bulgaria, his Government would have to be keenly on their guard.

It was only then that M. Duca had brought the telegram to support the reasons alleged for adopting the French attitude in regard to policy at Constantinople. I asked if he thought that the French were justified in taking a step calculated to induce Kemal Pasha to remain inactive pending negotiations. He replied that it would be desirable so far as possible, but did not offer any further opinion.

I have, &c.
HERBERT G. DERING.

Enclosure in No. 209.

M. Duca to Mr. Lloyd George.—(Received September 20, 1922.)

Ministère des Affaires étrangères,
(Télégraphique.) *Bucarest [non date].*

NOUS constatons à regret que l'accord entre la Grande Bretagne et la France en ce qui concerne la question de Constantinople et l'attitude à avoir en cas l'avance de Mustapha Kemal n'est pas établi.

D'un autre côté il se confirme que les bolcheviks veulent venir en aide à leurs alliés les Turcs.

Dans ces conditions, la Roumanie, en toutes circonstances, ne saurait participer à une action commune à Constantinople avant d'avoir effectivement reçu les munitions dont elle a besoin afin de pouvoir défendre en tout état de cause sa frontière de l'est.

Le Gouvernement français, d'après les communications qui nous sont faites, n'a pas encore qu'il serait en mesure d'arrêter Kemal Pacha sur la rive asiatique, si on subsistait des nouvelles manifestations militaires à Constantinople et si on assurait aux Turcs la possibilité d'atteindre par voie pacifique et conférences internationales la nouvelle frontière de Thrace. Nous sommes loin de cette solution sous, si on l'établit en même temps une zone autre entre Turcs et Bulgares.

Nous resumons pour la commodité nos points essentiels:

1. Maintenir son barrage anglo-française sur toute solution,
2. Empêcher à tout prix le retour des Turcs en Europe,
3. Ne pas perdre de vue le danger russe, le plus grave pour la Roumanie, même pour toute l'Europe.

E 9893 27/44] No. 210.

Sir R. Graham (the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Oct. 3rd) September 25.)

(No. 87.)
My Lord, *Rome, September 21, 1922.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 84 of the 16th September, I have the honour to report that since that date the disposition of the Italian press to any kind of military action against Turkey, with the object of the neutralisation of the Straits, has steadily increased.

While the "liberty of the Straits" is still generally declared to be an essential Italian interest, it is argued that Italian warships were to be ordered from Italian ports it could be impossible to trust to the course of events during the long communications which would be necessary to understand.

In my despatch under reference I reported that opinion in this country was at, authoritatively pointed out that while the Government had put a policy of limited military co-operation, it was not.

It is doubtful whether this is any longer the case. It appears that a *mot d'ordre* has been given to the press in the contrary sense. Nothing short of an active participation in maintaining Italy's "equal rights" on the Straits would now be tolerated, and this point of view (Tribuna, 19th September, &c.) appears to be shared and fostered by the Government.

Two causes have contributed to strengthen this attitude. The first was the discovery that the attitude of France was less inimical to the British view than had at first been reported. As the Secolo (20th September) remarks: "Had France really been at one with England in elementary programme Italy might have been wise to reconsider her own position in order to avoid isolation. It is, on the contrary, the British Government which has found itself isolated." The note of satisfaction and relief at the reserve shown by M. Poincaré was very great, enabling the press.

The other principal cause of this increase of belligerent partisanship was the British Reuter communiqué. The strong wording of this document, on the one hand, alarmed Italian opinion with the sense that events were moving precipitately towards hostilities of a far-reaching character; on the other hand, it gave a reassuring feeling that the liberty

of the Straits, which Italy wishes maintained, would be adequately and, in the end successfully champ ned without any risk or expense to herself" On both these grounds the neutral st tendency was reinforced The Reuter communique was widely denounced as "an unjustifiable provocation" At the same time there was a marked cessation of articles emphasising that Italy has interests at the Dardanelles to defend

Moreover the Italian Government on the publication of the Reuter communique was pressed by newspapers of every political colour to define more clearly the nature of the "satisfactory assurances" alleged in the British statement to have been given to the Foreign Office by Signor Scialoja with the result that the Italian Government hastened to abandon its somewhat ambiguous position and issued the communique reported in my telegram No 281, which adopted, at the same time, definitely strengthened the pacific prejudices of the public It is necessary, comments the "Tribuna" 17th September "to arrange a regime to protect the liberty of the Straits. But such a regime is compatible with the Turkish aspirations for sovereignty" On this subject the press may now be said to remain silent We should not be surprised, writes the "Tribuna" which on this question has shown itself on the closest touch with the Consulta, "if the Government's decision to withdraw its military contingents to Constantinople were in the event of any further complications to be extended to a withdrawal even from Egypt itself"

At the same time the Restoration Carrée (20th September) points out that it is "extraordinary exhibitionism on the part of Italy to couple her affirmations about the freedom of the Straits with explicit declarations that she is impotent if need arises to enforce her intervention We regret that the consumption of the *Entente* should be so conspicuously increased In general, however, Italy is desirous to have the *beau rôle* for past foresight and purpose to emphasise it yesterday's meeting at Paris seems to us a splendid confession of the Latin thesis

In regard to this meeting, more resentment is to be expressed at your Lordship's reported reluctance to notice Count Sforza in the conversations The Giornale d'Italia" writes "This attempt to exclude our representative from a discussion which deeply concerned us was nevertheless noted not to our disadvantage but as an attempt to refuse Italy the rank of a first class Power in an essentially diplomatic task which is saving something that is wise not to underestimate Some hints have been given to us privately, we take it, by the President of the Council himself that this result of the pressure exercised on his behalf by the British Government was due before the Genoa Conference, which is the reason that Signor Schanzer was kindly kept waiting in London for ten days before he was received, although not only does the British Government attempt to exclude Italy by its aggressive attitude by a series of acts covertly or openly offensive to her interests and prestige Much praise is given on all hands to Count Sforza for his high and dignified attitude at this important juncture" He is at this moment a much better press than Signor Schanzer

As soliciting support to this sensational attitude, it may be noted that the Press points out that a policy of entente between France Britain differences is logical first step to the settlement of Near Eastern questions But Signor Nitti is so unpopular at this present moment that the support of his press is of benefit to us

In general it may be said that the events of the past week have reduced in the Italian press the latent very more friendly attitude towards France and a corresponding increase of hostility towards England In the latter sentiment the Fascisti organ 'Popolo d'Italia,' is most conspicuous, an article such as that by Signor Mussolini forwarded in my despatch No 280 of the 16th September are of almost daily occurrence in its columns It repeatedly demands the restoration of Constantinople and Adrianople to Turkey the reflection of British influence from the Straits, an outlet for Bulgarian on the Aegean and the refusal to let the essential greed of Great Britain assume the mask of collective interest by which the Allies are repeatedly asked to save the British Empire and their presented with the bill This attitude is by no means confined to the Fascisti, but the growing influence of that party, which is bound to increase as the Fascisti exercise an increased influence on Italian foreign policy, renders it worthy of remark

I have, &c
R GRAHAM

E 9849 27 44] No 601

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 25)

(No 2221)

His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from M Poincaré, dated the 21st September 1922, respecting French troops at Chanak

Paris September 23 1922

Enclosure in No. 601

M Poincare to Lord Hardinge

Ministère des Affaires étrangères,
Monsieur l'Ambassadeur *Paris le 21 septembre*, 1922

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire connaître que les troupes françaises cantonnées dans la région de Tchanak, et qui comprenaient une compagnie d'infanterie (80 hommes) d'un peloton de spahis marocains (20 hommes), ont reçu l'ordre de se retirer à Kilid Bahr dans la péninsule de Gallipoli C'est le Général Harington qui en a donné l'ordre à la demande du Haut Commissariat français et sous que le Haut Commissaire anglais ait fait à ce sujet aucune observation Les troupes italiennes devaient prendre le temps que les troupes françaises

Il reste à Smyrne un peloton de spahis marocains (20 hommes)

D'après les renseignements qui me sont envoyés de Constantinople Sir Horace Rumbold se serait inspiré exactement de la suggestion faite à son collègue français sur la convocation de la dite conférence qui règlerait les questions territoriales uniquement aux exigences turques en renvoyant à une conférence ultérieure la solution des questions plus complexes comme celles des Capitulations, ne seraient pas le meilleur moyen d'arrêter l'avance des troupes kémalistes

Notre Haut Commissariat ne néglige d'autre part pour sa part rien pour calmer la nervosité régnant à Constantinople et que des mesures de précautions militaires aient été prises

Enfin d'après des informations que le Colonel Meagher me fait parvenir d'Angora il règne là une profonde émotion La Convention d'Angora comptant toujours la liberté complète des Détroits sur la déclaration de principe de l'Angleterre fait appel à toutes armes pour la défendre On exprime l'opinion que plusieurs généraux anglais auraient démissionné en conflit La Colonel Meagher ajoute que la situation est grave et que le Gouvernement d'Angora ne reviendra pas dans cette ville, mais restera à Brousse où arrivent des troupes

Je vous prie, pour avoir intérêt de vous donner connaissance de ces diverses informations que vous jugerez certainement utiles de communiquer à Lord Curzon

Veuillez, &c
R POINCARÉ

E 9850 27 44] No. 602

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 26)

(No 2222)

His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from M Poincare, dated the 21st September, respecting the action of General Harington at Constantinople

Paris, September 23 1922

Enclosure 1 in No. 227

M. Poincaré to Lord Hardinge

Ministère des Affaires étrangères

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Paris le 21 septembre 1922*

J'ai l'honneur de communiquer ci-joint à votre Excellence un télégramme adressé à M. le Ministre de la Guerre par le commandant des forces françaises de Constantinople. Il en résulte que le Général Harrington a convoqué les généraux alliés le 18 septembre pour les inviter à se tenir prêts à résister le cas échéant avec toutes leurs forces aux kémalistes, conformément à la décision qui aurait été prise par les Gouvernements alliés. Le Général Harrington a demandé l'envoi urgent de renforts français et italiens dans le secteur d'Ismid et dans celui de Tchanak et l'exécution de travaux de défense.

Je me puis me dispenser de protester contre l'initiative ainsi assumée par le Général Harrington. Elle est, sans doute, le résultat d'un malentendu, mais dont les conséquences pourraient être assez graves pour qu'il soit indispensable de le dissiper sans délai. Je n'ai pas à apprendre à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement de la République a toujours le Gouvernement britannique déclaré prêt à s'associer à une démarche diplomatique auprès de Moustapha Kemal pour l'inviter à respecter la zone neutre mais qu'il a toujours interdit à associer à une décision ayant pour objet d'organiser la résistance sur la force. Loin de là, le Gouvernement français a cessé de l'écrire et a fait toute prise à ce sujet par le Gouvernement britannique qu'il convenait avoir sur ce point et qu'il a lui-même fait à tous égards.

Je suis certain que le Gouvernement britannique s'empressera de déclarer immédiatement au Général Harrington sur les différents points, comme je me renseigne moi-même le Haut Commissaire français à Constantinople et le Général Charpy.

J'attire d'autre part toute l'attention de votre Excellence sur les considérations exposées par le Général Charpy et qui m'apparaissent en tous points celles que, au cours de notre entretien développées hier devant Lord Curzon, sur les difficultés de l'action militaire préconisée par le Général Harrington sur les dangers qu'elle présenterait et sur l'absolue nécessité de recourir à l'action diplomatique pour empêcher un conflit.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

R. POINCARÉ.

Enclosure 2 in No. 227

General Charpy to French Ministry for War

(Télégraphique.) *Constantinople, le 19 septembre 1922*

Les mesures à prendre ont été exposées par le Général Harrington le 18 courant. Elles ont été accueillies avec réserve, chacun estimant que cela devait ressortir aux attributions des Légations et nécessiter de se tenir prêt conformément à la décision des Puissances à défendre le cas échéant avec toutes leurs forces la route aux nationalistes turcs.

Il demande en conséquence envoi urgent renforts français, italiens dans le secteur d'Ismid et celui de Tchanak et exécution de travaux de défense. Mon collègue italien et moi avons déclaré tout d'abord ignorer décision susvisée des Gouvernements alliés. Nous avons rappelé ce qui avait été décidé à la conférence des Hauts Commissaires à Londres le 10 septembre.

1. Ont été envoyés dans la zone neutre petits détachements alliés, mais seulement pour une démonstration d'entente et de coopération au sujet du principe respect de la zone neutre.

2. Que seraient demandées instructions aux Gouvernements en raison de l'impossibilité de défendre avec chances sérieuses la zone avec les moyens militaires alliés actuellement disponibles à Constantinople.

Nous plaçant ensuite au point de vue exclusivement militaire, nous avons exposé que la situation en août à Tchataldja très différente de celle d'une part importance forces grecques armées démoralisées indisciplinées, hésitation chez Gouvernement et commandement grec à exécuter menace, d'autre part appui flotte efficace, terrain propice défensive, front connu bonne position repli, soutien moral peut-être

matériel de la population turque de Constantinople, ces opérations pouvaient donc être engagées avec grandes chances succès.

Problème actuel.

1. D'une part forces ennemies nombreux matériel et moral exalté décidées à lutter pour conquérir capitale et territoire national. D'autre part, terrain peu propice à la défensive favorable aux infiltrations, nécessite grande densité troupes défense large front, aucune profondeur pour la défense, mer à dos. Éléments turcs zone occupation hostiles.

2. Nécessité surveiller efficacement front Tchataldja à cause effervescence Thrace, organisation de bandes.

3. Entre ces fronts danger agglomération Scutari, Constantinople où soulèvement certain en cas de lutte contre Kemal à courte distance capitale.

4. Occupation de Tchanak excentrique éloignée troupe de ce secteur isolé. Dans ces conditions, convient pas engager bataille avec plusieurs fronts et insécurité lignes intérieures échec certain, prestige militaire allié insulté. Plan action est basé sur moyens actuels très nettement insuffisants. Si on envisage moyens réellement nécessaires, il faudrait véritable corps expéditionnaire, dans ce cas effectifs actuels même renforcés immédiatement par plusieurs bataillons seraient insuffisants pour permettre lutter avec chance succès contre kémalistes qui ont tous leurs moyens à pied d'œuvre tandis que le nouveau renforts alliés forcément éloignés et tardive.

Dans ces conditions, mon collègue italien et moi nous avons exprimé l'avis que, au lieu d'envisager l'action militaire il était préférable de traiter la question par moyens diplomatiques. Un groupe d'eux reconnaître justesse de cette observation.

Il a été décidé sur cet exposition que les généraux conféreraient avec les Hauts Commissaires et leur signaleraient la gravité des conséquences d'une opération aventurée après leur avoir exposé le point de vue militaire.

E 9853/27/44 No. 228

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 25.)

(No. 2227.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter from M. Poincaré of the 23rd September respecting the maintenance of order in Constantinople.

Paris, September 24, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 228

M. Poincaré to Lord Hardinge

LE Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères a l'honneur d'accuser réception de la communication de son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté britannique en date du 24 de ce mois relative à la situation intérieure existant à Constantinople.

Le Gouvernement français est naturellement prêt à s'associer à toute mesure destinée strictement à assurer le maintien de l'ordre. Puisque celui-ci ne paraît pas être jusqu'ici avisé de la présence d'un corps d'armée aussi considérable de gens armés à Constantinople, Néanmoins M. Poincaré a l'honneur de faire connaître à son Excellence Lord Hardinge of Penshurst que des instructions vont être envoyées, par l'entremise du Haut Commissaire français au Général Charpy, lui qu'il se concerte avec le Général Harrington en vue d'aviser aux moyens d'empêcher l'explosion de troubles dans la ville en tenant compte de la nécessité d'éviter dans les circonstances actuelles des mesures qui pourraient être interprétées comme ayant un caractère politique et de nature à être un motif d'excitation pour la population locale.

Ministère des Affaires étrangères

Paris, le 24 septembre 1922.

E 9854 27 44 No. 604

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 25)

(No. 2228)
My Lord, *Paris, September 24, 1922*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of a communication from M. Poincaré, stating that the denial by His Majesty's Embassy, made during your Lordship's presence in Paris, of the statement made by him that His Majesty's Minister in Athens had requested the Greek Government to provide 60,000 troops, to be supplied by His Majesty's Government with arms and ammunition, M. Poincaré states that he has communicated this denial to the French Legation in Athens where the report apparently originated.

I have &c.
HARDINGE OF PENSHURST

Enclosure in No. 604

M. Poincaré to Lord Hardinge

PAR une note en date du 23 de ce mois l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique a bien voulu faire savoir à M. Poincaré que l'information relative à une démarche que le Ministre de Sa Majesté Britannique à Athènes aurait faite pour demander au Gouvernement grec de constituer en Thrace une force de 60,000 hommes, armée et équipée par l'Angleterre et dont les frais et le matériel étaient entièrement dénués de fondement et que l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté était autorisée à la démentir formellement.

Le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, s'empresse d'accuser réception de cette communication dont il a transmis de ce pas un commissaire à la Légation de la République à Athènes.

Ministère des Affaires Etrangères
Paris, le 24 septembre 1922

No. 605

Mr. Findley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 25)

(No. 476)
(Telegraphic) R *Athens, September 25, 1922*

SIR H. RUMBOLD'S telegram No. 453.

I hesitate to make request without instructions, because Greeks here believe that Greeks in Constantinople are in imminent danger and many may wish to leave at the shortest notice. In such case Averoff might take some of their ships and her presence may reassure them.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 606

Mr. Findley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 25)

(No. 477)
(Telegraphic) R *Athens, September 25, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 250.

My information is that all Greek ships in Greek ports have been requisitioned and Greek ships in foreign ports except in cases in which Greek Government have not been able to find necessary foreign exchange. Ordinary traffic with islands is completely suspended, ships being used for transporting soldiers and refugees. Greek Government have been afraid to send Greek ships to [illegible] groups omitted, they will send them to Smyrna under arrangement mentioned in my telegram No. 273. In short I believe Greek Government are doing all they can but I do not mean that more efficient Government and people could not do more with means at their disposal.

It should be remembered that these refugees are not Greek subjects and very many thousands are not even Greek speaking. In fact they are Christian minorities whose protection has been subject of constant pledges on the part of His Majesty's Government. Greek Government in agreeing to receive them has already done more than any other Government.

Greek authorities are also doing their best to feed them when landed, but they have neither means nor organisation to do so efficiently and I fear that severe epidemics will break out unless a competent foreign organisation takes charge forthwith.

It should be realised that refugee question has not nearly reached its worst. Hundreds of thousands are still awaiting shipment from Asia Minor and everything points to enormous numbers leaving European Turkey. Americans here are doing all they can and so is British colony. Nothing more can be expected of others.

No. 607

Mr. Findley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 26)

(No. 478.)
(Telegraphic) R *Athens, September 25, 1922*

NEWSPAPERS of all shades denounce terms of Allied invitation to Kemalists as betrayal of promises made to Christian subjects of Turkey and as the opening of new era of war in the Balkans. Venizelist papers declare that Greece must resist decisions of the Powers and that M. Venizelos must return.

Deputation of nine Eastern Deputies called this morning to plead the cause of their countrymen. In reply to their representations I informed them that proposals of the Powers must be regarded as definite and that they must make up their minds that [illegible] of the Maritza was a question which was prepared to go to war to keep Turks out of Europe and that they could not help themselves. I said that it was madness to organise armed resistance which would merely ensure a disaster and it was to be presumed that Powers would be able to prevent repetition of Smyrna tragedy in Europe. As regards movement against present régime which they put forward as a way out of their difficulties I said that such movement meant internecine civil war which was greater disaster than any that had yet overtaken Greece and would have no influence on decisions of the Powers. Prime Minister was shown to be patriotic man and it was duty of all Greeks to sink their differences and support him.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 608

Sir H. Lamb to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 25)

(No. 125)
Telegraphic) R *Belgrade, September 25, 1922.*

FRENCH Chargé d'Affaires communicated this morning to Serb-Croat-Slovene Government in the name of Great Britain, France and Italy text of note to Government of Angora and expressed hope that it was in accordance with views of Serb-Croat-Slovene Government. Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs thought that Cabinet would await return of M. Nintchitch who is expected within next two days before giving it their consideration.

No. 609

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 25)

(No. 460)
(Telegraphic) R *Constantinople, September 25, 1922*

YOUR telegram No. 417.

At meeting this morning of Allied and United States High Commissioners it was decided to request our wireless naval authorities at Smyrna to urge Kemalist Government to extend period of delay within which refugees thence must be removed

including fifteen vessels chartered by Board of Trade some twenty five vessels in all appear to be available for transport of refugees It was agreed that first necessity was despatch to Smyrna of these vessels and that once there it should be left to Allied naval authorities on the spot to regulate embarkation and destination It is, however important that vessels sent for the purpose should be victualled in advance for journey say from Smyrna to Salonica or Cavala Arrangements for supplying refugees when they have arrived at their destination would best be made at [Athens] possibly with representatives of Red Cross committees there

Generally speaking it is scarcely practicable for High Commissioners here to attempt to co-ordinate measures of relief which would best be arranged direct between Athens and Smyrna Incidentally there are no funds here at disposal of High Commissioners for relief purposes French and Italian High Commissioners are telegraphing to their Governments on this subject

Smyrna is, of course primary consideration but it must be recollected that there are perhaps some 100,000 to 120 000 refugees in the north shore of Sea of Marmora, Rodosto &c, who will probably wish to be transferred from Eastern Thrace before it is handed back to Turkey

(Repeated to Athens)

No 610

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 25.)

(No 461)
(Telegraphic) R *Constantinople September 25. 1922*

MY telegram No 456

General Harington informs me that a force of Turkish cavalry 2 000 strong with machine guns has appeared at Ereglikeui

We have arranged to telegraph to admiral at Smyrna to interview Mustapha Kemal if passible and get him to give orders for withdrawal of this force of cavalry from neutral zone French High Commissioner at my request has undertaken to instruct French admiral at Smyrna to take similar steps and is speaking to Nationalist agent here We are pointing out that British military authorities at Chanak have shown utmost forbearance in this matter Turkish force will be surrounded by line within a short time across which it will not pass on receipt of orders by commander of force

Mustapha Kemal and Nationalist agent are to be warned that if Turkish cavalry remain at Ereglikeui after lapse of time limit General Harington will have no alternative but to turn them out

---

No 611

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 26)

(No. 462.)
(Telegraphic) R *Constantinople September 25. 1922*

YOUR telegram No 421 is deciphered instructed me to consult General Officer Commanding but I assume that I was to consult Admiral Brock as General Harington knows nothing of the matter The latter agrees that His Majesty's Minister Bucharest, might sound Roumanian Government, as suggested

Repeated to Bucharest)

No 612

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 25)

(No 463)
(Telegraphic) R *Constantinople September 25. 1922*

ATHENS telegram No 476

French High Commissioner asked me yesterday to join in recommending that orders should be given that Averoff should leave Constantinople Both of my colleagues consider her presence here a source of provocation and as likely to complicate matters for us at this critical juncture I informed French High Commissioner that I had already telegraphed to you and to Athens

It should not be difficult for Greek Government to have two or three ships ready to take Greeks off in case of necessity If in the meantime presence of Averoff at Constantinople is more likely to react unfavourably on Greeks

(Repeated to Athens)

No 613

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief Mediterranean (Received at Foreign Office September 25)

(No 983)
(Telegraphic) *September 24. 1922*

RUMBOLD'S telegram No 450 of 23rd September raises questions of grave importance which will receive immediate consideration of Cabinet Meanwhile whilst in no way cancelling or interrupting your plans for control of shipping in the Bosphorus do not actually take action on them until you receive instructions which will be sent to you to-morrow

Show this to Rear-Admiral Darrington

No 614

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief Mediterranean (Received at Foreign Office September 25)

(No 989)
(Telegraphic) *September 25, 1922.*

WITH reference to Admiralty telegram No 983 of yesterday Rumbold's telegram No 450 of 23rd September to Foreign Office has been carefully considered by Cabinet to-day and I repeat it paragraph by paragraph

The situation has necessarily varied from day to day, and subject to general instructions from His Majesty's Government I trust Admiral Brock, General Harington and I myself may be given full latitude to deal with it to the best of our ability

as approved by His Majesty's Government which is complete confidence in its representatives on the spot It is enough to hint at delay which has occurred in carrying out our instructions will illustrate the fewness of units of shipping

---

No 615

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 25)

By Bag

(No 479)
(Telegraphic) *Paris September 24. 1922*

PRACTICALLY entire French press welcomes with unfeigned satisfaction decision reached here yesterday to send identical instruction to Angora Government, and stress as much as its being a first step for peace in general, and not for any particular country's Government Your Lordship's conciliatory disposition is highly appreciated and is the subject of much eulogy Regret is expressed in most of the papers that Mr Lloyd George should in contrast, have assisted in controversial statement at moment when three Powers had just reached agreement

I am sending by to-night's bag leading articles in this evening's Temps which reflects general opinion of press It does not disguise difficulties which still remain and hints that Kemalists may be reluctant to accept the proposed for Straits but its tone is in general optimistic and is merely to Great Britain

M Gauvain in the Journal des Debats remarks gloomily that the proposed peace will result in a Turkey stronger than before the war If the Turks show intransigence it will, he declares prove that it is impossible to allow their re-establishment in Europe He wonders with the suggestion that the Soviet Government may prevent Mustapha Kemal from accepting the conditions now offered to him

No 616

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 25)

(Unnumbered Private and Secret)
(Telegraphic) *Paris September 25 1922*

MENDL has seen Nahad Resmi today Latter expresses conviction that Kemal will accept terms and opportunity of conference He views Bourdon's sole presence with Kemal as most dangerous to British interests since he will attribute entire success of terms offered to Allied solidarity to France's efforts He considers we should send a trusty English envoy and suggests that he should cross to London to see you Resmi adds "I think it important for you to see him" The name suggested by Resmi as one who would be acceptable to Turks will believe in him is Aubrey Herbert

I would suggest one way of preventing harm in Bourdon from prejudicing [? British interests] would be to send someone from Constantinople to see Kemal before Franklin Bouillon gets there such as Mr Henderson

---

No 617

Sir A Geddes to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 25)

(No 575)
(Telegraphic) R *Washington September 25 1922*

My telegram No 572

The underlying eastern hope is regard British participation in joint note sent to Kemal as a diplomatic victory for France due largely to attitude of British ideal Terms offered mean regard Turkish aspirations for Kemal who where there is little hostility to return home return of Turks to Europe is helped and it is rarely predicted that present settlement eventually is generally interpreted it is accepted by Turks with a result of stalemate in the Near East

Activity of League of Nations to maintain freedom of the Straits or protect minorities is very generally derided by press New York Times welcomes proposal as natural sequel and logical improvement yet all to League

World thinks that if Court of war enforcement of League's authority in the Straits will go by the British navy and sees our suggestion only as compensation for what it regards as defeat of our policy in three directions

---

No 618

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 25)

(No 110)
(Telegraphic) *Warsaw September 24 1922*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs informed me yesterday that visit of President to Bucharest had been received by great cordiality No new agreements had been concluded but ties had been strengthened uncertain ambiguities in treaties regarding competence in existing military agreement had been cleared up

Minister for Foreign Affairs had formed all confidence in Roumania seriously preoccupied by Bessarabian question and possible complications arising out of Near East crisis President had in the expressed opinion that Russian attack was improbable this year but he was himself apprehensive as to possible aggressive action by Soviet Government next autumn He hoped Roumania would not be forced to take up any openly hostile attitude towards Angora Government in order to safeguard liberty of straits as this might be exploited regarded by Soviet Government as part of preparation

I enquired whether in that case Poland would consider that *casus foederis* had arisen as their agreement with Roumania was purely defensive He replied that this would be a matter for consideration but later he added that his opinion was that quite apart from treaty Polish Government though most sincerely desirous of avoiding renewal of war would for their own sake be obliged to come at once to assistance of Roumania and thus anticipate a Russian attack on Poland which was sure to follow

(Repeated to Bucharest and Moscow)

No 619

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr Lindley (Athens)

(No 251)
(Telegraphic) R *Foreign Office September 25, 1922*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No 453 repeated to you

Please urge Greek Government to withdraw Greek warships from Constantinople at once and to close their naval base there

Reasons given by Sir H Rumbold are of unanswerable force

(Repeated to Constantinople No 425)

No 620

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris)

(No 325)
(Telegraphic) D *Foreign Office September 25, 1922*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No 461 of 25th September Re entry of Turkish troops into Chanak zone

You should inform French Government, who will doubtless desire to reinforce action of their High Commissioner and Admiral with the right quarter

(Repeated to Rome No 284)

E 9843 27 44 No 62

British Secretary's Notes of the Conference between the French President of the Council the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Italian Ambassador in Paris held on Friday September 22 2 P M (Received September 25)

Third Meeting

Present

For France
M Poincaré

For Great Britain
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
Lord Hardinge of Penshurst

For Italy
Count Sforza

Secretaries

M de Laroche	M Gallo
M Massigli	Mr Forbes Adam
M Clinchant	Mr Leeper
M Barreton	

M POINCARE opened the proceedings by enquiring whether Lord Curzon had received any information from British sources or from his Government regarding the situation

LORD CURZON said that he understood that their endeavour that afternoon would be to lay down the bases of agreement on certain important points upon which

the future peace conference would proceed. The difficulty was undoubtedly great but it was essential that the three Great Powers, while reaching a general agreement upon these issues, should not lay down publicly on this subject any terms or precise conditions without consulting the smaller Powers who might well object to them. It would not only be disrespectful to them, but it would be dangerous to bring upon the work of the peace conference unnecessary trouble. It might be suggested that the main points of importance should be discussed privately and that they should exchange their views in order to see how far agreement was possible. By this procedure Lord Curzon felt that despite the differing standpoints and upon which the three Allies still stood, He proposed that they should agree by taking the Bosporus and Constantinople Convention of 1841 as the basis of Europe the Straits might be regulated. He did not wish to take up time in so many conferences that existed the power of the Allied Governments to reach a satisfactory settlement were free to work together privately to prove a united front which he had already mentioned.

Lord Curzon then by stating that he had the most certain fact to give the conference. His own telegrams from His Majesty's Commissioner at Constantinople rested mainly on the information from General Pelle which M. Poincaré had read to the conference. He himself did not know where he was but he was sure he could trust M. Poincaré would have news to give them on this point to-morrow.

M. POINCARÉ said that he did not quite understand the position as explained by Lord Curzon. All that he wished to do that day was to find a means which would render possible for the Turks to come to the peace conference. He could not consent to go to a peace without their presence. His aim was to be in a position to restore Great Britain and Italy were to sign an agreement on certain important points to enable Mustapha Kemal and his representatives to come with confidence to the conference.

M. Poincaré then proceeded to read two telegrams giving an account of conversations between General Pelle and Mustapha Kemal at Smyrna. General Pelle stated that Kemal was in a state of some exaltation. He had stated that his troops were tired and eager to fight. But even so General Pelle's opinion was that it was prepared to accept some sort of compromise. General Pelle's personal opinion was that the presence of the Allied fleets and soldiers would prevent the Turks from crossing to Europe. The result would be war preceded probably by a revolution in Constantinople and Thrace. The more pressing the Turkish troops on the southern shores of the waters between the Black Sea and the Dardanelles together with the Greek refugees and women and children in the Allied navies to evacuate their position. In his opinion the only means of avoiding such a catastrophe was to propose that Great Britain should agree to a Mudania or some sort of conference provided Great Britain would agree to attend and send representatives. It would be impossible perhaps to arrange with Kemal to stop his troops. In General Pelle's opinion it was quite certain that Kemal would not stop them however if he were at once promised that he would receive Thrace up to the Maritza at the future conference. General Pelle concluded his telegrams by asking for urgent instructions as to the movements of the French fleet and army in the Near East.

M. Poincaré suggested that at these circumstances and in the possibility of a Kemal attack it seemed now imminent it was essential for them at once to decide to give Kemal these territorial assurances which would alone satisfy him. Even if England and Italy would allow France to give him these assurances it was to be feared that if war might be stopped and the powers of a revolution in Constantinople and Thrace be avoided. If England and Italy refused to join in or send any such communication to Kemal France would have publicly to explain her position and repudiate all responsibility for the failure of the Allies to stop the war.

As an instance of the feeling in France and her colonies on this point, M. Poincare referred to a recent communication from the Sultan of Morocco who was in Paris and who had told him that it was absolutely essential that France should not go to war with the Turks.

M. Poincare concluded by urging again that the Allies could say at once to Kemal that subject to future agreement regarding the freedom of the Straits, the Allies were prepared to accept at once his desire to obtain the Maritza frontier, Kemal would not advance and the one means of stopping the war would have been found.

COUNT SFORZA then gave some confidential information which he had received that morning from Constantinople. Since he regarded as vital to the interests of the Alliance and of Europe the most intimate co-operation between the Allied military and naval forces at Constantinople he asked that the information on which he was now going to give might be kept strictly confidential and not regarded as gossip to be passed on to people outside the Conference Chamber. His telegram showed that General Monelli had had a conversation either with General Harington or with one of the British generals on the spot. Monelli had told this general that a Turkish attack were to develop, he would do his best under General Harington's orders to meet it and to help the British, but in his opinion the military situation was hopeless. The other had replied that it was admittedly grave, but that the British were in a position to count on the arrival of Greek and Italian divisions. Even if these did not arrive there were other ways of meeting the danger and he had then suggested that it might be possible to arm the Christian population of Constantinople and the surrounding country. Count Sforza drew the earnest attention of the conference to the gravity of this advice and the incalculable disasters that might result when war began.

M. POINCARÉ said that he had had a report in something like the same sense from his own military authorities on the spot. At any rate the latter were quite as pessimistic as General Monelli.

LORD CURZON thanked Count Sforza and M. Poincaré for the information they had just given to the conference to which he attached much importance. He would like to point out however, that it was quite natural that Kemal should state the position in a light which was unfavourable to the Allies. It was natural that he should try to show to the Allies that their measures of defence would be useless. It was natural that he should advance across the neutral zones and the Sea of Marmara. He was simply endeavouring to make a certain impression upon his hearers. Lord Curzon's own information was of quite identical with that of his colleagues. It was true that General Harington was bitterly disappointed that the Allied co-operation on which he had counted had failed. So far, at any rate, as the Asiatic shores of Asia Minor were concerned General Harington realised thoroughly the danger to himself and his troops, but with the forces at his disposal and the presence of the British fleet he believed that he could render a better account than other British or Italian troops were supposed to have possibly done. His attitude was one of resolution and determination. If he were compelled to fight the Turks and withdraw from the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles and Gallipoli the fact would not be wholly that of Great Britain. Public opinion would remember that in the circumstances Great Britain had been abandoned by the Allies and public opinion would appreciate the very heavy blow thus dealt at the Alliance by those who had chosen to desert us.

Lord Curzon understood from the previous discussions that they were all agreed that the essential rest was to have an interview at once. He himself had entirely concurred with this point of view and had asked that it should be held as soon as possible and in any place that suited his colleagues. Everything went to show that Mustapha Kemal took the same view as to an immediate meeting but the suggestion which Kemal had made and which M. Poincaré and General Pellé had supported that this meeting should be at Mudania seemed extremely unreasonable. He asked his colleagues to think what this would mean. Were British, French, Italian, Serbian, Roumanian and Greek delegates to embark upon a ship and go to meet their conqueror at one of his own ports? For his part he must absolutely decline thus to tear up the Venice proposal and proceed to Mudania dragged by Mustapha Kemal like a Roman conqueror in his train. Once at Mudania, the Allies were apparently to be invited by Kemal to give him certain provinces in advance of any conference, for instance Thrace up to the Maritza. Did M. Poincaré

suppose that the Lord Curzon had received authority from his Government to agree to such proposals? M. [illegible] seemed to expect that the principal work of the future peace conference was to be done in advance, the conference itself, with a view [illegible] to Moscow [illegible] with the Allies [illegible] stop his attacks.

Lord Curzon said that he would now like to explain in a [illegible] a little further exactly what it meant to allow Kemal to return to the Maritza [illegible]. It seemed to him essential that when both parties were entering upon negotiations they should know exactly what they were to [illegible] the point [illegible] take place. Mustapha Kemal [illegible] Turkish [illegible] the pre-war Turco-Bulgarian frontier to be retained [illegible] territory [illegible] on the west by the Maritza [illegible] frontier and on the west, south-west, and south by the Aegean Sea and the Straits and the Sea of Marmara respectively. It was [illegible] conditions regarding the [illegible] of the Straits. [illegible] restoration of Turkish sovereignty over the whole of the above [illegible] complete. Lord Curzon said his colleagues [illegible] when they [illegible] the peace conference at Venice [illegible] Were [illegible] and Roumania [illegible] with this agreement [illegible] Surely not. [illegible] Kemal [illegible] Bulgarian frontier [illegible] Lord Curzon trusted that his colleagues would realise [illegible] proposal is unacceptable. [illegible] Lord Curzon [illegible] understood M. Poincaré's wish that as far as possible the Allies should be [illegible] He also asked [illegible] what [illegible] Paris Conference [illegible] Eastern Thrace [illegible] proposed. The British Government [illegible] frontier [illegible] the Midia-Rodosto line [illegible] as Kuleli Burgas [illegible] the Sea of Marmara [illegible] [illegible] was to [illegible] of Turkey in Europe [illegible] had reached [illegible] conference. But this [illegible] would have [illegible] towns [illegible] such as Adrianople, Kirk Kilisse [illegible] and Gallipoli. Against [illegible] statistics which [illegible] explained at the Moudania [illegible]

[illegible] to the [illegible] the [illegible] It was well, however, to remember [illegible] Greeks [illegible] and that [illegible] Moslem [illegible] at the [illegible] Except there [illegible] Lord Curzon [illegible] exact informa[tion] [illegible] in addition to the [illegible] Asia Minor [illegible] several divisions which had fought a good fight against the Turks in the neighbourhood of Eskishehr. [illegible] there would [illegible] Thrace [illegible] the wind.

He, Lord Curzon, would ask the conference [illegible] the Greeks [illegible] Eastern Thrace. [illegible] There [illegible] This [illegible] the well-known [illegible] methods of dealing with [illegible] with [illegible] They would [illegible] the Allies in Eastern Thrace. It was true [illegible] committed atrocities [illegible] to which Kemal was not subjected [illegible] Take for instance the [illegible] the Turkish entry into Smyrna. Kemal

* [illegible] After this statement Lord Curzon [illegible] and gave [illegible] conference [illegible] figure of the Greek forces [illegible]

was apparently refusing to allow any refugees between the ages of 15 and 45 to leave the town [illegible] refugees [illegible] leave after a certain date. [illegible] the deportations [illegible] would follow his entry into Thrace [illegible] was a [illegible] the Allies [illegible] gave him a promise [illegible] that he should have possession [illegible] M. Poincaré's [illegible] would have to [illegible] Roumanians [illegible] be taken by the conference.

LORD CURZON proceeded to suggest that it would be well to examine a little more [illegible] what was the real [illegible] of the conference as regards the future of Eastern Thrace. [illegible] Government there. For this purpose it was necessary that [illegible] and see whether it would not be possible [illegible] perhaps some [illegible] arrangement [illegible] the few years [illegible] Some [illegible] State [illegible] this purpose. There was no novelty in the idea. [illegible] M. Poincaré had suggested it himself during the [illegible] conference [illegible] State [illegible] proposed was to have been of a very restricted size, as it was only the territory [illegible] of the Maritza and [illegible] of the Enos-Midia line. [illegible] Lord Curzon had enquired whether the League of Nations would really undertake such a responsibility [illegible] whether it was possible to provide for the defence of such a State, or to maintain it, and whether it would not be a prey to the neighbouring countries. The situation was now, however, rather different, and there seemed to him, Lord Curzon, more [illegible] a larger [illegible] territory were [illegible] such as [illegible] Eastern Thrace [illegible] the Rodosto-Midia line [illegible] Maritza [illegible] further examination. [illegible] Turkish sovereignty [illegible] not [illegible] displace the flag [illegible] the Straits Commission [illegible] the League of Nations [illegible] A government [illegible] Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria [illegible] represented [illegible] Roumania and Serbia [illegible] the possible evacuation of Thrace [illegible] Constantinople [illegible] Greece [illegible] he would ask his [illegible] It [illegible] remembered that the Allies could not [illegible] Greece [illegible] Eastern Thrace without offering [illegible] compensation in return [illegible] Lord Curzon [illegible] view. [illegible] the Mudania proposals [illegible] to do the same [illegible] of Thrace [illegible] subject to the views of the Balkan States [illegible] proposal [illegible] M. Poincaré [illegible] that we should telegraph at once to Kemal [illegible] immediately to the Maritza [illegible] Lord Curzon concluded [illegible] his [illegible] to accept his proposal.

M. POINCARÉ was afraid that he [illegible] himself properly understood. When he had previously [illegible] as the result of General Pellé's visits to Smyrna [illegible] of Mustapha Kemal. He, M. Poincaré [illegible] General Pellé [illegible] there might be a good deal [illegible] in Kemal's attitude [illegible] General Pellé himself, who was a soldier of [illegible] experience and merit [illegible] had played a great part in the recent war. General Pellé, as the result of these conversations, had summed up the situation as very grave.

[illegible] M. Poincaré [illegible] Minister for War [illegible] The gist of this telegram was that the Allied [illegible] General Harington [illegible] the 18th September. [illegible] the possibility of the [illegible] the necessity of [illegible] the Powers [illegible] to the Turkish Nationalists [illegible] General Harington [illegible] asked, therefore, for French and Italian reinforcements in

both sectors on the Asiatic shore are that the works of defence should be pushed forward. The Italian and French generals had remanded General Harington in reply of the decisions taken at the meeting of the Allied High Commissioners and Generals on the 10th September, namely to send small Allied detachments to the neutral zones simply by way of demonstrating the *Entente* and the co-operation for the principle of respecting of the neutral zones, and secondly they wished to ask instructions from their Governments since it was impossible to defend with any chance of success with the military means at their disposal the said zones.

General Monbelli and General Charpy had explained to General Harington that the situation at Chatalja in August had been quite different. The Greek Government was hesitating, and their forces were demoralised and without discipline. The "terrain" was favourable for the defence, and there was the support of the fleet. The situation now was very different. There was a numerous enemy with exalted *morale* and much material determined to reconquer Constantinople and the national territory. On the Asiatic shore the ground was unfavourable for the Allied defence owing to its length and the fact that the sea was behind their backs. There were most Turkish elements actually in the zones of occupation. It was necessary effectively to watch the Chatalja zone because of the troubles in Thrace and the organisation of bands. There was certain to be a rising in Constantinople as soon as Kemal came close to it.

Charpy meant in my opinion far away from the centre of the zones being defended. They should not therefore open a fight with several fronts insecure interior and a certain crack in front of them with the possible result to Allied military prestige. The plan of action was actually based on material means which were quite insufficient. They really required extraordinary corps for the purpose. Even if several Italian divisions were sent to reinforce the Allies they would be insufficient to fight the Kemalists with any chance of success. These reinforcements in any case would probably arrive late and have to be scattered along the front.

General Charpy and his Italian colleague therefore expressed the view that the best way to solve the problem would be by diplomatic means rather than by military action. It had been decided on his proposal that the generals should confer with the Allied High Commissioners and find out from the grounds of the consequences of operations risked after the military point of view had been explained as above.

After reading this telegram M. Poincaré stated that according to the first paragraph of it General Harington had attributed to the Allied Governments which they had never taken. His statement as reported was incorrect and in sending troops of General Charpy's suite to Lord Hardinge the day before we had energetically protested against General Harington's action.

LORD CURZON said that he could not allow this attack on General Harington to pass. General Harington naturally thought that if the generals and High Commissioners had agreed to the movements of the troops to Ismid and Chanak, their Governments were in accord. He could not have foreseen that they would disavow them.

M. POINCARE said that General Harington had actually referred to a decision of the Governments which had not been taken. He must maintain his point of view.

LORD CURZON regretted that he could not allow the incident thus to pass. General Harington had always acted with scrupulous exactitude to his colleagues since he had been in command at Constantinople.

M. POINCARE, reverting to General Charpy's telegram, said that in face of such a telegram the Allied Governments ought not to allow such a dangerous operation as that contemplated by General Harington to continue. He cited the opinion of Marshal Foch and various other French generals and members of the Supreme General Staff and of the French Naval Staff who had come to see M. Poincaré the night before. One and all agreed that the present position of the Allied forces and navies was an impossible one.

LORD CURZON pointed out that he had already known for two days that this was the view of the French and Italian generals and their experts and he did not understand why M. Poincaré kept referring to the matter.

M. POINCARE said that he had understood Lord Curzon to have said that morning that, if the Allies were now attacked and defeated by the Turks, France would have to bear the responsibility. In fact, that if, after France's defection a misfortune occurred it would be the fault not of Great Britain but of her Allies. M. Poincaré could not allow this to pass. He emphatically repudiated the idea that he was committing a felonious act, an act of treachery, towards his Allies in withdrawing the French troops from the Asiatic shores of the Straits. It was simply a step necessitated by the situation and essential for the protection of precious lives. He would recall that once before France had allowed herself to be led into danger at the Dardanelles. It was true that they had taken the advice of a man, a civilian, whom M. Poincaré himself much respected, but they had come into it reluctantly and the results had been disastrous. He did not wish to take such a risk again. Lord Curzon must not be surprised if in such a matter he displayed emotion.

LORD CURZON asked to be allowed to say something to defend himself against the charges which M. Poincaré had made. For the last ten minutes M. Poincaré had been attributing to him certain words which he (Lord Curzon) had not employed, and upon that basis he had built up a fierce attack. As far as he could remember the words which he had used were that if General Harington had to withdraw from Asia Minor the fault would not wholly lie with Great Britain. For the rest he would remind M. Poincaré that they were holding intimate conversations, and in the privacy of the Council Chamber they did not always prepare their words in advance. However, he would ask M. Massigli to read the passage to which M. Poincaré referred, as he had taken it down and interpreted it.

M. MASSIGLI then quoted a passage in which Lord Curzon had said that if General Harington were compelled to fight and withdraw from the Asiatic shores of the Dardanelles or Ismid the fault would not wholly lie with Great Britain; that public opinion would remember that in this instance Great Britain had been abandoned by her Allies; and that public opinion in England would view as a serious the very heavy blow dealt at the alliance by those who had chosen to desert her.

M. POINCARE said that he must ask Lord Curzon to withdraw that statement.

LORD CURZON said that he would not do so. M. Poincaré had attributed to him the word "responsibility" which he had not used, and had wrongly quoted him.

COUNT SFORZA intervened to suggest that it would be well for them to consider how many times during the war there had been differences of opinion at the Council Chamber on various points, and how they had overcome such differences. For the moment in considering the Allied attitude towards Turkey it was essential to remember that France, Italy and Great Britain were Moslem Powers. It was particularly owing to that fact in the situation that France had felt compelled to withdraw her troops, as he understood it, and that was certainly one of the main reasons behind the Italian attitude.

M. POINCARE entirely agreed with Count Sforza. For the rest he, M. Poincaré, had never agreed to the despatch of troops to the southern shores of the Straits, and it was to the common Allied interest that those troops should be withdrawn. He agreed with Lord Curzon that in the Council Chamber they did not always and could not be expected to weigh their expressions very carefully. But this matter was a very grave one, and he was afraid that he would have to make a public declaration as to what had been said at the conference if British troops were attacked and beaten back from the southern shores of the Straits.

M. Poincaré then proceeded to read a message which he had sent to the French Embassy in London on the 18th September before the present conference. In this telegram he had clearly explained the French attitude as he had explained it since at the conference, thus showing that the French Government feared and were greatly impressed by the serious initiative taken by the British Government in sending and seeking reinforcements for the defence of the Straits at this time. He had then explained that it was impossible for the French Government to associate themselves with the measures contemplated by the British Government. He would recall that in March last he had warned Lord Curzon of the dangers they were running in not meeting the Turkish point of view to a greater extent and the difficulties which would face them in trying to obtain the acceptance of any terms which were not thus actually negotiated with the Turks. He had feared that Kemal might defy them with grave consequences to Europe and the Moslem world. His pessimistic forecast was now being proved by events. The British Government, however, appeared entirely to overlook the realities of the situation. The French Government however could not afford not to face the dangerous consequences of the Kemalist victory at which all Moslems throughout the world were rejoicing. The

French Government realised the risks of wounding Moslem susceptibilities at the moment, and they were certain from all the information which had reached them that Kemal insisted that he must receive back Adrianople and Eastern Thrace with safeguards for the Straits or he would never come to a conference, and a conference was the only method of settling the present dangerous situation.

LORD CURZON regretted that he was unable to understand why M. Poincaré had read his instructions to the French Embassy in London at the present conference. He was perfectly well aware of the French Government's views, as were his own Government. He had never for a moment attempted to throw doubt on M. Poincaré's entire consistency, not only during the present crisis, but since March last. He was well aware of M. Poincaré's views regarding the necessity of promising Kemal the Maritza frontier. He was well aware of the views of French expert military opinion upon the whole situation. All Lord Curzon had asked that day was that they should examine quite calmly and rather more deeply the concessions which they were proposing to make to Kemal and the consequences which might follow from them.

M. POINCARÉ said that he had understood Lord Curzon to say that he, M. Poincaré, had changed his views on that question from those that he held two days ago.

LORD CURZON said that he had never made or implied any accusation of inconsistency against M. Poincaré.

M. POINCARÉ then continued to read the instructions which he had sent to his Embassy in London on the 18th September. These instructions, among other things, had pointed out that if England adopted a threatening attitude and proposed to cross the Straits, the Turks might for a short time be prevented from doing so, but they would certainly take Mesopotamia in the meanwhile. As regards the possibility of relying on support from other States in the Balkans, M. Poincaré had there pointed out that the Serbian Government had informed him that they were on excellent terms with Kemal and had been for some time. They did not fear him. Apparently also England was now applying for Greek help. M. Poincaré then read out a telegram from a responsible source [illegible] to the effect that the British Minister had received a reply from the Greek Government for 60,000 men to help the British Government in defending the Straits. (Lord Curzon intervened to say that he did not believe for a moment that this information was correct.) The British Government must understand that the French Government would never agree to fight beside the Greeks. He wished again to emphasise to Lord Curzon that his point of view on this question had been throughout consistent, and that he was perfectly certain that Kemal would not stop his advance on the Straits and Constantinople without receiving before the conference certain soothing assurances. He regretted that [illegible] Lord Curzon and the British Government [illegible] appeared to share the [illegible] of General Harington regarding the [illegible] and they [illegible] to take the Turks in vague terms [illegible] giving them back the sovereignty of parts of Thrace in order to stop the Kemalist advance. He, M. Poincaré, did not exclude the possibility of providing some demilitarised zone on the Turkish side of the frontier in Thrace if the Maritza frontier and Adrianople were conceded to them. We could explain to Turkey that there were precedents in the other treaties for imposing restrictions on the sovereignty of other European States. Take for instance the case of the Rhineland. Of course if the Allies were to demilitarise a part of Turkish Thrace they would have to do the same across the frontier in Greek Western Thrace.

At this point, Lord Curzon, explaining that he could not tolerate the repeated and unfounded charges against himself and his country that M. Poincaré had thought fit to make, asked leave to suspend the sitting and take time to consider his action.

After an interval, in which private explanations were exchanged, the sitting was resumed.

M. POINCARÉ [illegible] to develop [illegible] question of the demilitarisation of parts of Thrace. When the Versailles Treaty was made, a phrase to which he objected was inserted in one of its articles which described the frontiers of Germany on the west as Belgium, Luxemburg and France. Thus Germany was left with the Rhineland under its own sovereignty.

Servitudes were however imposed as a military precaution, for instance the Allied occupation and various other controls. On this analogy it might be possible in the

[illegible] the east and west of the Maritza to inform the Turks and Greeks respectively that military precautions must be taken by the Allies in the matter of demilitarising certain zones. That, however, was a matter for the future conference, but meanwhile, the Allied Governments should be able to say something definite to the Turks about the frontiers of Thrace. In doing so there was no question of treason to Serbia and Roumania. In short, what M. Poincaré desired was to know whether, in the name of France, he could inform Kemal that the Allied Governments were agreed about such and such a frontier in Thrace. Otherwise France must speak alone.

LORD CURZON thanked M. Poincaré for his explanation which he thought had advanced the case and, without however making it absolutely clear, the proposal as he understood it was that the three Allies should say to Turkey that her frontiers would be extended to the Maritza, but that this would not preclude measures of military precaution on the Turkish side of the frontier and equally on the Greek side of the frontier. This still left one point undecided. He was not [illegible] M. Poincaré of any inconsistency. He simply wanted to get the information as to what M. Poincaré really meant. This was the point on which he had doubts. If he understood M. Poincaré rightly, the Allies were to give to Turkey in advance of any conference a definite pledge that she was to receive the Maritza frontier. This seemed a very serious step for the Allies to take at that stage. M. Poincaré appeared to be satisfied after his interviews with the Roumanians and the Serbians that they would accept the position without difficulty. Lord Curzon's own views with these Balkan representatives and [illegible] a different impression on his mind as to the gravity of the view which they would take of such a step. He therefore thought that it was better not to be definite at this stage, but to try and [illegible] to Turkey the [illegible]. Lord Curzon wondered whether it would not be possible to [illegible] formula [illegible] give to Kemal [illegible] conference. He had been surprised that M. Poincaré should [illegible] the most [illegible] controversial [illegible] the Maritza frontier [illegible] suggest that at [illegible] given [illegible] the Straits [illegible] necessary to give all assurances to Kemal before the conference, assuming of course that the peace conference would be at Venice under the aegis of General Pellé [illegible] to advise. The question arose whether the [illegible] given [illegible] general terms. Before [illegible] Lord Curzon had prepared a formula which he thought his Government would allow him to put forward for discussion. The [illegible] was [illegible] M. Poincaré and Count Sforza had exactly the same intentions as himself in this matter. He did not want to give Mustapha Kemal, in so many words, [illegible] the Allies and their [illegible] and provided his [illegible] were [illegible] to the conference. Meanwhile he was afraid that [illegible] suggested by M. Poincaré would [illegible] to [illegible].

Lord Curzon would like to add that he particularly wished to say in the formula to be presented to Kemal something about Constantinople. From the various observations made by Franklin-Bouillon and Kemal himself in this [illegible] that there was obviously some [illegible] as to the Allied intentions.

M. POINCARÉ said that he would like to read some further passages from his instructions of the 18th September to the French Embassy in London. He then cited a paragraph in which he had said that it was essential that the Allies should say something definite to Kemal on the important points of Constantinople, Gallipoli, the Maritza frontier and Adrianople.

As regards Serbia and Roumania, it seemed to him quite possible that if they were asked their opinion they would say that they much disliked a long common frontier between Bulgaria and Turkey. But in the last resort the Allies could make them agree to anything, and it must be remembered that under the March proposals a common frontier between Turkey and Bulgaria had been conceded. It was only a question of adding a few more kilometres to that frontier.

M. Poincaré had found some differences in the views of M. Nintchitch and the King of Serbia on the one side and M. Pasitch on the other side regarding Thrace. M. Pasitch seemed entirely opposed to conceding anything in Europe to Turkey, while the King and his Minister for Foreign Affairs were as completely opposed to preventing Kemal from obtaining the Maritza frontier.

COUNT SFORZA interposed to say that M Ninchitch had told him that M Pasitch was antipathetic to a long Turco-Bulgarian frontier, but that, as a matter of fact, he disliked change and it took time for any new idea to sink in

M POINCARE thought that this was quite true For the rest, he had recently had breakfast with M Ninchitch and the King of Serbia—a family party at which both the Queen and the King's doctor were also present and the King and his Foreign Minister had then told him that their relations with Kemal were excellent, and that they had no fears regarding the return of the Turks to Thrace The French Government had therefore no apprehensions on this score

LORD CURZON thought that at any rate from the point of view of the Straits, Roumania was perhaps more important than Serbia Even as regards the latter, it was a curious fact that he had seen the King of Serbia M Ninchitch and M Pasitch, that the first two had taken a different view from the Serbian Prime Minister but that the positions of both parties were precisely the reverse of those which they had explained to M Poincaré In any case all his information went to show that Roumania took a very serious view of the situation and her voice must be heard at the conference He would now ask leave to move his formula read

M MASSIGLI then read the draft invitation to the Angora Government which Lord Curzon had prepared before the conference (see annex to these minutes)

M POINCARE stated that he could adhere to much that was in this document but there was one grave omission and that was the lack of any precise statement as to the return of the Maritza and of Adrianople to the Turks Again he was not sure that Venice was a good choice for the conference It was too far from Asia Minor and Kemal might insist on a conference in the neighbourhood He would suggest leaving the place of the conference vague in the invitation, and allowing the generals to settle it with Kemal when they met him at Mudania as suggested in the latter part of the invitation

COUNT SFORZA interposed to say that Fethi Bey had expressed himself in favour of Venice

LORD CURZON suggested that if Mustapha Kemal refused to have a conference anywhere outside Asia Minor it would be quite impossible for the conference to be held

M POINCARE thought that it might be possible to have a conference on neutral ground Asia Minor apart

Both LORD CURZON and COUNT SFORZA pointed out that a peace conference could not be held in this way

M POINCARE then said that unless something more specific could be said about the Maritza he thought that France would have to reserve a separate note to Kemal

LORD CURZON enquired whether M Poincaré meant a kind of separate annex to or gloss on the joint note which would be on the lines of the draft he had prepared this annex or gloss making definite mention of the Maritza and Adrianople or whether a relevant but entirely separate note emanating from the French Government

M POINCARE said that he could not agree in any case, to the British draft without obtaining the French Government's consent

COUNT SFORZA asked whether the draft represented England's last word

LORD CURZON said that it did not and that he was prepared for modifications but not on questions of principle In particular he was afraid of the Greek population in Thrace and outside Thrace revolting if Adrianople and the Maritza were specifically promised in the note

M POINCARE enquired whether His Majesty's Government would oppose the Maritza frontier when it came to a conference

LORD CURZON replied that they had no intention of being intransigeant on the point all he desired was that the note should not be excessively precise on this question and that some latitude should be given for the conference to hear the views of others, such as the Serbians and Roumanians, and explore other solutions, such

as the autonomous buffer State The British Government were ready to be sympathetic, but they did not like to pledge themselves in advance M Poincaré was quite at liberty to say to Kemal that the French Government desired that the future frontier of Turkey should be the Maritza, and include Adrianople

M POINCARE enquired whether he could inform Kemal that at least there was some hope on the side of England whether in fact he would be able to say that France and Italy supported the Maritza frontier that there would be no serious opposition from Serbia and Roumania and that there was hope from England

LORD CURZON said that he could not give any pledge on the point, as he did not wish to rule out now, before the conference some form of League of Nations' solution He did not wish to tie his hands, and so prevent himself from making such a proposal at the conference

M POINCARE expressed himself as against the League of Nations proposal which he would oppose

LORD CURZON asked whether M Poincaré really proposed to give back to Turkey all the 1914 frontier subject only to League of Nations guarantees for the demilitarisation of certain strips of territory on each side of the frontier the latter not to be mentioned now to the Turks but to be discussed later at the conference, after the promise as to the Maritza had been given to them For his part, Lord Curzon could not commit himself to this He wanted to urge for the League of Nations solution at the conference

COUNT SFORZA suggested that it was essential to take into account the state of mind in Turkey now and therefore to give her some definite assurance about the Maritza This would not imply that such safeguards as the Capitulations might not be discussed at the conference and obtained in Thrace

At this point M POINCARE asked to be allowed to read a telegram which he had received from Admiral Dumesnil regarding his recent conversations with Mustapha Kemal at Smyrna He quoted passages from the admiral's report which made it clear that Kemal was playing a waiting game and was in fact showing a favourable attitude on the part of the Allies towards his territorial terms He also quoted passages to show how wisely Admiral Dumesnil had pressed to Kemal that there could be no question of disagreement between the Allies on their policy towards Turkey and that Kemal must expect to meet a united Allied front Kemal had explained to the admiral that the refugees' situation in Smyrna had become difficult because for the first two days no food had been allowed to be brought into the town by Turkish police or gendarmerie After that perfect order had reigned Another passage from the admiral's despatch showed the friendly language which he had held regarding the neutral zones and Allied solidarity in defending them Kemal had informed him that he recognised the neutral zones but not the terms of the armistice as between Turkey and the Allies The admiral had pointed out to him how the Allied attitude towards Greece and the neutral zone had enormously helped Kemal in Asia Minor It had led the Greeks to take enormous risks of good regiments back to Thrace and then before the Chatalja lines just before Kemal's offensive The admiral urged Kemal again and again to rely now on diplomacy and not to take military action at the risk of war with the Allies Kemal had replied that provided he could get what he wanted namely, the territorial terms of the National Pact as regards Eastern Thrace he was prepared to obtain them by diplomatic means He also mentioned the idea of a plebiscite in Western Thrace in accordance with the terms of the National Pact He had referred to the question of the liberty of the Straits and had said that he was prepared for reasonable guarantees such as were allowed for in the National Pact He had however talked more than once to the admiral about the necessity of driving the Greeks from Eastern Thrace

LORD CURZON thanked M Poincaré for the information and said that he thought the admiral had acted with courage and loyalty in his conversations but the more he heard of Kemal's views the more he was afraid of the intentions of the Allies being misinterpreted by Kemal For instance let them take Gallipoli The British Government took the view very strongly that, in order to guarantee the freedom of the Straits both sides of the Dardanelles must be garrisoned permanently and he would have to defend this point of view at the forthcoming peace conference The National Pact however said nothing about the Dardanelles or about any such guarantees It was therefore essential that the Allies should be agreed on this point

in the conference Lord Curzon concluded by asking M Poincaré to take his draft and to submit it to his Cabinet It was essential that the Allies should agree upon a collective note and not attempt to send separate documents

M POINCARE feared that he could not agree to any collective note unless the question of the concession to Turkey of Tarace was made more precise For the rest he would point out that Lord Curzon had made entirely new proposals as regards garrisoning the southern shore of the Dardanelles Under the March proposals the garrisons were to be confined to the northern shore

LORD CURZON agreed but explained that he had precise instruction from his Government on this point and that in any case the March proposals as M Poincare admitted were now open to modification and had indeed been modified by circumstances The question of guarantees for the freedom of the Dardanelles was in any case a matter for the peace conference He would like to point out that Great Britain would soon have strong forces in the Gallipoli Peninsula and if necessary be in a position to dictate her terms on this point He did not mean this in any way as a threat

At this point M POINCARE read extracts from the *procès verbal* of the March discussions about the Allied garrisons at the Straits and Lord Curzon's views at that time

LORD CURZON again explained that this was a new situation in that his Government thought it important to strengthen the guarantees for the Straits They had all heard Admiral Grasset's views which made it quite clear how essential it was to hold the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles in order to keep the passage free

At this point it was agreed to adjourn the meeting until 2 P M on Saturday afternoon the 23rd September

It was agreed to issue the following communiqué to the press

' Lord Curzon M Poincare and Count Sforza have decided that there should be submitted to the consideration of the formula under which an invitation could be addressed to the Government of Angora for the conference of peace The examination of the formula will be continued to-morrow afternoon'

ANNEX

Draft of Invitation to Angora Government

BRITISH and French Foreign Ministers and Italian Ambassador in Paris have the honour on behalf of their Governments to invite Mustapha Kemal to come himself or be represented by Assembly of Angora to send a representative with full powers to a meeting at Venice or elsewhere to which will also be invited plenipotentiary representatives of France Great Britain Italy, Japan Jugoslavia, Roumania and Greece The meeting will be held as soon as the necessary arrangements can be made by Italian Government and the other Governments concerned Its object will be to negotiate and draw up the final treaty of peace between the Allied Powers and Turkey and thus among other things to mediate a settlement of the outstanding points in dispute between Greece and Turkey

The British French and Italian Governments desire at the same time to take this opportunity of recording that they view with sympathy and are ready to examine with benevolence at the coming conference the desire of the Government of Angora to secure the return of the greater part of Thrace to Turkish sovereignty They hope it will be found possible after taking into account at the conference all the vital interests of the countries concerned to give such satisfaction to Turkish aspiration in this direction as can be reconciled with the provision not only of those guarantees for the permanent maintenance of the freedom of the waters between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean which the Allied Powers are united in regarding as indispensable but also of that protection of racial and religious minorities under the ægis of the League of Nations which the Government of Angora have already declared their willingness in principle to accord The Allied Governments solemnly reaffirm the assurances which they gave in March last to withdraw their troops from Constantinople upon the entering into force of the treaty of peace

As a pledge of their good faith the Allied Powers are prepared while the arrangements for the Venice Conference are being made to use all their influence to secure the withdrawal of the Greek forces to such a line in Eastern Thrace as may be agreed upon between the Turkish and Greek military authorities and the Allied Commander-in-chief at Constantinople and his Allied colleagues provided always that the Government of Angora first declare their readiness pending and during the peace conference not to enter the neutral zones or cross the Sea of Marmara

For the above purpose a meeting could be arranged between the Allied generals and Mustapha Kemal at Mudania or Ismid

---

[E 10320 27 44] No 622

MEMORANDUM ON THE FREEDOM OF THE STRAITS

I *Previous History of the Question*

(A *Treaties &c.*

(*a*) Until the eighteenth century the Black Sea and its issues and entrances was a purely internal possession of the Ottoman Empire The Black Sea was as much a Turkish lake as the Lake of Van there was no problem as to how people should get into or out of it

(*b*) With the eighteenth century, and the appearance of the Muscovites as a formidable littoral Power the question of the Straits at once became important A series of treaties ensued at first these treaties had little more than commercial arrangements between the Sublime Porte and the Kremlin With the rapid emergence of Russia as a civilised and exporting country, the problem of the Straits began to take upon itself an international complexion Thus, although the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji in 1774 applied only to Russia we find that by 1802 all the Great Powers asked to be included under article 7 of the Treaty of Adrianople In 1833, again, Russia concluded the bilateral Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi with Turkey It is always asserted that in this treaty there was a secret clause which enabled Russia to use the Straits not only for her trade, but also for the passage of warships If so, the secret article was never subsequently appealed to or even quoted It is interesting however as showing that by 1833 the passage of the Straits had become an international question of such importance that Russia in making her own arrangements felt obliged to keep these arrangements secret and in the ultimate event had not dared to appeal to them

(*c*) The international importance of the Straits was fully emphasised during the middle and later course of the nineteenth century By the Treaty of London of the 13th July 1841, an attempt was made to establish once and for all that foreign men-of-war should be excluded from the Straits, Great Britain, Austria Russia Prussia and France all agreed by this treaty to conform to a safeguarding principle No warships of any Power other than Turkey were to operate in or even to traverse the two Straits. This treaty was confirmed by Article 10 of the Treaty of Paris of 1856 and by Article 2 of the Treaty of London of 1871

The culminating development of this phase of the question, and it was significant occurred at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 Lord Salisbury and Count Schouvaloff were discovered to hold very different views as to the inner meaning of the above previous enactments Lord Salisbury cherished the opinion that the previous obligations assumed by the Powers had been assumed by them only towards the Sultan, that they had seen themselves merely to "respect in this matter His Imperial Majesty's independent determinations"

Count Schouvaloff thought quite differently To his mind the obligations and ordinances accepted in the past fifty years by the Powers were binding not only as regards the Porte, but as regards each other "The principle," he recorded, "of the closing [sic] of the Straits was a European principle, and the stipulations concluded in this respect in 1841, 1856 and 1871 are binding on the part of all the Powers not only as regards the Sultan, but also as regards all the Powers signatory to those transactions."

These views and counter-views, which were very illustrative and even ominous, were embodied in the 18th and 19th protocols of the Congress of Berlin.

(B.)—*Extent to which these Treaties have been Executed or Observed.*

In general the exclusion of foreign men-of-war from the Straits has been upheld, the more notable exceptions being the passage in 1902 of four Russian destroyers under the commercial flag, and the passage in 1904 of two vessels of the Russian Volunteer Fleet also under the commercial flag. On both these occasions we recorded a protest.

In 1895, at the time of the first Armenian massacres, a slight international squadron was sent by mutual agreement to Constantinople. Again in November 1912, when the Bulgarians were approaching Constantinople, several important international ships appeared, again by mutual consent and arrangement off the Seraglio Point. The escape of the "Goeben" and Breslau to the Dardanelles in 1914 did not really affect the principle of the closing of the Straits since the Turks claimed that these ships had suddenly been purchased by them, and were therefore not in any sense foreign men of war. We acquiesced in this explanation.

Conversely, during the Tripoli war and the Balkan wars which followed, the Straits were closed for long periods not only to men-of-war but also to commercial vessels. For weeks at a time the grain ships from Constanza and the tankers from Batoum were held up at Bayukdere at the mouth of the Bosphorus, and much commercial loss was occasioned.

(C)—*General British Policy up to 1914.*

During the nineteenth century our policy, inspired as it was by confidence in Turkey and fear of Russia, was directed not towards what we now call the "freedom of the Straits," but towards what they termed the "closing of the Straits."

Lord Salisbury's declaration at the Congress of Berlin shows that he wished to interpret our obligations and privileges as a matter concerning only Turkey and ourselves. His idea was, I suppose, that in the event of war between Turkey and Russia, or of a menace to Turkey by Russia the former would appeal to us: that she would expect the British fleet to protect Constantinople against the Russian fleet: and that in responding to this appeal His Majesty's Government would in no way be transgressing their obligations to other European Powers.

The purpose and object of this theory were at once as we now see upon the assumption that Turkey would always be on our side against Russia. This assumption has altered in a very radical manner, and with it the old expression, "closing of the Straits," has been transformed into the new formula "freedom of the Straits."

The difference between these two catch-words is not only obvious but essential. For whereas up to 1914 our object was to prevent the Russian Black Sea fleet entering the Mediterranean, our object now is to ensure that the British Mediterranean fleet can, in the last resort, enter the Black Sea.

It may be useful to trace the causes which have led us to some readjustment of our attitude.

II. *British Policy after 1914.*

As has been said, our whole energies during the nineteenth century were directed towards the closing of the Straits to men-of-war and not towards the opening of the Straits to commerce. We protested when four Russian torpedo-boats were allowed into the Mediterranean: we did not seriously protest when the whole trade of Roumania and Southern Russia was held up by the closing of the Straits in 1912 and 1913.

2. Our agreement with Russia in 1907 rendered it inevitable that Turkey should throw herself into the arms of Germany. It was only after the 12th August, 1914, when the Goeben was safe in the Golden Horn that we realised that Turkey no longer looked on the British fleet as her protector, but as her enemy. From that moment it became important to consider whether Russia could get out from to consider whether we could get in, and the Dardanelles campaign showed us clearly that, so long as Turkey remained in physical occupation of the Straits, she was thoroughly immune to our command of the sea.

3. The Treaty of Sèvres was thus drawn up with the hope of securing that never again should Turkey be in a position to close the Straits against Europe, i.e., against the British command of the sea. The waters and territories of the Straits were it is true, neutralised, but express provision was made at the same time to secure that they could not be closed against warships, and that the British fleet could proceed when it

liked and in a body up the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus and out into the Black Sea. In the subsequent proposals, elaborated in March of this year, this right of passage for men-of-war was not abandoned.

It is to be expected that a serious combined attempt will be made in the impending conference to deprive us of this essential privilege for the following reasons and by the following methods:

4. The French Government hope to establish for themselves in Turkey a position almost analogous to that enjoyed by the German Government in 1915. It is necessary for them to dissociate only from the material advantages of Turkish friendship, but also because so long as they are dominant at Constantinople they will also remain dominant at Bucharest, Belgrade, Sofia and incidentally, Prague, Warsaw and Athens. They realise that so long as Constantinople and the Black Sea are exposed (if only in the ultimate result to naval pressure Turkey and Roumania (and in their wake the other Balkan and Eastern European) powers will tend to consider at least, if not to defer to, the wishes of His Majesty's Government. The French might like to go back to the old theory of "closing the Straits" but they know that this is impossible: what they hope to secure is that the "freedom of the Straits" shall be interpreted in a commercial sense only, and that from the naval and military point of view Turkey shall be left in a position in which only paper guarantees stand between her and the position she enforced so rapidly and so effectively in 1915.

5. It is submitted therefore that our main object is to secure that the Black Sea is not rendered impregnable to naval pressure from the British fleet: that it does not become, that is, a Russo-Turkish lake. It does not matter so much what guarantees we accept to secure the demilitarisation of the Straits themselves and the Sea of Marmora so long as these guarantees apply to Turkey as well as to ourselves: so long as the Straits are open to ships of war and Turkey as Roumania and Bulgaria are pledged to act in concert. Provided that the Sublime Porte realise that in the last resort it will take them longer to close the Straits to us than it would take us to get the fleet up the Straits, they will continue to feel that we are on this last resort more important than the French. It is only upon the basis of such a feeling that we can establish any relations of *entente* with Turkey. If they feel sure that whatever happens they are safe-guarded against the British fleet they will look to Paris only, the same effect will be produced, though in a lesser degree, in Bucharest and other capitals of the Little *Entente* and in Moscow.

6. The vital object to secure, therefore, is the free passage of men-of-war into the Black Sea. If we can secure this object, it matters little what subsidiary arrangements are proposed for the purpose of saving Kemal's face or placating the French. If we cannot secure this object of the Black Sea, while denied to our commerce, is not opened to our fleet, then it would have been better to have stuck to the old formula of the "closing of the Straits." The one thing to avoid is that under the new formula of "freedom" the Turco-Russians will be free to get out into the Mediterranean and we shall remain unable to penetrate into the Black Sea. In such an eventuality our strategic and diplomatic position would indeed be alarming.

HAROLD G. NICOLSON.

Foreign Office, September 25, 1922.

No. 623.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir P. Loraine (Tehran).

(No. 239.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 25, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 346 of 20th September. Wireless.

Imperial Bank of Persia desire to apply for a concession on behalf of themselves and Marconi. Text for communication to bank manager is being telegraphed to you separately.

Persian Minister in London is also being approached by Marconi, but action through this channel may be slow. In any case bank hope that their recent financial advances may work in their favour.

Neither Marconi nor bank has asked for your good offices. If however, you consider intervention desirable you may offer to support them.

No 623A

Mr Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 26)

(No 480.)
(Telegraphic) R
Athens, September 25, 1922

PRIME MINISTER called this morning in order to say that Greece still looked upon Great Britain as her only friend and hoped for her help

I told him what I had just said to Thracian Deputies and he agreed that local resistance was madness and that Greek Government must bow to the decree of the Powers He would accept invitation to conference as soon as he received it and if Chamber which meets in a few days time did not agree he would resign I explained to him grave consequences which war with Kemalists would have had for Great Britain He understood position and only regretted that Greek Government had not realised it before

He said Government were quite willing to use Venizelos abroad, but latter would not recognise present regime, so there was nothing to be done He then asked whether His Majesty's Government would not recognise the King Nothing would do more to unite Greeks and give them the moral satisfaction they so much needed If the King were recognised and facilities for a loan accorded he had hopes that Greece might yet pull through

I said I would report what he had said to you but that I thought it most unlike y decisions on such serious matters would be taken before peace conference had taken place

(Reported to Constantinople)

No 624

Mr Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 26.)

(No 482)
(Telegraphic) R
Athens September 25, 1922

YOUR telegram No 251

I have seen Prime Minister, who recognised force of Sir H Rumbold's arguments, and I said he would lay matter at once before Cabinet and try to have orders issued to-day His Excellency added that Greeks had information that Turks were sending small part east of Mudania and that was reason why Greeks were still at Constantinople I reported I understood His Majesty's Government would not allow Kemalists to possess Europe pending negotiations, and that Greek ships were therefore useless

(Reported to Constantinople)

No 625

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 26)

(No 405.)
(Telegraphic) R
Constantinople September 26, 1922

ADMIRAL BROCK informs me that Greek transports with troops are coming through Dardanelles both for northern shore of Sea of Marmara We think that in view of decision of Allied Governments to use their influence to bring about withdrawal of Greek forces in Thrace to a line to be fixed by Allied generals in agreement with Greek and Turkish military authorities Greeks should refrain from sending troops into Thrace via Dardanelles We are leaving Thrace to Turkish troops and we are concerned to deprive Kemalists of every excuse for violating neutral zones Meanwhile Admiral Brock is instructing Senior Naval Officer at Dardanelles to detain Greek transports bound for Sea of Marmara

(Repeated to Athens)

No 626.

Consul London to Field Marshal Viscount Allenby — (Repeated to Foreign Office Received September 26.)

(No 55.)
(Telegraphic) R
Geneva September 25, 1922

FOLLOWING from Lord Balfour

"Assembly of League of Nations has charged Dr Nansen to provide provisions for refugees in Smyrna He wants immediately some [?500] tons of flour, which he would undertake to replace subsequently or pay for

Are any supplies available in Egypt for instant shipment?

No 627

M Karakhan to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 26

(Telegraphique) *En clair*
Moscou, le 24 septembre 1922

LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, Ministre des Affaires étrangères de Grande Bretagne Londres

Le Gouvernement russe attire votre attention sur la situation sérieuse survenue dans le Proche Orient et sur le fait qu'aucun des Etats actuellement intéressés n'entreprend les démarches nécessaires pour prévenir les événements de nature à entraver dans la guerre de nombreuses Puissances et qui ont presque conduit au conflit gréco-turc

La situation est si retardable que seule une intervention énergique pourrait empêcher les événements et préserver le sud est de l'Europe d'une nouvelle effusion de sang et d'autres désastres dont le caractère et les conséquences dépassent les limites de la question d'Orient

Les Puissances occidentales et avant tout la Grande Bretagne se refusent à restituer à la Turquie ses territoires et les Détroits qui lui appartiennent incontestablement sous prétexte de liberté des Détroits agissent en réalité pour maintenir leur domination

La liberté des Détroits est nécessaire avant tout pour les Puissances riveraines de la Mer Noire la Russie et ses Alliés la Turquie et la Grèce dans la plus large partie des côtes de la Mer Noire

De par 1920 par le Pacte national pour la défense de l'indépendance et de l'intégrité de la Turquie a reconnu la liberté des Détroits pour le commerce et les transports de toutes les nations pourvu que le régime en soit établi par les Etats intéressés Le Traité d'assistance signé à Moscou le 16 mars 1921 entre la Turquie et la Russie, dans son article 3 de la liberté des Détroits pour les bâtiments de commerce en ajoutant que le statut international sera fixé par les Puissances de la Mer Noire Néanmoins, les documents officiels accordant au problème des Détroits la reconnaissance d'entre intéressés en la matière par les grandes Puissances victorieuses de la guerre de 1914 et garantissent les intérêts de la Russie Quant à la Turquie, elle est considérée uniquement comme victime des agresseurs Ce point de vue a été encore très franchement dans le communiqué du 16 septembre où le Gouvernement britannique désigne sur ceux des plus intéressés après eux dans la question des Détroits la France et l'Italie

Le Gouvernement russe doit protester contre la façon dont les intérêts légitimes de cette dernière sont méconnus par les Puissances occidentales qui ont usurpé les droits de la Russie et des républiques alliées La Russie avec ses alliées Ukraine et la Géorgie est après la Turquie le pays auquel appartient la première place parmi ceux qui sont intéressés à la liberté des Détroits Les Puissances occidentales font de mauvaise grâce droit aux intérêts de la Russie dans la question d'Orient à prendre place à la Russie dans tous les traités internationaux concernant cette question Cette reconnaissance des intérêts russes alla même si lors de son 1916 les Gouvernements de l'Entente alliés de la Russie tsariste s'engagèrent par un accord spécial à lui remettre les Détroits et Constantinople

Le Gouvernement soviétiste n'estime pas que les intérêts de la Russie exigent l'asservissement d'une partie du peuple turc et pour cette raison il a dénoncé les anciens traités du Gouvernement tsariste. Mais le fait d'une reconnaissance aussi récente et poussée aussi loin des intérêts russes donne lieu d'espérer que les Puissances occidentales ne pourront pas s'ajourner à la Russie des intérêts de premier ordre dans la fixation du sort des Détroits. Le Gouvernement soviétiste renouvelle ses déclarations précédentes et la Russie ne reconnaîtra aucune décision prise sans sa participation et contre ses intérêts.

La Russie et la Turquie se sont mises d'accord sur les termes par lesquels doit être reglée la liberté des Détroits, et la Russie prévient les Gouvernements occidentaux contre la répétition des erreurs fondées sur l'ignorance des intérêts vitaux des États intéressés. Aucune décision prise sur les Détroits sans la Russie ne sera définitive ni durable. Elle ne fera que préparer de nouveaux conflits. La liberté qu'envie la Grande Bretagne équivaut seulement au désir d'une grande Puissance maritime de contrôler une voie de accès vitale pour les autres États et de tenir constamment ces derniers sous sa menace. Cette menace est dirigée avant tout contre la Russie et la Turquie.

La Grande Bretagne envoie des forces armées dans le Proche Orient elle essaie d'entraîner dans la guerre contre la Turquie la France et l'Italie, la Yougoslavie et la Roumanie. Les buts de la guerre ainsi fomentée sont comme il ressort du communiqué britannique celui de la défense de Constantinople et de la zone neutre ainsi celui de la préservation de l'Europe contre une offensive foudroyante et hostile des Turcs. Quant à ce second point il ne mérite aucune attention et ne peut être pris au sérieux par aucun Gouvernement. La défense par la Grande-Bretagne et par ses alliés de Constantinople contre le peuple turc, l'armée turque et le Gouvernement turc par la force seulement et pouvoir exercer dans son siège légitime est une provocation qui ne peut que susciter le plus grand étonnement. De même la défense de la zone neutre doit être considérée comme une violation par les forces armées rendues à cet effet souveraineté turque sur les territoires parmi lesquels il faut compter ceux où le ravitaillement de l'armée turque ne peut être qu'un moyen de garder la capitale du peuple sous une perpétuelle menace militaire.

Le Gouvernement russe estime que les efforts isolés de quelques États pour trouver par voie de fait, tout elle et sans la participation de tous les peuples intéressés une issue à la crise du Proche Orient ne peuvent donner un résultat positif, mais au contraire, ne feront que créer une nouvelle guerre. La Russie est vertement situation spéciale en Orient et surtout sur la mer Noire, en tant que représentant les intérêts des peuples qui en sont le plus intéressés, ne voit de solution pacifique de la question que dans la convocation immédiate d'une conférence de tous les Puissances intéressées et notamment des États riverains de la mer Noire. Le Gouvernement russe se réserve d'exposer ses vues détaillées sur toutes les questions qui seront soulevées par la future conférence.

Le Gouvernement soviétiste maintient sa décision sur l'égalité des parties et sur le plein respect de la souveraineté turque sur tous les territoires turcs.

No 628

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received September 26*)

By Bag

(No 480)
(Telegraphic)
Paris September 25 1922

FOLLOWING are numerous papers this evening's Temps.

M. Franklin-Bouillon, who negotiated the Treaty of Angora in 1921 left Paris yesterday evening for Toulon where he embarks today on board the battleship Metz en route for the East. He will meet Mustapha Kemal either at Smyrna or at Isnid and will furnish him with the necessary details in regard to the letter of invitation to a peace conference sent by MM. Poincaré Curzon and Sforza preliminary meeting and determination of a Graeco-Turkish armistice line in Thrace liberty of the Straits respect of the neutral zone summoning of a peace conference promise of the restoration to Turkey of Eastern Thrace &c.

No 629

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received September 26*)

(No 481)
(Telegraphic)
Paris September 26 1922

YOUR telegram No 325.

I have seen Millerand who accepts the invitation with pleasure. He will discuss it this evening with Poincaré and Barthou and I hope to see them tomorrow night. He promises to send me redraft instructions to General Pellé and Admiral Dumesnil to be sent almost at once to Mustapha Kemal to withdraw Turkish troops which have entered within neutral zone.

He wishes me at the same time to impress upon you the importance which he attaches to the views which he has already expressed to you regarding the maintenance of troops at Aspida which are not in reality worth the risk of danger that exists so long as troops are there so that we should not be responsible for any action on the part of Mustapha Kemal's regular and irregular troops and that we should then be in a position to remove them without danger.

His Majesty's Government would be grateful to be informed at the same time whether the French Government will be prepared to withdraw their troops from Constantinople.

As an indication of improvement in situation at Constantinople I learned at Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Harris Bey has inferred General Pellé that he has received orders from Mustapha Kemal to convey an expression of his desire to avoid conflict with British troops at Constantinople.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No 630

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received September 26*)

(No 482)
(Telegraphic)
Paris September 26 1922

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Now that schism between Allies has been revealed I feel that it would be well to have official view from that field on the following points in connection with suggestion to withdraw troops at Chanak which have been represented as important factor in preserving peace of Europe as exposed to danger by unprovoked action on the part of Turkish troops whether regular or irregular as it seems that this danger might be averted by agreement between General Harington and Mustapha Kemal that neutral zone should not be occupied either by British or Turkish troops. If arrangement were made it would be easy to ascertain whether it was being observed by air reconnaissance.

No 631

Telegram (by Telephone) from Lord Hardinge (*Received September 26*)

(No 483)
(Telegraphic)
Paris September 26 1922

I HAVE just been informed from Quai d'Orsay that in accordance with M. Poincaré's instructions General Pellé has sent Harold Beyard the latter has sent urgent message to Mustapha Kemal to withdraw Turkish troops which have penetrated within neutral zone. He will receive no still more serious step she says that Mustapha Kemal is anxious to avoid conflicts.

The Angora agent was called this morning to Quai d'Orsay and urged to send a message to Mustapha Kemal in a similar sense. He promised to do so but remarked that what is preoccupying Turks and causing them to continue their concentration of troops is the news that they received of the strength of British reinforcements going out to the Near East. He was told that it was not likely that this would cease until Mustapha Kemal had accepted the invitation to the conference.

Would it not be possible to give less publicity to Lloyd George's speeches. The French papers are full of them.

No. 632.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 26.*)

(No. 290.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, September 25, 1922.*

ITALIAN susceptibilities will no doubt be offended if Venice or some other Italian town is not chosen for Near East Conference.

On the other hand, feeling throughout Italy is so violently pro-Turk that local atmosphere may encourage Kemalist delegates to present exaggerated demands.

French Ambassador has pointed out to his Government that Venice was comparatively recently scene of mobbing of French officers and insult to consulate.

No. 633.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 26.*)

(No. 291.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, September 25, 1922.*

YOUR telegram numbered 423 of September from Paris.

Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs has issued instructions to Constantinople in the sense desired on the assumption that French co-operation is assured.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 634.

Sir Erskine to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 26.*)

(No. 56.)
Telegraphic. R. *Sofia, September 26, 1922.*

BUCHAREST telegram No. 123.

Russian Minister tells me he has heard of recent activity at Bourgas of ten officers of Red Army, one of whom is said to have gone to Thrace and that some workmen employed at Bourgas on some Bolshevist literature in Greek had been reported to him.

Although I have no confirmation I thought it advisable to mention report received to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, who thought it dangerous if Bulgaria being used by Bolshevik agents as means of access to Thrace.

Roumanian Minister's report is based on above.

No. 635.

Sir A. Geddes to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 28.*)

(No. 376. Secret.)
Telegraphic. *Washington, September 25, 1922.*

I HAVE had conversations both with President of United States and with the Secretary of State on the subject of Turkish situation. With President I was one of four in conversation that initiative in the matter rested with him. He and Mr. Hughes had had a conference yesterday with a view to determining whether they could usefully act in association with His Majesty's Government in connection with Near East situation. The President who has become violently anti-French wishes to support British stand at Chanak and to snub M. Poincaré. Before I left him he undertook to see what could appropriately be done to indicate American support of British attitude with regard to neutral zones and freedom of Straits. He suggested that I should see Secretary of State as soon as possible and said he would see him to-day on this matter.

Secretary of State more restrained and much more cautious than President. He also is anti-French, as indeed he has been since Washington Conference. He made it quite plain it would not be possible to associate American ships with British in the Dardanelles or even land a handful of marines to be with British military forces as a symbol of unity. This, I gather, President had wished to do though he had not said so in so many words to me.

Secretary of State, however, assured me that he was trying to find something that could be done definitely to demonstrate that America regarded freedom of Straits and neutralisation and demilitarisation of their shores as an American interest. Both President and Secretary of State seemed quite to like the idea of their control by League of Nations.

If there is anything within the rather fatuous limitations which America imposes on herself in these matters that it would be useful for us to have America do please let me know quickly as if they are going to do anything they wish to do it this week.

No. 636.

Sir A. Geddes to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 26.*)

(No. 378.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Washington, September 25, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 375.

Press states that Federal Council of Churches have presented a memorial to President and Secretary of State urging that influence of United States Government should be exerted to secure immediate establishment of peace and justice in Asia Minor.

President of American Federation of Labour yesterday urged that "nations of the world should come to the rescue of civilisation and peoples now threatened by Turks."

[E 9955/27/44] No. 637.

British Secretary's Notes of the Conference between the French President of the Council, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Italian Ambassador in Paris, on Sunday, September 23, 5.15 p.m. *Received September 26.*

(Secret. Meeting.)

Present.

For France:
M. Poincaré.

For Great Britain:
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.
Lord Hardinge of Penshurst.

For Italy:
Count Sforza.

Secretaries.

M. de Laroche. | M. Gelli.
M. Massigli. | Mr. Forbes Adam.
M. Clauclant. | Mr. Leeper.
M. Barjeton. |

M. POINCARÉ opened the meeting by referring to the desire of the British Government to secure Serbian and Roumanian troops for the defence of Constantinople. He understood that in fact the week before a direct request for such assistance had been addressed by His Majesty's Government to Belgrade and Bucharest. This action seemed to him very grave. He was quite sure that the arrival of such troops at this moment at Constantinople would be regarded as provocative by the Turks and could only risk the peace which they were so anxious to secure instead of helping them to obtain it. He was very strongly of opinion that before the Serbian or Roumanian Governments came to a decision as to the despatch of troops the Allied Governments should have received and considered Kemal's reply to their invitation. As long as they were in communication with Kemal they should

not seek assistance either from Serbia or Roumania If Kemal refused the invitation it might then be necessary to discuss the despatch of these Balkan troops The views of the British Government as to this question had never already been announced in Bucharest and Belgrade and had created public opinion This appeared to him (M Poincaré) a serious situation and he was already taking steps to make representations at both capitals on this subject

LORD CURZON replied that he had listened with great respect to M Poincaré's statement He knew, and let him admit that, any of the suggestions to which reference had been made were in the nature of a provocation either to the Allies or to Kemal In his conversations with the representatives of the Balkan States to-day he had expressed the British Government's desire to secure peace If they were in doubt whether troops should be despatched to Constantinople now or later (a) with the Russian Governments concerned or (b) as M Poincaré said, without any such assurance those Governments had in fact given their consent to the immediate despatch of contingents He and the Serbian Prime Minister and his Foreign Secretary together with the King of Serbia were now returning on their way back to Belgrade and there could be no question of the Serbian Cabinet until Wednesday Roumania might reach a decision sooner but in any case Lord Curzon saw no necessity for the conference to take any collective action at Bucharest or Belgrade in this matter If there was no difference in M Poincaré's remarks and Lord Curzon thought that they might be left to the Ambassadors at Bucharest and Belgrade He would very much regret if anything he (Lord Curzon) had said in the course of the discussion should be taken to indicate that the British Government were not in full accord with the French Government in their desire to make the representations which were to be made at those points Lord Curzon thought that the proposals of Allied operations in the Asiatic shores of the Straits little deserved the considered Coast and the consultations of Ismid and the Sea of Marmora Governments had assisted in establishing the necessity of Allied authority in Eastern Thrace and the Sea of Marmora and he (Lord Curzon) thought the only object which they were now entitled to pursue by the despatch of troops was to show the Turks that the unbroken Franco-British entente of the Great War still held and the smaller Allies Such a display would be necessary on Allied front and would probably exercise a serious impression on Kemal's mind What he (Lord Curzon) was anxious to make clear was that the despatch of troops should take place as soon as possible and that Britain was as much anxious to see Bulgaria and Turkey represented at Constantinople as the British point of view had been represented at Bucharest and Belgrade and he hoped that no effort would be left untried to secure that end

M POINCARÉ said that he did not wish to say that the British Government had not kept previous engagements Its views on the subject were entirely satisfactory but he thought that the despatch of troops to the region of Batoum might have been arranged by the Powers directly with Kemal The object of the Allies should be, as far as possible, to prevent the present conference from breaking up on the Russian question although there had been no question of the immediate despatch of troops from Serbia or Roumania he hoped that Bucharest was thinking about it and the Powers were bound to do all in their power to assist the Allied interests The Allies were anxious to see Bulgaria represented at Constantinople as well as the British point of view had been represented at Bucharest and Belgrade and he hoped that the Conference would be left free to act

COUNT SFORZA suggested that the question of the despatch of these troops might be left for consideration by the Ambassadors at the Allied capitals

LORD CURZON said that it was necessary to obtain a decision on the part of the British Government as to how far it was prepared to go in the question of preventing the Russian forces entering the zones de guerre and zone neutral by the Allies He had asked the Serbian and Roumanian Governments whether they were interested in the Russian question and both replied that they were not Both Governments had, however, declared that they had given concrete offers to their Ambassadors at Constantinople for any assistance that the three Allied Governments could decide on some step which would clearly indicate that the Allies were united He (Lord Curzon) trusted that there might be no need for a recourse to arms or for the arrival of reinforcements at Constantinople

M LOUCHEUR was apprehensive of the arrival of even a detachment of Serbian and Roumanian troops which however small might prove a dangerous provocation to Mustapha Kemal If it was always he had raised the matter He would however like to refer to the question of the invitation to Kemal The French Cabinet had considered the British draft but it must first decide at the Conference whether they were going to present a single note or three separate notes to Kemal

LORD CURZON suggested that Lines 1 should first examine the British note paragraph by paragraph

M POINCARÉ replied that he was in general agreement with the new text, subject to certain drafting alterations Except however for regarded it as essential to be precise regarding the frontiers which they were prepared to offer Kemal in Thrace

LORD CURZON again suggested that they should go through the text and see what changes M Loucheur and Count Sforza desired They would thus ascertain whether they were already in a large measure of agreement on the rest of the note and that would relieve the Conference of the essential point as to the terms to be offered Kemal in Thrace He was anxious to urge most emphatically upon the importance of sending a single note to the Turks Allies to Kemal and not three distinct notes Three separate notes would show *prima facie* that there was disagreement amongst the Allies as to the terms to be offered Kemal and that afternoon was to be a meeting of Allied experts to discuss the text of a single Allied note He wanted to discuss the whole question in the most friendly spirit to see whether their different points of view could be reconciled

M POINCARÉ said that he had no objection to carrying the Conference that afternoon as far as the question of the Armenian frontier was concerned but he thought that M Loucheur and Sir Horace Rumbold who were the authorities on Turkish affairs, and Sir Eric Drummond who was the Secretary to the Conference, should first meet to see whether they could not agree on the terms to be offered to Kemal He thought that there was no necessity for the experts to meet that afternoon as the question of the Armenian frontier (the Maritza) and Adrianople Thrace could be discussed at the Conference itself He did not see why the Conference should not begin at 10 o'clock and finish at 1 o'clock and then meet again at 4 o'clock to discuss the whole question in the most friendly spirit

LORD CURZON said that he would like to hear M Poincaré's opinion on the question of the Maritza frontier M Poincaré replied that he had always emphasised the need of making the utmost concessions to Kemal in order to bring him to the Conference Could M Poincaré, he (Lord Curzon) asked, say what concessions the Allies would be prepared to make on the Maritza frontier? M Poincaré replied that he was not prepared to say at this point M Loucheur was going to the Allied meeting and would be able to show the most powerful and the most extended concessions that could be made in order to bring Kemal to the Conference table (Lord Curzon) pointed out that the Allies had already made concessions in Thrace

M POINCARÉ said that he did not wish to say that the Maritza frontier was not important but he thought that the Allies could be prepared to make concessions on the Maritza frontier if Kemal would agree to the Straits being open to the Russian Fleet

LORD CURZON said that he was prepared to go to the Conference that afternoon but he thought that the Conference should first meet to discuss the Maritza question

M POINCARÉ said that he thought that the Conference should discuss the Maritza question first

LORD CURZON asked M Poincaré to give an indication as to what further points of the British note he was prepared to accept If a long argument could be reached as to the Maritza there would be no question of trying M Poincaré to do anything he might say about the rest of the note but he thought this would be the best procedure

COUNT SFORZA suggested that the Conference might begin its discussions at 10 o'clock and settle the Maritza question first and then go on to discuss the Armenian and Smyrna questions which were to be dealt with together

M POINCARÉ said that he agreed with Count Sforza as to the form and substance of the document but thought that there was nothing in the British note to necessitate a new draft except the omission of the precise reference to the Maritza

and Adrianople. He then proceeded to translate the British text into French. In the first paragraph he suggested that it was to be inferred from the manner in which the last sentence was drafted that Greece was still an Ally. France had refrained from regarding her as such since King Constantine's accession and he would not agree to sign a note which placed Greece among the Allies.

LORD CURZON said that as far as he was able to gather from M. Poincaré's version of the British note a entirely new text was being proposed. As he had already explained, private to M. Poincaré here, he had to await the views of his Cabinet upon the text of the British draft as soon as communicated to them the day before. If they were now to propose a new text he would probably have to refer to London and the delay which they feared would be inevitable. He was perfectly ready to consider French modifications of the text provided they were not fundamental to attack the whole structure of the English draft.

COUNT SFORZA suggested that it was to the British and Allied interest not to send out a document which scrapped itself as a purely British text. The Turks would present it as such and the object would be thwarted rather than furthered. In effect it was a question of form and *nuance* and not of any change in the substantive proposals of the British draft.

LORD CURZON replied that he was quite prepared to accept a French version of his text and he would ask M. Poincaré to consider redrafting his French translation but in the first paragraph of his own text he would like to substitute the word desire for the words leave the decision to be all of their Governments.

After some discussion on this point it was agreed to substitute the words orient le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie pour leur faire savoir si celui-ci serait disposé ou sans retard for the corresponding passage in the English note.

M. POINCARÉ then asked that the words "or elsewhere" (*ou ailleurs*) should be inserted after the word "Venice" in the first paragraph. He thought that it would be necessary to hear Ismet's views on the place of meeting of the peace conference and that the Generals and High Commissioners might discuss this with the Mudania.

LORD CURZON said that he was quite ready to accept this insertion but he particularly desired that any reference to Mudania except the meeting of the military authorities for the specific purpose suggested in the British note namely that of lending the lines on which the Greek and Turkish troops were to stand pending and during the conference.

COUNT SFORZA supported Lord Curzon. He had sent the text of the British note to Rome and he expected some halting alterations and to change in the French sense regarding Greece to be received favourably to accept it. But his Government would certainly object to the Mudania meeting being circumscribed to the soldiers and to their duties as set out in the British note.

After some further discussion it was agreed to substitute the word "conclude" for the words "draw up" in the last sentence of the first paragraph and in order to meet M. Poincaré's point regarding Greece and the Votes the last half of the last sentence of the first paragraph of the British note was omitted and the word "Greece" inserted between the words "Turkey and the Allied Powers".

M. POINCARÉ then proceeded to read the French version of the second paragraph of the British text (see annex to these minutes for full French version as approved by the conference and despatched).

The second sentence of the second paragraph of this version as originally put forward by the French Government d'Angora est disposé à ne pas envoyer.

LORD CURZON while agreeing with M. Poincaré that some such alteration would be useful to strengthen the British text suggested that the version might be made stronger by the substitution of the words "a la condition" instead of "si" and of "ne viendra pas" instead of "est disposé à".

These amendments were accepted.

LORD CURZON said that he could not accept the first sentence of that paragraph at this stage but it would return to it later.

Lord Curzon then asked to be allowed to insert in the second half of the second sentence of the second paragraph of the French version the words "pour sauvegarder les intérêts de la Turquie et de ses voisins" pour obtenir le retablissement paisible et regulier de l'autorité turque. These insertions were to meet instructions which he had received that day from his Government and he believed they would not only be acceptable to his colleagues and to Turkey but in particular they would show the Balkan Allies were they summoned to the conference that their interests were not being lost sight of.

M. POINCARÉ said that he could not accept the first half of this insertion unless some mention were made of the interests of Turkey. He would willingly, however accept the second half.

After some discussion the words "pour sauvegarder les intérêts de la Turquie et de ses voisins" were accepted instead of the first half of the insertion suggested by Lord Curzon.

M. Poincaré then suggested that the words "and that Turkey should be free to choose Constantinople as her capital" should be inserted after the assurance which was given in the English text about the withdrawal of the Allied troops from Constantinople.

Both LORD CURZON and COUNT SFORZA thought this insertion unnecessary and as possibly being open to the inference that the Allies claimed the right to interfere in Turkey's choice of her capital.

M. POINCARÉ then withdrew his suggestion.

M. Poincaré then suggested the insertion of a phrase as to the Allied Governments supporting Turkey's admission to the League of Nations.

LORD CURZON and COUNT SFORZA willingly accepted this insertion.

M. POINCARÉ then proceeded to read the French version of the fourth paragraph of the British text (the third paragraph of the French text).

It was agreed to omit the words "as a pledge of their good faith" at the beginning of this paragraph of the British text. It was also agreed to substitute the words "fixed by the Allied generals by agreement with the Turkish and Greek military authorities" for the words "agreed upon between the Turkish and Greek military authorities and the Allied Commander in chief at Constantinople and his Allied colleagues" since M. Poincaré desired to avoid any reference to the Allied Commander in Chief in this note.

M. Poincaré also proposed that the British text of this paragraph should be split into two sentences and the second sentence should begin with the words "En retour de cette intervention le Gouvernement d'Angora serait sans doute disposé à".

LORD CURZON agreed to the proposed change except that he thought that the words "serait disposé à" should be made much stronger and he would suggest the words "s'engagerait à".

With this alteration the French proposal was accepted.

It was also agreed to substitute the words "the zones provisionally declared neutral by the Allies" for the words "neutral zones".

Some discussion followed on the last paragraph of the British note (penultimate paragraph of the French text).

M. POINCARÉ suggested the words "in order to conclude the armistice" instead of the words "for the above purpose".

LORD CURZON said that it was essential that the meeting at Mudania should be strictly confined to the single point of fixing the line in Thrace to which the Greek troops might be withdrawn. There could be no question of sending High Commissioners to this conference or of widening the terms of reference such as would be inevitable if all the provisions of an armistice between Greece and Turkey were to be raised.

COUNT SFORZA agreed.

M. POINCARÉ withdrew his suggestion.

M. Poincaré then enquired whether Lord Curzon could accept the first sentence of the second paragraph of the French text. He thought that it would flatter the Turks and satisfy the Allies if instead of mentioning the Maritza and Adrianople the Allies offered to concede the full frontiers of the National Pact in Thrace.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

LORD CURZON replied that in order to secure what he considered to be absolutely essential, namely a joint note instead of three separate notes, he was prepared to make a concession in this direction but he could not in any case agree to any mention of the National Pact. The latter covered more than the Maritza frontier and raised the question of the autonomy of Western Thrace. He would therefore agree to a reference to the Maritza frontier in Europe in the second paragraph of the French text. He would also accept the French proposal as to the three Governments willingly supporting at the conference such an extension of the Turkish frontiers in the final treaty. He made these concessions in the interests of peace and of the *Entente* but he trusted that in this case none of the three Allies would attempt to give independent assurances as to their intentions at the final conference. He hoped that M. Franklin Bouillon would not attempt when he arrived at Angora to make concrete promises to the Turks outside the terms of the Allied note.

COUNT SFORZA here interposed to say that he was upset to learn that M. Franklin Bouillon might promise the Turks further concessions which the Allies were not prepared to give.

M. POINCARE replied that he thought that the whole genesis of this affair and the part played by Signor Giolitti were known to all. He was willing to give instructions to the effect that M. Franklin Bouillon should not go further than the terms of the Allied note.

The French text of the note (see annex) was then accepted by the conference.

LORD CURZON said that he must point out that Serbia and Roumania would soon be there at the invitation of His Government and would have to be invited to secure their signature to the present Allied invitation to Kemal Pasha. The latter would attach much greater weight to a request from Serbia and Roumania than to one from the Allies. He would have shown Serbia and Roumania that he invited them to the conference was out of date. As however it was essential to avoid delay, a note despatched by the post and so late would not be possible to obtain the signature at any rate of the Serbian Ministers until they received the reply during the next two days and it did not seem possible to do more than communicate a copy of the note to each Government. Greece. This might be done by the French Ministers at Belgrade and Bucarest on behalf of the conference and in communicating a copy the Ministers should express the hope that it may prove with the concurrence of both Governments. He would like to have done more than this as his Government strongly desired it but he did not feel in the circumstances able to do so.

COUNT SFORZA who agreed generally with Lord Curzon's suggestion said that he was rather apprehensive as to the results of giving Serbia and Roumania *a priori* equal footing with the other Powers at the forthcoming conference. He said this from no anti-Balkan point of view. He was notoriously Italy's friend of the Balkan Powers, and if Greece played her *entente* advice to her would be that if we had asked them originally to deal with the other Great Powers we should have given them a strong weapon which might prove of later danger. In fact the British Government might find their adhering at this late date to the conference and the treaty would be opposed to the views upon Thrace and the Straits which the Balkan representatives would there be advocating.

Lord Curzon's proposal was then accepted by the conference and it was also agreed that the French Minister at Athens should communicate a copy of the invitation to the Greek Government without however commenting upon it in any way.

ANNEX

French Draft of Note despatched by the Conference on September 23 to the Greek Government based on the British Draft of September 22 (see Annex to Minutes of Third Meeting)

LES trois Gouvernements alliés prient le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de vouloir bien leur faire savoir s'il serait disposé à envoyer sans retard un représentant muni de pleins pouvoirs à une réunion qui se tiendrait à Venise ou ailleurs à laquelle seraient également invités avec les représentants de la Turquie les plénipotentiaires de la Grande Bretagne, de la France, de l'Italie, du Japon, de

la Roumanie, de l'Etat serbe-croate-slovène et de la Grèce. Cette réunion aurait lieu dès que les dispositions nécessaires auraient été prises par les Gouvernements intéressés. Elle aurait pour objet de négocier et de conclure le traité de paix définitif entre la Turquie, la Grèce et les Puissances alliées.

Les trois Gouvernements alliés saisissent cette occasion pour déclarer qu'ils considèrent à ce faveur le désir qu'a la Turquie de récupérer la Thrace jusqu'à la Maritza et Andrinople. A la condition que le Gouvernement d'Angora n'envoie pas son armée pendant les pourparlers de paix dans les zones dont les Gouvernements alliés ont pris la neutralité, ils assurent les trois Gouvernements sont prêts à la conférence à l'intervention de ces frontières à la Turquie, étant entendu d'ailleurs que des mesures seraient prises d'un commun accord dans le traité pour sauvegarder les intérêts de la Turquie et ses voisins par démilitariser, et vue du maintien de la paix certaines zones, à déterminer pour obtenir le rétablissement paisible et régulier de l'autorité turque et enfin pour assurer efficacement sous les auspices de la Société des Nations, la liberté des Dardanelles de la mer de Marmara et du Bosphore ainsi que la protection des minorités de race et de religion. Les trois Gouvernements appuieront du reste volontiers la demission de la Turquie à la Société des Nations. Ils sont d'accord pour renouveler l'assurance déjà donnée au mois de mars dernier que les troupes alliées seront retirées de Constantinople aussitôt que le traité entrera en vigueur.

Les trois Gouvernements alliés useront de leur influence pour provoquer avant l'ouverture de la conférence le retrait des forces grecques sur une ligne qui sera fixée par les généraux alliés. Il sera avec les garanties militaires turques et grecques. En retour de cette intervention le Gouvernement d'Angora s'engagera à n'envoyer aucune troupe pendant la durée de la conférence dans les zones qui ont été provisoirement démilitarisées et à ne pas franchir les Détroits et la mer de Marmara.

Pour déterminer la ligne dont il est question plus haut, une réunion pourrait immédiatement avoir lieu entre Mustapha Kemal et les généraux alliés à Moudania ou à Ismid.

Les Gouvernements alliés ont la conviction que leur appel sera entendu et qu'ils pourront collaborer avec la Turquie comme avec leurs Alliés pour le rétablissement d'une paix à laquelle aspire toute l'humanité civilisée.

CURZON — POINCARE — SFORZA

Le 23 septembre 1922

No. 648

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Lindley (Athens)

(No. 252.)

(Telegraphic) R. *Foreign Office, September 26, 1922*

YOUR telegram No. 476 and my telegram No. 251 of 25th September. Greek navy at Constantinople.

If Greek Government raise objections foreshadowed in your telegram, you should point out that the presence of the Averoff is a potent source of danger to the Greek army in Thrace, provides a motive for a Turkish attack. Moreover two or three Greek armoured vessels would be far more efficacious for taking off members of Greek colony in case of need.

(Repeated to Constantinople No. 429.)

No. 649

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Lindley (Athens)

No. 253.)

(Telegraphic) R. *Foreign Office, September 26, 1922*

YOUR telegram No. 474 of 23rd September.

Your action approved.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

No. 640

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Findley (Athens)

(No. 254.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Foreign Office, September 26, 1922*

GENERAL Officer Commanding Constantinople telegraphs that 2,500 Greeks are reported to be moving to Bulair lines, part of which are within and part without the neutral zone.

You should urge the Greek Government to withdraw these troops, pointing out that, as in the case of the Greeks in Constantinople, their presence in or near the neutral zone offers the Turks an excuse for attacking.

No. 641

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Dering (Bucharest)

(No. 85.)
Telegraphic. *Foreign Office, September 26, 1922*

SIR H. RUMBOLD'S telegram No. 462 of 25th September: Base in Roumania.

Please act accordingly.

Sir H. Rumbold's despatch is correct.

I am, &c.
(For the Secretary of State) Hope.

No. 642

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Consul-General Lamont (Athens)

No. 69.)
Telegraphic. *Foreign Office, September 26, 1922*

FOLLOWING for Sir Maurice Hankey from Sir M. Bulton.

"My telegram No. 176 of 24th September: Relief expenditure for refugees.

"It is evening at home that other Powers will now contribute with Great Britain.

"Details telegraphed to Paris, Rome, and Washington.

"The British Government have been informed by other Governments directly concerned that they are prepared to give at least £50,000. The basis humanitarian and not political.

"Cabinet's intention was that Great Britain should contribute on same basis as Great Britain, i.e. 50,000, and that other Powers should contribute proportionately. On the assumption that this intention is supported, Chancellor of the Exchequer would be grateful if you will take earliest opportunity of informing Assembly of precise nature of the conditions attached to British offer, unless you think that this will only delay effect of the offer. Cabinet's intention was, of course, to raise as large a sum as possible from other Powers.

No. 643

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris)

(No. 320. Private and Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 26, 1922*

YOUR telegram Private and Secret of 25th September.

I am quite willing that agree to suggestion made by Nihad Rechad that he should come to London.

On the other hand I am very doubtful if it is desirable to send anybody, either from Constantinople or from here, to see Mustapha Kemal at the present juncture.

No. 644

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir A. Geddes (Washington)

(No. 290. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 26, 1922*

YOUR telegram No. 457 of 20th September: American attitude towards Near East crisis.

We are very glad to hear of American sympathy with Turkey and I would cordially welcome any demonstration of that feeling which American Government may feel disposed to give. In maintaining treaty of Chanak even though we are alone and run considerable risks, we have no idea of claiming any special or exclusive advantage. Our sole aim is to place beyond all jeopardy the future freedom of the Straits which is a world interest just as much as one affecting the British Empire.

We naturally do not request any American action in support of our attitude on the spot. But if Washington were prepared to make any authoritative statement of their point of view it would be of immense value. Even if it were limited to enumeration of our objects as declared above it would be of great use. If it went further and indicated belief in disinterestedness of the action that has been and is being taken the effect on Turkey and on the Near East would be very great.

E 10312/1/16 No. 645

Sir Horace Lamont (Ismid) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 27.)

(No. 745.)
My Lord, *Ismid, September 16, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Turkish victory on Asia Minor appears so far to have had a slighter effect in Egypt than might have been anticipated.

In Alexandria the tower which is usually the first to respond to events affecting Turkey there have been no public demonstrations as yet, and reverses of last July to Greeks. The pleasure which is felt at Mustapha Pasha Kemal's sweeping successes has chiefly taken the form of congratulatory telegrams, many of which have been published in the native press.

A few individuals in the neighbourhood of Mansourah and Zagazig have sent congratulatory telegrams to the Sultan of Turkey.

The vernacular press is naturally delighted, and with the exception of two newspapers which have a pan-Islamic bias, such as Al Afkar and Al Jawaib Masri, it uses moderate language.

Mohammed Abd Wahid, whose name was mentioned to your Lordship as the self-styled leader of the Egyptian Liberal Party, and his friends, have written letters to the press eulogising the French as the friends of Islam, and it is alleged to have communicated with Prince Omar Toussoun and Mohammed Pasha Said with a view to organising a pro-French demonstration.

I have recently conversed with King Fuad and with Tewfik Pasha Nessim on the subject of the Turkish victory. Tewfik Pasha expressed the view that Mustapha Kemal Pasha, having secured Anatolia, would, if he acted in accordance with his character, probably be content to rest on his laurels, he thought that if His Majesty's Government now recognised him they would recover the friendly feelings of the Moslem East, and he remarked that the close sequence of the Turkish offers to soon General Townshend's visit to Angora had not passed unnoticed in Egypt. Neither he nor the King anticipated any co-operation between Mustapha Kemal and the Wahabis.

I have, &c.
ALLENBY, *for H.*
High Commissioner.

No 646

Mr Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 27)

(No 486)
(Telegraphic) R
Athens, September 26, 1, 22

I LEARN that Bulgarian Minister has offered Greek Government Bulgarian support for proposal that Thrace be Autonomous Power Greek Government have refused as acceptance would have compromised Greek claims.

(Repeated to Constantinople and Sofia)

No 647

Mr Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 26)

(No 487)
(Telegraphic) R
Athens, September 26, 1922

SERBIAN MINISTER, who is in charge of Turkish prisoners here, told me to-day that he was asking his Government to call attention of League of Nations to fact that Turkish prisoners were very well treated and that no one was looking after Greek prisoners in Turkey.

Repeated to Constantinople

No 648

Mr Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 27)

No 495)
(Telegraphic) R
Athens, September 26, 1922

MY Telegram No 476

FRENCH Minister has just told me he knows that orders have been given to all Greek destroyers to leave Constantinople except one torpedo boat destroyers which would instead Greek details are not stated.

(Repeated to Constantinople)

No 649

Mr Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 27)

(No 496)
(Telegraphic) R
Athens, September 27, 1922

SIR H RUMBOLD'S telegram No 465

You will have seen from my telegrams of yesterday that Greek Government no longer contest powers of transports or naval forces. I appreciate argument of Sir H Rumbold though it would seem that if it suits Kemalists to attack us they will always find or invent excuse. Revolutionary movement has for its main object reinstatement of Thrace as frontier and I am sure we are in any case effect which will be welcomed by Greek population here when it is known that we are preventing that from being reattached, although Kemal has not yet answered Allied invitation he must realise from remarks that no offensive expects Kemal to accept invitation as it stands. Neither Venizelos nor Bolshevists are believed to desire peace either in principle or practice.

Repeated to Constantinople)

No 650

Mr Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 27)

(No 500)
(Telegraphic) R
Athens, September 27, 1922

SIR H RUMBOLD'S telegram No. 469

It is certain that Greek authorities will be quite unable to cope with refugees after they have landed. What is wanted here at Athens is a strong international relief body who will co-ordinate efforts of smaller bodies and who will dictate to Greek authorities measures they should take to help them a thousandth of fearful sanitary state of comparatively few refugees here is appalling and gives rise to gravest fears of epidemic.

(Repeated to Constantinople)

No 651

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 27)

(No 466)
(Telegraphic) R
Constantinople, September 27, 1922

MY telegram No 461

At a meeting of Allied High Commissioners to-day generals this morning General Harington communicated reply of Mustapha Kemal to an telegram forwarding withdrawal of Turkish cavalry from neutral zone. Another Turkish force has meanwhile entered neutral zone from the direction of Biga. Mustapha Kemal's reply is thoroughly unsatisfactory. He denies any knowledge of neutral zone and says that the sole object of his troops is to prevent Greek armies. He alludes to activity of Greek troops as now East Thrace and the presence of Greek men of war at Constantinople on 26th September as proof that Greeks are not respecting armistice of any zone. He says that Nationalists are most sorry for their desire to avoid regrettable incidents but that they have decided to maintain certain measures taken. British forces in Chanak area. He says that British artillery has fired upon his troops from warships and that Nationalist troops. He reports solemn declaration of Turkish Nationalists with regard to freedom of the Straits finally asks General Harington to consider reasons of such a situation as will permit of a peaceful settlement.

My Allied colleagues and I all greatly regret reply to proposal that General Harington send reply in detail. Mustapha Kemal ignoring all his arguments and stating that Greek men of war have left Constantinople. Reply is being drafted now and will be considered at a further meeting of Allied High Commissioners and generals this afternoon.

I am convinced that if General Harington could get into personal touch with Mustapha Kemal much good would result from such a meeting.

No 652

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 27)

(No 467)
(Telegraphic)
Constantinople, September 27, 1922

YOUR telegram (unnumbered) to Athens of 25th September repeated to Constantinople No. 425

As Greek admiral was without instructions to leave Constantinople and as Nationalist agent in an interview with General Harington yesterday at once commented on presence of Greek warships here implying a connection between their presence here and violation of neutral zone at Chanak by Turkish cavalry, I took it on myself to ask Admiral Brock to request Greek admiral to leave with his warships at 6 this morning. The Greek admiral asked for a delay of six hours so as

to complete coaling and all Greek warships have just left the port I immediately informed Nationalist agent and Turkish Government

Admiral Brock and I consider that as His Majesty's Navy have been entrusted with task of preventing transfer of Nationalist troops from Asia to Europe it is unnecessary for Greek warships to proceed to this end that latter should be altogether withdrawn from Sea of Marmora We hope instructions may be sent to Athens in this sense

(Repeated to Athens No 146)

No 653

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 27)

(No 468 Confidential)
(Telegraphic) D *Constantinople September 27 1922*

FRENCH High Commissioner told me to-day that telegram sent by Allied Governments from Paris had produced a *détente* in the situation Mustapha Kemal's delay in replying to this note might be due to telegram sent by Franklin Bouillon from Paris for the purpose of persuading Mustapha Kemal to do nothing until he arrived at Smyrna Mustapha Kemal may have interpreted this to mean that he must await Franklin Bouillon's arrival before answering Allied note

French High Commissioner said he had been authorised by his Government to inform Allied Commissioners sent strong telegram to this effect and saying that Franklin Bouillon was going to Smyrna to assure Mustapha Kemal of the goodwill of French Government in which case his mission was superfluous or else that Mustapha Kemal might have increase of further concessions In that case French High Commissioner wished to know what these were and French Government replied that Franklin Bouillon had no authority to offer any additional concession

---

No 654

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 27)

(No 469)
(Telegraphic) D *Constantinople September 27 1922*

MEETING was held this morning at Ismid to consider instructions to be given to Allied generals and in the event of the proposed meeting with Mustapha Kemal at Mudania or Ismid to fix the line which Greek forces must retain pending meeting of conference

Explanation of Allied generals as to practical situation would be as follows Between Maritza line and Ismid Allied troops merely hold certain specified points which some 70 kilometres in front of them Allied troops would have to be immediately withdrawn

Allied High Commissioners were of opinion that this view should be accepted and decided to request their Governments to furnish them with instructions to be given to Allied generals as to whether they should declare for Angora or Central Government It was agreed that administration of Ismid of course only be provisional for say two months and that Ismid should be entrusted if possible to local recruitment of gendarmerie with cadres of Allied officers

Allied High Commissioners also decided to request Allied Governments to lay down immediately what powers and terms of reference should be given to Allied generals for purpose of meeting What for instance generals have full powers to settle nature of the new Constitution at meeting?

French High Commissioner observed that any discussion of cessation of hostilities would inevitably lead to request to Kemalists to stop further advance of their troops in direction of neutral zone and pointed out that such a demand would provoke correspondence and from Mustapha Kemal Allied High Commissioners would also be glad to know what arrangements have been made for presence of duly authorised Greek military representative at meeting

(Repeated to Athens No 146)

No 655

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 27)

(No 470)
(Telegraphic) R *Constantinople September 27 1922*

NATIONALIST agent has just made following verbal communication to the Constantinople Government on instructions from Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Angora

The concentration of British military forces at Chanak and Constantinople is not of a nature to facilitate maintenance of peace, which we ardently desire

I informed Hamid Bey that reinforcements which were being sent to Chanak were solely in the interests of peace, and had no hostile intention I referred to telegram sent by Allied Governments from Paris last Saturday and which bore your signature and stated that having regard to terms of that telegram I could not admit that presence of British military forces on Asiatic shores of Straits constituted hostilities to Kemalists

Hamid Bey then developed at great length argument that during Turco Greek war Allies had allowed Greeks to use Constantinople as naval base and that Greeks had been able to transport troops from Europe to Asiatic shore of Sea of Marmora He urged that Nationalist forces should be allowed to cross to Europe I replied that Greek ships had now left Constantinople and that Allies were not contemplating continuation of war but peace which would certainly appear if I said that Allied Governments had undertaken to support attribution to Turkey of Eastern Thrace as far as Maritza and Adrianople There was therefore no use in foreign ambassador

I impressed on Hamid Bey that telegram from Allied Governments had stipulated that as return for their intervention to secure these great advantages for Turkey Angora Government must undertake not to send troops either before or during the conference to zone which had been provisionally declared neutral and not to cross Straits or Sea of Marmora

Hamid Bey enquired what person Turks would prefer as representative of Eastern Thrace We did not like after proposed meeting at Mudania but I said I did not think so and that Turks must settle point for a short time anyhow Hamid Bey showed considerable irritation and said that he had received grave reports of persecution of Muhammadan population of Thrace was being subjected Nationalists felt that they must send troops at once to intervene and put an end to these persecutions

I am not quite certain whether at this subsequent interview Nationalist agent was using his own forgings or speaking under instructions He certainly had to a certain extent put Hamid Bey under the impression that situation with regard to neutral zone was becoming increasingly critical

I urged on Hamid Bey expediency of prompt meeting at Mudania or Ismid and of immediate cessation of hostilities pending proposed conference

I subsequently referred to well known attitude of Allied generals in foregoing and suggested that we might send out to latter Allied commissioners to various places in Eastern Thrace to report on latest persecutions if possible These commissions might have a tranquillising effect on population of those districts and give Nationalists a proof of our good intentions

---

No 656

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 27)

(No 471)
(Telegraphic) R *Constantinople September 27 1922*

MY telegram No 467

Greek High Commissioner informs me that Averoff sailed this morning without Greek admiral Latter had arrived on shore and when he wished to return on board found that his launch had gone He went off in another launch to find Averoff under way A bottle containing a letter was thrown to him from the ship Letter which was signed by all officers, stated that Averoff was going to

Rodosto and that a destroyer would be sent in a day or two's time to fetch admiral Greek High Commissioner on arrival at Constantinople Averoff will take part in revolutionary movement at Rodosto and will then probably sail for Greece

Greek General is now starting here at Constantinople

Revolutionary movement in Greece will have very serious bearing on development of events here in Greeks decide to fight for Thrace

Repeated to Athens No 147)

No 657

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 27)

(No 472)
(Telegraphic) Constantinople September 27 1922

FRENCH High Commissioner tells me that Hamid Bey has informed him that Yussuf Kemal was proceeding to Angora to ascertain where he would at once find Representatives of Grand National Assembly

Thus before we even know Allied Governments receive Mustapha Kemal's answer

---

No 658

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief Mediterranean (Received at Foreign Office September 27

No 997)
Telegraphic Admiralty September 25 1922

PERSONAL from Chief of Naval Staff

Recent events in Greece would seem to have no bearing to interfere with Kemalist movement in Ismid Peninsula Have discussed matter with Rear Admiral Webb who points out that Salonika and Chanak are the most suitable bases for Black Sea Fleet and should be kept under control from there Should Greek army capture Adrianople and not marshal in strength on Enos Dedeagatch line it would interfere with aerial spotting and so hamper bombardment

Possibility of retaining Greek warships in Princes Islands might be considered We have no reason to withdraw Turkish guns being sent you from England

---

No 659

Commander-in-chief Mediterranean to Admiralty (Received September 27)

(No 415)
(Telegraphic) September 26 1922

YOUR No 997 Personal to Chief of Naval Staff

Detailed plans of Ops as suggest for naval artillery support of military operations on Ismid Peninsula already exist vide Mediterranean No 887 of 7th May 1922 which I assume (report up to date) but the whole of the situation altered by refusal of Greek Land Italians to cooperate and the Metepe Dolubh have not been left General Officer Commanding does not intend to offer effective resistance on Ismid line but evacuate it attacked in force and return to Calapli such is his present policy and stay from the enemy's capital He will not withdraw his forces on political reasons but if the attack takes shape of which there are no signs present as the Nationalists hesitate to attack Ismid are sent on the larger scale Enemy Greek Italian sympathy by certain massacres that would use every effort to avoid and their contingencies With the fire of foregone naval artillery available aircraft spotting will have little effect other than a diminished effect of Nationalist advances to delay which will be surprised by the fact that the Turks are ready to get Further unsupported naval attack will undoubtedly provoke reprisals against the unprotected Christian population of the town who are in a highly nervous condition A complete organisation exists at Constantinople for removal of large bodies of Turks and the infiltration of undesirable elements by train

and ferry from Asia is uninterrupted Many of these men are undoubtedly soldiers Nothing can be done to prevent this short of isolating Asiatic shore from European It is with the foregoing in view that I do not consider that Nationalist penetration into Europe can be prevented once the military leave Ismid and that I do not recommend leaving a squadron in the Black Sea which would serve little purpose If the Turks mean business the only sound policy is to retire on Dardanelles, and if military operations become necessary to conduct them from there The navy would remain in control of Marmora and Mediterranean coasts of Anatolia and Thrace, and this with the severance of railway communication beyond Bulgaria should produce strong pressure on Turkey It is proposed to mount all guns coming from home in peninsula which will require strong counter battery fire General officer commanding agrees fully with the views expressed in this telegram

---

No 660

Commander-in-chief Mediterranean to Admiralty (Received September 27 1922)

No 419 Secret
(Telegraphic)

All Greek warships have left Constantinople for the Sea of Marmora at Turkey's request The High Commissioner concurred in the issue of instructions to Rear Admiral Commanding Fourth Battle Squadron to stop Greek troop transports entering the Dardanelles from the southwards Both the High Commissioner and Consuls-de-Carrière should be informed that all Greek warships are to leave the Sea of Marmora and remain outside the Dardanelles All these measures are necessary of a neutral attitude to be maintained as between Turks and Greeks now that we are preventing Turks from crossing into Europe

---

No 661

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief Mediterranean Received at Foreign Office September 27)

(No 15)
(Telegraphic)

MY No 977 of 23rd September It has now been decided that a total of ten vessels only are to be chartered and put at your disposal to transport refugees

September 27 1922

No 662

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 27,

By Bag)
(Private and Secret)

YOUR telegram No 826 Paris, September 26, 1922

Nahad Rechad will cross to-morrow but will not read Letter in time to go to the Foreign Office before 28th September

---

No 663

Sir A Geddes to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 27

(No 384)
(Telegraphic)

YOUR telegram No 290 Washington, September 26 1922

My immediately following telegram gives text of United States Government pronouncement on Near Eastern situation

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE
254

Second paragraph as you will see is designed to endorse our stand to show that United States Government does not consider French and Italian attitude shown by withdrawal of their troops from neutral zone has been well advised

Having regard to feeling in Congress and approaching elections I think that this action of United States Government is indicative of real desire to help us I have some reason to say that the desire of United States Government being willing to take part in a conference to discuss upon maintenance of freedom of Straits is not to be excluded However I do not think that it would be wise to issue any invitation until we have explored the ground a little further

---

No 664

Sir H Rodd to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 27)

(No 385)

(Telegraphic) R *Washington September 26, 1922*

SECRETARY of State to-day made following statement to press while declining to comment on territorial questions involved in Near East settlement proposals

American Government is gratified to observe that proposal of three Allied governments seeks to insure effective liberty of Dardanelles Sea of Marmora and Bosporus as well as protection of racial and religious minorities These points of proposal are referred to in connection with American interest

This Government also trusts that suitable arrangements have been agreed upon to the interests of peace to preserve freedom of the Straits pending conference to consider final terms of peace between Russia and the Allies

---

No 665

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to H Lindley (Athens)

(No 257)

Telegraphic R *Foreign Office September 27, 1922*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No 465 of 26th September reported to you Personal urgent representation in sense suggested

Repeated to Constantinople No 435)

No 666

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Lindley (Athens)

No 257

Decypher R *Foreign Office September 27, 1922*

YOUR telegrams Nos 478 and 480 of 25th September

Approve your excellent letter to the Turkish Delegates in strong language to the Prime Minister

---

No 667

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Lindley (Athens)

(No 258)

(Telegraphic) *Foreign Office September 27, 1922*

YOUR telegram No 480 of 26th September Protection of British subjects and safety of Greek Revolutionists

Admiralty are leaving to discretion of Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean despatch of vessels to Piraeus

It is certainly to be hoped that we shall not become involved in the actions of Greek Revolutionists Otherwise we would of course intervene to avoid serious bloodshed

(Repeated to Sir H Rumbold No 436 for communication to Admiral Brock)

No 668

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Constantinople (No 434) and Athens (No 255)

(Telegraphic) R *Foreign Office September 27, 1922*

YOUR telegram No 460 477 of 25th September Transport of Greek refugees

In addition to five British vessels already chartered Board of Trade will place five more at disposal of Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean as soon as possible for embarkation of refugees at Smyrna Vessels will if practicable take in water and bread for voyage only His Majesty's Minister at Athens should arrange with Senior Naval Officer Smyrna regarding places of disembarkation

(Sent to Constantinople and Athens)

[E 9680/27/44]

No 669

Foreign Office to Tumulty

(Secret)

Sir *Foreign Office September 27, 1922*

WITH reference to your secret letter of the 21st instant relative to the general question of the control of commerce in the event of hostilities in the Near East I am directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to state for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that the policy to be adopted on this subject is [illegible] and is embodied in the enclosed

2 On the assumption that hostilities would only arise as a consequence of some action taken by the Turkish forces which His Majesty's Government would be entitled to regard as a breach of the armistice it is not thought that His Majesty's Government will wish to [illegible] rights as against Turkey, and it would be inexpedient to [illegible] now we request the National Government not to exercise belligerent rights against Kemalist territory but it seems to be desirable that their powers under the Orders in Council should be suitably restricted so as to [illegible] Turkish vessels which [illegible] Kemalist territory and [illegible] Greece or Egypt

3 The effect will be that His Majesty's Government would not be able to [illegible] belligerent rights against Kemalist territory but it seems to be desirable that their powers under the Orders in Council should be suitably restricted so as to [illegible] Turkish vessels which [illegible] Kemalist territory and [illegible] Greece or Egypt

4 The Secretary of State proposes that even if the Orders in Council are suspended as in operation [illegible] would have to be given to vessels proceeding to Soviet and other non-enemy Black Sea ports in case of vessels which had no goods on board for enemy destination or origin

I am &c
LANCELOT OLIPHANT

[E 9850/27/44]

No 670

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris)

(No 2946)

My Lord *Foreign Office September 27, 1922*

I HAVE to request you to reply in the following sense to the note from M Poincaré, of which a copy was forwarded with your despatch No 2922 of the 23rd September

2 If General Harington as the French Government now declare, was under a misapprehension in inviting his Allied colleagues to co-operate in the defence of the

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

neutral zones on the Asiatic shores of the Straits, it was only natural that he should have fallen into this error in view of the very explicit terms of the note of the French Embassy in London of the 28th July of which a copy is enclosed.

3. In this note the allusion was to an attack upon Constantinople, and this it is clear, could be delivered as easily from Island as from Chatalja, and specific reference was made to an attack by the Turks, which could hardly in the circumstances of the case, be delivered from any other quarter than the Bosphorus.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

[E 7512/5/44] Enclosure in No. 670

Count de Saint Aulaire to the Earl of Balfour

DES renseignements parvenus au Ministère des Affaires étrangères à Paris établissent que le Gouvernement grec prépare en ce moment des dispositions militaires de nature à transporter le théâtre de la guerre sur Constantinople.

Trois divisions actuellement stationnées en Thrace et des forces qui s'y trouvent jointes par voie de transports vont être dirigées sur Constantinople. Les États Majors arrivent d'Athènes.

Dans une déclaration sensationnelle les journaux grecs reçoivent et annoncent cette expédition. Hier soir le Président du Conseil Gounaris a déclaré à la Chambre des Députés que le Gouvernement allait avoir à prendre à très brève échéance, des mesures très graves, ajoutant qu'il s'agissait seulement de manœuvres tendant à faire impression sur les Alliés et de simples mesures.

Nous nous sommes toujours refusés à penser que les trois Gouvernements alliés signataires de la paix à Sèvres, et notamment le Gouvernement grec que toute attaque contre la zone neutre par les Armées grecques serait considérée par les Alliés, qu'elle vienne des Grecs ou des Turcs, serait réprimée par la force.

L'Ambassadeur de France serait reconnaissant à Son Seigneurie le Comte de Balfour de vouloir bien lui faire connaître le sentiment du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté à ce sujet. Il saisit, &c.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 28 septembre 1922

No. 671

Mr. Findley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received September 28*)

No. 706
Telegraphic D
Athens, September 28, 1922

SIR H. RUMBOLD'S telegram No. 460.

Am I to understate the Cabinet's return to Thrace? Metaxas is to precede acceptance by Revolt of invitation to conference.

No. 672

Field Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received September 28*)

(No. 383.)
(Telegraphic) R
Cairo, September 27, 1922

MY telegram No. 315.

Refugees from Asia Minor are arriving at Constantinople. Persian and Greek shares whose passports bear British visa for Egypt.

In the interests of public order and public security I should be grateful if instructions could be issued to local authorities in Balkans by way of which they are likely to travel including Crete that no British visa for Egypt should be given to persons from Asia Minor other than British, French, Italian, American and Egyptian subjects without previous reference to Director General of Public Security (telegraphic address Amnan Cairo) who will only sanction admission of persons with close business connections or immediate relatives in Egypt.

(Repeated to Athens and Constantinople.)

No. 673

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received September 29*)

(No. 473.)
(Telegraphic) R
Constantinople, September 28, 1922

COMMANDER IN CHIEF wishes Admiralty to be informed of following summary of telegram from Rear Admiral at Smyrna regarding refugees (?olden).

Joint note drawn up at meeting of 27th September requests extension of fifteen days for evacuation. French Admiral at an interview with Nationalists obtained this assurance, but second date will not be arrived till expiration of first period, and even then concession may be withdrawn if necessitated by political situation.

It is impossible to estimate exactly increasing number of refugees, whose physical condition is getting worse. Report that there are 70,000 at Varla, Tchesme and Aivali is being investigated.

All refugees now proceeding to Mitylene are given steps are being taken to pass them on to Greece, but this cannot be done unless transports are provided for voyage. Rear Admiral Smyrna suggests that Mudania is only place where refugees can be received and inform authorities regarding [illegible] of ships.

(Repeated to Athens No. 148.)

No. 674

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received September 28*)

(No. 474. Private and Secret.)
(Telegraphic.)
Constantinople, September 28, 1922.

THERE is absolute proof from various secret sources that utmost pressure is being brought by Soviet representative at Angora to induce Mustapha Kemal to attack neutral zones.

It is of the greatest importance at all hazards that if pretext for such an attack should be created and councils of peace party in Angora thereby strengthened.

Principal pretext is undoubtedly collaboration owing to certain Thrace to Kemalist troops. British fleet has disappearance of [illegible] rear guard for Greek troops which at present are being unable to [illegible] Thrace.

Assurances of good will of Allies in the matter do not [illegible] Thrace to Turkey are not sufficient owing to Kemalists distrust of British policy whilst Russian influence has easy task of fostering [illegible].

I consider it therefore most desirable that earliest possible intimation be given by three Powers shall be given to Greece that Greek troops must withdraw immediately behind Maritza line. This would be in accordance with [illegible] taking given to Allied note to Angora Government as regards [illegible] of Greeks should be in Thrace before opening of conference.

Question of means to be employed to compel Greek Government to comply with this intimation and of temporary administration to be set up in Eastern Thrace during arrangement of negotiations must later be considered. It is indispensable that such a [illegible] should be controlled by Allied officers and [illegible] of Allied troops, but as returns for decision whether Kemalists or Constantinople Government officials and gendarmerie should be employed for the purpose.

No. 675

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received September 28*)

(No. 475.)
Telegraphic R
Constantinople, September 28, 1922

MY telegram No. 466.

For text of General Officer Commanding in Chief's reply to Mustapha Kemal, please see his telegram to War Office No. 1223 27th September.

Allied High Commissioners were consulted before despatch and raised [illegible] no objections] to terms.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

No 676

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received September 28*)

(No 476)
(Telegraphic) R
Constantinople September 28 1922

MY telegram No 467 and Mytilene telegram No 496
Admiral Brock informs me that Venoffis still working in Sea of Marmora We took it essential that all Greek ships should leave Sea of Marmora immediately If new Greek Government's regime cannot be induced to order withdrawal of warships from Sea of Marmora I think Admiral Brock should be instructed to prevent Greek ships of war from entering the Dardanelles
(Repeated to Athens)

No 677

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received September 28*)

(No 477)
(Telegraphic) D
Constantinople September 28 1922

DRIVEN by Congress to act in accordance to the same sense as secret telegram Paris telegram No 481 Have I Entente orders that British ships are not to allow any Angora vessels to cross the line of advance from Kemalist cross at Ismid to Mudania or Gemlik Proposed measures to prevent Kemalist crossing Marmora Dardanelles and with Greek troops Defence of neutral zone Difference between Entente and Angora Governments Question of transfer of Kemalist troops to Thrace Chanak incident Question of withdrawal of British troops
Impossible to foresee how we are to withdraw from Asiatic shore of Straits Invariably there would be nothing to prevent Kemalists from attacking Ismid and Chanak Between Entente with course of proceedings as before how would Greek Government be able to make cession of straits or bridgehead or evacuate Asia Minor Please instruct me if nothing to reply to these observations

No 678

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received September 29*)

No 478
(Telegraphic) R
Constantinople September 28 1922

YOUR telegram No 411
Messrs Sevket and Delegorgue have arrived by steamship Admiralty instructed 27th September

No 679

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received September 28*)

(No 479 Secret
(Telegraphic
Constantinople September 28 1922

GENERAL HARINGTON has communicated to me his telegram No 2485 to War Office This telegram clearly explains Limits of neutral zones were ruins not be in East with the demilitarised zones provided for in Treaty of Sevres The Chanak zone was established against Greeks when they were in occupation of parts of Anatolia and is being maintained in theory against Turks It is this zone which is referred to as Chanak neutral zone

Whilst General Harington's argument with reference to transfer of Greek or Turkish troops from European to Asiatic shore of Sea of Marmora and *vice versa* outside neutral zones is logical I have pointed out to him that I assume intention

His Majesty's Government in pressing for use to Admiral Brock to prevent transfer of Kemalist troops to Europe was to prevent reoccupation of lost Thrace Have always contended Kemalist army were to remain there we see no telling where it would stop One of Kemalists demands in peace negotiations in Western Thrace and Kemalists having occupied Eastern Thrace up to Maritza might well cross into Western Thrace This would presumably lead to mobilisation of Serbian army I said I thought these considerations must override questions of strict neutrality

However we are to carry Eastern Thrace to Kemalist troops I feel strongly that the Allies have a right to refuse Angora Government that transfer of Kemalist troops to Thrace will not be permitted Further, French and Italian admirals should help Admiral Brock to prevent passage of these troops from Asia to Europe There is no reason why we should wear white ensigns in front of this fracas

At this juncture would you please inform new Greek regime decided to fight for Eastern Thrace See Athens telegram No 496 In that event I do not see how we can help Greek element Eastern Thrace if Kemalist troops unless we are prepared to join Greeks ourselves

No 680

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received September 28*)

(No 480
(Telegraphic) D
Constantinople September 28 1922

THE position of affairs at Gallipoli is as follows

General Marden was last night informed by Mustapha Kemal's staff that Greek troops were not to be withdrawn from Asiatic shore as this would leave Angora Government open to attack from Turkish forces in considerable numbers close to British detachments

Orders were issued to Angora troops to withdraw from Mustapha Kemal's neutral zone at once about ten battalions of Ismid garrison Turkish forces is not subject to control by its general headquarters British artillery officers at Chanak have been restricted to the zones as shown on map

I have informed French High Commissioner of foregoing He promised to send a wireless to Franco in Boulogne where Poincaré is staying pointing out that danger point is not Ismid but Chanak and Gallipoli where troops should be kept Mustapha Kemal to give necessary orders to withdraw his troops from vicinity of Chanak and also to get Mustapha Kemal to meet General Harington at Mudania

French High Commissioner then communicated to Admiral Dumesnil of latest interview with Mustapha Kemal Essential part of this account was that Mustapha Kemal had given his sincere assurance that he wished to avoid a conflict at Ismid and that he and his staff at the moment unable to withdraw his detachments gave general orders that no aggression should be made against British troops Mustapha Kemal also asked that if British force was met with down from Chanak similar orders should be given to it

I have informed General Harington of foregoing Situation evidently contemplated by Mustapha Kemal is that British and Turkish should watch each other whilst Turkish forces are building up until Mustapha Kemal thinks that he is strong enough to attack

Admiral Brock informs me he has given orders that Turkish craft should be cleared from Asiatic shore of Dardanelles

No 681

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr Lindley (*Athens*)

(No 263 Secret)
Telegraphic,
Foreign Office September 28 1922

FOLLOWING for Naval Mission from Air Ministry

You must endeavour almost to ascertain and keep us informed of position of Turkish air forces paying particular attention to
(*a*) Present strength and location
(*b*) Reinforcements of machines and personnel and location of same

No 682

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr Lindley (Athens)

(No 264
(Telegraphic R *Foreign Office September 28 1922*
MY telegram No 256 of 27th Sept ne Greek transport-
S spend action

No 683

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Consul Lamb (Geneva)

(No 75)
(Telegraphic) R. *Foreign Office September 28 1922*
ATLENS telegram No 500 of 27th September Relief of refugees
Before my bring League of Nations to take any action I should like to know whether it is proposed to accept the suggestion

---

No 684

Mr Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston Received September 29

(No 509)
(Telegraphic) R *Athens, September 28 1922*
YOUR telegram No 256
Military attache spoke today to Acting Chief of the General Staff who seemed to understand enclave asked to him by passage of Greek transports through Dardanelles and promised to do his best to use Delegate
Military attache also spoke about Constantinople telegram No 469 and Chief of General Staff promised to do his best
There is at present no real anxiety here As soon as one is formed I will speak myself
Repeated to Constantinople

No 685.

Mr Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston Received September 29

(No 515)
(Telegraphic) *Athens, September 28 1922*
MILITARY attache reports that General Staff here are expecting supersession but their successors not yet appointed Consequently authoritative information difficult to find General Staff estimate is as follows

Troops now in Thrace are 4th Army Corps (three divisions) and 3rd Army Corps (two divisions), total five divisions with 72 three batteries of 6 inch howitzers and 18 six batteries of field artillery For further details of 4th Army Corps see my telegram No 456 and my telegram No 462 Other details of 3rd Army Corps not yet accurately known The strength of these five divisions has varied average strength at present probably between 8 000 and 10 000 This estimate would make total now in Thrace about 50,000 of which 20,000 could use rifles

The *moral* of these troops fell after collapse of Greek southern army but Greek General Staff believe that there has now been some improvement (*Note* – Improvement is not confirmed from Constantinople

No 682 A

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H Rumbold (Constantinople)

(No 442)
(Telegraphic) R
YOUR telegram No. 476. *Foreign Office, September 28, 1922*
Please make following communication to Angora representative at Constantinople

In accordance with spirit of Paris Agreement we have hitherto prevented and are still preventing, entry of Greek transports and men-of-war into Marmora and Dardanelles.

It is however, Mustapha Kemal does not withdraw from neutral zone (destruction for this purpose now will no longer exist and will be withdrawn (End of)

(For your information)

On the other hand we do not think that neutrality requires us to compel withdrawal of Greek ships at present in Marmora Please inform Harington and admiralty of this decision

(repeated to Paris, No. 297, to Rome No 787 and Athens, No 269

P.R.O. 424 254 ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Troops in Athens consist of two regiments of cavalry and two batteries of field artillery, remains of three divisions from Asia Minor, and 2nd division, which marched in to-day to support change of regime Total about 12,000 *Moral* of 2nd division and of artillery seems good of others low but likely to conform to 2nd division

Troops in Mitylene and Chios are remains of four divisions, total about 15,000 *Moral* unreliable and dependent upon success of military movement here

Troops at Salonica (excluding details of 14th division which is stretched along Macedonian frontier, an independent division strength probably not more than 8,000, *moral* reported good

Plan at present outlined is to retain four classes, 1919 to 1922 to confirm summons already given to 1923 class and to recall two or more of classes older than 1919, to form two divisions (or three if response is good) here and in the islands and to send them to Thrace with independent division. This would give eight (or nine) divisions in Thrace, say a total of 100,000 men comprising 36,000 rifles, but no estimate of time required to organise can be given before new Government moves

General Staff say enough mountain artillery was saved from Asia Minor to provide for projected force, that guns and equipment for more than ten batteries of field artillery are stored in Athens and that in the absence of horses, guns required by army will be drawn by agricultural tractors, which are available and have given good experimental results Over 1,000 rounds a gun are immediately available also personnel for all artillery of 9th Army There are also three batteries of Skoda 15 cm guns at Salonica

Transport No details yet but General Staff believe sufficient

Military organisation force and supply in Thrace are much hampered by refugees

General Staff assert that most of the artillery lost in Asia Minor was effectively destroyed

My own impression is that at present moment everything is fluid and nothing certain can be predicted about *moral* Original idea of revolution was to strengthen Thracian front but it is not certain that this idea will continue to predominate Nevertheless, I still consider that a serious Greek army would be available if fighting for definite object and fully supported by Great Britain.

(Repeated to Constantinople)

No 686

Mr Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received September* 29)

(No 518 Secret)
(Telegraphic) *Athens, September* 29, 1922

POLICE have informed me directly that they have papers belonging to M Gounaris dealing with his conversations in London I have informed police that these should be handed over to Minister for Foreign Affairs as soon as he is installed, and that they should not be seen by unauthorised persons I might possibly have got hold of papers but I did not want responsibility since life of M Gounaris may well depend on their contents

---

No 687

Sir C Young to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received September* 29)

(No. 129)
(Telegraphic) *Belgrade, September* 28, 1922

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs requested me this morning to inform you that question of furnishing detachment of two companies to demonstrate solidarity of this country in Eastern question will come before Cabinet as soon as M Pasitch returns, that is to say, in a day or two M Ninchitch explained that French Government had recently given this country credit of 100,000,000 fr for the purpose of

furthering re-equipment of Serbian army M Nincic fears that French may take umbrage at readiness of this country to contribute Serbian detachment and may cut off all deferred credit in question He desires therefore to be in position to assure council that in the event of French acting in that manner British Government will be ready to accord similar credit and facilitate rearming of army M Nincic dwelt on the necessity of bettering equipment of army if a policy is to be followed which has potentialities of military action and he lamented that 100,000 men was being raised on too small a sum

---

No 688

Sir I Young to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received September 29*)

(No 130)
(Telegraphic) *Belgrade September 28, 1922*

MY telegram No 129

I should have added that M Nincic when asking for credit similar to that given by French added proviso that prices asked for British material should not exceed those asked by French

I asked him what the army would specify any particular material that army specially needed, and he replied all sorts rifles cartridges ammunition aeroplanes &c

---

No 689

Sir H Dering to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received September 29*)

(No 24
(Telegraphic) *Bucharest September 28, 1922*

YOUR telegram No 421 to Constantinople

Having heard from High Commissioner that I might approach Roumanian Government I and Country located it your telegram

Minister for Foreign Affairs states that Roumanian Government would be ready to apply all declarations provisions and articles suggested and permit the use of Constanza as base but on condition that intervention in the sense desired against all consequences of such action be explained to Soviet Government and asserted that to afford pretext to engage in useful work was not in accordance with neutrality of Roumania that might cause this use for attack

Repeated to Constantinople

No 690

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received September 30*)

(No 482 Secret)
Telegraphic *Constantinople September 29, 1922*

YOUR telegram No 359

We know on most secret sources that Sarrou is in active communication with Nationalists French gendarmerie officer left Constantza area for Balikesri where he stated he went on urgent business for Turks he was arrested and imprisoned by Nationalists for three days and has now returned to Crimea Three French officers under Sarrou's orders are known to have remained at their posts after Greek evacuation to help Nationalists

---

No 691

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received September 30*)

(No 484)
(Telegraphic) R *Constantinople September 29, 1922*

ADMIRAL DUMESNIL has telegraphed that Franklin-Bouillon attended a long meeting yesterday at Smyrna with Mustapha Kemal and his Ministers Meeting was to be continued in the evening and Franklin Bouillon proposes a full account to-day Franklin Bouillon states that matters will be very difficult, but that he hopes it will be possible for a meeting to take place very soon at Magnesia between Mustapha Kemal and Allied generals

---

No 692

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received September 29*)

No 485) (By Bag)
(Telegraphic)
THIS morning's Echo de Paris publishes article from M Clair-Gayet, its special correspondent at the Near East which ends with the following words

Since leaving Smyrna (to which I shall return for Constantinople I have passed through the Dardanelles British battleships and cruisers are going and coming at the entrance to the Sea of Marmora for they have begun to leave Smyrna where, they say 'they have nothing more to do' As a matter of fact they took on board some ten or twenty British subjects As for the rest consisting chiefly of terrified Greeks they leave to the mercy of the Edgar Quinet and le Jean Bart the duty of rescuing them Their preoccupations are elsewhere

This is an extreme instance of a tendency prevalent in the French press to insinuate that we have done less than our share in rescue work at Smyrna and to magnify at our expense the achievements of French navy in this respect As these statements are cited and no doubt intended to damage our reputation in the Near East we should not be advisable to issue official Note for use of Ambassadors statement showing what part has been played by Great Britain in work of rescue? If such a statement is issued I should be glad to have it with a view to my order that I may endeavour to secure its publication in those French papers which have not scrupled to assert that we have been playing a passive

---

No 693

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received September 29*)

(No 486) (By Bag)
(Telegraphic) *Paris, September 28, 1922*

FOLLOWING communiqué has been issued as result of Cabinet meeting at Rambouillet this morning —

M Raymond Poincare President of the Council gave an account of the situation in the East and in Greece The Council decided that the events which have taken place in Greece cannot modify the resolutions of France which were taken in agreement with the Allies and were contained in the proposals communicated to Mustapha Kemal Pasha

This statement is a reflection of the apprehensions expressed in the press (and I understand started by the Quai d'Orsay) as to the possible results of the abdication of King Constantine Danger is foreseen in two quarters (1) That Greece may climb and obtain support of Great Britain if not of other Allies now that she has got rid of King Constantine and is free to recall Venizelos (2) that the Turks may

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON 254

slow ntrat s ren e and hasten to seize D ardanelles before a new Ent ente Greek fighting start takes place

The press is unanimous in pointing out that events in Greece can make no difference to decision of Allies of 23rd September which must remain basis of negotiations whether M Venizelos returns to power or not Figaro observes that King Constantine's departure is inopportune as the rest of his acts and the general embarrassment of the press at this turn of events bears out the truth of this remark as far as French opinion is concerned

---

No 694

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received September 29*)

By Bag

No 487,
Telegraphic) *Paris September 28, 1922*

M JARDOUIF of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs remarked in private conversation with one of my staff to-day that there had been much regret in the absence at Russian conference of Bulgaria at approaching conference He added that if Bulgarians were anxious to submit some scheme for revision of Treaty of Neuilly he had been unable to do so because it gave Mustapha Kemal opportunity of demanding revision of other Powers

---

No 695

Sir R Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received September 29*)

No 293)
(Telegraphic) R *Rome September 28, 1922*

SCIALOJA has two subjects connected with Near East to discuss Some apprehension exists here as to Greek attitude Stamboulisky's expressions have created unfavourable impression

Tittoni delighted Serbia was to be given Port of Dedeagatch Concessions always made by Italy to Serbia are now announced to have been made to Turkish Embassy

Stringher telephoned yesterday to insist on Venizelos's return to conference Article in semi-official Tribuna suggests that Italy having secured equality of battleship tonnage at Washington is not unfavourable to Turkish claims to revision of Treaty

Contemplated visit of Duke of Aosta to London is not understood here but is said to be French policy also to prevent visit of Duke of York Results recently obtained in Greece by Allied attitude point

Stringher states that if forces of Italian Army of Occupation were withdrawn from neutral zone at the end of conference but not before possibility of Italian intervention

---

No 696

Sir R Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received September 29*)

(No 295)
(Telegraphic) R *Rome September 29, 1922*

YOUR telegram No 289

Minister for Foreign Affairs assures me that reports received at London of Italian naval steps in contemplation On the contrary General staff absolutely abreast I has been instructed to place himself in communication with British General Officer Commanding in order to ascertain what is required of him I asked his Excellency to confirm assurance to you that withdrawal would take place without previous consultation with His Majesty's Government and he assented

His Excellency urged that Greeks should be induced withdraw from Eastern Thrace to behind Maritza as this would remove my pretext for advance on Kemal But he was not sanguine as to how this would be accomplished

(Repeated to Constantinople)

381

No 697

(Nil

No 698

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir R Graham, Rome)

(No 289,
(Telegraphic) R *Foreign Office September 29, 1922*

TIMES publishes report that Italy has decided to withdraw her contingent from Constantinople Please enquire at once and report whether there is any truth in this rumour

Italian Government will of course realise extreme seriousness of step if confirmed in its effect upon Allied *entente*

(Repeated to Constantinople No 446)

No 699

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir R Graham (Rome)

(No 292)
(Telegraphic) *Foreign Office September 29, 1922*

YOUR No 295

It may interest you to know that Scialoja's claim to responsibility for policy of Quai d'Orsay at Paris meeting is wholly destitute of foundation Beyond backing up the French wherever disputed point arose he played quite inconspicuous part and his propaganda in Italian press, though carried on as freely as accounts in some dailies of previous months, actually fell off

---

[E 10261/27/44] No 700

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H Rumbold (Constantinople)

(No 959)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, September 29, 1922*

THIS afternoon Dr Nazim Recaid the Kemalist representative in London called upon me at his special request in order to discuss the situation that has arisen between the British and Angora Governments.

He began by thanking me for the friendly attitude that I had shown in Paris and congratulated me on the agreement that had there been arrived at. He said that he came as a warm friend of good relations between our two peoples and of the early conclusion of peace, and he hoped that I would not desist from my efforts to carry the matter to a successful conclusion

I said that I proposed to treat him with the utmost frankness, because a situation had arisen in which immediate action alone could prevent the outbreak of hostilities and probably the renewal of war between Great Britain and Turkey. I was at a loss to understand the tactics that had been pursued by Mustapha Kemal since he had received the Paris note. This communication, it could not be denied, contained an immense and unexpected concession to his views. The three Great Powers had found themselves in absolute accord upon the point, and it rested only with Kemal, in his own interests as well as in those of peace, to meet without delay the advance that had been made. Nevertheless, a week all but a day had passed since the Paris note was despatched to him. So far, he had not answered it, and, even if he offered the excuse that he was waiting to consult M. Franklin-Bouillon, who had arrived at Smyrna on Wednesday, there was no reason why a reply should not by now have been sent. On the contrary, Mustapha Kemal had amused himself by returning captious replies to the British Commander-in-chief, and meanwhile he had authorised the continuous advance of Turkish troops into the Chanak neutral zone up to a point where they were in direct contact with the British forces, and where the situation, as I should presently tell him, was one of a critical description. The sequence of events contemplated in Paris was, firstly, a general acceptance by Mustapha Kemal of the Allied proposals and of the conditions attached to them; secondly, an immediate meeting in Mudania with the Allied generals and the Greek commander, in order to arrange for the retirement of the Greek forces; and, thirdly, such arrangements as might be required pending the holding of the Peace Conference itself. Where, I asked, was Mustapha Kemal at this moment?

Dr. Nihad Rechad explained that he had gone off with M. Franklin-Bouillon to Angora.

I replied that I had nothing to say as to Kemal's desire to consult the Grand National Assembly, although I observed that he had already summoned his Cabinet for consultation in Smyrna; but that he should go off to Angora at this moment, instead of going to Mudania, seemed to me to constitute a tactical error on his part which I found it difficult to explain. Meanwhile, I would tell Dr. Nihad Rechad frankly what had happened, and what was going to happen. Mustapha Kemal having, in spite of the Paris note and in spite of frequent protests, absolutely declined to withdraw his forces from the Chanak neutral zone, and these forces having continued to advance until they were in a position where we were informed that they even made grimaces at the British troops on the other side of the barbed wire, a situation had arisen which could not be tolerated by any army—it would not be tolerated by that of Mustapha Kemal himself. It further constituted a military menace of the most serious description. Warning after warning to the Turkish commander having been ignored, the British Government had decided that this situation, for which they were in no sense responsible, must be terminated. Orders had therefore been given this morning to the British commander to call upon the Kemalist forces to retire, and, in the event of their refusing, to compel them to do so. Thus we might, owing to the culpable action of these forces, find ourselves within a few hours on the edge of war.

Dr. Nihad Rechad expressed the utmost alarm at this situation, which had apparently come upon him as a great shock, and he announced his intention of telegraphing at once to Mustapha Kemal on the point. He believed that he could reach him by wireless before to-morrow morning.

I suggested that, if there were still time, orders should be given to the Kemalist cavalry—of whom there were now 4,500—to retire; and that, even if these orders came too late and an unfortunate incident occurred, it was still possible for Mustapha Kemal to explain that the incident had been due to an error on the part of his troops, and to order their instant withdrawal from the neutral zone. It might be too late to prevent hostilities, but it might still be possible to avert a war.

Dr. Nihad Rechad then proceeded to give me his own explanation of the Kemalist position. He said that Kemal was in great alarm lest, owing to the revolution in Athens, we were already arranging with the new Greek Government that they should re-enter the war and join us in the occupation of the Marmora and in the retention of Thrace. Further, in the event of the Greek troops retiring, as was proposed in the Paris note, either to the Maritza or to another line in Eastern Thrace, what guarantee had the Turks as to the nature of the administration to be set up in the evacuated territory? They were desperately afraid that it would not be a Turkish administration, and that some attempt would be made to rob them of the spoils which they appeared to have won. It was these doubts more particularly which had restrained Mustapha Kemal from returning an immediate answer to the Paris

proposals—a delay which Dr. Nihad Rechad, for his own part, joined with me in deeply regretting.

I replied that, on the two points which he had mentioned, I would be as explicit with him as I had been in respect of Chanak. It was not true that so far any step whatever had been taken to encourage the Greeks. I was not in communication with the new Government in Athens. I did not even know who they were. I was unaware of the disposition of their troops, and of their military intentions. We had given them no encouragement whatsoever in Thrace. On the contrary, Dr. Nihad Rechad must know quite well that we had obliged the Greek man-of-war to leave Constantinople, and that we had prohibited Greek transports and vessels of war from entering the Dardanelles. We could not possibly have acted in a more strictly neutral manner. But I must warn him frankly that, if the incidents which I had described resulted in hostilities, this attitude would at once be changed. There would then be no reason whatsoever why we should prevent Greece from doing anything that she pleased in respect of Thrace or the Marmora; and, if Mustapha Kemal chose to fight us, he would have no cause to be surprised at the re-entry of Greece upon the scene. As regards Thrace, I said that I had not the slightest difficulty in rebutting the suspicions of Mustapha Kemal. As a matter of fact, the British Government had already had in contemplation the necessity of instituting a civil administration in those parts of Eastern Thrace which would be evacuated by the Greek army, and, although the assistance of Allied officers might be required in reporting upon the situation and setting up an administration, I had always contemplated that it should be in the main Turkish in character, and that certainly no attempt should be made to get behind the terms of the Paris note. But how, I asked, was this to be brought about if Mustapha Kemal refrained from coming to Mudania? Mudania, I repeated, was the first step; the line of evacuation was the second; and the setting up of some form of civil administration was the third. That at such a moment Mustapha Kemal should be in a train going to Angora instead of expediting these issues so favourable to him, was to me quite incomprehensible.

Dr. Nihad Rechad asked my permission to include in his message to his chief the observations which I had just made.

I readily gave him permission, and urged upon him the utmost speed and the most definite presentation of the case if he was to have any chance of avoiding what we both regarded as the disastrous contingency of a new war. No one wanted such a war, certainly not Great Britain. But, if it were provoked in the particular circumstances which I had described, I did not think that public opinion would be left in the smallest doubt as to where the responsibility lay.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

No. 701.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 30.)

(No. 519.)
(Telegraphic.)

Athens, September 29, 1922.

SIR H. RUMBOLD'S telegram No. 150 to Athens with reference to General Harington's telegram No. 2485 to War Office.

Might I be informed whether, as I have hitherto understood, it is the determination of His Majesty's Government to keep Kemalist forces out of Europe until a final settlement by conference is reached, quite apart from what other Powers may do?

I am doing all I can to get all Greek men-of-war withdrawn from narrow seas, and for this purpose a definite answer would be most helpful. It would also be a guide for me in my attitude towards reorganisation of a Greek army in Thrace since I ought to later on discourage this if His Majesty's Government have decided that war with Kemalists must be avoided whatever latter [? groups omitted].

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

No. 702.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 30.)

(No. 521.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, September* 29, 1922.

SIR H. RUMBOLD'S telegram No. 476.

I called on Acting Minister of Marine this morning and learnt that "Averoff" was here, but that it was intended to send another ship to Sea of Marmora to replace her. Acting Minister promised she should not start until Government was formed and could take decisions. He also promised to recall torpedo-boat now passing Dardanelles.

I told Acting Minister that Senior Naval Officer of Allied forces might have to ask Greek ships to withdraw, and I wanted to avoid this.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 703.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 30.)

(No. 522.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, September* 29, 1922.

GENEVA telegram No. 54.

According to our information, there will be no refugees left at Smyrna by the time flour arrives.

It had better be sent to Mitylene, Salonica, Piræus and Rodosto. As regards Nansen's plan of concentrating refugees, we consider Greek plan of distributing them better, in spite of difficulties of victualling. These people must be absorbed into the population as quickly as possible, in order to prevent them becoming a permanent charge on the community. Far the best place for them is Thrace, but it is impossible to send them there in view of terms of settlement.

Baron de Reding agrees with the above, and is reporting in the same sense.

No. 704.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 30.)

(No. 483.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, September* 29, 1922.

INFORMATION is reaching Allied High Commissioners from sources which they cannot disregard that Greeks are behaving very badly to Turks in Eastern Thrace. This is causing excitement amongst Nationalists and will certainly be used by them as a pretext for pressing their demand to be allowed to march into Thrace.

Greek High Commissioner here is being notified that three or four inter-Allied commissions are starting at once for Eastern Thrace with a view to calming apprehensions of Greeks and Turks. Meanwhile, I submit that strong representations should be made to Greek Government to give orders for cessation of vexatious measures against Turks, on railway and at Adrianople, &c.

Greek High Commissioner informed Allied High Commissioners this morning that Turkish bands which had been forming in Chatalja neutral zone had attacked Greek troops, but had been repulsed. Greek commandant has intimated that army of Thrace declines all responsibility for results, seeing that proceedings of the enemy are not only not prevented in neutral zone, but that latter is serving as a shelter for concentration and organisation of Turkish armies.

I have urged French High Commissioner to impress on French general necessity of preventing formation of these bands and of disarming them. General Harington is likewise taking matter up. We have every reason to believe that considerable numbers of Turks are concentrating and are being armed in [two groups undecypherable].

(Repeated to Athens.)

No. 705.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 30.)

(No. 485. Private and Secret.)
(Telegraphic.)
MY telegram No. 474. *Constantinople, September* 29, 1922.

Earliest possible intimation to Greek Government referred to in penultimate paragraph would probably best be immediately after preliminary meeting of generals at Mudania or Ismid.

Please see my immediately following telegram.

No. 706.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 30.)

(No. 486.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, September* 29, 1922.

ATHENS telegram No. 298 to Constantinople.

Request to Greek Government to withdraw troops behind Maritza line should presumably be made immediately after preliminary meeting of Allied generals at Mudania or Ismid, and of course only if result of that meeting is satisfactory.

Suggestion is to empower Allied generals to make statement to that effect to Kemal at meeting, which he is not likely to attend unless he means to accept invitation to conference.

(Repeated to Athens.)

No. 707.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 30.)

(No. 487.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 30, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 441 has crossed my telegram No. 479, containing my comments on General Harington's telegram No. 2485. I sent these comments immediately after I had received communication of General Harington's above-mentioned telegram. My present telegram supplements those comments and deals with specific points you have raised.

1. I entirely agree that it is inadvisable that General Harington should meet Mustapha Kemal alone. If and when Mustapha Kemal says he is ready for a meeting at Mudania, the three Allied generals should proceed there. In view of Kemalist invasion of neutral zone at Chanak, it is obvious that General Harington will have more to discuss with Mustapha Kemal than the two Allied generals.

2. I agree that, in the event of Maritza being fixed and Greeks accepting it, it would be useless to assign administration of evacuated area to Constantinople Government. Mustapha Kemal would never agree to such a procedure. We must rely on Allied generals to submit proposals for administration of this area after their meeting with Kemal at Mudania.

3. In the event of Greeks declining to withdraw from Eastern Thrace, it appears to me that Allies will be confronted with alternative of bringing pressure on Greece to withdraw or of standing aside and allowing Kemal to transport his troops to European shore of Marmora. But Allies would not be justified in putting pressure on Greece unless Kemal observed his share of the bargain by respecting neutral zone. If Allies stood aside, advantages offered to Kemal under Paris proposals would presumably lapse—at all events, for the moment. In that event, we could not deny Greeks right of entering non-neutral waters of Marmora and attempting to prevent passage of Kemalist troops from Asia to Europe. In practice Kemal would not be able to cross either Dardanelles or Sea of Marmora, and he would be limited to trying to cross Bosphorus. This means that he would, regardless of consequences, try to invade neutral zone opposite Constantinople. The British force would be exposed to weight of bulk of Kemalist army and would inevitably have to withdraw. If Greeks tried to dispute passage of Bosphorus, there would be fighting at Constantinople, results of which would probably be disastrous to the town.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

My telegram No. 479 will have shown you that I am fully alive to consequences of transfer of theatre of war to Europe. I consider we should do everything possible to avoid such a disastrous eventuality, and I entirely agree that our policy should be to adhere as closely as possible to Paris Agreement.

Unfortunately, it looks at present as if both Kemal and Greeks will make it difficult to adhere closely to Paris Agreement. Kemal's delay in replying to Allied telegram from Paris, coupled with his invasion of neutral zone at Chanak, may at any moment lead to an incident which may mark beginning of hostilities and compromise whole position. It is reported that Kemal is having great difficulty in restraining his generals, who are certain to be egged on by Bolsheviks, but I believe he is playing for time. On the other hand, it would seem that watchword of new Greek régime is to be: Recognise Greek troops for defence of Eastern Thrace. There seems little doubt that Greeks in Eastern Thrace are acting in a manner calculated to exasperate Kemalists.

In view of foregoing considerations, our energies locally must be directed to getting Kemal to meet Allied generals at Mudania as soon as possible. If we can secure this His Majesty's Government will no doubt consider in good time what form of pressure will have to be applied to Greece to get her to evacuate Eastern Thrace.

I entirely agree with last sentence of your telegram under reply.

I have shown this telegram before despatch to Admiral Brock and General Harington, both of whom concur in its terms.

No. 708.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 30.)

(No. 489.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, September* 30, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 443.

I have just made communication to Angora representative.

I took this opportunity of telling him in strongest possible terms that procrastination on the part of Angora Government must cease and that there must be no further vague talk of meeting at Mudania. I said that this meeting must come off without further loss of time, and I spoke in the sense of sentence of your telegram No. 447, beginning: "If, therefore, Mustapha Kemal desires," &c. I said that action of Kemal in entering neutral zone at Chanak was provocative, and that there was a limit to the patience of His Majesty's Government.

I also took exception to tone of Mustapha Kemal's last communication to General Harington, which I said was [group or groups omitted] General Harington. I told him that he had better realise that His Majesty's Government would vigorously support their local representatives here.

This shook Hamid up considerably, and he hastened to say that, whilst he could only speak privately, he had reason to believe that meeting at Mudania would take place within two or three days' time. He said he would attend it, and he asked that one of the vessels of Serai-Sefain fleet, name of which he gave, should be fitted with a wireless apparatus so as to enable him to communicate with Constantinople.

I think this means that details of meeting at Mudania have been arranged at Smyrna.

Hamid then handed me a protest, substance of which I am telegraphing separately, against proceedings of Greeks in Thrace. I said that if facts mentioned in this protest were true it was an additional reason why Angora Government should not, by their delays, prolong present unsatisfactory state of affairs.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 155.)

No. 709.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 30.)

(No. 490.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 30, 1922.

GENERAL HARINGTON has shown me his telegram No. 2538 to War Office. I am in agreement with it. General Marden reports a distinct improvement in situation at Chanak. The Angora Government is now discussing its reply to Allied

telegram, and you will have seen from my immediately preceding telegram that there is now a good chance of meeting at Mudania. If General Harington were to carry out his instructions at once we might compromise the situation irremediably. I do not think we lose anything by delaying action for two or three days to see whether meeting at Mudania materialises. I do not think Kemalists mean business at Chanak. Mustapha Kemal probably means to strengthen his military position at Ismid as much as possible before coming to meeting at Mudania.

No. 710.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.—(*Received September* 30, 1922.)

(No. 431.)
(Telegraphic.)

I AM stopping Greek men-of-war as well as [? transports] from passing through Dardanelles into Marmora.

No. 711.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.—(*Received September* 30, 1922.)

(No. 433.)
(Telegraphic.)

REQUEST Admiralty view on following points: If and when British troops evacuate Constantinople—(1) action of navy after evacuation; (2) Black Sea force to be maintained; (3) disposal of "Goeben" and the Turkish war vessels in the Golden Horn. Unless orders are received to the contrary, the following will be [? my] action: (1) Rôle of navy after evacuation will consist of watching and preventing any traffic entering Bosphorus from south and controlling Marmora. Bombardment of Constantinople is not recommended. French troops are in Stamboul and Pera is full of Europeans. (2) This will not be done. (3) "Goeben" will be sunk, but vessels in Golden Horn are of such little value that it would be merely a wanton act of no military value.

No. 712.

Telegram (by Telephone) from Lord Hardinge.—(*Received September* 30.)

(No. 492.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, September* 30, 1922.

I CALLED this morning on the President of the Council to ask him what news he had received from Franklin-Bouillon of his interview with Mustapha Kemal.

M. Poincaré read to me a long telegram, of which I have copy *in extenso*, which I will send to your Lordship to-night, reporting his conversation with Mustapha Kemal, and the proposals which he has made to him. It struck me as very moderate, requiring alteration as suggested by M. Poincaré in only one important detail, upon which he has already taken action. The conversation seemed promising, and at the end Franklin-Bouillon announced his intention of going to Angora and of addressing the Assembly. He added that Mustapha Kemal anticipates considerable difficulties with the Assembly.

M. Poincaré, however, read to me a telegram, which he had received from the French Ambassador in London, reporting the conversation which he had had with Sir William Tyrrell, and expressed his satisfaction with the views expounded by the latter, which seemed to him to meet the situation in every respect.

M. Poincaré then stated that he had been greatly disturbed to read in the French papers—he mentioned particularly "Figaro" and "Matin"—a statement to the effect that General Harington had been authorised to issue an ultimatum to the Turks, which he interpreted as meaning that, if the Turks refused to agree to the general's demands, there would be war between Turkey and England. He expressed to me his astonishment that, after solidarity between the Allies achieved at the conference here last week, action of such nature should have been taken without

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE LONDON PHOTOGRAPHIC COPY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE 254 424

consulting either the French or Italian Governments, especially as it would be impossible to see what the eventual result of such action might be throughout Europe. He quoted the case of the Ruhr, stating that, although there would have been no question of war with Germany, he had resisted the desire of a large section of public opinion in France for an incursion into the Ruhr, in view of the attitude of France's allies, and particularly of England, towards that question. He expected to have been consulted in this case before any definite action had been taken, and he stated definitely that the French Government would not consider themselves bound by or responsible for any developments that might result from the action that General Harington had been authorised to take.

I presume that the statements of the French press are inexact, in view of the fact that I can find no corroboration in the Foreign Office and military telegrams sent to me by bag last night, and it would be useful if I could contradict them here.

No. 713.

Sir A. Geddes to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 393.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Washington, September 29, 1922.*

MY telegram No. 385.

Twelve destroyers and one supply ship are expected to leave Hampton Roads, where they are at present being fitted out, for Near East on or about 2nd October.

It is also anticipated, although not officially confirmed, that United States ship "Pittsburg," which is to leave shortly to replace "Utah" as flagship in European waters, will proceed to Near East.

No. 714.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Paris (No. 330, Telegraphic) and Rome (No. 293, Telegraphic).

(Telegraphic.) D. *Foreign Office, September 30, 1922.*

HIS Majesty's Minister at Athens enquires whether Greek retirement in Thrace contemplated in ante-penultimate and penultimate paragraphs of Allied invitation to Angora of 23rd September is actually to take place prior to Kemal's acceptance of invitation to peace conference.

In our view, which we cannot doubt will be shared by French (Italian) Government, the answer is in the negative, and Kemal cannot accept the note in fractions.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 451, and Athens, No. 272.)

No. 715.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 452.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 30, 1922.*

SIR C. HARINGTON'S telegram No. 2458 of 26th September.

Representations at Athens regarding presence of Greek gendarmerie in Gallipoli Peninsula would in present chaotic state of Greece be useless. Such matters must be decided locally by you and your colleagues with Allied generals.